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Foreword

TheWar

International

Law Studies

"Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval

College in 1901 to publish learned essays, treatises, and articles that

contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This volume, the
81st of the series, contains papers addressing the issues discussed

and debated

at a

colloquium hosted here at the Naval War College from June 23 to 25, 2004, entitled
International

Law Challenges: Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism.

This colloquium's charter was to study and debate various international law issues

homeland defense, and the combating of terrorism.
Renowned international law scholars and practitioners of all stripes academics,
military officers, government officials, and those representing various political peraffecting

homeland

security,

—

suasions

—

participated in collegial but often spirited

and examinations of these

issues.

and always

fruitful discussions

A vastly increased understanding and appreciation

of the role of international law in the ever-changing 21st century resulted.

This colloquium received generous support from the Israel Yearbook on

Hu-

man Rights; the Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol,
Rhode Island; the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict of the American Society of International

Law; the

Pell

Center for International Relations and Public

Rhode Island; and the Naval War Colmuch-appreciated support, this noteworthy and

Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport,
lege Foundation.

Without

highly productive event

On behalf of the
Commandant

this

would not have been

possible.

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations,

of the Marine Corps,

I

and the

extend our sincere thanks and appreciation

to the participants, contributing authors, editors,
their contributions to this successful gathering

standing addition to the historic "Blue Book"

J.

L.

and supporting organizations for

and

to the publication of this out-

series.

SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War College

Introduction

International
June 2004, the Naval War College hosted a colloquium
InLaw
Challenges: Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism. This colloquium
entitled

was made possible with the support of the

Israel

Yearbook on

Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law,

Human

Bristol,

Rights; the

Rhode

Island;

on the Law of Armed Conflict of the American Society of International Law; the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of Salve
Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island; and the Naval War College Founda-

the Lieber Society

tion.

Without the support and

not have been the success that
is. I

assistance of these organizations, this event

it

was, and this

would

volume would not be before you as it

sincerely appreciate their support.

As noted

in the Introduction to

Volume 79 of the "Blue Book"

series,

the events

of 9/ 1 1 brought home to the United States that, perhaps unlike any time in the past,
the "tyranny of distance" could not be relied

harm. That volume, International

Law and

ceedings of a colloquium hosted by the

This colloquium, held two years

upon

to protect

its

War on Terror, contained
Naval War College in June 2002.

later,

from

citizens

the

the pro-

examined actions taken since then,

e.g.,

the Proliferation Security Initiative, a response to the growing challenge posed by

the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction,

lated materials worldwide;
rity

and measures

initiated to increase the control

and

re-

and secu-

of maritime borders. Additionally, with the growing insurgency and increasing

terrorist acts in Iraq, issues

plied following World

loquium

of occupation law, which the United States had

last

ap-

War II, played a prominent role in the discussions of the col-

participants.

—Captain Thomas
mander Glenn Sulmasy, US Coast Guard—
I

their delivery systems,

thank the editors

lication of this

the Naval

War

volume.

also

I

would

like to

Sparks,

US

Coast Guard and

Com-

for their substantial efforts in the

pub-

recognize two long-time supporters of

College and the International

Law Department, whom

they credit

with completing "the lion's share of the substantive editing of this volume": Profes-

and Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.).
dedication, conscientiousness, and perseverance were

sor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt

Without question,

their

principally responsible for the production of this volume. Additionally,

conference coordinator,

Commander Glenn

perb efforts in organizing the event.

Sulmasy,

I

thank the

US Coast Guard, for his su-

Additionally, a special thank

President of the Naval

you

War College;

is

necessary to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford,

Dr. James

F. Giblin, Jr.,

the College's Provost;

and Dr. Kenneth Watman, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for their
leadership and support in the planning and conduct of the conference and the publication of this

volume.

The "Blue Book"

series

is

published by the Naval

throughout the world to academic institutions,
tional military

Security and

commands. This volume,

Combating Terrorism,

the United States

and

its

is

War

libraries,

International

a fitting

College and distributed

and both US and interna-

Law

Challenges:

and necessary addition

coalition partners continue to

DENNIS

L.

wage

this

to the series as

"long war."

MANDSAGER
& Chairman

Professor of Law
International

xn

Homeland

Law Department

Preface

the summer of 2004, sense of normalcy had returned to the homeland of the
InUnited
One could say the "sleeping giant" that had awakened on 9/11
a

States.

had

fallen

back "asleep." Military victories in Afghanistan and in Iraq had been

achieved. Operation Enduring

(OIF) were

officially

Freedom (OEF) and Operation

Iraqi

Freedom

declared as examples of military successes. Domestically, the

USA PATRIOT Act had been passed and was implemented. The reorganization of
the

government had occurred and the National Security Strategy of 2002 had be-

come

part of

US

strategic culture.

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) had

been created. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security resulted in
the merging of 22 federal government agencies and a department staffed by over

177,000 personnel. Bringing the war on terror to the
necessary to protect the homeland. This

and armed

conflict,

enemy

overseas was seen as

new war, one that mixes law enforcement

was the challenge of the 21st century and the United

States

was

preparing for a long-term struggle. The Bush Administration clearly articulated
belief that in "taking the fight" to the terrorists overseas,

its

our homeland would be

more secure.
With this in mind, legal scholars, practitioners, judge advocates and warriors
gathered in Newport, Rhode Island at the US Naval War College in late June to review, debate,

and challenge the myriad legal issues surrounding the evolving reality

of the Global

War on Terror.

The need for a reasoned, rational legal regime to enhance domestic security became critical after 9/11. Jihadists, and the Global War on Terror itself, do not fit
squarely into existing laws or custom. The predominant enemy we now fight is
neither warrior nor criminal but a hybrid of both. In addition, the war being
waged is at times against lawful combatants (e.g., the armed forces of Iraq) and at
times against entities deemed illegal combatants. Some of these "enemy combatants" would have protections afforded by the law of armed conflict and some
would not. A growing nexus between international law and the concept of homeland security had emerged. Ambiguity as to this intersection of international law
and national security law (homeland security) provided a unique backdrop for
two and a half days of intense debate and intellectual exchange on the seminal legal issues of our times.

The Honorable Ryan Stiles, Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy
Counsel to the White House's Homeland Security Council, initiated the debate

Preface

with a discussion of the relationships between international law and homeland security.

He further articulated the need for the Global War on Terror to be viewed as

warfare and one not suited for a law enforcement response
pre-9/1

1

approaches to combating terror. His talk

—

a different tack

set the stage for

from

what turned out

to be a recurring, stimulating debate during the colloquium.

The

case

is

made

that

stand that the Global
tion.

it is

critical for

US

War on Terror is in

(and Western) policy makers to under-

fact a

war and not

a law

enforcement ac-

The events of 9/1 1 arguably displayed the manifest failure of employment of a

law enforcement response to the threats of international terror.
far as to

Some have gone so

claim that the West's previous law enforcement only responses created, in

large part, the bold actions taken

by al-Qaeda at the end of the 20th century and the

beginning of the 21st. The colloquium revealed, however, that considerable angst

and cynicism remains regarding some of these

assertions. Nonetheless,

most

agreed that the magnitude of the events of 9/11 and the repeated world-wide at-

and attempted attacks of the

tacks

strated the relative
policies

In

its

and

jihadists (primarily al-Qaeda)

have demon-

weakness of past approaches and have fueled demands for new

tactics that

response, the

continue today.

US government

offered new, sometimes controversial ap-

The colloquium brought together military and civilian experts, all leaders in their respective fields, to assess and debate these approaches and the legal
issues that dominated the military liberation of Iraq and the regime change that
was underway as the colloquium began, e.g.:
proaches.

•

Maritime border security

•

The law of the

•

Application of the law of armed conflict to certain military operations and

sea

issues;

and the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI);

occupations;
•

Lawfulness of the military commissions underway in

Guantanamo

Bay,

Cuba;
•

The new

•

The lawfulness of targeting

strategy of "pre-emption"

spirited debate

and anticipatory

self-defense;

and

individual terrorists which was the subject of a

between Mr. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights

Watch and Professor Bob Turner of

the Center for National Security of the

University of Virginia School of Law.

A

special highlight of the

of Defense for

Homeland

colloquium was an address by the Assistant Secretary

Defense, the Honorable Paul McHale. His description of

the coordination between the combatant

xiv

commander (NORTHCOM) and

the

Thomas McK. Sparks and Glenn M. Sulmasy
Department of Homeland Security was most informative and appreciated by the
participants.
It

was

a privilege to have so

many fine representatives from myriad perspectives

present to challenge these critical issues. Assembling this international group over
the previous year was certainly not an easy task, but
ists

when our distinguished panel-

from around the world were gathered together the fruits of that effort were very

homeland security and international law
an invigorating experience. Scholars and representatives from across the

apparent. Exploring the nexus between

made

for

political

spectrum made for

Sincere thanks

must go

Ralph Thomas, JAGC,
val

lively discussions.

to Professor Emeritus Jack

US Navy (Ret.)

War College and this

Grunawalt and Captain

for their tireless efforts

on behalf of the Na-

"Blue Book" in particular. Their knowledge of the issues

and editing skills were critical in making this book a reality. Also, a special thanks to
Professor Dennis Mandsager for his foresight in directing an exploration of this

evolving area of the law.

Thomas McK. Sparks
Captain, US Coast Guard

Glenn M. Sulmasy

Commander, US Coast Guard
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PARTI
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

I

The International Dimensions of

Homeland Security

Ryan

As

I

through

this

P. Stiles*

know from the news and recent statements by both Attorney
General Ashcroft and Secretary Ridge, we are entering an unprecedented
period of threat as we go into the summer; a threat that is projected to continue
tions

think we

all

November's

elections.

So what we're doing here has

practical implica-

and will apply in the real world where terrorists routinely flout international law.

My goal for this morning is not to overlap with the discussions of the panels that
will

occupy much of the next three days of this conference. They will address many

of the supporting issues regarding international implications of homeland security.

My goal is to frame the debate: how, from a US Government perspective, the

Bush Administration looks
look

at

some

specific ideas

homeland security and its objectives, and then to
and concepts about how homeland security interacts
at

with the international dimensions.

To frame

the debate

unfortunately skip that

homeland
Homeland

security
Security,

for creating a

is
1

homeland security. I think many people
definitional issue. The United States definition of

we must
first

found

define

in President Bush's July

which was released

Department of Homeland

age you to do so.

The

Strategy defines

2002 National Strategy for

as part of the Administration's proposal

Security. If you haven't read

homeland

it, I

encour-

security as "a concerted national

Deputy Counsel, Homeland Security Council, the White House.

The International Dimensions of Homeland Security

effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the

United

reduce America's vul-

States,

and minimize the damage and recovery from

nerability to terrorism
2

occur." Each piece of this definition

is

attacks that

do

attached to a specific concept that requires

additional analysis.

"Concerted national

effort."

homeland

to play in

Obviously the federal government has a

security. Yet the federal

from future

critical role

government alone cannot possibly

The Administration's approach to homeland security is based on the principles of shared responsibility and
partnership with Congress, state and local governments, the private sector and the
protect the United States

terrorist attacks.

American people.

The concept of the first responder is one of the critical issues and one of the most
difficult concepts in homeland security because the federal government is often
not the

first

responder. In

many cases,

it

will

never be the

anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of our critical infrastructure

and

local

The

governments, and the private sector.

federal

first

in the

hands of state

sector. It

is

state

and

local

a daunting task to coor-

of those things, including such challenges as incompatible communica-

all

tion equipment. Federal
the

is

3

government depends not only on partnerships with

governments but additionally with the private
dinate

responder because

first

government

entities

must be

able to

communicate with

who inevitably have their own independent and different com-

responders

munications systems.
"Prevent." The
Post-9/1

homeland

security

to prevent terrorist attacks.

is

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (and the Department of Jus-

1,

(DOJ)

tice

priority of

first

transformed

as well)

itself

from being a

traditional law enforcement

number one goal the prevention of terrorist

agency to making

its

cessitates a shift in

concept and a shift in tactics for the FBI; that shift

It

also

makes the Department of Justice and the FBI's tasks

attacks.
is

a

That ne-

good one.

significantly

more dif-

increasingly difficult

when we respond and deal with

individual terrorists in the United States. In the past,

most law enforcement consisted

ficult.

Furthermore,

it

makes

it

simply of investigation and response to terrorist attacks.
the

DOJ and

mode

Now, however,
is

occurred,

FBI would investigate, identify the perpetrators, and put them on

This responsive

mission

If a terrorist attack

did have limited success and did produce

the

challenged,

Department of
if

Justice's success in

measured by a conviction

to prevent those attacks in the first place.

they occur, the

DOJ

attack convictions.

will

Now

rate,

convictions.

accomplishing

because

By interrupting

some

trial.

its

new

now their intent is

terrorist attacks before

not have that clear chain of evidence that produced postintent

must be

established before an attack occurs. That

Ryan P.

Stiles

means by necessity that the Department of Justice is probably going to lose a lot
more cases in the short-term since they don't have the evidence trail they were able
to

produce during the post-attack

trials

because the plot has indeed been

That's not necessarily a bad thing, however.

ulous about which cases they bring to

The Department of Justice is metic-

and which they don't.

trial

foiled.

It is

not a decision

made by the individual US Attorney offices. Each terrorism case is scrutinized both
in those offices and by the Criminal Division at Main Justice in Washington, D.C.
"Terrorist attacks."
States.

Terrorism

is

Homeland

security

is

focused on terrorism in the United

defined in the United States in a variety of ways but a definition

that captures

some of the core concepts of terrorism would be "any premeditated

unlawful

danger to

act,

human life or public welfare that is intended to

intimidate

or coerce civilian populations or governments." 4
This definition captures the core concepts shared in the various iterations of the

United States Code. As I'm sure
defining terrorism in the

first

many of the international practitioners here know,

instance

is

probably one of the most pressing prob-

lems facing the international community.

The United
out attacks in

States has

attempted to define the term

this country.

I

at least for

who

those

think one of the key challenges for the international

community is to develop an agreed upon

definition of "terrorism."

It is

nearly im-

possible to eradicate something without having a definitional basis of
that's to

carry

what

it is

be eradicated.

"Reducing America's Vulnerability." The United

States

changing target. As we shore up our defenses in one area,
bilities in

other areas.

A

Without Visa Program

good example of that was

that

a

is

an ever- evolving, ever-

terrorists exploit vulnera-

program

called the Transits

was shut down by the federal government

mer of 2003 because of some specific intelligence that
that program as a way to enter the United States. 5

terrorists

in the

may be

sum-

looking

at

An example of that program is an individual flying from South America to Europe who stops over in the United States for a connecting flight. Traditionally that
person wasn't required to have a visa to "transit" the airport in the United

States.

However, that presented a seam for terrorists to exploit because they wouldn't have
to go through the screening process with the

Department of State or Department of

Homeland Security. Thus, an individual could get on a plane in another country
and, in some instances, land at an airport in the United States and simply walk unchallenged right out of the airport.

So you had a double vulnerability. One,

know they like

to use to attack the

United

would be on planes, which we
and two, operationally they enter

terrorists
States;

The International Dimensions of Homeland Security
The United States has now closed that gap, although 1 do think a more secure program is probably in the offering at some point.
Once that program was ended, the terrorists looked for new vulnerabilities. So it
is a constant challenge to make sure that when closing one gap or seam, new gaps
the country in a fairly easy fashion.

and seams are not created. Avoiding new vulnerabilities

work hard to ensure
seam when we close

that the new, fresh policies

effectively

do not inadvertently open

a bigger

a smaller one.

"Minimizing the damage." As

ally

of great concern to those

White House. Accordingly, when conducting our policy evaluations we

in the

spond

is

I

and minimize

mentioned
loss

not with federal government

at the outset, the greatest

of life resides with our

entities.

first

chance to

responders, gener-

We're working with our

state

and

local

governments and the private sector to make sure they have their own homeland
curity plans to deal with whatever event

"Recovery."

It is

re-

se-

may occur.

the intent of the United States

Government to build and maintain

various financial, legal and social systems that will ensure recovery from

all

forms

of terrorism.

Responding to attacks on the homeland has been a vexing problem for the
United States for the

last

40 or 50 years. The old thinking about what type of attack

Under that conceptualizagovernment would have to go somewhere,

would occur was focused primarily on nuclear

would be the strike, the
some later date and then repopulate the

tion, there

emerge

at

strikes.

institutions.

Of course with the nuclear strike it was assumed that there would be an advance
warning of an impending attack, so that continuity of government operation plans
were premised on having some period of time to make preparations for the attack.

Now we have an entirely different model for attack and recovery: a "no-notice"
event potentially aimed at decapitating the United States Government, to include
the President

model

also

and

means

his staff, the cabinet departments,

that

we must look at

other methods of making sure that our in-

stitutions survive because we're not going to
six

Congress and others. That

be able to have 24 hours or even

five

or

hours to place those in key leadership positions in secure places.

Homeland
there

is

eignty
tact.

security

and national security are two obviously

related concepts. But

a core distinction. National security looks towards guaranteeing the sover-

and independence of the United

This

is

slightly

different

States with the values

from "homeland

and

security."

institutions in-

To provide

the

overarching strategy to ensure our national security, President Bush issued the National Security Strategy of the United States. 6 If read together with the National

Ryan P.

Stiles

Homeland Security\ you'll see they reflect an integrated concept, and
not just a Department.
that homeland security is a concept
Within the concept of homeland security are the Continuity of Operation plans
mentioned earlier; Critical Infrastructure and Protection, which is principally exercised within the United States, although some infrastructure is shared with Canada and Mexico, and defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These
Strategy for

—

obviously have to be dealt with

if they

enter the United States, but once they arrive

on our shores we're already in trouble. Thus, much of the
overseas as we combat terrorism.
Another weapon of great concern

is

WMD efforts are focused

MANPADS (man-portable air defense sys-

tems). These short-range, ground-to-air missiles are one of the greatest threats to
aviation

around the world today. They're cheap, increasingly available on the black

market, and exist in large numbers. Civil aircraft are virtual "sitting ducks" to terrorists

who

possess

MANPADS. The United States is working to

strengthen secu-

rity

over existing stockpiles and to prevent their continued proliferation.

also

working on measures to reduce the vulnerability of both military and

craft to these

are

civil air-

weapons.

Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security

November

We

25, 2002,

funding for what

we today

throughout the government. But even in

fiscal

call

homeland

year 2003, the

security

(DHS) on

was spread

year following the

first

Department's establishment, only 51 percent of what the Office of Management and

Budget considers homeland security spending was spent
2004, that figure

is

up

at

DHS. 7 For

year

to about 60 percent. In terms of actual total dollars, funding

dramatically increased after September 11th, with about twice as

voted to homeland security in

One

fiscal

fiscal

year 2003 as

organization of which you

may

compared

be unaware

is

many

dollars de-

to the preceding year.

the

Council (HSC). In October of 2001, the President created the

Homeland Security
Office of Homeland

Security within the

White House. Governor Tom Ridge became its head as

House-appointed

official.

a

White

Then when Congress created the Department of
Governor Ridge became "Secretary" Ridge and left the White
8

Homeland Security,
House to become a cabinet

secretary.

At the same time, the Office of Homeland Security transformed into the
land Security Council. The HSC's primary role

is

Home-

to serve as confidential adviser to

on homeland security matters in much the same way as the National
Security Council does on national security and foreign policy matters.
The Homeland Security Council's member's primary responsibility is to coordinate interagency efforts to ensure that the homeland is safe. HSC members work

the President

closely with the

DHS

staff,

but also spend

much

of their time working with col-

leagues at the Department of State, Department of Justice,

and the Central

The International Dimensions of Homeland Security
The reason, of course, is that the Department of Homeland
Security can't do homeland security at the federal level by itself. It must coordinate
its functions with those of other government agencies. Those functions are often
Intelligence Agency.

based on funding

priorities.

I

suspect

I

surprise

no one when

I

say those agencies

on the best way forward. When that occurs a mediator is required
and that's generally the role of the HSC.
The Homeland Security Council was built on the concept of the National Secuoften don't agree

rity

Council, 9 which was created in 1947 by the National Security Act.

The NSC

HSC are parallel organizations and sit side by side; one coordinating national
security, the other homeland security. The NSC has no operational capacity, neiand

ther does the

HSC.

We

simply try to resolve disputes and push efficient policy

decision-making to secure the homeland.

America must pursue a sustained,
agenda to counter the global

steadfast,

terrorist threat

and systematic international

and improve our homeland security.

If

we will still have
failed because most of the threats will be emerging overseas. If we aren't working
cooperatively with our other States
our international partners then we have
really no chance at preventing terrorists from reaching our borders. If we can't
screen cargo before it gets here, if we can't screen passengers before they step off the
plane, ultimately we will lose the fight because those individuals will find methods
the United States

is

100 percent effective in homeland security,

—

—

to attack us even if we're secure within the borders.

Thus the

international agenda

homeland security is extremely important. We have to win our "away" games as
well as our "home" games.
The following table lists the major homeland security initiatives with internafor

tional dimensions.

Major Homeland Security

Initiatives

with International Dimensions

•

Create "Smart Borders"

•

Combat

•

Increase security of international law enforcement cooperation

•

Intensify international law enforcement cooperation

•

Help foreign nations

•

Expand protection of transnational

•

Amplify international cooperation on homeland security

•

Amplify international cooperation

•

Review international obligations to international

fraudulent travel documents

fight terrorism

8

critical infrastructure

S&T

in response to attacks
treaties

and laws

Ryan
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of these initiatives don't touch on the military components, which are

more "overseas combating terrorism" than "homeland combating terrorism." I do
this intentionally
I

also

because

I

think our later panels will speak to those issues.

wanted to emphasize the international dimensions

probably don't have a

lot

of visibility and are

the creation of Smart Borders.

in a lot of projects that

unknown to most people. The first is

We have a 5,500-mile border with Canada, a

1,900-

mile border with Mexico, and 95,000 miles of shoreline. According to the 2000

census each and every year the United States admits 500 million people, including

330 million non-citizens through our borders. 10

Our Smart Borders
well as the

1

1.2

must be able to deal with that flow of people, as
million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars that cross the border annuinitiative

The Department of Homeland Security is spearheading the effort to create
Smart Borders. America requires a border management system to keep pace with
its expanding trade, while protecting the United States and its territories not only
from terrorist attacks, but also illegal immigration, illegal drugs and other
ally.

contraband.

The

future of Smart Borders

must

integrate actions abroad to screen goods

people prior to their arrival in sovereign

and

US territory. The border control agencies

of the federal government also must have seamless information chain systems that

permit communication
cal

among and between themselves and federal,

state,

and

lo-

law enforcement communities.
I

One

want
is

to address

two

specific

programs within the Smart Borders

initiative.

the US-VISIT program that deals with land borders into the United States.

The law

program be implemented at the 50
2004 and all ports of entry by Decem-

requires that an automated entry/exit

busiest land ports of entry

by December

31

,

ber 31, 2005.

The 50 busiest land ports of entry process 94 percent of the foreign visitors who
enter and exit the United States through established border crossing. The concept
of US-VISIT, which is being run by the Department of Homeland Security, is a
continuum of security measures that begin before an individual enters the United
States and continue through arrival and departure from the United States.
US-VISIT incorporates eligibility determinations made both by the Department of Homeland Security and, of course, the Department of State. Using
biometrics such as finger scans and digital photographs, DHS will determine
whether the person applying for entry to the United States is the same person who
is issued the visa by the Department of State.
Additionally, the biometric and biographical data are checked against a watch
list, thereby improving DHS's ability to make admissibility decisions, as well as the
Department of State's ability to make visa determinations. US citizen entry
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procedures are currently in place

VISIT

will

at

115 airports and 14 seaports. This year US-

be expanded to the 50 busiest land ports.

Since US-VISIT was launched in January 2004,
successes

and

— mostly

it

has already achieved

in the non-terrorist area to include

child molesters. Since the

US Government

some

drug smugglers, gangsters,

stood up

DHS,

the Department of

more than 200 people with prior suspected criminal or immigration violations. They include convicted rapists, drug traffickers, convicted armed
robbers and numerous individuals committing visa fraud. The "non-terrorists" of
today are creating pathways for the entry of bona fide terrorists of tomorrow.
State has intercepted

Another important
tion 343 of the

initiative to create smart, secure

Trade Act of 2002,

as

amended by

borders

is

addressed in sec-

section 108 of the Maritime

Transportation Security Act, which requires that regulations be promulgated providing for the transmission to
tronic data

interchange system.

concerning cargo that
rival

cal

US Customs and Border Protection through an elec-

is

The new system

will

provide information

brought into or taken out of the United States prior to

ar-

or departure. This helps target specific cargos for potential, especially biologi-

and chemical, weapons

for inspection

when

Of

they arrive at our borders.

we can't have trucks backed up for miles on the Mexican border awaiting
entry. If we wait until the cargo arrives at the point of entry to see what's on the
manifest, we will have failed. We also will have failed our international partners because we will not have helped them facilitate their own internal economic stability.
A second major initiative is combating fraudulent travel documents. The Decourse,

partment of Justice, in conjunction with the Department of State,

is

spearheading

They announced a new program that will contribute substantially to
travel document security and our ability to impugn the movement of terrorists and
other criminals. During the processing of travelers at ports of entry, if a hit occurs
this effort.

against the Interpol database, the hit will be verified with
tion

is

taken against a bearer of such a passport. This

is

US authorities before ac-

a significant step in the di-

rection of curbing not only terrorism but also identity theft
identity fraud. Travel

use of the
curity.

US

fraud, including the fraudulent application

passport, represents a serious

However,

terrorist or

document

it is

expected

and other types of

and growing

and

threat to our national se-

who has stolen them who is necessarily the
Often they are middlemen who steal passports and

not the individual
terrorist.

passport numbers, create fraudulent documents and

sell

them

to the terrorists.

who we know or suspect of being international
middlemen who are facilitating the preparation of

So we can't only concentrate on
terrorists.

We have to go at the

those fraudulent travel documents. Currently the Interpol database contains 1.6
million records reported by 41 different participating
1.6 million records,

member

countries.

Of the

approximately 60 percent are passports while 40 percent are

10
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national identification documents.

documents

The United

to that Interpol database.

has had great success with the

Stiles

Although

number of

States has provided
this

is

a relatively

about 300,000

new

initiative,

it

entries into the database increasing

rapidly.

Contained within the

combat fraudulent travel documents

initiative to

is

the

is-

sue of biometric passports. The Administration has asked Congress to pass legisla-

two years the October 26, 2004 deadline by which countries must

tion to extend for

produce biometric passports to participate

lem

is

in the Visa

Waiver Program. The prob-

when Congress passed the law establishing the October

didn't have a complete understanding of what

26,

2004 deadline

it

required to produce an effective

is

biometric passport. Biometric passports address a key weakness in our system for
identifying terrorists. There are really

before

two concepts.

First, is

the person standing

me the person that is identified in the travel documents? Second, is that per-

son a good guy or bad guy?

one of those ends, you

If you fail at either

A person may have

pected terrorists.

on any watch

list.

But

if

that person

aren't going to catch

perfectly

good

travel

known and

documents

sus-

that aren't

someone other than the individual he purdocuments is meaningless. That is the issue

is

ports to be, the validity of the travel

biometric passports are trying to address.
estimated that 13 million visitors from visa waiver countries enter the

It is

United States each year. Travelers from visa waiver countries are allowed to enter
the United States for

up

to 90 days for business or pleasure using only a passport.

Our international partners tell us this is one of the key issues for them because it
permits entry to citizens of those countries that the Department of State and De-

partment of Homeland Security has determined

as

having secure documents. The

Visa Waiver Program allows citizens of those countries easier entry into the United
States.

They don't have

to go

through the extended visa process. They can come in

simply with their passport. We're working hard with our international partners to

make sure this program continues

in place while those countries

come up with the

technology and the decision-making necessary to continue to participate in the
Visa Waiver Program.

The next

issue

I

want to address

is

the increase in security of international ship-

ping containers through a program called Container Security Initiative (CSI).
Containerized shipping

is

a critical

percent of the world's trade

is

component of global

trade because about 90

transported in cargo containers. 11

In the United States almost half of incoming trade by value arrives by containers

on board

ships.

Nearly seven million cargo containers arrive on ships and are

offloaded in U.S. seaports every year. In post-September
Security Initiative programs are key

components

11

to our

1

1th America, Container

homeland

defense, based
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on the idea that it makes sense to extend our zone of security outward so that
American borders are the last line of defense and not the first.
Through CSI, maritime containers that pose a risk of compromise by terrorists
are identified and examined at foreign ports before they are shipped to the United
States. In so doing, the

carried out

the

first

United States hopes to prevent

by preventing the

terrorist attacks

arrival of dangerous materials to the

from being

United States

in

instance.

CSI consists of four core elements:
containers that pose a

risk; (2)

using intelligence to identify and target

(1)

prescreening those containers that pose a risk in the

port of departure rather than the port of arrival in the United States; (3) using detection technology to screen containers that pose a risk; and, finally, (4) using

smarter, tamper-resistant containers.

Obviously this would be an impossible
ners.

When we

initiative

look to our international partners, despite what you

we have tremendous cooperation on

occasion,

without our international part-

all levels

their considerations are taken into account.

done

make

a

good job

in

I

first

instance

think for the most part we've

working both through multilateral and bilateral negotiations to

sure their concerns are addressed.

Intensifying international law enforcement cooperation occurs

Perhaps the most important area

The

read on

in all these initiatives I've

discussed. They're brought into the decision-making process in the

and

may

Patriot Act

12

is

on many levels.

terrorist financing; the ability to freeze assets.

greatly assists our international efforts to freeze assets, but obvi-

ously law enforcement cooperation occurs at intelligence and other levels as well.
I

must again emphasize

that the United States

is

committed

to coordinating

with our international partners to combat terrorism. As part of that coordination,
the United States provides specialized training
pability to

assistance to help build the ca-

combat terrorism. This occurs not only for military forces but also in the

civilian agencies. Additionally, the

United States hosts seminars to help our

national partners draft their legislation,
like

and

and

inter-

to provide assistance regarding issues

MANPADS and bioweapons. The United States also provides equipment from

time to time and science and technology advice on enhancing border security.

We're

also

pecially with

the

power

expanding the protection of transnational

Canada and Mexico. As the events of August 2003, when

our neighbors, that
it is

a greater

responders
cause

failures in

grid caused blackouts in large areas of northeastern United States

Ontario, Canada bore out,

But

critical infrastructure, es-

is

if

you have an event in the United States that cascades to

a big problem.

problem

if it

were to be part of a terrorist attack preventing first

who rely on the power grid to respond and execute their initiatives.

we share such

and

a large border with

our friends

12

in

Canada and Mexico,

Be-

a lot of

Ryan P.
our

security, especially cybersecurity

border. So

we work with them

Stiles

and obviously electrical

to help

make

security, crosses that

sure that those systems are

more

se-

cure from terrorist attack.

We

on homeland security through science and technology, a key concept being biosensors and also sensors of nuclear radioactive material. We work on science and technology with our international
also amplify international cooperation

partners and once that technology

nations as well so that

we can

is

assist

developed,

them

in

we provide

that to those friendly

combating terrorism on

their

own

shores as well as here. Other countries which haven't yet been targeted by terrorism
still

have an interest in ensuring that biological, chemical and nuclear weapons

aren't being transited

through their country.

We also work on improved cooperation and response to attacks. Last May, the
United States staged a massive terrorist attack simulation to test our new plans. Canadian

officials

were involved in role playing. The scenario provided for simulated

terrorist attacks in Seattle
at a

and Chicago. The hypothetical Chicago attack occurred

Chicago Bulls-Toronto Raptors basketball game.

After the

game

the Raptors

and

their supporting contingent got

back on

their

plane and returned to Canada, only then to realize that an attack had been carried
out.

So they had already spread the agent that was released in Chicago. This simula-

tion allowed for cross-national planning
a coordinated response,

e.g.,

on how the two countries could carry out

determining whether or not the border could be or

should be shut down.

The United

States, at the federal

government level, looks to make sure we're po-

sitioned to deal with almost any imaginable scenario.

doing "red
still

cell"

planning to hypothesize the

considerable

room

for

variety of attacks, although there

improvement. We'll never know

occurs, but the United States

there are preparations

full

We've gotten very good

made

Government

for

is

at
is

until the next attack

very focused on making sure that

any kind of attack.

Finally, reviewing international obligations, international treaties

and

laws.

We also work on a bilateral basis to negotiate and renegotiate Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). These assist

US law enforcement

and exchanging information and evidence with foreign
criminal

We

agencies in gathering
authorities for use in

trials.

have

many

different international fora

tional objectives. Obviously the

we can

use to secure our interna-

United Nations plays an important

role, as well as

the Organization of American States and other regional groups, the G-8, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

One

of the great concerns of the G-8

biometric passport issues.

I

is

the

MANPADS

threat.

ICAO

handles

am too technically illiterate to assist the determination
13
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of whether there should be a 32-bit contactless chip embedded in a passport, but

do know

I

we must have one uniform, worldwide readable document so we don't

have some countries developing a technical form of passport.
In conclusion, as President

"We will not achieve these goals overagainst all who believe they can stand in the way of

Bush

states,

we will prevail
America's commitment to freedom, liberty, and our way of life." 13 But as we strive
to reach those goals a key component is our international efforts. We will not secure America if we only secure the homeland from within our hard borders. We
have to work with our international partners. We've had great success so far and we
[But]

night

continue to hope to have that kind of success in the future.

Now many critics have said that the war on terror is not a winnable war, but the
same critics said that about the Cold War as well. We must eradicate terror as an accepted tactic in warfare.

Some

people say again that's impossible, but

I

ask you to

compare other forms of warfare and tactics that were previously acceptable and
widespread, but now, for the most part, have been eradicated or substantially reduced

as a tactic

of war. Look

at slavery, piracy,

and genocide. Today these

are

among the universal crimes, but for hundreds, if not thousands, of years these were
looked upon as acceptable methods of conducting war.
It's

going to take a long time to drive terrorism into the same dustbin, but the US

Government is giving its best to put an end to this evil. We again thank our international partners for their help in making us secure in our homeland and we will continue to work with them to secure theirs as well. Thank you.
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Comparative Approaches to Security and
Maritime Border Control

Dale Stephens'

Remarkably perhaps, the question of maritime border protection attracted an
unprecedented

level

of political debate during the course of the Australian

federal election of November 2001, ultimately

ciding the

becoming

a significant issue in de-

outcome of that contest. Indeed, the election became,

endum on

in essence, a refer-

the Federal Government's revised policy concerning strict maritime

border protection measures designed to prevent the influx of illegal migrants arriving by sea into Australia. This issue was principally ignited by the Australian Gov-

ernment's stance in denying the admission into Australia of 433
rescued by the Norwegian container ship

MV Tampa

]

the subsequent passage by the Australian Parliament,

omnibus border protection
This

new legislative scheme

legislation that

in

on September

provided for a robust

from

is

tensely

*

maritime zones. There

September

felt

11,

26, 2001, of

legal regime. 2

infused the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with sig-

and remove suspected

attacks of

migrants

August of that year and

nificantly greater authority to intercept

Australia's

illegal

no doubt

illegal

entry vessels

that the reverberations of the

2001 (hereinafter referred to as 9/11), which were in-

within Australia at the time, also heavily influenced approaches to the

Commander, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in

this article are those

of the author

alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government, the Australian

Defence Force, or the Royal Australian Navy.

Security

issue of

and Maritime Border Control

maritime border protection by both the Government and the Australian

population. Such reverberations, in conjunction with the emotions generated by
the Bali

bombings of October 2002, 3 continue

to largely influence approaches to

maritime border protection issues within the Australian body

politic,

though not

without criticism by significant segments of the Australian public.

The unprecedented

level

of political debate relating to maritime border protec-

tion at the time of the election has been

matched by an equally intense academic

debate as to the lawfulness of actions taken by the
vessels carrying unlawful

ADF

in intercepting

incoming

immigrants and denying them entry into Australia. The

lawfulness of the actions undertaken by the

ADF

implementing the Govern-

in

ment's stringent border protection policies were also the subject of domestic

litiga-

tion (which occurred while such operations were ongoing) within the Australian

Federal Court, as well as a fulsome and comprehensive Senate Inquiry following
the 2001 election.

The legal

issues,

which have been hotly debated with respect

possibly familiar to an

to these events, are

American audience. They concern questions of constitu-

tional capacity, especially the extent of executive

tions

under the constitution

They

also

power

to direct military opera-

in the face of potentially contrary legislative direction.

touch on issues of international law relating to law of the sea rights and

obligations and, of course, issues concerning the incorporation of international

law within domestic law and the priority of either domestic or international law in
operational decision making.

The Australian Defence Force and
The Australian Defence Force
particular,

the

generally,

in

have a solid tradition of exercising law enforcement powers on behalf of

military, there

or

Law Enforcement Role

and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

Commonwealth Government. Unlike

ADF

its

RAN

is

restraints

imposed upon

no comparable Posse Comitatus Act

to enforce federal law.

To

4

limitation

parts of the

US

on the use of the

the contrary, provisions of Australian

Commonwealth law specifically authorize military members to exercise necessary
law enforcement powers. Indeed, when the issue was peripherally raised in a constitutional context in the 1970s, a justice of the
dicta that

High Court of Australia noted

in

he could not conceive of any inherent limitation on the use of the ADF to

enforce laws of the

Commonwealth Government. 5 Such a reflection is entirely con-

sistent

with Australian constitutional interpretive methodology dating to the

1920s,

which has traditionally given

laws provided they are based

upon

full effect

a requisite

to the terms of

Commonwealth

head of constitutional power. Con-

comitantly, the courts have been slow to impose any implied personal rights or

20
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from the Constitution which might

obligations arising

forcement capacity. Indeed, there

Amendments

to the

US

is

act to restrict

no equivalent of the

ADF law en-

Fifth or Fourteenth

Constitution in the Australian Constitution nor

is

there

same historical experience that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in
the United States, namely post-Civil War Reconstruction and the fear of martial
the

excess. 6

As

a result of the

broad constitutional capacity of the ADF to enforce

Common-

wealth laws, there has developed a relatively large, though disparate, corpus of law

RAN maritime law enforcement operations, particularly that of the patrol boat force operating off of northern Australia. In essence, the ADF has responthat guides

sibility

under Commonwealth

such diverse areas as

legislation for

customs, migration, and quarantine control, and

Notwithstanding

anti-piracy.
cisable

by the ADF

differ

this

more

fisheries,

generally for issues such as

broad range of subject matter, the powers exer-

according to the particular subject, thus the specific piece

of legislation under which operations are being conducted will shape the powers

and responsibilities of ADF

officers.

Importantly, there exist significant differences

between various applicable pieces of legislation.
Fisheries

enforcement has traditionally occupied the central focus of ADF law

enforcement operations and has involved both major and minor

RAN

Thus, Australia routinely deploys a major

of Heard and

McDonald

fleet

unit to

Islands located in the Southern Indian

its

territories

vessels.

Ocean (approximately 4100

ki-

lometers southwest of Perth, Western Australia) to intercept major foreign fishing
vessels

engaged in wide-scale commercial fishing activities. Such deployments have

some dramatic enforcement actions including one in particular, which is believed to be the longest hot pursuit in recorded history. 7 More generally, fisheries
enforcement largely occurs in the northern Australian Exclusive Economic Zone
led to

(EEZ) with respect to lower

scale illegal fishing activity.

For example, in the

first

months of 2004, there were 48 interceptions of foreign illegal fishing in that
region. 8 With respect to customs enforcement, the ADF usually acts in conjunction
with the Australian Federal Police, typically focusing on maritime drug interdicfour

tion operations. In 2003 for example, the

RAN

deployed a guided missile

frigate

with a contingent of Special Air Service (SAS) troops on board to successfully intercept a

North Korean

freighter that

had landed 150 kilograms of heroin on the

southern Australian mainland.

MV Tampa and Border Protection
As previously mentioned, the Tampa incident generated considerable debate
within Australian political and legal
as

it

circles.

The timing of that incident, coinciding

did with 9/11, witnessed a subtle revision of approach regarding the question
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Security

of illegal entry

and Maritime Border Control

— from one of mere migration control

to

one with greater national

security overtones. This in turn has influenced the nature of legal analysis of the in-

ternational

and domestic

legal rights that

may

be exercised in maritime border

control actions and has influenced contemporary policy and legal choices.

The MV Tampa Case

On

Norwegian container ship Tampa rescued 433 people
from a grossly overloaded and sinking Indonesian-flagged wooden-hulled vessel in
the Indian Ocean. That vessel had been attempting to reach Australia from IndoAugust

26, 2001, the

nesia as part of a people-smuggling operation and, accordingly, the persons

board did not possess lawful entry
the Tampa's

visas.

Having rescued the crew and passengers,

Norwegian master intended

to return

them

to an Indonesian port to

disembark them, when a decision was made to divert to Australian
master then sought to drop them

at

on

territory.

The

Christmas Island, an Australian territory close

to Indonesia. Representatives of the Australian

Government contacted

and informed the master that the ship did not have permission
waters and could not disembark the migrants.

the ship

to enter Australian

The master responded by claiming

some of the migrants on board were suffering from dire medical emergency
and thus relied upon the right of "distress" to demand entry into the port facilities.
that

Australian authorities countered by preparing medical teams to
to address the alleged medical emergencies.

fly

out to the vessel

During the course of planning the pro-

vision of medical assistance, the ship steamed into the Australian territorial sea sur-

rounding Christmas Island and was then boarded by 45 SAS soldiers

who

traveled

by fast boat to the vessel. Through a dramatic standoff during the next few days, the
vessel

was

visited

by the Norwegian Ambassador to Australia who received a note

from the migrants outlining their assertions of refugee
multaneously

filed in the

status.

Proceedings were

si-

Federal Court by public interest lawyers seeking an order

of habeas corpus to compel the Australian Government to bring the migrants into

The Government sought to prevent such access. The mibe from a number of countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq,

Australian jurisdiction.
grants appeared to

Kuwait, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
After several days, the illegal migrants were voluntarily transferred to an Austra-

Nauru where representatives of Australia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) subsequently processed their applications. The Australian Government
was aware that this was the commencement of a wave of vessels carrying persons
lian naval vessel

and transported

to the island nation of

seeking refugee status and ultimately implemented Operation Relex, which was

designed to prevent entry into Australian internal waters by such

mately a dozen vessels attempted to transport

22

illegal

craft.

9

Approxi-

migrants to Australia
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following the
vessels.

Tampa

incident; the

ADF/RAN

successfully intercepted

all

of these

10

Legal Issues Raised

The

ability to intercept vessels carrying

unlawful migrants

1982 United Nations Convention on the
tion) in Article 33,
trol

the

addressed within the

of the Sea (Law of the Sea Conven-

State the authority to exercise "the con-

which permits a coastal

within

necessary"

Law

is

contiguous

zone

prevent

to

infringement

of

immigration laws. Accordingly, as a matter of international law there can be no
question of attracting state responsibility on the part of the coastal State for the interference with navigational rights of vessels infringing such laws. Additionally,

such authority

exists,

a fortiori, in the territorial sea where Article 19(g) expressly

notes that the loading/unloading of persons contrary to coastal State immigration
laws

"is prejudicial to

tutes passage which,

the peace,

good order or

under Article

security" of that State

25, a coastal State

and

consti-

may "take the necessary steps"

to prevent.

The

difficulty confronting the Australian action lay

mestic law concerning

with the application of do-

ADF powers. The Australian Migration Act provided for a
"Commanders" of duly commissioned

highly formalized procedure with which

comply in order to exercise powers relating to the detention
of illegal immigrants. Moreover, the Act seemed to generally contemplate that persons detained would be conveyed into Australian Migration Act jurisdiction (i.e.,
land territory) rather than removed from it. On the day SAS forces boarded the
ships were required to

Tampa, the SAS were not acting in accordance with powers pursuant to the Migra-

They were neither duly appointed "Commanders" for the purposes of the
Act nor were they in command of a commissioned ship as required by the Act, but
rather were acting pursuant to specific Government direction under the executive
power of the Constitution. This executive power is exercisable in circumstances of,
inter alia, national security and is identical to the type of power President Truman
unsuccessfully sought to exercise in the Youngstown case. The difficulty facing the
Commonwealth in relying upon the executive power in the context of the Tampa
tion Act.

1 1

interception
in the

was

that

it

Youngstown case

lation,

which

was squarely the type of situation described by Justice Jackson
as being

one where the Legislature had passed specific legis-

essentially directed

reached in the Youngstown case,

it

an incompatible regime. As with the

seemed

to

be a very precarious basis upon which

to base military action. Indeed, a single Judge of the Australian Federal

decided the

Tampa

Commonwealth.
federal

12

case in the

first

result

Court that

instance determined the matter against the

Subsequently, however, the matter was decided in favor of the

Commonwealth Government on appeal by a 2-1
23

majority. 13

The opinion of
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one the majority

Justices

and Maritime Border Control

on appeal expressly acknowledged

that the

Common-

wealth possessed sufficient constitutional authority by use of the executive power
to prohibit illegal entry in terms that

security goals.
cantly,

It

was

a

seemed

remarkably wide reading of prerogative powers and,

was handed down on September

events of 9/1

1

to correlate such denial with national

16,

2001.

It

signifi-

seems very plausible that the

did influence judicial thinking, especially as the author of the opin-

ion envisaging such a wide interpretation of prerogative powers was not expected

way he did. 14
has been criticized by some academic commentators

to have decided the matter in the

The decision

for failing to

properly have regard to implicit international obligations contained within the
1951 Refugee Convention 15 to which Australia

is

party. 16 Indeed, the issue

have been discussed in the literature as highlighting

new and

seems to

possibly intractable

tensions between national security concerns arising from the "war

on international

terrorism" and humanitarian obligations to accord basic procedural rights to

unlawful migrants arriving by sea so as to properly determine who

all

may have a bona

fide claim to refugee status.
It is

background that the border protection

against this

passed in September 2001
legal

legislation that

maybe better understood. Under the current domestic

regime outlined in the Migration Act, the

ADF

is

empowered

vessels suspected of containing unlawful migrants entering the

time zone and

was

17

may remove such

vessels either to a

to intercept

all

contiguous mari-

nominated third country pro-

cessing center or simply to a "place" seaward of the contiguous zone. This latter

method of removal

necessarily gives rise to potential objections

the Sea Convention with respect to the capacity to detain,

under the Law of

and indeed tow, foreign-

number of answers that
might be offered to such objections. First, while Australia has ratified the Law of the
Sea Convention, there exists no mechanism of self-executing treaty implementa-

flagged vessels across international waters. There are a

tion within Australia such as exists within the United States. Accordingly, while

some

aspects of the

tralian

Law of the

domestic law,

it is

Sea Convention have been incorporated into Aus-

certainly not a

comprehensive incorporation and there

no inconsistency with the amended Migration Act
such

vessels.

bility that

legislative

is

powers to remove

This does not, of course, answer potential questions of state responsi-

might

arise

from

interfering with

State of the vessel, yet notwithstanding

freedom of navigation

rights of the flag

ADF actions there has yet to be any kind of

claim raised by any nation State that has alleged breach of such obligations. Sec-

ond, and

in partial

answer to the first issue, the practice to date has been to tow only

those vessels with Indonesian nationality under the terms of a "letter of notice"

provided to Indonesia advising of such intent to return Indonesian flagged vessels
carrying unlawful migrants.

The return of such
24

vessels to the

12nm edge

of the
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Indonesian coast under Operation Relex was observed by Indonesian authorities

without protest and Australian international lawyers have characterized

this for-

bearance as "constructive acquiescence."

The
sarily

issue of unlawful

immigration and border control mechanisms has neces-

been brought into sharper

relief in the

context of the war against terrorism.

Notwithstanding the navigational regime contemplated in the Law of the Sea Convention pertaining to the application of immigration laws in the contiguous zone

and

territorial sea only, the general jurisdictional rules

of international law con-

cerning both territorial and prescriptive jurisdiction relating to national security
controls does admit to an extended reach of application
zones.

Under these principles

it is

entirely arguable to

beyond these maritime

admit to the extra territorial

application of migration controls that might be exercised within international waters

where

interests.

the

this

is

deemed to be

Indeed, the skein of authority emanating from a US Court of Appeals and

US Supreme

cases

Court, respectively, in the Nippon Paper 18 and Hartford Fire 19

would seem
conduct in

where

to lend support for such reach, at least in circumstances

the intent of foreign actors
their

a necessary incident of preserving national security

fact

is

to unlawfully interfere with domestic activities

produced or

is

likely to

produce a substantial

effect.

and

More

trenchantly, the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 20

on September

28, 2001

would seem

to provide

ample Chapter VII authority

Law of

override objections of navigational interference reflected in the

to

the Sea

Convention. Resolution 1373 deals with international terrorism in the context of
the post-9/11 environment. Article 2(g) thereof calls

upon

States, acting

Chapter VII authority, to "prevent the movement of terrorists or

under
groups

terrorist

by effective border controls." Pursuant to Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, which

demand compliance with such
sistent provisions

decisions

and provide

for the overriding of incon-

contained in any international agreement, such a stipulation

could readily displace navigational rights of vessels carrying unlawful migrants in
circumstances where there

is

The requisite level

a suspicion of terrorist connection.

of suspicion of terrorist connection required to authorize action need not necessarily

be high. The academic Derek Jinks has persuasively argued that in the con-

text of international terrorism the rules of state responsibility

virtue of both Resolution 1373

and international consensus

the threshold of attribution between private actors

where the

State merely harbors or supports such actors.

ther dilutes the original tests promulgated
(IC) in the Nicaragua case

22

may be

21

to significantly lower

State in circumstances

Such

a

development fur-

by the International Court of

and the International Criminal Court

Yugoslavia in the Tadic appeal

proach

and the

have been applied by

23

regarding attribution

critiqued for being both under

25

criteria.

and over

for the

Justice

Former

While such an ap-

inclusive, 24

it

nonetheless
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grounded offensive military action in Afghanistan in 2002 and thus opens the door
for consideration of lesser forms of control mechanisms. If such action is acceptable in the context of offensive military operations then surely

beyond the

tighten maritime border controls

it

permits a State to

traditional limits of the contiguous

zone and thus authorize preventative action within international waters where
is

deemed necessary

such a proposition

to preserve both national

relies

and international

upon the authority of Resolution

1373, as

it

security.

does,

is

this

That

hardly

revolutionary. As far back as 1949 in the ICJ's Corfu Channel decision, the highly

respected Judge Alvarez pointedly acknowledged the capacity of the Security

Council to vary maritime navigational rights where

and security and

international peace

fully

Certain Expenses

and Namibia

tional lawyers today

27

seems not so

was necessary to preserve

accepted the consequential diminution

of sovereign rights that such actions might
26

this

entail.

25

Indeed, as evidenced by the

decisions of the ICJ, the challenge of interna-

much

as deciding

do, but rather determining the limits of what

it

what the Security Council can

may not

do. 28

The clash between national security measures as applied in the context of border
control actions and humanitarian aspirations of those seeking asylum and
rights obligations of the coastal State

human

does raise uncomfortable conundrums. In the

on terrorism, States such as Australia are choosing
and the orderly processing and screening of asylum

current environment of the war
to accord national security

on the shores of Australia) a higher
choice might be criticized on both legal and policy

seekers within countries of origin (rather than
priority.

grounds,

While such
29

it is

a

not altogether unique within the domestic jurisprudence of a

ber of countries

who have

faced similar issues.

The US Supreme Court

num-

in Sale

v.

Haitian Centers Council 30 for example, in an 8-1 majority decision determined
that high seas interdiction of Haitian

der the Refugee Convention

supporting

United
v.

US

States.

32

UK

as the

Similarly, the

Court construed neither the Convention nor

Home Department33

Government following 9/11

rights to a fair trial)

territorial

boundaries of the

UK Court of Appeal in the recent 2002 decision of A

gated from a host of international

determined that measures adopted

to detain

and expel non-nationals dero-

human rights guarantees

(detention policies and

but were nonetheless acceptable as derogations which could be

justified in times of public

the

asylum seekers did not attract obligations un-

domestic law as applying beyond

Secretary of State for the

by the

31

emergency.

What is

intriguing in that instance was that

UK Government's detention of non-nationals was directed more at the threat

such non-nationals posed to the United States than the United Kingdom, but
nonetheless such actions were unanimously upheld by the Court.

26
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Multilateral Cooperation

While invocation of national security measures to inform approaches to maritime
border control suggest a theme of arrogant unilateralism,
case.

this

is

not necessarily the

The experience of maritime law enforcement by Australia within

the region

has been one of exceptionally constructive co-operation. This has been particularly

pronounced with Australia's near neighbors such
nesia

and more generally with countries situated

as

Papua New Guinea and Indo-

in the

South West Pacific under

the Nuie Treaty, 34 but has also extended
the

more broadly to countries situated within
Indian Ocean which was amply demonstrated by the South Tomi incident of

early 200 1. 35

In that instance, a Togolese registered vessel had engaged in illegal fishing activity at

Heard and Macdonald Islands and was pursued from the EEZ of those islands

by an Australian

Fisheries Authority vessel in a

two-week hot pursuit that extended

along the entire southern length of the Western Indian Ocean to the coast of South

During the course of the pursuit

Africa.

from French

authorities

who occupied

offers of warship assistance

were received

the French possession of Kerguelen Island

and, similarly, South African authorities

who were

exceptionally helpful

when

was requested. In the event, an Australian military boarding team was

sistance

as-

dis-

patched to South Africa and transited through that country for deployment upon a

South African warship that met South Tomi

With

hastily

as

it

rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

prepared complementary rules of engagement and mutually agreed

understandings of the legal issues involved, Australian military members (who

were also authorized

fisheries officers

apprehended South Tomi from the

under the relevant

flotilla

legislation) successfully

of South African warships that had

steamed out into international waters to intercept the vessel.

An Australian steam-

Tomi and the vessel returned back to Western
Australia where the ship and catch were forfeited and the master prosecuted. From
a Law of the Sea Convention perspective, the incident raised a number of interesting legal issues which included, in particular, the capacity of one nation to hand
ing party was placed onboard South

over hot pursuit to another nation while
diction

upon apprehension.

still

maintaining law enforcement

juris-

makes

refer-

In that regard, the Convention merely

ence to "government ships" without mentioning the nationality of such ships as an
integral criteria for hot pursuit. Similarly, the question of

whether the skirting of

South Tomi through the territorial sea of Kerguelen Island would have rendered
the hot pursuit otiose even
ject to the

when

the coastal State, in this case France, did not ob-

continued pursuit. In any event,

this latter issue

was not

in issue, for

while South Tomi seemed intent on entering the French territorial sea at Kerguelen
Island

it

eventually diverted

its

track

and did not do
27

so.
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international legal issues

thrown up by the South Tomi incident were never

tested within international legal or diplomatic fora as

tions

on behalf of the

vessel

upon

its

arrest or

Law of the Sea Convention.

standing the co-operation of so
that the terms of the

It

seemed

many nations

Convention had,

representa-

subsequent prosecution. The issues

nonetheless demonstrated the unilateral nature of
within the

Togo made no

many

a very

of the rights contained

odd outcome that notwith-

in seeking to

apprehend

this vessel,

in theory at least, the capacity to defeat this

intent.

Conclusion

The tightening of its maritime border control laws by the Australian Government
has generated considerable academic criticism by those who validly rue the subordination of humanitarian priorities. Such measures have nonetheless been supportable under a sheath of domestic and international legal authority and,

moreover, have proven to be extremely effective in stemming the tide of seaborne
unlawful migrants. Australian embassies in countries of origin apply the very same
tests for

refugee status in those countries as

seeker washing

up on Australian

The events of 9/1 1 and the

would apply

to the hapless

asylum

shores.

associated

war on terrorism continue

to resonate in

approaches to maritime security issues and have permitted the ascendancy of na-

and international security measures which have the potential

tional

to override

long standing navigational rights. The key in confronting international terrorism

and ensuring adequate maritime border security is
ation rather than resolute reliance

upon

striving for multilateral cooper-

unilateral rights.

The experiences of the

ADF/RAN in undertaking law enforcement measures within our region in concert
with countries such as South Africa, France and Papua New Guinea have amply
demonstrated the magnificent

ability to "force multiply" military

means

so as to

common ends. Such co-operation is of course key to ensuring effective mar-

secure

itime border security and

more broadly to ensuring a durable victory in this war we

are fighting against the scourge of international terrorism.
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European and German Security Policy

and International Terrorism

Torsten Stein*

German security policy cannot be separated from that of the European Union,
especially when

it

comes to border controls as one of its principal elements.

Since the 1970s, the European

Union (then

the European

Economic Community

Member

States' security policy,

(EEC)) has been engaged in harmonizing the

which

has, in the light of the

mary goals,

ongoing European integration, become one of its

especially with regard to the enlargement of the

took place on

May

operation in this

1,

2004.

field

pri-

European Union, which

The importance of both European and

transatlantic co-

cannot therefore be overemphasized, particularly since the

events of September 11, 2001, which have confronted

all

States with a

new threat.

1

The most prominent feature of the threat posed by international terrorism is the
changed profile of its perpetrators: Al Qaida, and the persons and organizations associated with it, is not confined to nations, regarding either its members or its aims.
The offenders are recruited from various countries and together constitute an internationally organized structure of terrorism, of which

be victims,

as witnessed last in

societies

from

all

known

can

this in-

criminal groups.

The

European Union and Comparative Constitutional Law and
(Law Department), University of Saarland, Saarbnicken,

Director, Institute of European Studies

Germany.

Western

Madrid. From a sociological point of view,

ternational terrorist structure differs

* Professor of International,

all

European and German Security Policy and International Terrorism

spectrum reaches from

illiterate religious fanatics to

with international experience.

velopment of border controls

2

highly educated businessmen

The focus of this article shall therefore be on the deand their effectiveness in the fight against interna-

tional terrorism.

and Border Controls

Legal Regime for Security Policy

The ongoing European

in

Europe and Germany

integration has brought Europe's citizens not only eco-

nomical, but also great personal freedom, a development which found
the introduction of EU citizenship

its

climax in

by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 3

But by granting those freedoms, a need for coordinating justice and

home

affairs

became obvious. Starting with the Naples Agreement on the Cooperation of Customs Services in 1967, 4 informal governmental cooperation in the area of justice
and home affairs has evolved. In this context, the TREVI Group, 5 mandated to
combat terrorism,

illegal

Member

ecutives of the

immigration and organized crime, and composed of ex-

States' respective authorities,

was created. The Single Eu-

6

ropean Act of 1986, which introduced the concept of the Single Market, brought
about the need to create a balance between market freedoms and security interests,
especially as far as controls of the

mon

EEC's external borders and the creation of a com-

European asylum and immigration policy were concerned.

The Schengen Regime
Due to the difficult and tedious process of reconciling policies in the area of justice
and home affairs, France, Germany and the Benelux countries concluded the 1985
Schengen Agreement 7 with a view to abolishing controls
harmonizing measures

and

in the area of visas

judicial cooperation.

and asylum

policy,

controls at the external borders,
visas

and

and provided

for determining jurisdiction for
9

Dublin Agreement. The SIA came into force
tures of the

SIA for the topic of

pursuit and shadowing
ter

is

a

that

it is

down

the procedure for

rules for issuing short-

asylum requests according to the

in 1995.

The most

interesting fea-

introduction of cross-border

and of the "Schengen Information System"

change data on wanted persons as well
is

common

this article are the

computerized network allowing the

the SIS

and creating police

The 1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement (SLA) 8

codified the abolishment of internal border controls, laid

term

at the internal borders,

at the

The

lat-

Member States' police authorities to ex-

as stolen goods, e.g., cars.

designed to serve only 18

pean Community Council,

(SIS).

Member

The weak point of

States. Therefore, the

urging of the Schengen Executive Council

Euro10

(the

primary organ created by the Schengen Agreements), directed that a second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS

32

II)

be developed that would take into

Torsten Stein

account

new developments in information technology and update the system with

new capacity criteria.
cal difficulties.

1 1

However, SIS

II

has not yet been implemented, due to techni-

The foregoing agreements,

as well as the legal instruments

decreed by

the Schengen organs, collectively constitute the Schengen Regime, which
plicable in

all

is

now ap-

EU Member States except the United Kingdom and Ireland. 12

The Treaty of Amsterdam, 13 which first stipulated the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice as one of the EU's goals, 14 incorporated the Schengen Regime into the European Union. 15 The provisions of the Schengen Regime were
transferred in 1999 16 to the respective legal bases of the Treaty Establishing the Eu-

ropean Community (TEC) 17 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 18
Title

IV on

visa,

asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free move-

ment of persons was
and

EU

found

inserted into the

TEC. Since

measures in the areas of justice and

in the

A new

Schengen Regime can

then, the statutory basis for

home

was before

affairs that

EC

to be

now be found in the TEC and in the TEU. Ac19

Regime forms part of the acquis communautaire, which
the accession States must adopt. Exceptions apply only to the United Kingdom and
cordingly, the Schengen

Ireland as States that originally did not sign the Schengen Agreements, as well as

Denmark, who opted out of some
European Union

parts of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the

in 1992.

on the grounds of TEC/TEU provisions, except for regulations, need to be transformed into national law by the Member
States, both EC/EU measures and national laws coexist, but also intertwine.
Sparked by the innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council of the European
Since most of the measures adopted

Union decided, while meeting in Tampere, Finland in 1999, that the creation of an
area of freedom, security and justice should be given the same importance as the
realization of the Single Market. The area of security thus should comprise fighting
cross-border crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism as the negative aspects resulting from the area of freedom. The European Commission was
mandated to create a scorecard, which, at regular intervals, would show the progress in creating an area of freedom, security and justice.
Europol- Agreement
Police cooperation between

Member States was and is to date a significant aspect of

an area of security. Therefore, the European Drugs Unit was
as part of the

TEU's police and judicial cooperation,

20

set

enabling

up

as early as

Member

1995

States to

exchange and analyze information on criminal acts and assisting national police
authorities in

combating crime. However, the Drugs Unit was subsequently man-

dated with further competencies in the areas of drug trafficking,
radioactive

and nuclear

illegal

dealing of

materials, illegal immigration, trafficking in

33
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moving of automobiles and money laundering. The exchange of information with the Drugs Unit was carried out via liaison officers in each Member
State, who had to comply with the respective national laws protecting personal

beings, illegal

data; therefore personal data could not

1999, the

be stored directly with the Drugs Unit. In

European Drugs Unit was replaced by the European Police Office

(Europol), which was established

on the

basis of the 1995

Europol has essentially the same competencies as
but

Europol Agreement. 21

predecessor, the Drugs Unit,

its

maintains a computerized information system, which

it

from the Member

rectly

States.

Europol, on condition that

it is

is

fed with data di-

Furthermore, personal data can be stored with
only used to investigate serious crime falling into

Europol's competencies. In addition, personal data fulfilling these conditions can

be processed to third countries and their authorities, subject to an international

agreement or

in a situation affecting vital interests of a

Member

State or if

immi-

22

The agreement with the third country must include
provisions on the type of data to be transmitted, on its recipient and on the purpose
nent danger must be averted.

for

which

it is

required. Also, the question of liability in the case of unauthorized or

wrongful processing of data needs to be regulated. Should these requirements be
met, the transfer of data

is

possible, but limited to law

enforcement agencies.

ever, these agencies are obliged to delete the transferred data as

longer required for the specific purpose intended.

soon

How-

as they are

no

23

Eurojust
Besides enhancing police cooperation, the Council of European Union, at

Tampere

ing in

in 1999, decided to

expand

its

meet-

judicial cooperation in order to

im-

prove the fight against organized crime and agreed on the creation of an agency in

which prosecutors, judges or police
forces.

To

this end,

with comparable authority would join

Eurojust was established in 2002. 24 Article 3 of the Council De-

and

facilitate investiga-

and law enforcement between the respective Member

States' authorities.

cision states that the

tions

officers

purpose of Eurojust

Article 4, in turn, provides that Eurojust's

is

to coordinate

competence extends to the same forms

of crime as that of Europol, but in addition Eurojust
cial

is

mandated

to deal with spe-

forms of crime such as computer crime, fraud and corruption, money launder-

ing as well as unlawful practices causing

damage

to the environment. Article 14

authorizes Eurojust to process personal data, but mandates maintenance of a mini-

mum level of data protection as stipulated in the Council of Europe Agreement of
January 28, 1981. 25 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 19 of the Council Decision,
personal data must be deleted

if

it is

wrong or incomplete. This

sonal data no longer required for the original purpose.

34

also applies to per-
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In order to ensure the effectiveness of police and judicial cooperation, Eurojust

works closely with Europol and can exchange information to
Eurojust
for the

is

this end. 26

Moreover,

empowered to conclude cooperation agreements, including provisions

exchange of personal data, with third countries, competent institutions un-

der the

TEU/TEC,

international organizations

third countries, subject to approval

The coming

and law enforcement agencies of

by the Council. 27

years will determine

if

the judicial cooperation practiced through

Eurojust will stand the test of time. In the long run, a truly effective information

network between investigative and law enforcement agencies within the European

Union can only be achieved by concluding a formal cooperation agreement between Eurojust and Europol, as envisaged in the Council Decision 28 and by giving
those two agencies access to the SIS, as currently planned. 29
Legal Instruments in the Fight against Terrorism

The danger posed by

terrorist attacks carried

out with nuclear, biological and

chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons,
all

Western

States; international terrorism

calls for

determined action by

can only be fought by extensive and op-

timized international cooperation.

European Level
As early as 1995 the EU-US Action Plan 30 was

established to foster cooperation in

the fight against the global threats of organized crime, terrorism
ing.

and drug traffick-

On a European level, the Council of the European Union, at its Vienna meet-

ing in

December

Amsterdam
and justice. 31 The Ac-

1998, adopted an Action Plan for implementing the

Treaty provisions on building an area of freedom, security

tion Plan underscored the fight against terrorism as one of the EU's aims. Special

emphasis was also placed on the central role of Europol

ment of enhanced cooperation between the Member
sures foreseen in the
realize

EU Action Plan,

an area of security,

e.g.,

September

11, the

an important instru-

States.

as well as the existing

However, the mea-

measures intended to

provisions of the Schengen Regime and the Europol

Agreement, did not prove to be
attacks of

as

effective; a fact that

was

tragically affirmed

planning of which took place in

by the

Germany and

re-

mained undetected. The new security threat called for advanced countermeasures
on the part of both the European Union and the European Community, as well as
at the national level in

order to confer the necessary competencies upon the au-

thorities responsible for protecting the

population and fighting the latent danger.

Therefore, the Council of the European

Union

September 21, 2001 agreed on an Action Plan

35

at its

extraordinary meeting of

specifically

aimed

at

combating
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terrorism,

The Action Plan included enhanced

These were to be

a

and

had already been anticipated

at the

uniform definition of terrorism, and the creation of a

tions, as well as the

judicial cooperation.

by the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant

facilitated

(the creation of which

police

1999 Tampere meeting),
list

of terrorist organiza-

formation of joint investigation teams and of an anti-terrorism

unit within Europol. In addition,

it

was decided that security measures

for air

transportation and quality controls for security at airports should be enhanced.
In fulfilling

both

and the guidelines
adopted two

UN Security Council Resolution

set

2001

18,

out by the Action Plan of September 21, 2001, the Council

Common Positions on combating terrorism and on the application of

32
certain measures to this end.

Common

1373 of September

According to an update of June 27, 2003, these

Positions contain, in addition to a definition of "terrorist act," a

list

of

52 persons and 34 groups that are subjected to enhanced police and judicial cooperative scrutiny

mon

and whose funds and

Positions, the Council

in criminal matters

adopted a decision on police and judicial cooperation

preventing and combating terrorist attacks. Thus, every

State has to establish a specialized authority within

ing access to

all

Com-

under Title VI of the TEU, 33 which defines the scope of admin-

istrative assistance in

Member

be frozen. Based on the

assets are to

its

police service hav-

information relating to terrorist offenses. These authorities are

then required to forward the information to Europol and Eurojust.

For the purpose of EC-wide implementation of the

Common

Positions, the

Council of the European Union issued a Regulation "on specific measures directed
against certain persons

and organizations

in

combating terrorism." 34 The

list at-

tached to this Regulation names 26 persons and 23 organizations whose funds and

The Regulation was subsequently extended, 35 pursuant to a Council of the European Union Common Position of May 27, 2002, 36 to
specifically apply to persons and organizations connected to Osama bin Laden, the
Al Qaida network and the Taliban. Since the Member States' national laws and
other assets are to be frozen.

measures were partially in need of improvement, the Council issued a decision in

November 2002 37 aimed

those laws in order to attain higher

at reassessing

effi-

ciency in combating terrorism.

One legal instrument expected to show great effect in fighting terrorism is the European Arrest Warrant, 38 which

is

designed to replace the political and administrative

phases of the old extradition process with one single court procedure.
first

It

constitutes the

palpable realization of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal law matters,

which was agreed upon by the European Council

As regards criminal
terrorism
ing the

is

law, a

Tampere

in 1999.

2002 Council Framework Decision 39 on combating

of vital importance, since for the

Member

in

States' criminal laws

first

time a

was made

36

move towards harmoniz-

in the sense that

minimum
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standards for terrorist offenses and their elements, and for law enforcement, were

becomes obvious when

defined.

The need

as late as

200 1 only six EU Member States had incorporated provisions on

for such a decision

it is

considered that

,

offenses into their criminal laws. 40

Union has

laid a

With

this

Framework Decision,

the

terrorist

European

foundation for a comprehensive system of combating terrorism,

whereby the Member

States'

law enforcement agencies, assisted by Europol,

HowMember

Eurojust and the SIS, can improve the effectiveness of their investigations. 41

Framework Decision has not been fully implemented into all
States' national laws. As of March 2004, only eight Member States had implemented it, although Article 1 1 of the Framework Decision had set a deadline of December 21, 2002. This puts the events of March 11, 2004 in Madrid into an even
more tragic light.
ever, the

National Level

Measures to combat the

terrorist threat

have also been taken on the national

level,

principally through the implementation of EU decisions. This article will focus

on
Germany as an example. The German Law on Combating Terrorism, which came
into force on January 1, 2002, created a statutory basis for further measures and for
enhanced cooperation between the various existing German security authorities. 42

The Federal

Office

the

for

Protection

of the

Constitution

(Bundes-

verfassungsschutz), as one of Germany's principal security agencies, was tasked to
investigate cases involving organizations

opposed to the idea of international under-

standing and peaceful coexistence of peoples. That agency now has the power to de-

mand information on bank accounts and their holders from banks or other financial
service providers. Thus, financial transactions to

and from organizations with ex-

tremist or suspicious attitudes can be disclosed and further support for those organizations cut

off.

In addition, further competencies for disclosure of information

by telecommunication and mail

some of which were
nachrichtendienst)
dienst).

43

service providers as well as airlines

were created,

transferred to the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundes-

and

to

At the same time,

the Naval Intelligence
all

(Marineabschirm-

Service

the measures just mentioned are subject to a strict

control regime by impartial bodies. 44

Another agency endowed with new

investigative

and executive authority

is

the

Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt). That agency can

now directly intervene in cases of information technology (IT)

sabotage, as one of

the potential fields of future terrorist attacks, without further consultation with

other agencies. If it has an
investigations

and use

its

initial

own

suspicion of an offense,

it

can

now initiate its own

resources for gathering information, especially in

37
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the areas of terrorism

and IT sabotage, while working together

closely with other

security agencies.

The Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) has been granted power for
training and deploying armed sky marshals. 45 Furthermore, in the interest of air
security, the provisions

forcing of controls

of the

air

transportation law were altered to allow the rein-

and quality standards

at

and around

airports, as well as the use

down hijacked airplanes as a last resort. The latter provision permits for the first time the deployment of the Federal Army (Bundeswehr)
within Germany in other than disaster operations. It was passed against strong opof military aircraft to shoot

The need for such a competence became all too obvious on January 5,
2003 when a deranged man commandeered a motorized glider, circled over Frankfurt/
Main for several hours and threatened to crash the plane into the building of the
position.

European Central Bank. Fortunately, the plane did not have to be shot down by the

summoned

F-4 pursuit planes

since the perpetrator gave

up

—no

legal basis existed for

after three

inforced control standards at airports

employees.

To

hours and

safely

such an action then 46
landed the plane. The

—
re-

now include checking the reliability of airport

this end, the air security authorities

can obtain unlimited disclosure

of information from the Federal Central Register (Bundeszentralregister). 47
Similarly, the

Law on the Review of Security Measures introduced strict control

and security measures

in order to prevent sabotage of other vital or militarily

portant installations. In the future

it

economic background of employees
critical infrastructure.

in close contact

im-

be possible to explore the personal and

will

in nuclear plants

and other

focal points of

The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation therefore keeps

with the respective operators of the relevant

facilities in

order to

update the security assessment and optimize both protective measures and the
flow of information. 48

This

new and

intensified investigative

tions of individuals with Islamic

work

resulted in 182 criminal investiga-

backgrounds between September 2001 and Febru-

ary 2004. Seventy of those were led by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation

and

1 1

2

by the regional police (Landespolizeien), the

latter

maintaining a close co-

operation with the competent federal authorities. The Federal Office of Criminal
Investigation alone investigated 25,600 hints

changed provisions

in the

and

traces, taking

advantage of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung),

which allow a simplified procedure and advanced competencies for intercepting
correspondence, including telephone,

cell

phone, and e-mail contacts. However,

the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 49 declared

some

portions of the latter competencies unconstitutional.
In order to guarantee
tion, the

an adequate and constitutionally sound criminal convic-

German Criminal Code

(Strafgesetzbuch) had to be adapted to the

38

new
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circumstances, therefore

new

provisions were inserted into the code. Previously

only membership in a terrorist group constituted an offense, so that the courts

could not adequately react to terrorism in

its

new, international dimension. With

new provisions into the Criminal Code it is now possible to convict
offenders
especially members of Al Qaida. 50

insertion of the

—

foreign

The
tences

new

investigations initiated

between 2001 and 2004 led to several severe sen-

and some criminal proceedings

are

under way. The weaknesses of the

still

provisions and the difficulty of their latent infringement of the rule of law,

which

is

Mounir

highly protected in Germany, becomes especially apparent in the case of
al

Motassadeq

who prepared and

(a

member

of the

Hamburg group

carried out the attacks of

September

11),

overruled and remanded due to insufficient evidence.

Motassadeq demonstrate that
case

the

it

all

States

was alleged that the United

German court)

of Al Qaida terrorists

51

whose

verdict

Cases like that of

have to join in a closer cooperation

States

had evidence

it

did not

make

sure against terrorist organizations through criminal convictions

(in this

available to

so that the efforts of the single nation State in building

court sentences will produce the intended

was

up

pres-

and adequate

effect.

Before repression of crimes committed, however, comes prevention of terrorist
attacks. Preventive

in the field

measures on the federal

level in

inter alia,

of financing of terrorist groups. Identifying the financial sources fund-

ing terrorists

and preventing

financial transactions are critical aspects of combat-

ing terrorism. Also in this area, the complexity
call for

Germany were taken,

and

diversity of transaction paths

coordinated cooperation of security agencies and the financial sector, on

both national and international
Action Task Force (FATF),

adopted a

total

52

levels.

On

the multinational level, the Financial

of which 30 States besides

Germany are members, has

of eight special recommendations on combating the financing of

terrorism. In August 2002,

Germany became

implement the guidelines of the FATF,

the

first

as well as the

State within

Europe

to fully

corresponding provisions of

EU directives on money laundering, into its national law. 53 That legislation assigns
special

importance to the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) within the

Federal Office of Criminal Investigation. 54

The FIU functions as a central office for
investigative leads, for matching of international measures and for informing other
national or European authorities about methods of fighting money laundering or
other means of support for Islamic organizations. Nonetheless, finding evidence of
planned financial support of terrorist attacks remains a very

difficult task despite

new competencies enabling authorities to acquire information on account holders
and transactions from

financial institutions.

Still,

principal features of transaction

methods were successfully identified and cut off. Given the complex and shrouded
paths of monetary transactions, further isolation of international terrorism's
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among

financial sources requires intensive international cooperation

States

and

exchange of information between their respective counterterrorism authorities.

Border Controls
In addition to breaking

up

terrorist

groups already existing within the European

Union, preventing the entry of terrorists into the territory of EU

Member States

is

another point of focus, and shall be the main one under scrutiny here. In this context,

one needs to consider the

fact that in a territory

without internal customs and

immigration borders, such as the greater part of the European Union due to the

Schengen Regime, the State penetrated by a terrorist organization
the State that

is

is

not necessarily

the target of attack.

The European Council

is

responsible for the adoption of uniform measures for

control of the EU's external borders. 35
(SIA) defines the external

The Schengen Implementation Agreement
borders of the European Union as all land, sea and air

borders of Member States that are not internal borders. 56 However,

from concluding separate arrangements with third nations,

are not precluded

long as those agreements are in accordance with
Specific

SIA. 58

Community Law.

A Member State confronted with the entry of a third country national must
security interests of all other

have to be taken into account pursuant to
country nationals can be denied entry

if

Community Law.

the

Member

the

names of individuals

States

available to

sons have to

have drawn up a

all

fulfill

exit regulations),

Member States

Therefore, third

common

list

Member

State.

States. In

To

this end,

of wanted persons, from which

to be denied entry are transferred to the SIS

Member

order to be put on this

and thereby

common

list,

per-

the criteria set out in the SIA (prison sentence of at least one

year, suspicion of having
60

59

they constitute a danger to the public or-

der, national security or international relations of any

All

as

57

measures for the control of the EU's external borders are detailed in the

comply with the SIA mandate that the

made

Member States

committed

a serious crime, severe breach of entry and/or

and there has been compliance with national procedural

rules.

persons are subject to controls regarding their entry/exit, stay and work

documents. 61 In every

case, their identity

must be

tionals are subject to a stricter control than

EU

verified. 62

citizens,

63

Third country na-

they generally have to

submit to separate customs clearance procedures. In exceptional
manitarian reasons,

if

cerned an individual

national interests or international

Member

is

i.e.,

commitments

for hu-

are con-

State can grant entry to third country nationals

irrespective of fulfillment of the requirements just
in those cases

cases,

mentioned. However, the entry

limited to the sovereign territory of the

40

Member State concerned. 64
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External borders

may

only be crossed

at

border checkpoints and during their

re-

spective designated passing hours. 65

In order to

comply with the foregoing provisions, the Member States concerned

must monitor the boundaries of the external border and deploy specially trained
border patrols to this end. 66 The latter is quite a problem regarding the EU's new
Eastern border, since border fortification and patrol are largely inadequate.

What

is

more,

terrorists in

all

must be applied in identifying
detection and defense against terrorism. In

available technical resources

order to achieve effective

particular, the identity of visa applicants

a

Member

State of the

identification
trols are

is

and other persons entering the territory of

European Union must be

the basis for

all

further measures.

concerned, responsibility

Union and the Member

States.

effectively assessed, since reliable

is

As

far as passport

and

visa con-

divided between the Council of the European

The Council

is

responsible for establishing general

rules

governing short-term visas (up to three months). 67 Competence over long-

term

visas

remains with the individual

Member State. The Council has specified68

those third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa in order to en-

European Union,

ter the

as well as those countries that are

exempt from visa

gations. In order to qualify for a visa waiver, third countries

regarding

criteria

illegal

must

obli-

certain

fulfill

immigration, public order and security, especially danger

of terrorist attacks. The EU's external relations do, of course, also play an important role in assessing whether a visa waiver will be granted. In certain cases,

Mem-

ber States can permit exemptions from visa obligations. 69

The Council

is

also responsible for laying

down procedural rules for the issuing

of short term visas, particularly with regard to subject matter, jurisdiction of the
suing authority, and material requirements.

70

Jurisdiction for visa issuance

with the diplomatic or consular representative of the
tion.

71

Details can be

lies

State of destina-

Common Consular Instruction (Gemeinsame
of the Common Handbook of the Schengen States. 72

found

Konsularische Instruktion)

Member

is-

in the

The Council also made provisions for the design of short-term visas. 73 The European Commission proposes the details of visa design. The security criteria for
short-term visas include the appearance of an unforgeable visa and the information to be entered

on

it.

74

In the area of seafaring, a Council of the European
registration formalities for ships entering
(largely

1965

76
),

transit.
ties

77

Union

directive establishes

and leaving ports of the Member

States 75

based upon an International Maritime Organization Agreement of

and on the issuance of visas

The

latter prescribes

at the

border, including those for sailors in

reporting requirements of Member States' authori-

responsible for visas in the case of signing in and signing off of ships lying in

ports of the Schengen area. Additional qualifications for entry into the Schengen
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area

must be

fulfilled

between the competent authority and the shipping company/

shipping agent in order to obtain a visa at the border. These procedures guarantee
the exchange of security-relevant information, in particular through the SIS, be-

tween the

Member

States.

78

In the area of identification, special attention
istration

of biometrical data (fingerprints,

face,

is

accorded to biometrics. The reg-

hand and

iris

screening) and their

inclusion in passports or visas can allow for positive identification of notorious terrorists

and violent enemies of Western

societies,

and therefore pave the way for ap-

means for
the European Commission

propriate countermeasures. Moreover, they constitute an effective

On the EU level,
proposed introducing digitalized photographs into EU Member States' passports.
allocating

documents

to their owner.

Germany envisages

the use of biometrics in three important

and other residence permits, and

trols for entry, in visas

identification

fields:

in passports

border con-

and national

documents. The necessary amendments to the relevant laws (Pass-

und Personalausweisgesetz) have already been

enacted. Together with the use of

biometrics, entry procedures can be extensively facilitated and accelerated by in-

troducing an automated, computer-assisted border control process. 79

sponding

pilot project

began operation

A

corre-

Frankfurt airport at the beginning of

at

2004. However, the introduction of biometrical passports prescribed by the United
States for maintaining the visa waiver

than expected. The

initial

2005, and has

now been

ber 26, 2006.

It is

program vis-a-vis

EU citizens, is taking longer

deadline of October 26, 2004 was extended to October 26,

extended for a second time. The current deadline

is

Octo-

therefore undecided whether the former visa requirements for

entry into the United States are going to be reintroduced.

Considering

this

development, the essential need for harmonizing the EU's ex-

ternal border controls

the interest of the

on

a high standard

European Union

to

becomes

have

all

too obvious.

terrorists

It

cannot be in

circumvent the high-tech

Member State by entering a neighboring State not applying
standards for border controls. What is more, the coordination

border controls of one
the

same

technical

among the States must include harmonizing the applied biometrical methods. Last
but not least, biometrics is a relatively new technology subject to uncertainties and
avoidable errors, which could be eliminated by joint efforts in exchanging infor-

mation and experience between the

States involved in the interest of an optimized

outward protection. Germany, therefore,
area within the

European Union, and with

strives for greater
its

G8

partners.

cooperation in this

80

Within the context of this cooperation, the forwarding of personal data on passengers

embarked on

transatlantic flights

is

needs to be mentioned here. As of February
tion Transportation

a matter of current importance

5,

2003, and pursuant to the

and

US Avia-

and Security Act of 2001, the US Bureau of Customs and
42
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US Transportation Security Administration require airlines to provide access to so-called "PNR" (Passenger Name Record) data for interBorder Protection and the

Union airlines conflicts with
both because no specific authority therein

national flights. Provision of this data by European

European Union laws and regulations,
allows for such transfer and because

it

81

has not been determined that the data will be

"adequately protected" by the receiving authority as defined by European
law. 82

munity
citizens,

What

is

more,

US

authorities,

encroach upon the sovereignty of

Com-

by accessing the personal data of EU

EU Member

States

without being au-

thorized to do so under public international law.
In order to both create a legal basis for the justified security interests of the

EU citizens are

United States and to ensure adequate data protection to which the

European Commission has proposed that an agreement be entered

entitled, the

into between the

European Community and the United

States.

83

Such an agree-

Community pertaining
to data transfer and would justify the encroachment upon the Member States' sovment would meet

the legal requirements of the European

ereignty. Furthermore, the

Commission has determined

that the proposed agree-

ment would guarantee adequate protection of personal data as mandated by the
applicable European Parliament Directive. 84 The Council signed this agreement at
the end of May 2004 over the protests of the European Parliament. The European
Parliament argues that the agreement violates the Treaty Establishing the Euro-

pean Community, 85 since
legal

it

purports to

instrument adopted according to the procedure

treaty, requires

European Parliament approval

European Parliament has decided
Justice.

to

no reference
87

251 of that

amendment. Accordingly, the

to bring the matter before the

to

US

European Court of

authorities to be too broad, since the agreement

to the extent of data protection

makes

mandated by European Community

especially with regard to a potential transfer of the data to third countries.

Although the basic criticism of granting a
the

for

set forth in Article

as a

A majority of members of the European Parliament deems the right of access

PNR-data granted

law,

amend the relevant Directive 86 which,

right of transferring personal data to

US authorities as being too far reaching maybe justified, one needs to take into

account the

fact that the

European Commission has obtained guarantees from the

US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
for appropriate use of the data

in the

form of a self-commitment 88

and that the current state of affairs

sonal data without any legal basis

—

is

—

transfer of per-

simply unacceptable.

Intrastate Countermeasures in Case of a Terrorist Threat

As soon

as terrorists

have been identified, either on the basis of European and inter-

national cooperation or as a result of the extended national competencies, further
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procedures become the responsibility of the
the authority to deny

Member

State concerned. Therefore,

German visa and residence permits

in a simplified

was enhanced by adapting the provisions of the
landergesetz)

89

fungsgesetze).

90

to accord with the

Law

Enemies of society and

1990 Aliens Act

identification

(Aus-

against Terrorism (Terrorismusgbekampits

democratic foundations

to use or appeal for violence in pursuing their goals are

from obtaining a

procedure

visa. In addition, the

who

now explicitly

are ready

prohibited

use of unforgeable features in national

documents and residence permits has been enhanced by legislation.

Since the provisions of the

Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz) 91 have

been amended so as to include registering fingerprints, photographs, and,
future, biometrical data of asylum seekers,

it is

now possible

ings of asylum seekers, thus providing information

thermore, these data can

on

in the

to save voice record-

their country of origin. Fur-

now be stored for up to ten years after irrevocability of the

asylum decision and can be processed by the police and security authorities for

The main aim in this area is to
standardize and simplify the procedure, as well as to make it more automatic, while
identification purposes in a simplified procedure.

maintaining an adequate

level

of data protection.

new Immigration Act, which was finally agreed on in June 2004,
first version had been declared unconstitutional by the German Supreme

Pursuant to the
after the

Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on formal grounds, an admitted asylum seeker

who

is

member of a terrorist

a

organization or an organization supporting terror-

can be deported in a simplified procedure. The

ists

into force

tradition

on arrest and extradition
or extremists endangering Germany's internal security. If ex-

on January

of foreign terrorists
is

new Immigration Act 92 entered

1,

2005, and contains stricter rules

impossible due to the potential of torture or implementation of the

death penalty by the country of destination, notification requirements and constraints

on the freedom of movement can be applied

in order to

maintain control

over the potential danger.

Apart from the measures already taken on the basis of the

many

EU Action Plan, Ger-

continues to campaign for further initiatives to enhance transnational co-

operation within the Council of the European Union, especially on improving

information flows, identification systems and searches for wanted terrorists (profile

search). In this context,

it

needs to be mentioned that the success in combating

cross-border terrorist networks depends on concerted and determined action of
the international

and

fora,

Security

community. The cooperation within international organizations

such as the United Nations, G8, 93

and Co-operation

in

Europe) 94

is

NATO

or

OSCE

therefore of

(Organization for

paramount importance.

The Council Recommendation on joining the G8 network of contact points with
24-hour service for combating high-tech crime
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95

is

just

one example of

this

Torsten Stein

cooperation. In addition, bilateral agreements and informal cooperation in identifying, arresting,

on the

prosecuting and sentencing terrorists continue to be necessary

international level.

A further aim of the German Law against Terrorism is

to protect the population as well as possible

and

to

minimize the vulnerability of

key points of infrastructure. However, the competencies created need to be used
continuously and with determination. Particularly in the areas of air security and
infrastructure protection, measures taken to date have brought about an easing of
tension. Close cooperation
authorities

between the Department of the

and the operators of key infrastructure

Interior, other security

facilities, as

well as airlines,

warrant both continuous updating on the threats faced and the development of
suitable strategies for countermeasures.

While

this article,

much

main focus of the measures addressed in
optimizing crisis management after a terrorist attack requires at least as

terrorist act

prevention

is

the

attention. Civil protection plays a central role in this context.

an Action Plan of the German Department of the
ties, i.e., all

Interior,

According to

key infrastructure

facili-

organizations and institutions of vital importance for the population

especially energy

and water facilities, the breakdown of which can cause a long last-

ing shortage of supply, material disturbance of public security

consequences for the population and the

State's structures

—

and other dramatic

are the center of at-

tention in this context. In the event of extensive catastrophes, attacks or other crisis
situations, federal

and regional (Lander)

bined. For this purpose, the

new

federal

civil

comProtection (Bundesamt

protection resources need to be

Bureau for

Civil

und Katastrophenhilfe) was created as a further pillar of
national security. The new bureau began its work in May of 2004. It can avail itself
of the Joint Information Center of the German Federal State and the Regions
(Gemeinsames Melde-und Lagezentrum des Bundes und der Lander, (GMLZ)),
which began operations in the autumn of 2002 and which can coordinate crisis
management (both information and countermeasures) in the scenarios menfur Bevolkerungsschutz

tioned above. 96

For information and warning purposes, the

gency Information

System

(Deutsches

GMLZ can utilize the German Emer-

Notfallvorsorge-Informationssystem),

which provides the public with precautionary information about rescue, evacuation

and supply

via the Internet

emergency situation

(e.g.,

and telephone

hotlines. In the case of

an extraordinary

an attack on a nuclear plant), a satellite based warning sys-

tem, in place since October 2001, can, within seconds, issue public warnings to be

broadcast on
rior

is

all

public television and radio stations.

The Department of the

Inte-

currently engaged in the development of other possible warning systems,

such as alerting phones or clocks, and coordinating protection measures. Together
with

its

European neighbors, Germany
45

is

developing defense concepts and
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participates in joint exercises that

form part of the program on the improvement of

cooperation in preventing and fighting terrorist threats of a chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear nature (e.g.,

ing radiological

and chemical

EURATOX 2002, a simulation exercise involvfrom

fallout resulting

a terrorist attack).

More attention is increasingly being paid to computer network attack, the relatively new form of information technology terrorism. Since most of the vital faciliof infrastructure

ties

— from

nuclear plants

traffic lights to

—

are computerized,

defense against attacks on these systems, the consequences of which can be catastrophic,
in

must have utmost

Germany, the Federal Bureau

priority. In

for Security

Information Technology (Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstech-

nik)

examines the potential

and prepares those

sensitivity of critical infrastructure

systems for defense against terrorist interference by creating framework plans or by
directly cooperating with the systems' operators.

The
rorism
cial

last

element of the Department of the Interior's Action Plan

at its roots.

Defense against Islamic terrorism

and ideological source.

support should be not the
tional

measures

Isolating terrorists

last,

is

most

is

fighting ter-

effective at its finan-

from their ideological and economic

but the foremost goal of both national and interna-

in fighting terrorism.

Conclusion

The Coalition
to the

against Terror

new "asymmetric"

cate respect for

must cooperate closely in order to respond effectively

threats

our nations face today. But

and advancement of human

it

needs also to advo-

rights in the countries that

form the

up political pressure against
oppressive regimes. By fostering democratic reforms and the development of the
rule of law, as well as by handing over power to the oppressed peoples themselves,
terrorist structures can more often than not be destroyed at the root, and true facultural base for international terrorism

natics can be cut off from their sources.

eration at

its

Union and

highest level in this area

its

It is

is

to build

beyond doubt that international coop-

of paramount importance. The European

Member States take their international responsibilities seriously and

are therefore involved in Operation

Oman,

and

Enduring Freedom

in Africa

are part of the Coalition against Terror in Afghanistan,

great material

and personnel commitment

and

in the

Gulf of

and demonstrate

to the International Security Assistance

Force for a sustainable pacification of Afghanistan.

The

fact that the

European Union

fore having to share competencies

eign States, creates

some

is

and

difficulties

not the "United States of Europe," therejurisdiction not with federated but sover-

and sometimes delay

in

necessary measures. But there can be no doubt that the European

46

achieving the

Union and

its

Torsten Stein

Member
will

States will live

remain a true and

up

and

to their international responsibilities in the future

reliable partner

of the Free World.
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PART III
THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

IV
The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Security vs.

Freedom of Navigation?

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction: Object

The Krakow,

and Purpose of the Proliferation

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

in

Poland, on

May 31, 2003.

'

Cambodian-registered vessel en route to

weapons of mass destruction
for Iraq.

2

As

(WMD)

was announced by President Bush

It is

action to the So San incident that occurred in

Security Initiative

generally conceived of as a

December 2002 and

Yemen

was released after

it

that involved a

suspected of illicitly transporting

components

that were ultimately destined

a matter of fact, the intercepting Spanish frigates,

searching, discovered

US re-

upon boarding and

SCUD missile parts on board the vessel. However, the So San

had become clear that the missiles, though coming from North

Korea, were destined for Yemen.

The announcement by President Bush triggered a series of meetings of the
(originally eleven and now fifteen 3 ) States participating in the initiative. During the
Brisbane meeting they seemed to be prepared to follow a proactive course of action
with the aim to effectively impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems,
and related materials. 4 However, a far more cautious approach was chosen during
the Paris meeting in September 2003. There the participating States agreed upon
the so-called "Interdiction Principles" which, in general terms, provide the political basis for unilateral

proliferation.

5

It

or concerted activities aimed at the prevention of

needs to be emphasized here that PSI

* Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law,

is

WMD

neither a treaty nor

US Naval War College.

some
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form of an international body,

vs.

Freedom of Navigation?

of all an international organization.

least

It is

to be

seen as a concerted effort by the participating States to supplement, not to substi-

and regimes dealing with the problem of

tute, existing treaties

tion.

WMD prolifera-

6

PSI's ultimate goal

is

their delivery systems,

to effectively "interdict the transfer or transport of

and

related materials to

and from

states

WMD,

and non-state actors

of proliferation concern." The term "states and non-state actors of proliferation

concern" refers to
[T]hose countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be
subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through:
efforts to

delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of
their delivery systems, or related materials.

As regards
term

and

"states of proliferation

refers to Iran

8

At

first

it is

more or

special international

in

glance, the

view of the

less

evident that this

to other States striving to acquire

WMD

term "non-state actors of prolifera-

tion concern" seems to cover transnational terrorists

However,

WMD,

7

concern"

and North Korea and

their delivery systems.

structures.

( 1

develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated

and

their organizational

fact that transnational terrorism

regime the correct understanding

vate persons, like the notorious Pakistani Dr. Khan,

9

is

that

and

it

is

subject to a

relates to all pri-

entities involved in

clandestine proliferation activities, regardless of a terrorist background. Therefore,

PSI

is

not to be mistaken for an exclusively counter-terrorism

the Initiative

may trigger

activity.

concerted actions of the participating States

reasonable grounds to suspect that,

e.g.,

ultimately destined to a terrorist group,

if

While

there are

WMD transported on board a vessel are
scope

its

is

certainly not limited to such

scenarios.

The means by which the

participating States intend to reach the Initiative's goal

comprise: exchange of information;

if necessary,

modification of the respective do-

mestic law and of international law; and "specific action."

Of course, exchange

of information

is

subject to the protection "of the confi-

dential character of classified information."
ticipating States to rapidly

a matter of course,

is

if they

If the

is

are close

usually classified

allies.

and not too

easily

shared

Equally important, and far from being

the willingness of the participating States to modify their do-

mestic law in order to enable
tive.

the principal readiness of the par-

exchange information should not be underestimated

because the information concerned
with other States even

Still,

them

to

fulfill

their

commitments under

the Initia-

modification of domestic rules does not suffice because rules and
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principles of international law prove either insufficient or an obstacle for the Initiative's objectives,

steps

the participating States have to be prepared to take the necessary

on the international

the United States

level. First efforts in that

and may eventually result

in

respect have been initiated

by

an amendment of the 1988 Conven-

tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation 10 at the end of 2005. n

The Initiative's core commitments, however, are laid down in Interdiction Principle 4 on "specific action," i.e., the participating States will:
Not transport or
Board

their

well as

own

assist in

the transport of

WMD;

vessels in their respective internal waters

on the high

seas, if there is

engaged in proliferation

and

territorial sea areas as

reasonable ground for suspicion that they are

activities;

Consider to provide consent to boarding of their vessels by the authorities of other
participating States;

Take measures against foreign

vessels in the sea areas covered

by

their territorial

sovereignty and in their respective contiguous zone; and

Take measures against foreign

At

first

glance,

problems

aircraft in their respective national airspace.

none of these commitments seems

—the more

so because the participating States have stressed that their in-

terdiction activities will be "consistent with

frameworks, including the

seem

UN

to widely agree that in

basis in the existing law.

12

are taken against vessels

and

that State's sovereignty.

13

.

.

.

relevant international law

is

sufficient

certainly correct insofar as interdiction measures

aircraft

and

and

Security Council." Indeed, international lawyers

view of its rather limited scope PSI finds a

This

Vessels flying a State's flag

State's

to imply insurmountable legal

belonging to one of the participating

aircraft

States.

bearing a State's markings are subject to

Accordingly, they

may be

visited

and searched by

that

organs in sea areas and in airspace not covered by the territorial sovereignty

of another State. The said position

is

also correct if the flag or

sented to interdiction measures by another State

14

or

if

home State has

con-

the foreign vessel or air-

craft

is

traveling in the internal waters or national airspace of a participating

State.

15

However, some doubts remain with regard to interdiction measures taken

against foreign vessels within the territorial sea because the rules of the law of the
sea

on enforcement measures by the

be.

These questions

will

coastal State are less clear than they

be addressed in the second part of this
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article.

seem

to

Moreover,
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the question arises whether States participating in PSI are excluded

and

ing foreign vessels

aircraft in high seas areas

true that, according to the
Paris, there

is

in international airspace.

It is

Still,

have for once and for

in

that they are prepared to interdict the transport of

WMD and related material in those areas
States

interdict-

wording of the Interdiction Principles agreed upon

no indication

longing to one of them.

and

from

does not necessarily

this

all

on board

if

excluded that

a vessel or aircraft not be-

mean

that the participating

possibility. Therefore, the third part

of this paper will deal with the legality of interdiction measures on the high seas

and
is

in international airspace.

important to

first

proliferation regime.

However, before dealing with these

will

be shown in the

first part,

the Initiative

ing a fundamentally novel approach by States sharing a

gard to the threat posed by the proliferation of

Some of the
fact that a

problems

and the international

establish the relationship of PSI

As

legal

is

far

it

anti-

from be-

common concern with re-

WMD and their delivery systems.

voices raising (legal) concerns with regard to PSI

seem

to ignore the

comparatively small group of States has a long history of close coopera-

WMD and their delivery sys-

tion with the

aim of preventing the

tems. PSI

but a small tessera in the mosaic that

is

proliferation of

is

the international anti-

proliferation regime.

The International Anti-Proliferation Regime
It is

a fact

all

too often ignored that there already exists a rather sophisticated inter-

national regime

aimed at the prevention of the proliferation of WMD. This regime

covers not only nuclear weapons and nuclear material but also chemical and biological

weapons, including their components,

related technology.

It

as well as delivery systems

consists of "hard law obligations"

menting agreements of a merely
formal agreements pertain to

mentioned, however, that there

and the

and of a number of supple-

Most of those formal and inspecific weapons and materials. It should be
are three further instruments that are based on a
political character.

comprehensive approach but that

will

not be dealt with here because they only in-

directly contribute to counter-proliferation of

WMD:

the International Ship

and

Code (ISPS Code), 16 the Container Security Initiative (CSI), 17 and the
"Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism" (C-TPAT) Program. 18
Port Facility

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material
According to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), 19 nuclear-weapon States are prohibited from making
rectly or indirectly, to

available, either di-

non-nuclear-weapon States "nuclear weapons or other nu-

clear explosive devices" (Article

I).

Non-nuclear-weapon
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under
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an obligation not to "manufacture or to otherwise acquire such weapons or devices" (Article
State

is

II).

According to Article

paragraph

III,

1,

a non-nuclear-weapon

obliged to "accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated

and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the

ment of its
ments

obligations

in force with

fulfill-

assumed under" the NPT. The IAEA has safeguards agree-

more than 145

States

around the world. Most of these are

comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT. Other
types of agreements are

known

as

item or

untary offer agreements. Also in place

is

a

facility

safeguards agreements and vol-

Model Additional Protocol to safeguards

agreements that grants the IAEA complementary verification authority. 20

The NPT-IAEA system is supplemented by the Zangger Committee and by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), both informal groups of States that aim at
strengthening the counter-proliferation efforts. The Zangger Committee 21 was
formed in 1971 and consists of 35 States. Its main task is to harmonize the interpretation of nuclear export control policies by specifying the meaning of Article III,
paragraph 2, of the NPT. Accordingly, the so-called "trigger list" 22 relates to source
or special fissionable materials and to equipment or materials especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials.

By

interpreting

and implementing

Article

paragraph

III,

to prevent the diversion of exported nuclear items
clear

weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices.

ported by one of the participating States

if

commitment

to re-transfer.

The Nuclear

the "trigger

list"

from peaceful purposes

helps

to nu-

Such material may only be ex-

three conditions are met:

explosive use assurance, (2) observance of the
(3)

2,

IAEA

( 1 )

non-

safeguards requirement, and

Suppliers

Group 23 comprises 40 nu-

clear supplier countries. It seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports. In view of
NSG's informal character the guidelines are not legally binding; they are, however,
implemented by the participating governments

that take the necessary decision at

the national level according to their respective domestic law.
Finally, there are

number of States,

two

draft conventions that, if ever accepted

by a representative

will certainly contribute to strengthening the international re-

gime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear material: the
Draft Convention for Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism
Fissile

Material Cut-Off Treaty

(FMCT).

(CNT) 24 and

the Draft

25

The Draft CNT would exclusively address acts by individuals. Therefore, its
scope would not include the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or
nuclear threats posed by States or intergovernmental organizations. States parties
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would be obliged

to cooperate in preventing or prosecuting acts of nuclear terror-

ism by, inter

adopting necessary

alia,

legislative

and technical measures

to protect

nuclear material, installations and devices, and to forestall unauthorized access to

them by

third parties.

It

would supplement the 1980 Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material. 26
Fissile material, e.g.,

enriched uranium,

is

a

key component in the development

of nuclear warheads. After the General Assembly of the United Nations had passed
a resolution

on the prohibition of fissile material

plosive devices

mament
fissile

27

for nuclear

weapons or other

ex-

an ad hoc committee was established by the Conference on Disar-

in 1998,

with a view to negotiating a treaty banning the production of

material for nuclear weapons. While

it is

unclear whether the

work on

the

FMCT will produce results, the FMCT would cap the amount of fissile materials in
nuclear weapons States and non-parties to the
to

plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium

non-fissile material (e.g., Tritium).

It

NPT. However,

it

would not apply

for non-explosive purposes

would not address

and

to

existing stockpiles.

Chemical and Biological Weapons
Chemical weapons and biological weapons are governed by the
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in

War of Asphyxiating,

Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (GP
1925), 28

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin

Destruction

(BTWC),

29

Weapons and on

their

and

1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical

CWC).

Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993

30

The Australia Group (AG) 31 is an informal arrangement of 39 States and the European Commission which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to
minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation. Its task is to ensure, through licensing measures on the export of certain
chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing
facilities and equipment, that exports of these items from their countries do not
contribute to the spread of CBW.
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Delivery Systems

With regard

to

WMD delivery systems, there

is

no

treaty or other legally binding

instrument either prohibiting or restricting the transfer of such delivery systems or
of related technologies. However, there are three informal arrangements aiming at
the prevention of their proliferation.

The

Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR) 32

is

an informal non-treaty

on the prevention of the proliferation of
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and of related technologies. Similar to
the Zangger Committee and the NSG, the MTCR is functioning on the basis of
association of 34 States that have agreed

guidelines that are

amended by an Equipment and Technology Annex.

In addition,

Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOC)
was adopted in November 2002. 33 The object and purpose of the HCOC is to curb
the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and to exercise maximum restraint in developing, testing, and deploying such missiles. 34
the

Security Strategies of NATO, the United States

and the European Union

At the end of this overview of the international regime

it

needs to be emphasized

that proliferation of

WMD and their delivery systems has been identified as a ma-

jor security threat in

NATO's new Strategic Concept of April

tional Security Strategy of September 2002,

36

1999, 35 in the

US Na-

and in the European Security Strategy

The US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction of December 2003 provides that: "U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the
threat and use of
by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies." The EU member States, according to the Euroof December 12, 2003.

37

WMD

pean Security

Strategy,

have recognized that "[a]ctive policies are needed to

new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic
rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention."

counter the
ters early,

Moreover, the European Union has adopted the
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction
tion, control

culture that fos-

EU Strategy Against Prolifera-

which provides for a strengthened identifica-

and interception of illegal

trafficking in

WMD. Hence, the European

Union is prepared to adopt "common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of WMD-related material"; to consider "measures aimed at controlling the transit and transshipment of sensitive materials";
and to support "international initiatives aimed at the identification, control and
interception of illegal shipments." 38

EU approach towards the proliferation issue may be less proactive than the
US approach. Still, both EU strategies clearly indicate that the European Union will
The
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not

restrict itself to

armed

force

diplomatic means but that

whenever

this

may prove

vs.

it is

Freedom of Navigation?

prepared to also make use of

necessary.

PSI as a further Cornerstone of the International Counter-Proliferation

Regime
It

has been

shown

that PSI

is

a

common effort of a group of States that fits well into

the already existing counter-proliferation regime. 39 Subject to the final determination of its legality

under international law, PSI

is

without doubt to be considered an

additional step towards an effective prevention of the proliferation of
their delivery systems. Its informal character

WMD and

enhances the participating

ability to flexibly react to proliferation activities

by

States

States'

and individuals of con-

cern and thus contributes to an effective implementation of their national and international security strategies.

Chemical

Biological

Weapons

Weapons

AG
GP

1925

WMD

PSI

NPT

PSI

MTCR

Threat

ZC

HCOC

NSG
r

^

Wassenaar

Nuclear

Delivery

Weapons

Systems

Figure

1:

PSI as Part of the International Counter-Proliferation Regime

Interdicting the Transport of

The

success of PSI

is,

WMD in the Territorial Sea

of course, dependent on the firm political will of the partici-

pating States. However,

some of them,

e.g.,

Russia and Germany, have continu-

ously stressed that their active participation in the Initiative presupposes the
legality

of the measures taken under international law. As long as interdiction mea-

sures are taken in the respective territories, national airspaces,

they are in conformity with international law.
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and

The same holds

internal waters

true

if

ships

and
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aircraft are intercepted in international sea areas

and

in international airspace ei-

home

ther by, or with the consent of, their respective flag or

However, when

it

State.

41

comes to intercepting foreign vessels within the territorial sea,

the question arises whether the law of the sea provides a sufficient legal basis.

needs to be emphasized that interference with foreign shipping, even

if it

It

occurs in

the territorial sea of the intercepting State, will always have to be measured against
the freedom of navigation, especially against the well-established right of innocent
passage. Since

all

States participating in PSI are heavily

and unimpeded maritime commerce, they

lanes
fringe

upon those freedoms and

rights.

dependent upon

will certainly

The precedent they

set

free sea

not too easily in-

may be

copied by

other States and could contribute to a

new form of "creeping jurisdiction" that may

ultimately prove counterproductive.

It is,

therefore, vital for PSI that interdiction

measures are in compliance with the regime of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the

and

in the

territorial sea as set forth in the

Law of the

Sea 42 (1982

LOS Convention)

corresponding customary law. 43

Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense, the right of coastal States
to interfere with foreign vessels in their territorial sea

27 of the 1982
State

LOS

may exercise

rest persons,

Convention.

44

its

is

According to the

criminal jurisdiction

on board

regulated in Articles 25 and

latter provision, the coastal

a foreign ship,

conduct investigations, and temporarily detain the

i.e., it

may ar-

vessel, if

crimes

have been committed on board during passage that impact upon the coastal
In view of the fact that coastal States are entitled to prevent infringement
alia, their

customs,

21, paragraph 1),

ing

fiscal,

State.

of, inter

immigration and sanitary laws and regulations (Article

enforcement measures taken against vessels suspect of transport-

WMD, WMD components or delivery systems, do not seem to pose any prob-

lems. If the States participating in PSI enact legislation prohibiting the transport of

such material they would be in a position to enforce these regulations against suspect vessels.

It

may, however, not be

left

out of consideration that the mere breach

of the domestic (criminal) law of the coastal State will justify the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction only in cases where the crime has been committed

its

on board a

ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving the coastal State's internal waters (Article 27,

paragraph

2). If

the vessel concerned has not

left

a port of the

coastal State the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, according to Article 27, para-

graph

1, is

limited to one of the following cases:

(a) if the

consequences of the crime extend to the coastal

(b) if the

crime

is

State;

of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good

order of the territorial

sea;
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(c) if the assistance

Freedom of Navigation?

vs.

of the local authorities has been requested by the master

of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d)

if

such measures are necessary for the suppression of

illicit traffic

in

narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

In the context of PSI, the coastal State will therefore

prohibited transport of

subparagraph

WMD and related material meets the conditions of either

or (b).

(a)

be obliged to prove that the

An analogy to subparagraph

(d)

is

not justified in view of

the restricted scope of that exception. In view of the fact that the coastal State's en-

forcement jurisdiction in the

complete, 45 and in view

territorial sea is in principle

of the dangerous character of such cargoes, the coastal State will in most cases be in
a position to provide sufficient evidence that the said conditions are met.

should not be

out of consideration that there

left

is

Still, it

no general and complete prohi-

bition of the transport of such material. Therefore, the coastal State that wishes to
interdict the transport of

WMD through

its

territorial sea

should give prior

cation of its domestic legal rules prohibiting such transports.
If

ship,

the crime has been

committed before entry into the

proceeding from a foreign port,

is

measures because the transport of

manent crime,

i.e.,

territorial sea

and

if

the

only passing through the territorial sea

without entering internal waters, the coastal State
the ship. 47 However, this rule will in

notifi-

46

most

may not take any steps on board

cases not be an obstacle for interdiction

WMD or of delivery systems constitutes a per-

the perpetration continues during passage.

Finally, the question

remains whether the coastal State would be entitled to take

enforcement measures against foreign vessels by referring to a "non-innocent"
passage

no domestic law or regulation prohibiting the transport of the
question. According to Article 25, paragraph 1, of the 1982 LOS Conven-

if

items in

there

is

tion, the coastal State

passage which
is

is

not innocent

"may take

if it is

paragraph

2 which,

e.g.,

"prejudicial to the peace,

2.

if the

vessel

is

engaged

Transporting missiles or

territorial sea to

whether interdiction

in

one of the

WMD

is

48

activities listed in Arti-

not mentioned in paragraph
list

of activities that would

some authors have serious doubts as
measures may be based upon the assumption of the nonAccordingly,

innocent character of the transport of WMD. 49 However, this position
convincing. According to
nuclear, chemical
stitutes a

prevent

good order or security of the coastal

the United States considers "an exhaustive

render passage not innocent."
to

its

not innocent." Article 19 of the Convention provides that passage

State" (paragraph 1) or
cle 19,

the necessary steps in

and

UN Security Council Resolution

biological weapons, as well as their

threat to international peace

64

and

1540

50

is

not very

"proliferation of

means of delivery, con-

security." Daniel Joyner argues,
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therefore, that

it

"should be relatively unproblematic

overcoming seagoing

when

waters

liferation."

graph

1,

there

51

will

is

Although the coastal

State's reaction,

according to Article 25, para-

be limited to "preventing" such innocent passage,

coastal State's laws

does not

this

mean

may only be ordered to immediately leave the territorial sea.

merely applies in cases of warships not complying with the

restriction

torial sea,

of innocent passage through their territorial

a reasonable basis for suspicion that they are involved in pro-

that the suspect vessel

Such a

vessels' right

... for coastal states to justify

and regulations because warships, even

enjoy sovereign immunity.

52

if within

a foreign terri-

With regard to merchant vessels that do not

enjoy sovereign immunity, the coastal State will therefore be entitled to take

all

necessary steps, including the arrest of the vessel and seizure of its cargo. 53

Interference with Foreign Vessels

As

the

seen,

Principles
States

54

interdiction

and Aircraft in High Seas Areas

measures agreed upon in the Paris Interdiction

are consistent with existing international law. 55

do not

The

participating

yet envisage interdiction activities in high seas areas or in interna-

tional airspace unless their

own vessels and aircraft are concerned or unless the flag

or home State has consented in a boarding or interception by another participating
State.

BBC

As

a matter of fact, such consent

China

September 2003.

in

56

was the

legal basis for the interception the

Consent, including presumed consent, will also

be the decisive legal argument for the interception, boarding, search, diversion,

and

arrest of Liberian-

and Panamanian-flagged

vessels according to bilateral

agreements concluded by the United States with the two
true for an

amendment of the 1988 Convention

Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

pected to be agreed
It

upon

in the

are reasonable

57

The same holds

for the Suppression of

(SUA Convention)

58

Unlawful

that

is

ex-

end of 2005.

needs to be emphasized here that no considerable

if there

States.

legal

problems are involved

grounds for suspicion that a vessel encountered on the high

seas (or a civil aircraft in international airspace)

is

engaged in the transport of

WMD and their delivery systems and that the cargo

is

destined to transnational ter-

rorists.

There

is

today widespread agreement that in case of a terrorist background

interception, boarding, search, or arrest of vessels

and

aircraft finds its legal basis

either in the (inherent) right of self-defense or in the international

measures

(in

law of counter-

combination with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373

(2001) 59 ).

However,

it

remains to be seen whether the PSI States would be entitled to also

interdict the transport of

WMD on the high seas or in international airspace
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there

home

background nor

neither a terrorist

is

(presumed) consent by the

a

flag or

State.

Law of the Sea
Merchant
flag State.

on the high seas are subject to the sovereignty of their respective
The same holds true with regard to civil aircraft in international air-

vessels
60

space. 61 Therefore, third States are not entitled to interfere with such vessels
aircraft unless

such interference
62

or by a special agreement.
transport of

is

justified

There

is,

by the consent of the

as yet,

no express

WMD and their delivery systems.

be equated with piracy.

64

63

flag

or

home State

treaty prohibition of the

Moreover, such

activities

Therefore, the only provision of the 1982

10,

paragraph

1

(d)

and

Hence, as was the case

(e).

must be without nationality

vessel

show

its flag, it

ship.

It

must, in

or,

though

in the

may not

LOS Conven-

tion serving as a basis for interdicting such transports in high seas areas
1

is

Article

So San incident, 65 the

flying a foreign flag or refusing to

be of the same nationality as the intercepting war-

reality,

remains to be seen whether the proposed amendments of the

Convention

66

modification of the

will also result in a

ute to the emergence of a

new

LOS Convention

1

10 of the 1982

SUA

or contrib-

customary international law. At present,

rule of

however, the international law of the sea does not provide a
scope of Article

and

legal basis

beyond the

LOS Convention.

Self- Defense

As

in cases

basis

if

WMD
be

with a terrorist background, the right of self-defense will serve as a legal

the conditions triggering that right are met. Hence,

is

sufficiently linked to a given threat

justified,

ing, leaving

case

if

a

because there

vessel

State's territorial sea

and

is

its

interdiction will

be a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelm-

sailing in the

if there

in order to effectively

all

immediate

vicinity of the outer limit of a

are reasonable grounds for suspicion that there

weapon on board. Under

certainly be entitled to take
sel,

the transport of

no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." 67 This will be the

merchant

a nuclear

will

of an armed attack

if

is

the right of self-defense the coastal State will

necessary measures, including the capture of the ves-

counter the threat. 68 The same holds true

if

the suspect

shown an aggressive attitude and has given sufficient evidence that it would make use (or would consent in
the use) of
as soon as it disposes of such weapons. Accordingly, the Cuban

vessel

is

destined to a third State whose government has

WMD

Quarantine could have been
interceptive

69

justified as a necessary

— not preventive—

distant future the

self-defense.

70

It

measure of preemptive/

may well be that in some near or

customary right of self-defense will also apply to less immediately

threatening circumstances.

The US National
66

Security Strategy

may

then be
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characterized as the

first

precedent contributing to a progressive development of

international law. For the time being, however, coercive measures of a purely pre-

ventive character are not in compliance with the right of self-defense.

shipment of

The mere

WMD and their delivery systems will in most cases not meet the three-

fold test of immediacy, necessity

and proportionality. 71 Hence, except

for extraor-

dinary circumstances, an extension of PSI to interdictions of foreign vessels and
aircraft in the

high sea and in international airspace cannot be based upon the right

of self-defense. 72

It

needs to be emphasized that any extensive interpretation, claim

or application of the right of self-defense to situations traditionally not covered by
that right
certain

may serve as a welcome precedent for other States. Even if they display a

conduct that the PSI States are unwilling to

most unpleasant and
their prior conduct.

difficult situation

Moreover,

all

tolerate, the latter will

be in a

because they will certainly be reminded of

States, including the

PSI States, should be aware

of the tremendous achievements of the past three years. Prior to September 11,

200 1 most international lawyers and governments would have agreed that the right
of self-defense does not apply to attacks by a group of private persons. Today no-

body would doubt

that this

is

the case.

A further extension of the right of self-de-

fense to situations not meeting the test of imminence

would not only be premature

but, ultimately, counterproductive.

Counter-Measures Short of Serf-Defense
However, the above findings do not rule out the
justifying the interdiction of

airspace that

is all

too often

possibility of a further legal basis

WMD transports on the high seas and in international
left

out of consideration: counter-measures short of

self-defense.

Admittedly, in

its

Resolution 1540 the

the boarding or capture of vessels
their delivery systems.

tion

—

73

Had

and aircraft suspected of transporting

—the resolution would be

plea for an express authorization
are at stake

is

unrealistic. It

is

However,

at

of a given na-

However, the continuous

based upon an erroneous perception of the

UN sys-

a functioning institutionalization of the use of

may be an ideal worth working for.

would amount to wishful
the People's Republic of China will ever vote in favor

present the system
e.g.,

aircraft

by the Security Council whenever security issues

measures short of self-defense,

thinking to believe that,

and

a perfect legal basis. 74

tem of collective security. Of course,
force, including

WMD and

the Security Council provided such an authoriza-

either in general terms or with regard to vessels

tionality

is

far

of a Security Council resolution aimed
rea

UN Security Council has not authorized

from

perfect.

It

at the proliferation activities

and authorizing the interdiction of North Korean ships and

by North Ko-

aircraft suspected

of being engaged in such transports. Moreover, the present system of international
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law

is

far

from excluding

unilateral or multilateral action outside the

UN system of

collective security.

Be that

ment

as

it

may, with Resolution 1540 there

unambiguously

that

now exists a legally binding docu-

specifies the obligations of all States with regard to the

prevention of the proliferation of

WMD by non-State actors. Contrary to the views

75

some politicians and international lawyers 76 the Security Council is
not limited in making use of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in sit-

expressed by

uations in which a specific State threatens the peace. In other words, the Security

Council may, in view of its primary responsibility for peace and international secua quasi-legislator if the only

rity, act as

general and abstract resolution.

The

means

to counter a threat to the peace

international

community has not

is

a

protested

against either Resolution 1373 or Resolution 1540, thus acquiescing in the perfor-

mance of such powers.
It

may be

recalled that, in Resolution 1540, the Security Council, acting

Chapter VII, has identified a

series

of obligations with regard to the prevention of

WMD proliferation by non-State actors
1

[A] 11 States shall refrain

under

77
:

from providing any form of support to non-State

actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological

weapons and

their

means

of delivery;

2.

...

all

States, in

accordance with their national procedures,

and enforce appropriate

shall

adopt

which prohibit any non-State

effective laws

actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or

use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,
in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to

the foregoing activities, participate in

them

as

engage in any of

an accomplice,

assist

or

finance them;

3.

...

all

States shall take

and enforce

effective

measures to establish

domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
biological

weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing

appropriate controls over related materials and to this end

(a)

Develop and maintain appropriate

and secure such items
(b)

effective

shall:

measures to account for

in production, use, storage or transport;

Develop and maintain appropriate
measures;
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Develop and maintain appropriate

(c)

enforcement
through

national

efforts to detect, deter,

international

when

the

necessary,

illicit

such items in accordance with their

in

and

authorities

legal

border controls and law

prevent and combat, including

cooperation

and brokering

trafficking

effective

legislation

and consistent with

international law;

develop,

(d) Establish,

review and

maintain

appropriate

effective

national export and trans-shipment controls over such items,

including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit,

trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and
services related to such export

as financing,

would contribute to proliferation, as well as
end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing

and transporting
establishing

and trans-shipment such

that

appropriate criminal or

civil

penalties for violations of such export

control laws and regulations ....

Accordingly, every State that either allows or otherwise
sists in

the transport of

violate

its

—

actively or passively

as-

WMD and their delivery systems by non-State actors will

international obligations under Resolution 1540.

on an assertion that the
comply with its duties

—

A justification

means

to

immaterial because Resolution 1540, in paragraph

7,

State in question does not possess the necessary
is

based

specifically:

Recognizes that
this resolution

some

States

may require

assistance in

implementing the provisions of

within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer

assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal

and regulatory
fulfilling

infrastructure,

implementation experience and/or resources for

the above provisions.

Therefore, a State that knowingly allows the transport of

WMD and of their deliv-

ery systems or that does not intervene by preventing such transports
sels

flying

its

flag

or on board aircraft bearing

its

on board ves-

markings commits an

internationally wrongful act. According to the well-established principles of the

law of State responsibility, 78 as codified in the 2002 rules prepared by the International

Law Commission

law

entitled to take the necessary

is

(ILC), 79 the State injured by a violation of international

wrongdoer to comply with

its

countermeasures in order to either induce the

obligations or to reestablish the legal status quo ante

instead of the delinquent State. 80 Since

all

forms of

WMD proliferation activities by

non-State actors are to be considered a threat to peace and international security

69

The Proliferation Security Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation?
and since the vast majority of

States, including the People's

Republic of China,

agrees that such activities pose a considerable danger, the category of "injured
State"

is

not limited to potential target States. Consequently, countermeasures and

reprisals involving visit, search
craft for the

mere reason

and capture may be taken against

vessels

and

air-

that they are flying the delinquent State's flag or that they

However,

are bearing that State's markings (genuine link).

in

view of the impor-

tance of the freedom of navigation and overflight such measures must be necessary

and

strictly

proportionate. That will only be the case

grounds for suspicion that the
illicit

of

activities

vessels or aircraft

WMD transportation,

i.e.,

if

there are reasonable

concerned are indeed engaged

in

that they are acting without the legal

authority of any State. 81

Conclusions

There are some

who are skeptical about the

Proliferation Security Initiative,

they consider a too proactive and, thus, dangerous undertaking.
also agree that proliferation of

which

However, they

WMD and their delivery systems constitutes a con-

crete threat to international security.
Initiative

82

Still,

they are not prepared to admit that the

has been built on a sound legal basis. PSI, as

it

now stands,

in perfect

is

conformity with both the international law of the sea and, though in exceptional
cases only, the right of self-defense.

Its legal

basis has further

been strengthened by

UNSC Resolution 1540, thus enabling the participating States to extend their interdiction activities to the high seas and to international airspace. A fortiori, they may
interdict transports of

WMD and their delivery systems in areas covered by their

respective territorial sovereignty,

Such interdictions

sea areas.

rial

are reasonable

i.e.

in their national airspace

eration activities not legally authorized

and

and

in their territo-

—wherever conducted—presuppose

grounds for suspicion that the vessel or

principle far too important

and

aircraft

is

that there

engaged

in prolif-

by any State. The freedom of navigation

vital for the

is

a

national economies and for national

multilateral security interests to be interfered with easily.

Of course,

the silver bullet

is

a treaty based approach.

As

seen, the United States

has succeeded in concluding bilateral agreements with the two most important flag

of convenience States
lateral

agreements

—

will follow,

terdict the transport of

the

Liberia

and Panama. 83

thus enabling the

US

to be expected that further bi-

Coast Guard to effectively in-

WMD and of WMD-related cargoes by non-State actors.

IMO member States succeed in amending the

be a multilateral treaty serving as a further
highest proliferation concern,
to

It is

e.g.,

conclude or accede to such

1988

legal basis.

North Korea and
treaties.

70

If

SUA Convention there will
However, the

Iran, will hardly

States of the

be prepared

For an indefinite period of time,
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interdictions involving those States

and

their shipping

based upon the rules and principles identified in
delicate character they should,
stricted

and aviation

this article. In

will

have to be

view of their highly

however, be conducted in a most cautious and

re-

manner.
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V
Limits on the Use of Force in Maritime

Operations in Support of

WMD

Counter-Proliferation Initiatives

Craig H. Allen*

We could have other missile crises in the future
different circumstances.

own
tries

But if we are

to

—

different kinds,

he successful then,

if we

no doubt, and under

are going to preserve our

we will need friends, we will need supporters, we will need counthat believe and respect us and will follow our leadership.
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
national security,

1

Introduction

On

May 31, 2003, President Bush invited a number of like-minded States to

join in a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to counter the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction

hands of rogue regimes and
United

States, together

(WMD)

and prevent them from

terrorist organizations.

with eight

NATO

allies

3

and

2

falling into the

In the following year, the

Australia, lapan,

and Singa-

pore, participated in a series of PSI planning sessions, experts' meetings, exercises

and operations to develop and

refine the initiative.

On September 4, 2003, the PSI

participating States adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles (reproduced in

* Judson Falknor Professor of Law, University of

Washington School of Law, Seattle,
Washington. After the paper was submitted, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a
new instruction which superseded CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01 A on which this article was based.
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Appendix

I),

in

which they agreed to "take

als."

The

support of interdic-

WMD, their delivery systems, or related materi-

tion efforts regarding cargoes of
4

specific actions in

and

"specific actions" are to include vessel boardings at sea

in port. All

such boardings are to be conducted in compliance with applicable international

and national

laws. 5

Soon

after the PSI

Panama, Liberia and the Marshall

was

Islands,

half of the world's shipping capacity

released, three

which

open

registry nations,

more than

collectively represent

by tonnage, entered into

agreements

bilateral

with the United States that will allow the United States to conduct PSI boardings of
vessels flagged in those States while in international waters. 6 Cyprus, Croatia

Belize

soon entered into similar agreements. By the time of the

meeting of the PSI States

in

Krakow, Poland on

anniversary

first

2004, sixty- two States had

and the Russian Federation had joined the

signaled their support for the PSI
nal

May 31

origi-

7

group of core participants. The 9/11 Commission embraced the PSI and

ommended that it be extended.

8

and

rec-

In addition, the United Nations Security Council

legitimated the core principles of the PSI by unanimously passing Resolution 1540

(reproduced in Appendix

II),

calling

on

all

States to criminalize possession of

WMD by, or the transfer or transport of WMD

to,

non-State actors. 9 The resolu-

on non-flag-States any new interdiction authority
over vessels engaged in transporting
and delivery systems on the high seas. 10
tion stopped short of conferring

WMD

A

proposal to add

WMD interdiction authority to the

1988 Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 11
is

presently under consideration. 12

As the PSI matures, maritime boardings under the Statement of Interdiction
Principles

may present

a

tant but non-legal issue,

number of practical and
is

legal issues.

the safety of the boarding teams,

The

who

first,

will

an impor-

be exposed

not only to the risks associated with boarding potentially noncompliant vessels
sea (rather than in the comparative safety of a port), but
risk

might

now

at

also face the

of exposure to radiological, biological or chemical materials and explosive de-

vices.

The second

issue,

which

is

related to the

first,

concerns the adequacy of

boarding platforms, equipment and trained personnel to conduct the necessary
detection, surveillance, screening, boarding, searching

and seizure of vessels,

car-

goes and crews, while also carrying out the multitudinous other missions already

imposed on the armed

forces. 13

The

third issue that could be presented in

cases concerns the scope of a State's authority to board
its

some

and search foreign vessels in

ports and coastal waters, or to permit other States to conduct boardings in their

coastal waters,
terrogate,
flag State

tion.

and the authority of States other than the

board and

seize vessels

on the high

seas,

with or without consent of the

or master of the vessel or the authority of a

The fourth

flag State to intercept, in-

UN Security Council resolu-

area requiring examination will arise in cases where
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or missile delivery materials are discovered during a boarding, and concerns the

handling and disposition of those materials and the possible actions to be taken
against the vessel

and the owner and crew found

to be involved in transporting

WMD. The final issue— and the subject of this paper—concerns the legal limits on
the use of force in carrying out

WMD interception operations. Analysis of some of

on added urgency in light of the fact that some US critics
of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 14 have urged the US Senate not to

these questions has taken

consent to accession to the treaty, in part because in the

critics'

opinion the terms

of the treaty would undermine the PSI. 15

Depending on the vessel's location,

flag

and type, the threat level presented, and

the goals of the mission, maritime detection, interception
tions in support of the PSI

and enforcement opera-

may involve a variety of Department of Defense (DoD)

and/or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) platforms and personnel. At-sea

measures to intercept vessels suspected of transporting

WMD by DoD or DHS

could potentially be carried out under one or more of the following frameworks:
(1)

boardings conducted pursuant to consent by the vessel's

State or vessel master; (2)

flag State, the coastal

maritime interception operations (MIO) to enforce em-

UN

bargoes imposed under the operative terms of a resolution by the

Council or similar authority;

(E-MIO);
right of

17

(4)

16

(3)

"expanded" maritime interception operations

maritime law enforcement operations (MLE); 18

approach and

visit;

19

Security

(6) the

(5) the

peacetime

customary law of countermeasures

(self-

help); 20 (7) the right of individual or collective self-defense; or (8) the belligerent's
right of visit

and search

for

contraband under the law of neutrality.

Vessel interceptions and boardings by naval vessels are generally carried out by
visit,

board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams drawn from the

Forces.

21

Boarding teams from

US Navy

platforms

may

US Maritime

include Navy, Marine

Corps and Coast Guard personnel. Coast Guard interception and boarding teams

may also operate from Coast Guard boats or cutters or from allied naval vessels.
most

cases,

In

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) on naval vessels

serve under the operational or tactical control of the cognizant Coast

Guard com-

mand authority when conducting boardings. In cases not calling for law enforcement measures, however, the LEDET may operate under DoD control, under the
22

Coast Guard's statutory authority to provide assistance to other agencies. 23
Experience has shown that interceptions and boardings by Navy and Coast

Guard

units occasionally require the use of force to

in self-defense.

A number of standing and

overcome noncompliance or

situation-specific

documents promul-

gated by competent authorities establish doctrine and provide guidance applicable in situations involving the use of force during interception

operations by

DoD

and Coast Guard

units.
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24

and boarding

At the same time, international law

Limits on the Use of Force

and US municipal law impose limits on the use of force. Which laws and doctrines
apply will depend on the particular situation, though some principles apply in virtually

all

situations. This article

examines the

legal limits

maritime interception and law enforcement operations.

on the use of force

It first

in

provides the reader

with an introduction to the nature of maritime interception and boarding operations, before turning to

an examination of the international and

garding the use of force

might

arise in the

at sea.

course of

It

US authorities re-

then applies those authorities to situations that

WMD maritime interception operations.

Nature of Maritime Interception and Boarding Operations

WMD maritime interception operations by the United States can be traced back at
least as far as the

by the US Navy

1962 quarantine proclaimed by President Kennedy and enforced
to halt the

shipment of Soviet offensive missiles to Cuba. 25 Navy

doctrine notes that the term "quarantine" was later dropped from the planning ter-

minology in favor of maritime interception operations. 26 Contemporary maritime
interception operations by the
gal authority (usually a

Navy are characterized by:

UN Security Council resolution);

( 1 )

the source of their

(2) the principle

le-

of pro-

means and ends; (3) the principle of impartiality; 27 and (4) a
effectiveness. 28 Only the National Command Authorities

portionality between

commitment to
("NCA") (the President or Secretary of Defense) can authorize US forces to conduct MIO. 29 Once the NCA approves US participation, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff designates the combatant commander for the relevant geographic
area to carry out the MIO. 30 The authorization will address the level of force that
may be used to carry out the MIO, the cargo or ships within the MIO prohibition,
the geographic limits of the operation

found to be

in violation of the

inevitably influenced

by

and the disposition of any cargo or ships

governing resolution. Planning such operations

political constraints

and resource

limits.

WMD or deliv-

Typically, the interception of a vessel suspected of transporting

ery systems will be based

on an

intelligence finding

is

which

is

later

developed

through surveillance and reconnaissance, before moving to the "stop-and-search"
phase of MIO. 31 For example, a vessel observed loading suspicious cargo in a port

might

later

be tracked by

bed sensors.
will

satellite, aircraft, radar,

surface ship, submarine, or sea-

When the vessel is encountered by an intercepting vessel or aircraft, it

be visually inspected for evidence of identity and

might be followed by

a radio inquiry, to

flag.

Visual surveillance

determine or confirm
32

its

name,

registry,

The information obtained
can then be checked against available information and intelligence databases. The
vessel's registry might also be confirmed with the flag State (if cooperative), and its
homeport,

last port,

next port, cargo and passengers.
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claimed next port of call might be contacted to determine whether the vessel has

an advance notice of arrival and a copy of its cargo manifest.

filed

main, the vessel

may be

If suspicions re-

ordered to heave to and stand by for a boarding.

A VBSS team 33 consisting of Navy and perhaps Marine Corps and Coast Guard
LEDET personnel may be sent over by small boat or helicopter. If the MIO on
commander concludes the boarding will be opposed or non-compliant, 34
the VBSS team may be augmented by special operations forces. 35 SEAL and Marine
Corps Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) members assigned to helicopter
scene

assault force

teams are trained to fast-rope from helicopters to the deck of the

ship (vertical take-downs), engage

gain control of the vessel.

36

and neutralize any

hostile forces aboard,

and

Throughout the boarding, supporting helicopters

hover overhead, with snipers stationed to provide cover to the boarding team.
Alternatively, special operations personnel

small boat.

may

"breach" the suspect vessel by

37

When the suspect ship

under control, a chemical, biological and radiological

is

(CBR) team and/or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team might be placed
aboard to sweep the vessel before the VBSS boarding begins. Once the VBSS team is
aboard,

all

personnel on the boarded vessel are accounted for by the

team, and the sweep team conducts an

initial safety

VBSS security

inspection (ISI) to confirm the

38

The VBSS team members then examine the
vessel's registry and cargo documents. Under some circumstances, the boarding
may extend to a search of all man-sized spaces, and an inspection of the cargo. In
boarding can be conducted

rare cases, the vessel

more

safely.

may be

detailed examination.

39

diverted to a port or other sheltered location for a

Diversion

may be necessary to

search a vessel trans-

porting containerized cargo since at-sea container inspections are at best
cult.

40

If the

native

band

is

is

boarding team has grounds for inspecting such cargo, the better

often to divert the vessel to a port. Diversion
discovered. If evidence of a crime

is

diffi-

alter-

may also be ordered if contra-

discovered in the course of a

visit,

boarding or search personnel with law enforcement authority (the Coast Guard

LEDET or foreign law enforcement agents) may be called on to arrest the offenders
and

seize the vessel

and

cargo.

Authority for and Limits on the Use of Force in

Maritime Interceptions and Boardings

Any given approach and boarding operation on
livery systems

a vessel to intercept

WMD or de-

could combine elements of the maritime interception and maritime

law enforcement doctrines. Depending on the response by the master and crew of
the suspect vessel, such operations can also raise questions regarding the source of
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on any use of force by the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard members of the team. 41 The authority to conduct an interception and
boarding42 must be distinguished from the authority for using force in such operathe applicable rules

The authority to use force in an interception, boarding, search and seizure
may derive from (1) a State's right under customary international law and the

tions.

State's

municipal law to use force as necessary to carry out law enforcement ac-

tions; (2) a

UN

Security Council resolution providing such authority; 43 (3) the

State's inherent right

UN Charter; 44

of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the

or (4) the unit's or individual's right of self-defense. Depending on the circumstances, the exercise of force

may be governed by international law,

the laws of the

boarding State (the constitution, statutes and regulations) and any doctrine and
guidance promulgated by the service or services carrying out the operation. The

common denominator

running through

all

those authorities

any action taken must be necessary to achieve

a legitimate

is

two centuries ago, other

but

if a State's

States will

mandate

end and

under the circumstances. As Chief Justice John Marshall opined
case

the

in a

is

that

reasonable

Hovering Act

oppose measures that are unreasonable,

enforcement measures are "reasonable and necessary to secure their

laws from violation, they will be submitted to." 45

US

Doctrines on Use of Armed and Police Force

In addition to limits

and

tion

on the use of force under international law and the Constitu-

statutes of the

United States (discussed below), members of the

DHS

must comply with applicable

their

command

rules of
fully

authorities. 46

explained below,

subordinate

command

ROE

directives regarding the use of force issued

At the

engagement (ROE) and

DoD and

outset, a distinction

rules

must be made between

on the use of force. 47 As more
established by appropriate national and

and

are generally

by

policies

authorities to guide the

armed

forces in the use of force in

homeland defense missions. The rules on the use of
force (RUF) for DoD elements and the Coast Guard Use of Force Policy (CGUFP)
are established by competent authorities to provide guidance on the use of force in
carrying out law enforcement and other civil support missions in support of homeland security that do not call for the traditional use of armed force. It is also important to recognize that not every use of force by a member of the armed forces
constitutes an application of "armed force" under the UN Charter and the law of
armed conflict. 48 The focus of this article is on "police" force directed against pricarrying out the national and

vate vessels or individuals

who may be

"armed" force against the territorial

The

article takes the position that

involved in transporting

integrity or political

it is

not

independence of a State. 49

the mission, not the uniform
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actor, that determines
trols that

how the force should be

classified

and which doctrine con-

use of force.

Rules of Engagement

(ROE)

may establish to delineate
own naval, ground and air

Rules of engagement are "directives that a government

and limitations under which

the circumstances

forces will initiate and/or continue

quate

combat engagement with enemy forces." 50 Ade-

ROE appropriate to the situation are vital to mission success and protection

of United States and allied

assets.

Even

deficiencies can prove devastating, as

so, readiness, training

was learned

the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon,
attack

its

on USS Cole in 2000.

failure to

obey controlling

form Code of Military

lated an internal

and re-learned

forces are well aware that

any

ROE is punishable as an orders violation under the Uni(UCMJ). 53 Additionally,

Justice

UCMJ.

bombing of
following the al Qaeda

in the 1983 terrorist

Members of the armed

ROE may

lates the applicable

charges under the

52

51

and implementation

54

a service

member who vio-

lose affirmative defenses to assault or

However, the

fact that official

homicide

may have

conduct

vio-

agency directive does not mean the conduct was unreasonable un-

Amendment or a violation of international law. 55
Although much of the ROE doctrine and guidance is classified,

der the Fourth

comments can be made. The ROE applicable to

a given situation

is

a

few general

typically

drawn

command authorities, and may include rules proor combined command authorities. The three commonly cited

from national and subordinate
mulgated by joint

ROE are national policy objectives, operational requirements and the relevant law. The ROE include the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), which in-

bases for

cludes both self-defense and mission accomplishment rules, and any supplemental
rules of engagement for specific operations, missions or projects. 56

The SROE ap-

ply to military operations outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

even during peacetime. 57 The

ROE

also

govern actions to be taken by

US

forces

during military homeland defense (HD) operations in the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 58

ROE do not apply to members of the armed forces when con-

ducting military assistance to
port

of

civil

civil

authorities missions, including missions in sup-

law enforcement agencies

circumstances the

SROE are also

(discussed

applicable to Coast

below). 59

Guard

Under some

units. 60

Naval units participating in multinational operations might find themselves operating under limitations

of Engagement

62

or

imposed by the

UN Security Council,

some other form of combined ROE.

63

61

the

NATO Rules

Like other

ROE,

the

rules for naval units participating in multinational operations will include mission

accomplishment and self-defense ROE. 64 The need

83

for

common ROE

doctrine in
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such operations has long been recognized; 65 however, the challenges of developing

ROE for multinational forces can be daunting. 66
ROE must conform to the relevant international
tional law" includes applicable international

international humanitarian law during an
for strategic, operational

more

frequently are,
In

by

restrictive

ROE

conflict. In

should be noted that

ROE may well be,

and

than international or national law would require.

ROE should constitute compliance with the ap-

An exception to that rule of thumb might arise in operations governed

prepared

comply with

peacetime and

rights laws in

and policy reasons the applicable

most cases, compliance with the

plicable law.

human

armed

law. 67 "Interna-

and national

all

at a

multinational

level.

Such combined

ROE

must of course

relevant international law; however, the national laws of any given

participant might be

more restrictive.

Potentially, a service

member's action might

be found to have been in compliance with the combined ROE, but not with the

member's more
careful

restrictive national laws.

Such

disparities are best

ROE drafting and implementation training.

avoided through

68

The SROE make it clear that they do not limit a commander's inherent author69
ity and obligation
to use all necessary means available and to take appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity. 70
Self-defense is limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality. 71 The current ROE provisions on self-defense direct that:

When

and scope of
which is required to decisively counter the
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US
the use of force in self-defense

is

necessary, the nature, duration,

the engagement should not exceed that

forces or other protected personnel or property. 72

Program-specific doctrine

may supplement

or amplify the rules set out in the

73

SROE. For example, to address the need for naval security personnel to determine whether approaching vessels possess a hostile intent in the post-Cole environment, the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations have
promulgated directives authorizing the use of warning shots against such threats. 74

DoD Rules for the
In addition to

Use of Force (RUF)
principal national security mission, the

its

Department of Defense

has long provided support to civilian law enforcement agencies and to
ities.

with

75

However,

some

in part

civil

author-

because the Posse Comitatus Act of 1879 (PCA) prohibits,

armed forces (other than the Coast
the use of force by members of the armed forces

exceptions, the direct use of the

Guard) to enforce US laws,

76

within the territory of the United States

is

84

restricted.
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Under
time

was written),

this

Homeland

the Joint Doctrine for

DoD identifies two homeland security (HS)

homeland defense (HD), with
port (CS). 77

CS

Security (under development at the

air,

land and maritime components, and

includes military assistance to

down

further broken

mission areas:

civil

(MSCA) and

sup-

(MACA), which is
disturbances (MACDIS),

authorities

into military assistance for civil

military support to civil authorities

civil

military support to civil law en-

forcement agencies (MSCLEA).

The SROE recognize
conflicts

that not

all

under international law.

78

Force (RUF) that address selected
use of armed force.
force during

CS

support of the

armed
DoD has now promulgated Rules for the Use of
situations involving the use of force are

DoD mission areas not calling for the traditional

RUF refer to directives issued to guide US forces on the use of

operations in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States in

HS mission area. The use offeree by US military forces deployed on

CS missions within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is not governed
by ROE. DoD forces deployed on CS missions are instead bound to adhere to the
RUF. 79

RUF directives applicable in MACA operations may take the form of mis-

sion execute orders, deployment orders,

RUF may

Those

memoranda

of agreement, or plans. 80

be established by the deployment order or

memorandum

of

agreement, or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction on the "Rules

on the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement
Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States." 81 RUF are restrictive, detailed

the

CS mission

force.

and

area

is

sensitive to political concerns, in recognition of the fact that

RUF are subject to

military

commanders

on weapons, tactics and levels of
change during operations. As a result, DoD policy directs

characterized by restraints

to consult with their judge advocates to draft written

RUF

RUF training program, to ensure military forces under their command understand the RUF procedures. 82
guidance and design and implement an appropriate

USCG

Use of Force Policy

(CGUFP)

Congress has long recognized that
treaties requires that the

carry out

its

effective

maritime enforcement of laws and

Coast Guard be authorized to use force when necessary to

enforcement of laws and

pressly address the use of force

treaties mission.

Two

by the Coast Guard. The

federal statutes ex-

first,

which was amended in 2004, addresses the use offeree to stop

14 U.S.C. § 637,

a vessel "liable to sei-

zure or examination" by the Coast Guard. 83 The second, 14 U.S.C. § 89, establishes

Guard boarding officers and authorizes such officers to "use all necessary force to compel compliance." In exercising the authority conferred by either statute, Coast Guard personnel and, in some
the general law enforcement authority of Coast

85
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situations, supporting

DoD platforms and personnel, must comply with the Coast

Guard's Use of Force Policy (CGUFP).

The

CGUFP

is

set

out in the agency's Maritime

Law Enforcement Manual,

The CGUFP must be adhered to by all
of the following while conducting Coast Guard missions, exercising the right of individual self-defense, and in situations where the SROE do not apply: (1) all Coast
Guard personnel (military, civilian and contract security), (2) all Coast Guard vessels and Coast Guard aircraft specifically authorized by the Commandant of the
Coast Guard to use force, (3) all non-Coast Guard personnel onboard a Coast
Guard unit, (4) all non-Coast Guard units or personnel operating under Coast
Guard tactical control (TACON) or operational control (OPCON). 85 Coast Guard
personnel follow the CGUFP even when the Coast Guard is not the lead federal
agency. 86 Coast Guard personnel do not, under any circumstances, apply foreign
use of force policies. 87 US Navy units operating under Coast Guard OPCON or
which

is

TACON

designated "for

official

use only."

84

conducting law enforcement support operations follow the

CGUFP

for

employing warning shots and disabling fire. Under those circumstances, the provisions of 14 U.S.C. § 637 (discussed below) extend to the naval unit. 88

follow the

The
sels

SROE and/or mission

specific

ROE or RUF

all

and against individuals. The provisions applicable

form of a "use of force continuum"

non-deadly force and deadly force. Deadly force
to cause death or serious physical injury.

90

is

Only

under the circumstances may be used. Force

other purposes. 89

shall

to the use of force against

that distinguishes

to avoid law

SROE,

the

the inherent right to use

vessels

CGUFP

all

not be used where assigned du-

available

Some

retreat

force, including deadly

provisions applicable to the use of force against noncompliant
for,

and modalities

of,

using force to stop a

law enforcement situation. The provisions do not apply to vessel-on-

US

practice differs in

some

respects

CGUFP it is important to recog-

from the practices of other nations.

States categorically reject the use of force to stop

minor offenses or
tions.

no duty to

means necessary to defend themselves or an-

vessel use of force in self-defense. 93 In applying the

nize that

is

91

address both the conditions

vessel in a

likely

CGUFP emphasizes that covered personnel always have

other from physical harm.

92

is

that force reasonably necessary

enforcement situations justifying the use of

force. Like the

between

defined as any force that

can be discharged without the use of force. However, there

The

units

CGUFP includes provisions for the use of force against noncompliant ves-

individuals take the

ties

for

Navy

Other

States apply the twin principles of necessity

It is

vessels for

for offenses not involving public safety, such as fisheries viola-

termining whether the use of force
compliance.

noncompliant

also

is

and proportionality in de-

appropriate to overcome a vessel's non-

important to recognize that in the United States any use of

86
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force, other

than in self-defense, generally requires case-specific approval by the

commander, who might well decline to approve the use of
force even in situations where it would be permitted under the CGUFP.
Under the CGUFP and 14 U.S.C. § 637, warning shots are considered a "signal"
to a vessel to stop, not a use of force. 94 Warning shots are only used after other signaling methods have been tried without success. Warning shots are not used
operational or tactical

against aircraft or

under circumstances where their use might endanger any person

or property. Generally, warning shots are not used unless the enforcement units

have the capability to deliver disabling
abling fire

imum

is

the warning shots are ignored. Dis-

the firing of ordnance at a vessel with the intent to disable

injury to personnel or

fire is to

fire if

damage

to the vessel.

be discontinued when the vessel stops,

is

Under

the

it,

with min-

CGUFP,

disabling

disabled, enters the territorial sea

of another State, or the situation changes in a manner that introduces substantial
risk to those

aboard the noncompliant

vessel. 95

14 U.S.C. § 637 (reproduced, with 2004
pressly authorizes disabling fire

amendments,

in

Appendix

III)

ex-

under limited circumstances and provides for an

indemnity of vessel commanding

officers called

on

to use disabling

fire.

96

Dis-

may be used against vessels subject to "examination" or "seizure." During the so-called "Rum War" of the Prohibition era, the Coast Guard used warning
abling fire

on numerous occasions to interdict vessels attempting to
smuggle alcohol into the United States. 97 The need for forcible interdiction measures arose again in the late 1970s, as Coast Guard and Navy units ranging in size
from 82-foot patrol boats to 530-foot cruisers responded to a surge in maritime
drug smuggling operations. 98 Air and surface assets trained and equipped for assignment to the Coast Guard's Operation New Frontier 99 employ relatively novel
means of stopping noncompliant vessels. The operation, which employs cutterdeployable, specially equipped high-speed over-the-horizon (OTH) boats and
Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) MH-68A
("Sting Ray") helicopters, establishes a coordinated method to chase down and, if
shots

and disabling

fire

necessary, forcibly disable "go-fast" vessels engaged in unlawful activity.

US Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Use of Force
Enforcement actions within the United

States, including its territorial sea, or

those involving

US vessels beyond the territorial sea,

foreign vessels

beyond the

tion.
(e.g.,

100

When

territorial sea, are

the Constitution applies,

it is

US nationals on
by the US Constitu-

or involving

constrained

clear that

Congress cannot by statute

14 U.S.C. § 637 or 14 U.S.C. § 89) authorize what the Constitution forbids. 101

Nevertheless, the

US Supreme Court has recognized that application of the consti-

tutional standards to maritime searches

87

and

seizures authorized

by Congress
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might vary from applications to similar actions carried out under the differing conditions prevailing

on

land. 102

The Fourth Amendment

to the Constitution pro-

vides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures

warrant authorizing such a search or seizure
able cause.

103

The

Fifth

shall

shall

and

not be violated and that no

be issued in the absence of prob-

Amendment further provides that the government may not

deprive any person of their

life,

liberty or property

without due process of law. 104

Both amendments potentially play a role in maritime interdiction and enforce-

ment

actions. 105 Constitutional violations

dismissal of charges

the violations.

and even

suits for

may

lead to suppression of evidence,

damages against the

To ensure compliance with

officers responsible for

Supreme

the constitutional limits, the

Court has repeatedly emphasized the duty of law enforcement agencies to provide
their officers with use of force training. 106

The Fourth Amendment

seizure provision

may be

triggered

by the seizure of a

Amendment applies to the actual arrest of a person by a law enforcement officer. An arrest

person, a vessel or property or papers on the vessel. Plainly, the Fourth

must be based on probable cause and it must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
"Excessive" force

is

by definition unreasonable. Allegations of excessive force dur-

ing a detention or arrest typically arise in suits for damages against an enforcement
officer, 107

or the officer's employing agency.

On

occasion, a defendant charged

with assaulting a law enforcement officer will assert in defense an argument that
excessive force

sponse.

108

by the enforcement

officer justified self-defense

Where a defendant was subjected to

"torture, brutality,

measures

and

in re-

similar out-

rageous conduct" rising to the level that violates due process the court might even
dismiss the charges against the defendant. 109

Actions by law enforcement officers that

fall

short of an actual arrest

theless rise to the level of a "seizure" implicating the

may never-

Fourth Amendment.

1

10

For ex-

ample, the Supreme Court has held that an "investigatory stop," although not an
arrest,

is

a seizure subject to the Fourth

ment. However, such stops

may

Amendment's reasonableness

require-

be justified by a "reasonable suspicion"

short of the probable cause that

would be needed

ducting a so-called "Terry stop"

may forcibly detain

for an arrest.

111

An

the individual

if

falling

officer

con-

necessary. 112

The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that any use of force by the government to effect a seizure must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 113 As a
result, the

reasonableness

test

is

the standard by which a claim of excessive force in

any seizure (including mere investigatory stops)
the contours of the reasonableness test the
cers are often forced to
tense, uncertain,

make

will

be measured. 114 In defining

Supreme Court recognized:

split-second judgments

—

in

circumstances that are

—about the amount of

and rapidly evolving

88

"police offi-

force that

is

necessary
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115
Accordingly, the
in a particular situation."

officer's belief as to the

perspective. 116

Court held, the reasonableness of the

appropriate level of force should be judged by that on-scene

The Court has

articulated a three-part balancing test that turns

on

the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to

others

and whether the suspect was
by flight.

arrest

117

If an officer reasonably,

likely to fight back, the officer

needed.

is

under the Fourth
personnel acting

justified in using

more

force than

might

in fact

is

be

involving
it

US

that the reasonableness requirement for searches

Amendment does not apply to actions by US law enforcement
outside US territory, when the action is taken against a non-

national of the United States.

still

but mistakenly, believes that a suspect

118

The Supreme Court has held

where

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

119

Moreover, the reasonableness of foreign searches

nationals or vessels

was conducted.

120

is

judged by reference to the law of the place

Some writers argue that the Fourth Amendment might

apply extraterritorially to a case alleging excessive force in the seizure of a non-

national. 121 Extraterritorial

"deliberate

conduct by law enforcement

and unnecessary lawlessness" has on one occasion

miss the charges against the defendant.
duct

officers

may be

122

amounting

to

led the court to dis-

Alternatively (or additionally), such con-

analyzed under the applicable international

human

rights laws

discussed below and the principles of State responsibility.

International

Law Limits on the Use of Force

Earlier, this article highlighted the distinction

the term "force."
Articles 2(4)

dividual

and

It

between the two

was suggested that when the

and 41,

123

it is

collective)

common usages of

UN Charter speaks of "force" in

referring to military force (aggressive

by one

State or

its

and defensive;

proxies against another State.

in-

The term

means used by authorized
government vessels and their agents to compel individuals to comply with enforcement actions. 124 Such "police force" is not directed against a State and does not
constitute "armed force," nor does it violate the LOS Convention provisions reserving the seas for "peaceful purposes" 125 and requiring States to refrain from the
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. 126 Nonetheless, it is
possible that some acts conducted in the course of a law enforcement action against
is

also used, in a very different context, to refer to the

a vessel might be construed as an act of aggression; 127 perhaps even a casus belli in

former times. 128
stricter limits

It is

also

important to bear in mind that international law imposes

on the use of force

against aircraft than against vessels.

against civil aircraft while in flight

protocol and federal law.

would

129

89

likely violate the

Use of force

Montreal Convention

Limits on the Use of Force

The
State

is

exercise of law enforcement authority outside the territorial limits of the

limited under international law. 130

in actions
treaty,

131

may be

not amounting to armed conflict

such as a bilateral boarding agreement

Convention,

most

Under international

133

132

law, the use of force

authorized or limited by

or the 2005 Protocol to the

SUA

customary international law and general principles of law. For the

part, international

law

directly implicated only in incidents involving con-

is

duct directed against the nationals, vessels or aircraft of another State. 134 Interna-

human

tional

rights law, including the International

Political Rights

own nationals.
Eighth Amendment
its

Article 7 of the

of the

Civil

US

ICCPR,

in

language closely paralleling the

inhuman
Amendment,

Constitution, prohibits torture and cruel,

or degrading treatment or punishment. Article

9,

echoing the Fifth

provides that no one shall be subjected to "arbitrary" arrest or detention, nor
the State deprive

and

may apply even to conduct by a State directed at one of

(ICCPR), 135
136

Covenant on

them of their

liberty except

on such grounds and

in

may

accordance

with such procedures as are established by law.

When an interception and boarding is carried out under authority of a multilateral or bilateral

force.

Such
137

States.

is

agreement, the agreement

itself

or limit any use of

the case with the PSI boarding agreements entered into by the United

Similarly, the draft

SUA Protocol includes an express provision on the use

of force during any action authorized within
other than in self-defense
treaty, as

may authorize

is

its

framework. 138

Any

use of force

therefore restricted to measures authorized by the

modified by any later case-specific verbal agreements. 139 The interplay of

conventional and customary law on the use of force in maritime law enforcement
operations

is

demonstrated by three leading

cases.

The

first case,

concerning the

Vm Alone, arose under a bilateral boarding treaty, but also briefly examines the use
of force under customary law.

The

Vm Alone

The

starting point for

(1929)

examining the international law

limits

on the use of force

against a foreign vessel by maritime law enforcement authorities

commission decision
ered schooner

Guard
vessel

cutter

in the dispute arising

is

the arbitration

out of the sinking of the auxiliary-pow-

Vm Alone on March 22, 1929. 140 The dispute arose after the Coast
USCGC Wolcott intercepted the British flag (Canadian registered)

Vm Alone on March 20,

1929, anchored between 8

and

15 miles off the coast

of Louisiana (the distance offshore was disputed by the parties).

A

1924 treaty be-

tween the United States and Great Britain authorized the United States to board
British flag vessels suspected of liquor
coast.

141

smuggling while

Both governments agreed that the

in close

proximity to the

Vm Alone was "unquestionably" a no-

torious smuggling vessel, which transported liquor from Belize

90

US

and the Bahamas

Craig H. Allen

for delivery to contact boats off the
torial sea.

142

The contact boats then ran

tional Prohibition Act.

Alone, asserting the

US

anchor and began to
vessel's

US coast, while staying just outside the US terri-

When

the liquor ashore, in violation of the

the cutter Wolcott approached, the master of

Coast Guard had no jurisdiction over his

flee

Na-

vessel,

Ym

weighed

southwest toward Mexico. The Wolcott fired across the

bow and into the rigging, but the Ym Alone continued to flee. Over the next

two days, the Wolcott followed the vessel

in hot pursuit, eventually enlisting the as-

Guard cutters, the Dexter and the Hamilton. On March
22, 1929, after the chase had taken the vessels more than 200 miles from the US
coast, the cutter Dexter closed in on the Ym Alone and once again ordered the vessel
sistance of two other Coast

to heave to for boarding. After the master refused, the Dexter fired across the ves-

bow then into the sails and rigging. The Dexter then ceased fire and once again

sel's

ordered the vessel to stop or

master of the
forcibly resist

it

would be sunk. According

to the Coast

Guard, the

Ym Alone then brandished a pistol and told the Dexter that he would
any attempt to board

his vessel.

The Dexter then resumed

fire, this

Ym Alone, sinking the vessel about thirty minutes later.
The master and crew of the Ym Alone jumped into the water as the vessel sank. The
time into the hull of the

Coast Guard recovered

all

but one of the crewmen. That crewman, a French na-

drowned before he could be recovered.
The arbitration panel appointed by the United States and Canada concluded
that, assuming the United States had jurisdiction over the Ym Alone under the 1 924
treaty; the Coast Guard was justified in using "necessary and reasonable force for
the purpose of effecting the objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing
into port the suspected vessel; and if sinking should occur incidentally, as a result of
the exercise of necessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel
might be entirely blameless." 143 The commissioners went on to conclude that the
tional,

cutter's act of intentionally sinking the
1

Ym Alone was not justified under either the

924 treaty or any other principle of international law. 144 Three observations are in

order. First, the

commission resolved the case under what they understood to be

the prevailing international law standard. Second, the "reasonable and necessary
force" standard articulated
ception,

tempt to

from boarding through
flesh

distinction

did

it

by the commissioners applied to

out

its

seizure.

145

Finally, the

all

phases of the inter-

commission did not

at-

"reasonable and necessary" standard, other than to draw

between a sinking that was incidental and one that was intentional, nor

explain whether the nature of the suspected offense (suspicion of liquor

smuggling) was a factor to be considered in weighing the necessity or proportionality

of the force used.

It

was

sufficient for the

commissioners to determine that the

Coast Guard's decision to intentionally sink the Ym Alone under the circumstances

exceeded that standard.
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The Red Crusader (1961)

Another commonly cited use of force case arose out of a 1961 enforcement action
against the British fishing vessel

Ebbesen.
vessels

On May

146

Red Crusader and

21, 1961, the trawler

frigate

Me/5

several other fishing

were sighted near the Danish Faeroe Islands. The parties disputed the Red

Crusader

exact position

s

Red Crusader, the

When

Red Crusader by the Danish

and whether

was engaged

it

Niels Ebbesen signaled

those signals went unheeded, the

to stop

it

Dane

in fishing.

by

fired a

Upon sighting the

signal searchlight

blank 40

and

mm warning shot

Red Crusaders bow. The Red Crusader then stopped, and the

across the

siren.

Niels

Ebbesen sent over a boarding party. The master of Red Crusader was notified that
his vessel

man

was under arrest and that he was

to follow Niels Ebbesen into port.

custody crew was placed aboard Red Crusader. After

the Danish frigate's instructions, the master of the

locked up the custody crew and attempted to

When

initially

A two-

complying with

Red Crusader changed his mind,

flee

with

its

embarrassed hostages.

became apparent to the commanding
officer of the Niels Ebbesen, the frigate fired two 127 mm warning shots (one astern
and one to starboard), accompanied almost immediately by a sound signal (Morse
Code "K") to stop. Two minutes later, it fired warning shots ahead of and to port of
the

the

Red Crusader

Red Crusader, again

later,

s

attempted

flight

closely followed

while Red Crusader continued to

by a whistle signal to

flee,

plosive) shots at the vessel's scanner, mast,

terspersing further warnings

minutes

the Niels Ebbesen fired solid (non-ex-

masthead

by loudhailer

stop. Fifteen

to stop.

light, hull

The

vessel

and stem, while

in-

was damaged, but

not sunk, and no one was injured. Britain protested the Danish action. The

Com-

mission of Enquiry later appointed by the two governments to investigate the matter

determined

that:

up to 03.53 hours, the Commanding Officer of the Niels
Ebbesen exceeded legitimate use of armed force on two counts: (a) firing without
warning of solid gun-shot; (b) creating danger to human life on board the Red
Crusader without proved necessity by the effective firing at the Red Crusader after
In opening

fire at

03.22 hours

,

03.40.

The escape of the Red Crusader in flagrant violation of the order received and obeyed,
the seclusion on board the trawler of an officer and rating of Niels Ebbesen, and Skipper
Wood's refusal to stop may explain some resentment on the part of Captain Selling.
Those circumstances, however, cannot

The Commission
which,

if

is

justify

of the opinion that other means should have been attempted

,

in, might have finally persuaded Skipper Wood to stop and
normal procedure which he himself had previously followed. 147

duly persisted

revert to the

such violent action.
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The commission did not specify what

"other," non-deadly

appropriate in this fisheries enforcement action.
the use of force that might create a danger to
sity."

Nor

means would have been

did

human life

it

categorically rule out

in cases of "proved neces-

148

Interestingly, the

commission was

also called

the conduct of the British naval vessel

confrontation.

HMS

The Danish government

upon

to

examine the propriety of

Troubridge, which intervened in the

initially

protested that Troubridge had in-

by Denmark when Troubridge

terfered with legitimate law enforcement measures

Denmark withdrew

interposed herself between the other two vessels. Although
parts of the question
its

from the commission, the commission nevertheless offered

opinion that Troubridge "made every effort to avoid any recourse to violence be-

tween Me/5 Ebbesen and Red Crusader." 149 The commission went on to opine that
"[s]uch an attitude and conduct were impeccable." 150

agreed to mutually waive

all

The two governments

claims and charges arising out of the incident.

later

151

The M/V Saiga (1997)

The most recent decision

to

force in a maritime law enforcement boarding
tional Tribunal for the

The

suit

—

the

State, Saint

Law of the

was issued

Sea (ITLOS) in the

case brought before the

first

on the use of
1999 by the Interna-

examine the international law

Vincent and the Grenadines

"M/V Saiga"

new ITLOS

("St.

in

limits

—was

(No. 2) Case. 152

initiated

by the

flag

Vincent"), against the coastal State,

The dispute arose out the forcible arrest by Guinea of the
St. Vincent flag vessel Saiga. Saiga was a coastal tanker that refueled fishing vessels
at sea. On the day before the incident Saiga had delivered gas oil to three fishing

the Republic of Guinea.

vessels in waters 22 miles offshore
just outside the

more

vessels.

from Guinea. Saiga then moved

Guinean exclusive economic zone

to a position

to await the arrival of several

At about 0800 on October 28, 1997, Saiga was,

in the

words of the

Tribunal, "attacked" by Guinean patrol boat P35 for an alleged violation of cus-

toms

laws.

Armed

officers

arrested the master

Saiga was taken to
travel

from P35 then boarded the

and crew,

firing their

weapons

at

Saiga, seized the vessel

and

various times in the process.

Conakry where the master was detained and the crewmembers'

documents were

confiscated.

during the boarding were

later

Two crewmen who were

injured by gunfire

allowed to travel to Dakar for medical treatment.

The Tribunal's first ruling in the matter concerned St. Vincent's application for
prompt release of the Saiga and its crew upon the posting of reasonable security. 153
The second decision concerned the merits and addressed a number of issues, including the use of force by the Guinean enforcement vessel.

St.

Vincent argued that

Guinea's use of force in stopping and boarding the vessel was excessive and unreasonable. 154

St.

Vincent pointed out that the Saiga was an unarmed tanker that was
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almost

fully

laden with gas

oil.

The vessel was

riding low in the water (and therefore

easily

boarded) and was capable of a speed of no more than ten knots. The crew of-

fered

no

P35

resistance. St.

fired live

Vincent also called the Tribunal's attention to the

ammunition, using

solid shots

from

fact that

weap-

large-caliber automatic

Guinea asserted that the P35 crew's actions were neither unrea-

ons. In response,

sonable nor unnecessary because the Saiga refused
signals to stop. In

its

all

visual, auditory

and radio

ruling, the Tribunal explained that:

Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of force
arrest of ships, international law,

which

is

in the

applicable by virtue of article 293 of the

[LOS] Convention, requires that the use of force must be avoided as

far as possible

and,

must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in
the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, just as
they do in other areas of international law. 155

where force

is

unavoidable,

The Tribunal concluded
the Saiga without

first

tional law

and

fired their

weapons

fered

no

that the

Guinean patrol

issuing any of the signals

practice.

resistance

it

Once aboard

vessel fired live

ammunition

at

and warnings required by interna-

the Saiga,

Guinean enforcement personnel

indiscriminately, despite the fact that the crew of the Saiga of-

and did not threaten the boarding team. In the process, two of

crewmembers were seriously injured and vital equipment in the vessel's
radio room and engine room was damaged. The tribunal ordered the government
of Guinea to make reparations to the vessel's flag State. It relied in part on the I'm
Alone and Red Crusader cases as the basis for its ruling and held that Guinea's use of
force before and after the boarding was excessive and endangered human life. 156
the Saiga

In ruling against Guinea, the Tribunal also cited the enforcement provisions in

the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 157
the decision,
ticle

and

in

which was not

in effect at the

any event would not have been controlling

21 of the Straddling Fish Stocks

Agreement provides

a

time of

in this dispute. Ar-

mechanism

for States

other than the flag State to exercise fisheries enforcement authority over foreign
vessels

sures

on the high

seas. Article

22

calls

under Article 21 to ensure that

"avoid the use of force except

on

parties

conducting enforcement mea-

their duly authorized fisheries inspectors

when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety

of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their
duties." 158

The Tribunal concluded

that Article 22 "reaffirmed" the "basic princi-

ple concerning the use of force in the arrest of a ship at sea." 159 Because the

quoted Article 22 provision was
ing agreements with Liberia
nal's construction

later

incorporated into the bilateral

above

WMD board-

and the Marshall Islands (discussed below), the Tribu-

of Article 22 could prove relevant in construing the

boarding agreements.
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UN Guidance Documents
Dire warnings on the continued use of deadly force in maritime interdiction and

enforcement actions demonstrate a need for further development and

on the international limits on such actions.
its

firing into a vessel

160

It is

clear that

clarification

customary law prohib-

without warning. Additionally, using gunfire to intentionally

sink a fleeing vessel suspected of smuggling illegal liquor, at least without

tempting to disable

it,

violates the established rule that force

reasonable. Such gunfire

aboard. 161 But the

remain unclear.

162

full

would almost

contours of the

In contrast to

first at-

must be necessary and

certainly pose a threat to the lives of those

legal limits

US law,

on the use of police

force at sea

international law has so far failed to rec-

ognize explicitly that the level of force that

is

reasonable and appropriate under the

circumstances will vary according to the nature of the violation and the impact
ternative enforcement approaches will have

on the

al-

163
legal regime's effectiveness.

Force levels appropriate in interdicting a vessel engaged in narcotics trafficking

might well be inappropriate to one suspected of violating
State's

EEZ. 164

And the community interest in

fisheries laws in a coastal

interdicting a

WMD shipment un-

der circumstances that threaten international peace and security could justify force

would be deemed excessive in response to a minor pollution incident.
To be accurate, any contemporary statement of customary law must also account
for a significant amount of State practice that is not easily reconciled with the broad
levels that

statements

made by the ITLOS in the M/V Saiga case. Finally, maritime use of force

norms should be reexamined
in the

periodically in light of the progressive

law of State responsibility.

In their text

on the Law of the Sea, Professors Churchill and Lowe take the

tion that international law, as articulated

Case, permits States to use only the
ance.

development

165

That position

is

Nations

for

arbitral tribunal in the

Ym Alone

"minimum force" necessary to compel compli-

generally consistent with the Basic Principles

Force and Firearms by
166

by the

posi-

Law Enforcement

Officials

on the Use of

adopted by the United

enforcement operations ashore. Drawing on Article 3 of the

UN

167

Law Enforcement Officials, the Basic Principles state that
"law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the ex-

Code of Conduct

for

tent required for the

of firearms and

performance of their duty."

It

generally argues against the use

asserts:

Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad
as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and
ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These
would include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in
appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means
capable of causing death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be
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possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self-defensive

equipment

such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation,
in

order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. 168

The commentary accompanying the Code of Conduct "emphasizes
force

that the use of

by law enforcement officials should be exceptional." Although the Basic Prin-

ciples are

not binding in themselves, an argument can be

made

that

when

the

UN

Security Council authorizes enforcement measures under Article 41, with the proviso that such

measures

shall

be carried out "in conformity with international stan-

dards," the applicable standards might be construed to include the Basic Principles

and Code of Conduct documents

if

the measures taken are in the nature of law en-

forcement actions.

Use of Force in Maritime PSI Interception Operations

WMD

The law applicable to the use of force in maritime operations to intercept
and their delivery systems will vary according to the legal basis for the action. The
limits on the use of force to interdict the shipment of an operational
under
circumstances amounting to an imminent act of "armed aggression" within the
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the belligerent's right of blockade or
visit and search under the laws of armed conflict and neutrality, will differ from

WMD

those for enforcing a
visit,

UN Security Council embargo, exercising a peacetime right of

conducting maritime law enforcement operations with respect to a vessel

within the enforcing State's jurisdiction, or while acting with the consent of the flag
State, coastal State or vessel master.

a

The use of force without legal justification or in

manner that is unreasonable may lead to

law or

liability

under the

State's

State responsibility

municipal laws.

169

under international

And, of course, any attempt

in

peacetime to assert jurisdiction or control over a warship or government-owned
vessel

used only on government non-commercial service would constitute a

ous breach of international law.

seri-

170

The starting point in any examination of the use of force by US Maritime Forces
during MIO and E-MIO operations is the applicable ROE. 171 However, because
most ROE doctrine is classified, this analysis will focus on the relevant international and US laws and to some extent the Navy MIO Doctrine and CGUFP, both
of which are unclassified. The authority to use force other than in self-defense is
derivative. Force may only be legitimately employed under circumstances where
the interdicting vessel (or aircraft) has the lawful authority to compel a vessel to
submit to

its

jurisdiction or control. If the vessel or aircraft has jurisdiction to en-

force applicable laws or a right to exercise

some measure of control over a vessel, as
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in

an exercise of the right of approach and

visit,

right to use reasonable force if necessary to

the vessel or aircraft also has the

compel compliance. For example,

a

warship justified in exercising a right of visit (an "examination" under 14 U.S.C. §
637) has the correlative right to use the necessary and reasonable force to compel

compliance. 172
If the

WMD interception operation

is

carried out pursuant to a resolution of the

Security Council, the measures available for enforcement derive
tion itself

and any other applicable

basis for asserting jurisdiction

along with the relevant mission accomplishment
ever, for Security

from the resolu-

ROE.

It is

not

and

control,

uncommon, how-

Council resolutions to omit specific provisions on the use of force

to enforce them. In construing

and implementing the enforcement provisions of a

Security Council resolution,

may be

it

helpful to refer to the provisions of the Vi-

enna Convention on the Law of Treaties ( VCLT) for guidance, even though they
are not directly applicable to Security Council resolutions. 173 Article 31 of the

VCLT

instructs that a treaty shall be interpreted in

the ordinary

meaning to be given to

its

good

faith in

terms in their context and in

and purpose. The ordinary meaning of the terms used

ject

tion

by the Security Council may

in

some

by the Council,

174

analogous

earlier resolutions

States regarding their

in a

treaties,

understanding of those terms.

It

is

to maintain or restore international peace

and

light

of its ob-

Chapter VII resolu-

cases be determined

by recourse to

and any statements by

should also be borne in

mind that the primary object and purpose of any resolution
VII

accordance with

issued under Chapter

security. 175 Accordingly,

any

members of the

UN

interpretation of the resolution should serve those ends. All

have an obligation to "accept and carry out" the decisions of the Council, in accor-

dance with the Charter, giving such resolutions universal

VCLT

force. 176 Article 32 of the

permits recourse to "supplementary" means of interpretation and the

cumstances of the

treaty's

cir-

conclusion to confirm the meaning determined by ap-

meaning if application of Article 31 leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or

plying Article 31 or to determine the

unreasonable. In

some

cases,

an Article 32 approach to interpreting resolutions

might justify resort to the record of any debate within the Security Council regarding the content

and meaning of the

cated in the resolution that

made

it

resolution. In cases

where the Council

remains seized of the matter, recourse

indi-

may always be

to the Council for clarification or supplementary guidance.

In consensual boardings the use of force other than in self-defense must generally

be authorized by the consenting

State.

Operations conducted under authority

of a bilateral boarding agreement with either the flag State or a coastal State in

whose waters the vessel is located must comply with any limitations imposed by the
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agreement. 177 The boarding agreements with Liberia and the Marshall Islands include the following provisions on the use of force:

Article 9

Use of Force
All uses

1

of force pursuant to this Agreement shall be in

applicable laws

and

policies of the Party

strict

accordance with the

conducting the boarding and applicable

international law.

Each Party shall avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to
ensure the safety of Security Force Officials and vessels or where Security Force
2.

Officials are obstructed in the execution of their duties.

under the circumstances may be used.

3.

Only

4.

Boarding and search teams and Security Force vessels have the inherent right to

use

all

that force reasonably necessary

available

means

to apply that force reasonably necessary to defend themselves

or others from physical harm.

Whenever any vessel

5.

being ordered to do

subject to boarding under this

so, the Security

Agreement does not stop on

Force vessel should give an auditory or visual

signal to the suspect vessel to stop, using internationally recognized signals. If the

suspect vessel does not stop

upon being

other appropriate actions to stop the suspect vessel.

As noted earlier, paragraph

may

signaled, Security Force vessels

2 of this article mirrors the use of force provision in the

Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, which the International Tribunal for the
the Sea concluded "reaffirmed" the "basic principle

of a ship

at sea."

179

take

178

Law of

on the use of force in the arrest

However, one important feature distinguishes boardings under

WMD boarding agreements with Liberia and the Marshall Island from those
conducted under the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement. The WMD boarding

the

agreements expressly provide that the "authorization to board, search and detain
includes the authority to use force in accordance with Article 9 of this Agree-

ment." 180

No

such authority

Article 9 of the Liberia

is

included in the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement.

and Marshall Islands agreements

applies

by

own terms

its

only to operations carried out under authority of the agreement. Article 9 does not
control in boardings carried out under an alternative basis of authority, such as a
right of

approach and

visit,

or boardings conducted while the vessel

is

located in

waters over which a coastal State has jurisdiction. 181

The
to

WMD boarding agreement with Panama takes the form of an amendment

an existing arrangement providing for cooperation in counter-narcotics detec-

tion

and interdiction. The Panama agreement differs in several respects from the Li-

beria

and Marshall Islands agreements. Like

98
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with Liberia and the Marshall Islands, Article

X of the agreement with Panama proand detain includes the authority

vides that the "authorization to board, search

use force." 182 However, Article XVII of the
limits

on the use of force,

common

Panama agreement, which

differs in several respects. Article

to

defines the

XVII draws on language

to bilateral counter-narcotics cooperative agreements (rather than the

Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement), and adopts the prevailing international and national law standard:

XVII

Article
1

All uses of force

cases be the

this

Supplementary Arrangement

and

policies of that Party

by a Party pursuant to

in strict accordance with applicable laws

minimum

and

shall

be

shall in all

reasonably necessary under the circumstances, except that

neither Party shall use force against civil aircraft in flight.

Supplementary Arrangement shall impair the exercise of the
inherent right of self-defense by law enforcement or other officials of the Parties. 183

2.

Nothing

Article

in this

XVII does not include the paragraph

dling Fish Stocks

Agreement and

WMD boarding agreements.
States

It is

common

to Article 22 of the Strad-

Article 9 of the Liberia

also

and Marshall Islands

noteworthy that the agreements the United

concluded with Liberia and the Marshall Islands expressly include authority

for boardings to be

conducted by the

agreement contemplates

US Navy, while the Panama WMD boarding

that, except in

only by "law enforcement"

officials.

emergencies, boardings will be carried out

184

Non-Forcible Measures to Stop and Board

SQ3: "You should stop or heave

As mentioned

earlier,

when

to;

I

a PSI interception

am going to board you." 185
and boarding

is

undertaken under

authority of a Security Council resolution, questions regarding the use of force

must begin with the authorizing resolution
will serve as the

zation

and the

foundation for the National

(see discussion above).

The

resolution

Command Authorities' MIO authori-

vessels' operational tasking directives

and ROE. Those documents

should provide clear directions on the use of warning shots and disabling
perhaps vertical take-down procedures

if

such a capability

exists.

186

fire,

and

All such guid-

ance must conform to the relevant principles of international and national law.
It is

well established that

under international law force may be used only when

The necessity for using force can only be established by demonstrating
that lesser means were attempted and failed to produce the needed compliance,
or that those lesser means would have been impossible or futile under the circumstances. The sequence of measures short of actual force must begin with an
necessary.
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identification of the enforcing vessel

the International Tribunal for the

and

intentions. 187 In the

its

Law of the

M/V Saiga

Case,

Sea identified at least two steps an

enforcing vessel must take before using force against a noncompliant vessel. 188
First,

must be given an auditory or

the vessel

tionally recognized signals.
justified in firing

manner
heeded

189

If

the signal

not heeded, the enforcing vessel

one or more warning shots across the bow of the

likely to attract attention.
is

is

visual signal to stop using interna-

Only

is

vessel in a

the signals and warning shots go un-

if

the enforcing vessel justified, as a last resort and after further warning

the noncompliant vessel, in using disabling

fire.

190

Given the history of tribunals

imposing on the enforcing State the burden of proving any use of force was necessary

and reasonable, warnings given before

firing

warning shots or disabling

fire

should be recorded by videotape and audiotape when practicable. Prudent com-

manding

officers will also require their

crew to document the

legal bases for tak-

ing interdiction or enforcement action against the suspect vessel before using
force against the vessel.

When

it

applies, 14 U.S.C. §

637 requires the enforcing vessel to display

its

pre-

191

The suspect vessel is signaled by visual, auditory and electronic means. Traditional "visual" means include
flag hoist and Morse Code flashing light signals taken from the International Code

scribed ensign, pennant or other identifying insignia.

SQ3 signal quoted above. 192 Auditory signals may be given by
megaphone and supplemented by siren or whistle signals to attract

of Signals, such as the
loudhailer or

the attention of those
sel's

intent

ship's

may

also

on board the suspect

vessel. If necessary, the

enforcing ves-

be demonstrated by uncovering, readying and manning the

weapons (without training them on the suspect vessel). Throughout the en-

counter, the enforcing vessel transmits radiotelephone

over frequencies

all

vessels are required to monitor.

transmitted in English and any other language

calls to

the suspect vessel

The calls, which are commonly

commonly used by

vessels in the

area or using internationally recognized signals for the International Code,

informs the suspect vessel of the enforcing
If the signals

and radio calls

vessel's intent to board.

are ignored or the suspect vessel otherwise refuses to

stop to permit boarding, the enforcing vessel

may pursue one or more options in a

The Coast Guard MLEM prescribes a four-step approach for
stopping noncompliant vessels. The sequence begins with "command presence,"
progresses to "low-level" and then "higher-level" tactics, and finishes, if necessary,
with "disabling fire." 193 The Navy MIO Doctrine adopts a similar approach. It prescribes
an ordered sequence
subject to the applicable ROE and tasking orders
progressive sequence.

—

—

of levels of force to be used against noncompliant vessels that escalates,

from "nonviolent"
shots), to a

signals

and maneuvers,

to "deterrence"

if necessary,

measures (warning

"show of force" (including disabling fire), and finally to "full force." 194
100
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A variety

of low-level force tactics designed to compel a fleeing vessel to stop

have been tried over the years, including low

by

level passes

blocking or even "shouldering" the fleeing vessel; directing

aircraft; physically

fire

hose streams into

the fleeing vessel's exhaust stack to flood the engine; deploying nets, lines

and severing the

devices designed to entangle the vessel's propellers;

Low-level tactics

line.

are

seldom successful

noncompliant suspect, particularly on merchant
transporting
vessel or a
circles

in

and other

vessel's fuel

persuading a determined

vessels of the size likely to

be

WMD. Moreover, some of the tactics might even expose the pursuing

nearby support vessel to added

risks.

For example,

if

the fleeing vessel

or doubles back, any nets and lines deployed in the water earlier to entangle

the fleeing vessel might endanger the pursuing vessel as

it

turns to continue the

pursuit.
If low-level tactics fail to

lowed by warning

induce the suspect vessel to comply, they

shots. Until recently, the federal statute

may be

fol-

governing the Coast

Guard's use of force against noncompliant vessels expressly required that warning
shots always be fired before the enforcing vessel

ure to

first fire

employed disabling

warning shots might have stripped the commanding

indemnity provided by the

statute.

However,

a

fire.

Any fail-

officer of the

2004 amendment to 14 U.S.C. § 637

introduced an exception to the requirement. The amended statute no longer
quires that warning shots be given before disabling fire

if

the person in

re-

command

of the enforcing vessel "determines that the firing of a warning signal would unrea-

sonably endanger persons or property in the vicinity of the vessel to be stopped." 195
It is

important not to read too

much into the 2004 amendment. To meet the stan-

dards set by international law for the use of force in maritime enforcement actions,
the use of disabling

fire

without prior warning shots would

still

have to be preceded

by an effective means of warning the fleeing vessel that force will be used against the
vessel if it fails to

The United
Warning shots

comply with the enforcing vessel's

orders. 196

States has long taken the position that a

warning shot

is

a signal.

on board and do
largely silent on the

are not directed against the vessel or any person

not constitute a use of force. Although international law

is

manner for firing warning shots, the CGUFP provides detailed guidance for Coast
Guard platforms (and DoD platforms under Coast Guard TACON or OPCON).
The CGUFP specifies the need for prior authorization from the operational or tactical commander, the visual, auditory and electronic warnings to be given to the
vessel before firing the warning shot, the position and posture of the crew on the
enforcing vessel, the choice of weapon and ammunition and the direction of fire
relative to the suspect vessel. 197 Like the CGUFP, the Navy MIO Doctrine provides
specific direction on pre-fire warnings, the choice of weapon and ammunition
and the weapon targeting method. 198 The general directions set out in the MIO
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Doctrine must be applied consistently with the mission accomplishment

ROE and

operational tasking directives.

The use of warning

shots to stop a vessel for boarding constitutes a "seizure" of

the vessel in the constitutional sense

and must therefore comply with the Fourth

Amendment standard of reasonableness. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the reasonableness

standard to a case involving the Coast Guard's use

of warning shots against a Panamanian drug trafficking vessel on the high seas. The

USCGC Tamaroa intercepted the 210-foot Panamanian mothership Roondiep fifty
miles off Cape
vessel to

and, with the consent of Panamanian authorities, ordered the

heave to for boarding. 199 The Roondiep refused, and after twice warning

the vessel
caliber

Cod

by

radio,

Tamaroa

fired

warning shots across the

vessel's

machine-gun. The Roondiep eventually stopped and

bow using a

in the

.50

boarding that

followed the team discovered a large quantity of marijuana in the hold. The defendants appealed their convictions on grounds that the boarding and seizure violated
the Fourth

Amendment. After first rejecting the Government's argument that Pan-

ama's consent provided an independent constitutional basis for the boarding, the

Court of Appeals concluded that the interception was a reasonable investigatory
stop and therefore did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. 200 The Court then

turned to the warning shots:

The

firing

of warning shots to stop the Roondiep was not unreasonable, since

reasonable force
refused to stop
in front

may be

if needed. The Roondiep had for some twenty minutes
The Coast Guard' firing of warning shots into the water
appears to have been the least drastic way to force the ship to stop,

upon

of the ship

and the shots were

used

request.

directly attributable to the Roondiep's refusal to

authorized request to stop.

It is

submit to an

201

not clear whether the court considered the warning shots a use of force, rather

than just one of several acts to consider in determining whether the Coast Guard's
seizure

was reasonable under the circumstances. However, the court went on to

hold that "the firing of warning shots appears to have been no more intrusive than
the circumstances required to get the Roondiep to stop." 202 Accordingly, the Coast

Guard's actions were held to be reasonable.

Use of Force to Stop and Board
SQ1: "You should stop or heave

The

effectiveness of

maritime

legal

compliance

is

poor. Compliance

otherwise

I

shall

open

fire

on you." 203

regimes has long been a matter of concern. 204

Even the most carefully crafted regime
if

to;

is

will fail to

produce the desired public order

best achieved

by a coordinated system of en-

forcement that detects, interdicts and punishes violators, thereby deterring future
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violations.

Any regime

that allowed a violator to escape interdiction

ment by simply registering
refuses
sary.
if

all

the vessel with a closed or uncooperative flag State that

requests to board

is

unlikely to be effective against a determined adver-

As one experienced commentator observed,

the patrol vessels lack the right to use force

Professor Myres

and punish-

McDougal

if

MIO patrols would be ineffective

necessary to stop ships. 205

The

late

observed:

The authority to prescribe law, to make law, if it is to have any meaning must carry with
it the authority to apply the law, decide what it is in particular instances, and to enforce
Mr. Burke and I have collected the authorities on this for every type of area. It is
it
our conclusion that you can be reasonably sure that states are authorized by
international law to employ force when it is necessary to apply any law which they are
authorized to make for the protection of their various exclusive interests. A
comparable competence

is

established for the protection of the inclusive interests.

.

.

is

by and large, the maintenance of order upon the oceans
206
a function of the application of force by the ships of nation-states.

It

has been

The principal point

... is that,

shown that the legitimacy of using force to stop a vessel subject to the

enforcing State's jurisdiction or control
practice, treaty law
eries

is

well established under international

and US law. 207 Although some condemn the use of force

and pollution enforcement actions

as

in fish-

unreasonable and anachronistic, the

WMD

need to preserve the authority to use force to compel compliance with the
non-proliferation regime
tional level a balance

is

not so easily dismissed. Accordingly,

must be struck between the

common

freedom of navigation and limiting the use of force against

on the one hand, and the need
curity posed

at the interna-

interest in preserving

vessels

and

their crews

to address the threat to international peace

and

se-

WMD and delivery systems into the hands of

by the proliferation of

rogue regimes and renegade non-State actors. As Professor Shearer recognized

when he put

the

Ym Alone decision

in perspective in an earlier Blue

Book

series

article:

[T]he proportionality principle requires the enforcing State to weigh the gravity of the

human

offense against the value of

life.

Rum-running

.

.

.

did not strike the

u
[

Ym

Alone"] commissioners as sufficient to warrant such drastic action. They did not have
to consider other cases.

It is

would

suggested that fisheries, revenue, immigration and other

same category. So might pollution offenses. This
is not only because sending a vessel with dangerous cargoes or wastes on board to the
bottom might only compound the danger, but because of the Convention scheme
under which the flag State can be required to take enforcement action against the
delinquent vessel escaping immediate arrest. Other cases might justify the use of more
vigorous, and perhaps ultimately deadly, force, such as piratical vessels, vessels carrying
arms to dissidents in the enforcing State, or craft carrying large quantities of dangerous
regulatory offenses

fall

into the

.
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drugs. These cases might be argued to have the character of self-defense or self-

preservation

more than of enforcement of regulatory

At the same time, any decision to use force
picious vessel
will

— must take

into account that in

It

has also been

tional

rise to a right

shown

most such

that use of force in

plained in

not a

Graham

v.

law.

by the Coast Guard to

Amendment

the Fourth

is

—

to get

aboard a sus-

cases the enforcing vessel

engaged in

illegal activities

of self-defense or self-help.

and statutory questions under US

the use of disabling fire

208

at this early stage

not yet have probable cause to believe the vessel

or activities that give

ual,

laws.

MLE boardings may raise constituAs with the

firing

of warning shots,

seize a vessel at sea

must comply with

reasonableness standard. As the

US Supreme Court

ex-

Connor, a case involving the use of force against an individ-

vessel, the court will

consider the severity of the crime at issue, whether

the suspect poses an immediate threat to others, and whether the suspect

evade arrest by

resisting arrest or attempting to

flight.

209

is

actively

The reasonableness

stan-

dard, along with the governing international law standards, was applied to an inci-

dent involving the use of disabling

fire in

narcotics boarding off the Bahamas. In the interdiction,

operating with a deployed Coast Guard

ber machine-gun disabling

dent was the

first

fire

LEDET,

fired

warning shots then

to stop a stateless vessel

use of disabling

fire

Guard counterthe USS Kidd (DDG-993),

a joint Navy-Coast

on the high

by a Navy ship

.50 cali-

seas (the inci-

in a counter-narcotics

Once aboard, the boarding team discovered over 57,000 pounds of
marijuana on the vessel. 210 On an appeal by the defendants of their conviction on
operation).

drug trafficking charges, the court concluded that "the boarding and the seizure
were not in conflict with United States
tions, or the Constitution."

of disabling

fire to

21

]

Nothing

statutes, international treaties or

conven-

in the court's decision suggests that the use

stop a fleeing vessel under those circumstances violates the

Fourth Amendment.

When

on scene commander or commanding officer has determined that a
suspect vessel will present either an opposed boarding or a noncompliant boarding the

the

full

range of use of force options described above

Those options may include the Coast Guard's "higher
abling

fire.

may come

into play. 212

level" tactics 213

and

dis-

"Disabling fire" refers to use of weapons to disable the ship without

risk to the crew.

The use of disabling

fire

by Navy and Coast Guard

vessels con-

MLE operations is constrained by a variety of sources, including 14 U.S.C.
§ 637, as amended in 2004, the CGUFP set out in the MLEM, any applicable bilatducting

eral

boarding agreement and tasking directives by

abling

fire is

used, the enforcing vessel's

limited by both service doctrine

OPCON

or

TACON.

If dis-

method and choice of ammunition

and international

104

law. In the

M/V Saiga

are

Case, for
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Law of the Sea held that in its use of
should make every effort to ensure that life is

example, the International Tribunal for the
disabling fire the enforcement vessel

not endangered. 214 Service doctrines typically require that the enforcing vessel

at-

weapons. Such a

se-

tempt to disable the noncompliant

vessel with smaller caliber

quence was followed by the Coast Guard cutter

USCGC Boutwell in

1988

when

it

encountered the converted Panamanian supply ship Encounter Bay 600 miles off
the coast of Washington. Boutwell

first fired sixty .50

into the drug trafficking vessel without

caliber

any immediate

machine-gun rounds

effect.

The Encounter Bay

crew decided to comply with the boarding demand when Boutwell threatened to
switch to the vessel's deck gun. 215

Despite the general acceptance accorded to the use of disabling

mand

commanding

drugs, as a practical matter few

sels trafficking in

fire

against ves-

officers or

com-

authorities are likely to be anxious to shoot at vessels suspected of

transporting nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or precursors. Moreover,

they will recognize that the typical merchant ship

longed disabling

fire

is

often able to survive even pro-

by the weapons and ammunition allowed by the use of force

doctrines. For example, in a 1990 interception of the 250-foot

Panamanian

freighter

M/V Hermann

USCGC

Chincoteague, with the consent of the flag State, fired over 130 rounds

from the

vessel's

20

suspected of transporting drugs, the Coast Guard cutter

mm gun and 600 rounds from an M-60 machine-gun into the

engine spaces and rudder post. 216 Despite the two-hour assault by

vessel's

Chincoteague, they were unable to disable the vessel before
sea of Mexico, at

which point the Chincoteague was

it

legally

entered the territorial

bound

to discontinue

the pursuit.

An

effective alternative

means of overcoming

the suspect vessel's noncompli-

—often without endangering crew or
suspect
—
the enforcing

ance or even opposition
gerous cargo on the

the

vessel

is

available

potentially dan-

if

vessel has the

capability of deploying a helicopter-borne special operations force boarding

team. 217

A

vertical

noncompliant
force"

The

take-down may obviate the need for disabling

vessel

and may therefore

best

fire

against a

meet the "reasonable and necessary

test.

efficacy of the vertical

interdiction of the

take-down alternative was demonstrated

in the

2002

M/V So San by Spanish naval forces acting under the leadership

of Spain's former Prime Minister Aznar. In response to United States and British
intelligence, the

Spanish frigate Navarra, operating in support of Operation En-

during Freedom and seeking to prevent the escape of al Qaeda and Taliban forces

from Afghanistan, intercepted the So San in the Indian Ocean approximately 600
miles from the Horn of Africa. 218 No ship named So San appeared in any of the vessel registries.

The vessel was

flying

no

flag at the

105

time of approach and displayed no
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indication of

its

State of registry or

homeport. In

fact, a

North Korean

funnel had been painted over, as were the Korean characters for So San.

flag

on

its

The master

of the vessel provided only cursory answers to radio questions from the Navarra.

He indicated that his vessel was registered in Cambodia and was carrying a cargo of
cement to Yemen. The government of Cambodia could only confirm that the ship
matched the description of a vessel registered in Cambodia under a different
name. 219 Concluding that the
the unverifiable claim of

failure to fly a flag or display a

Cambodian

name, together with

registry, constituted reasonable

suspecting that the ship was without a nationality

(i.e.,

on the high

vessel

seas.

220

The

warship to

right of visit entitles a warship to

aircraft to verify the ship's right to fly

its flag.

221

Spanish

stateless), the

ate chose to exercise the internationally recognized right of a

grounds for
frig-

"visit" a

send over a boat or

The So San captain refused

to slow

down or to allow Navarra to board. Navarra then fired warning shots in an attempt
to stop the So San, but the warnings

speed,
off,

were ignored. In

fact,

the So San increased

its

making it impossible to board the ship by small boat. After a six-hour stand-

Navarra prepared

a special operations

non-compliant boarding. To

team of Spanish Marines

facilitate a vertical

to

conduct a

takedown, snipers on the Navarra

away the guy wires on the So Sans main mast that would have endangered the team when they fast-roped from the helicopter to the deck of the ship.
first

shot

Their path cleared, the Spanish team was able to get aboard and secure the vessel

Most legal experts agree that the circumstances justiright of visit boarding.
And none of those who concluded the boarding was

for the right of visit boarding.
fied a

222

legitimate questioned the Spanish decision to shoot out the vessel's obstructing cables.

Had
to

the Spanish lacked a vertical take-down capability,

and therefore been forced

choose between resorting to disabling fire or forgoing the boarding,

whether the

command

authorities

would have authorized disabling

it is

not clear

fire.

Use of Force to Divert, Arrest and/or Seize
It

bears repeating that each progressive step in an interdiction from approach to

seizure
vert

in lawful authority.

The authority to order a vessel to

must be distinguished from a detention or formal seizure of the vessel.

larly,

a

must be grounded

di-

Simi-

the mustering or temporary detention of persons aboard a vessel to facilitate

boarding must be distinguished from the arrest of persons

ment

223

officer has

probable cause to believe committed a crime within the enforcing

State's jurisdiction.

The amount of force that may be "reasonable"

seizure might be seen as unreasonable

Even

whom a law enforce-

if

for

one form of

used in another context.

a cursory inspection of the international

and national

legal

regimes appli-

WMD, their precursors and delivery systems will reveal they are riddled
with gaps (the UN Security Council recognized as much when passed Resolution
cable to

it
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As

1540).

team could find

a result, a boarding

that the presence or transport of

WMD components or delivery systems turned up by their laborious search do not
violate

any laws enforceable by the boarding State. 224 For example, once aboard the

M/V So

SCUD

San, the Spanish boarding team uncovered fifteen

conventional (high explosive) warheads, along with parts to
siles

and 23

missiles 225

and

make eight more mis-

barrels of chemicals (nitric acid) buried beneath tons of

bagged ce-

ment. The missiles, which were sold by the government of North Korea to Yemen,

were not

cargo manifest. Yet the legal analysts ultimately con-

listed in the vessel's

cluded that no applicable international law prohibited the

sale or

shipment of

SCUD missiles from North Korea to Yemen. 226 Accordingly, there was no legal basis

for seizing the missiles, or taking further actions against the vessel or crew.

So San was released, to deliver

its

The

cargo to Yemen.

In circumstances where neither the vessel nor any of its crew has violated

WMD

possession or transportation laws enforceable directly by the boarding State, the

boarding State
sel

may nevertheless find that one or more individuals aboard the ves-

are suspected of having

committed an offense that

falls

within the extradite or

prosecute provision of an applicable international treaty. Such clauses are com-

mon

in multinational terrorism conventions.

manders must recognize
limited.

when

The

that their

power (and duty)

treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite

sion of a person

ing extradition.

229

is

Such

a provision

is

generally triggered only
is

within the

would not justify apprehen-

a foreign vessel for extradition to a third State. 228

on

hand, the flag State

to detain such persons

committing an offense under the treaty

a person suspected of

"territory" of a contracting party. 227

ful

Boarding teams and their com-

On the other

may be under such an obligation if it is a party to a treaty requir-

Such cases

—

like

those involving asylum requests

handling by the enforcing vessel's chain of

command

—

call for care-

within the context of

established interagency consultation procedures.

Assuming the authority to

divert, detain arrest or seize exists, the question arises

may be

used to carry out those actions. Vessels employed in

regarding what force

MIO or E-MIO operations

must consult

operational tasking directives.

their mission

The reader

accomplishment

will also recall that the

ROE

and

Vm Alone com-

missioners articulated an international law "necessary and reasonable force" stan-

dard that applies to
seizure

gaged

all

steps in the encounter, including the boarding, search

and bringing the

in

vessel into port. 230

For Coast Guard boarding officers en-

maritime law enforcement operations, 14 U.S.C. § 89 authorizes such

cers to use

all

force necessary to

CGUFP. The CGUFP imposes

deadly force that are similar

to,

offi-

compel compliance. That statutory authority must

be applied within the limitations imposed by the constitutional provisions
cussed above and the

and

107

on the use of
the Model Penal

limitations

but more restrictive than, those in

dis-
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MPC begins by addressing the use of any force (deadly or

Code. Section 3.07 of the

non-deadly) in making an
officer believes its use

arrest. It

immediately necessary to

is

imposes limits on the use of deadly
able unless: (1) the arrest

force

employed

creates

provides that force

is

no

force,

is

justifiable if the arresting

effect the arrest.

providing that deadly force

and

is

made

(3)

involved

officer believes

a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious

bodily injury

The

not justifi-

substantial risk of injury to innocent persons;

conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force or the
is

is

for a felony; (2) the arresting officer believes that the

the arresting officer believes that the crime for which the arrest

there

MPC then

The

if

his

CGUFP

1985 Tennessee

is
v.

apprehension

more

is

restrictive

delayed. 231

than the

MPC

Garner test described above.

junctive, requiring only that the felony for

232

and

better

While the

which the

arrest

comports with the

MPC
is

is

cast in the dis-

being

made

involve

the threat or use of deadly force or that there be a substantial risk that the person

being arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury
the

CGUFP

if

apprehension

is

only authorizes the use of deadly force to effect an arrest

delayed,

if

there

is

probable cause to believe that "the suspect has committed a felony involving the
use or threatened use of deadly force" and the "suspect

is

armed, or otherwise poses

an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to any person." 233 A separate
provision of the

CGUFP authorizes the use of force,

including deadly force,

when

necessary to protect hazardous materials or deadly weapons from theft, sabotage or

unauthorized control. 234 In addition, the boarding team has the inherent right to
use force

when

necessary in self-defense.

Use of Force in Self-Defense
Throughout the approach and boarding it is important to distinguish the use of
force to carry out the boarding, search and seizure from the use of force in selfdefense. Regardless of the stage of the approach and boarding, the intercepting
forces maybe faced with actions requiring the use of force in self-defense. The ROE
identify four levels of self-defense: individual self-defense (which includes defense

of others), unit self-defense, national self-defense, and collective self-defense. 235
Individual self-defense
force.

other

is

Unit self-defense

US

the act of defending oneself or another person by using

is

the act of defending a particular unit of

under Coast Guard

defense.

forces, or

forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

Responses to a ramming or attempted ramming of a Coast Guard or
vessel

US

236

TACON, would be governed by the SROE on

National self-defense

some circumstances, US

DoD vessel, or

citizens

is

unit

self-

the act of defending the United States and, in

and

their property, and/or

US commercial assets.

Collective self-defense refers to the act of defending designated

108

non-US

forces or
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designated foreign nationals and their property from a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent.

The SROE and

CGUFP recognize the inherent right of an individual and a unit

to act in self-defense, subject to the twin constraints of necessity
ity.

237

and proportional-

The definitions of necessity and proportionality in the self-defense context
from parallel provisions in mission accomplishment ROE. "Necessity" for

differ

the use of force in self-defense exists
terrorist exhibits hostile intent.
fers to

238

when

a hostile act occurs or

intensity, duration

The SROE make

used in self-defense.

240

force

to self-defense ends. Mission

SROE do

clear that

all

known to

the facts

Although the meaning of that phrase

when the hostile

said that

it

and magnitude

is

the

classified,

no longer represents an imminent
accomplishment

ROE

it

can be

threat, the right

written to supplement the

not limit the commander's inherent authority and obligation to act in

self-defense. 241 Intentionally sinking the

excessive as an enforcement

measure

Ym Alone (discussed above) was held to be

for a non-violent crime (smuggling alcohol).

For those familiar with the ruthless determination of some modern
narcotics

to the

commander
"all necessary means available" may be

perceived or demonstrated threat, based on
at the time.

a force or

"Proportionality" in the self-defense context re-

measures that are reasonable in
239

when

and

illegal

arms

it is

traffickers in

easy to imagine a circumstance in which

it

might be

necessary to intentionally sink a trafficking vessel in self-defense.

The authority to exercise national or collective self-defense is generally more re242
strictive.
The doctrine of unit self-defense is well established. In the Marianna
Flora, the Supreme Court recognized that a warship has no duty to flee or wait until
she

is

crippled before defending herself with force. Writing for the Court, Justice

Story held that the warship commander's duty under such circumstances
it is

to

"oppose force to

went on

force, to attack

to explain that the

had the

flag

hesitated in

and

to

subdue the

vessel."

243

his

plain:

Justice Story

commander:

of his vessel to maintain, and the rights of his cruiser to vindicate.

what was

is

To have

duty to his government called for on such an occasion, would

have been to betray (what no honourable officer could be supposed to indulge) an
indifference to

its

dignity

and sovereignty. 244

The Court then upheld the boarding and seizure of the approached vessel, not for
piracy but for the very act of firing on a US warship without legal justification. 245
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently extended that principle, holding that a threat to

open

fire

on the Coast Guard

provided independent grounds for seizing the

109

if its

vessel.

agents attempted to board

246
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The "no-duty-to-retreat"
though

trine,

it

also

rule has

been incorporated into Coast Guard doc-

acknowledges that under some circumstances temporary with-

drawal might prove to be the wiser alternative, to provide time for the arrival of
additional assets or personnel or to reduce tensions. 247 Similarly, under the
guidelines

SROE

on "de-escalating the situation," when time and circumstances permit, a
should be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw or cease any

hostile force

threatening activities. 248

Conclusion

UN Security Council Resolutions

1

373 and 1 540 provide stark warning of the grave

threat to international security posed

by global terrorism and the proliferation of

WMD and their delivery systems. For some, the resolutions also demonstrate that
UN Charter that nation-States will hold a monopoly

the presumption in the 1945

on the large-scale use of force must be reevaluated.

It is

those resolutions will eventually serve as the basis for

too soon to predict whether

new crimes of universal juris-

diction or progressive development of the right of approach

of the

sea. In the

and visit under the law

meantime, while the Security Council monitors progress on the

implementation of

terrorism and counter-proliferation resolutions, nations

its

participating in the PSI

and those cooperating with them will move forward with

a

pragmatic and adaptive program to counter the growing threat posed by the conjunction of global terrorism and

WMD proliferation. Given the physical nature of

most

WMD and delivery systems of concern and the likely routes they will follow

from

their sources to intended users, the PSI

component

if it is

to succeed.

To be

effective,

provisions for using reasonable force
ance.

As both

a legal

and

when

maritime interception must include

necessary to overcome non-compli-

practical matter, the enforcing vessel

tinue a pursuit indefinitely.

patience

must include a maritime interception

249

Even an enforcing

vessel with unlimited fuel

—and no other pressing mission—must terminate

sued vessel enters the

enforcement action
lution of the

territorial sea

in

its

International law

its

pursuit

if

and

the pur-

of a third State, unless that State consents to an

waters or such action

UN Security Council.

cannot simply con-

is

authorized by an applicable reso-

250

and the national laws of the

States participating in PSI mari-

time operations impose limits on the use of force. Through the Statement of Interdiction Principles, the PSI participants have pledged to
to international

and national

law.

conform

their operations

The exact contours of that law have yet to be fully

defined. For example, customary law has yet to expressly acknowledge that as the
threat to international or national security increases higher levels of force in en-

forcement measures

may be justified.

Cases involving the use of force in fisheries
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enforcement are inapposite where the danger of ineffective enforcement

not

is

merely over-fishing, but rather permitting nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
to

come

into the possession of a rogue regime or terrorist group.

Even

if

the law

would not lessen the need for use of force policies and caseby-case decision-making grounded in informed risk assessment and management
or comprinciples. The risk of using disabling fire against a vessel carrying
were

fully

developed,

it

WMD

ponent materials, and the low probability of success,
such measures are
vertical

likely to

cast serious

doubt on whether

be employed. Accordingly, innovative methods, such as

take-downs or breaches of non-compliant vessels by small boat,

come an

increasingly

common

may

feature of maritime interception operations.

members

options expose the boarding team

to greater risk

be-

Both

from the nature of the

operation and potential opposition by the boarded vessel; however, the risk to
global security posed

A

by a course of passive inaction

given PSI interception

may

is

likely to

implicate national defense,

and/or law enforcement mission responsibilities. Accordingly,

be even greater.

homeland

security

US maritime forces

and their legal advisers must be prepared to apply what are often subtle distinctions

among three distinct but sometimes overlapping systems of rules governing the use
of force

at sea. Policy

makers and planners

for PSI participating States

must bear in

mind that in framing a use of force approach for what will often be a combined operation they

must

strive to fashion

an approach that recognizes that national

tudes on the use of force in maritime boardings

grounded

in universally applicable Security

may

differ,

atti-

even when they are

Council resolutions. The execution of

those use of force policies will also shape and influence customary law on the use of
force

and on

State responsibility in the years to

Ill

come.
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Appendix I
ye

|

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish
a

more coordinated and

effective basis

through which to impede and stop ship-

ments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from

and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national
thorities
rity

and relevant international law and frameworks, including the

Council. They

call

on

all

states

concerned with

peace and security to join in similarly committing

1.

Undertake

legal au-

UN Secu-

this threat to international

to:

effective measures, either alone or in concert

states, for interdicting the transfer

states

or transport of

with other

WMD, their delivery

systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation

concern.

concern" generally

"States

or non-state actors of proliferation

refers to those countries or entities that the PSI

participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities

because they are engaged in proliferation through:

( 1 )

efforts to

develop

or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating)

of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2.

Adopt

streamlined

procedures

for

rapid

information concerning suspected proliferation

exchange
activity,

of

relevant

protecting the

confidential character of classified information provided by other states
as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources

interdiction operations

among
3.

and

capabilities,

efforts to

and maximize coordination

participants in interdiction efforts.

Review and work to strengthen

their relevant national legal authorities

where necessary to accomplish these

when

and

necessary

relevant

objectives,

international

and work

law

and

to strengthen

frameworks

in

appropriate ways to support these commitments.

4.

Take

specific actions in

support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes

of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their
national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations

under international law and frameworks, to include:
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a.

Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.

b.

At

their

another

own

initiative,

state, to

or at the request and good cause

take action to board

and search any

shown by

vessel flying

their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas

the territorial seas of any other state, that

is

beyond

reasonably suspected of

transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern,

c.

To

and

to seize such cargoes that are identified.

seriously consider providing consent

under the appropriate

circumstances to the boarding and searching of its
other

states,

vessels that

d.

own flag vessels by

and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes

may be

identified

To take appropriate actions to

by such
( 1 )

in such

states.

stop and/or search in their internal

waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones

(when declared)

vessels

that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or
states or non-state actors

from

of proliferation concern and to seize such

cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions

on

vessels

entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring

that such vessels be subject to boarding, search,

and seizure of such

cargoes prior to entry.

e.

At their

own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by

another

state, to (a)

require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of

carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern

and that are transiting their airspace to land for

inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b)

deny
rights

f.

aircraft

reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit

through their airspace in advance of such

If their ports, airfields,

or other

facilities

flights.

are used as transshipment

points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other

modes of transport reasonably suspected of
and

to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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Appendix II
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

252

Security Council

4956th Meeting (PM)*

The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
their

means of delivery,**

constitutes a threat to international peace

and

security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's

meeting

at the level

of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/

23500), including the need for
tion to

all

Member

States to fulfil their obligations in rela-

arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation

of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for
solve peacefully in accordance with the Charter

all

Member

any problems

its

resolve to take appropriate

international peace

Affirming

its

aspects

and

States to re-

stability,

effective actions against

any threat

to

and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical

and biological weapons and
responsibilities, as

its

in that context

threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global

Affirming

in all

4

their

means of delivery,

in

conformity with

its

primary

provided for in the United Nations Charter,

support for the multilateral treaties whose aim

is

to eliminate or pre-

vent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the impor-

tance for

all

States parties to these treaties to

promote international
Welcoming efforts

implement them

fully in

order to

stability,

in this context

by multilateral arrangements which contribute to

non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons should not hamper international cooperation

in materials,

and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful
be used as a cover for proliferation,
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Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors**

such as those identified in the United Nations
the

Committee

whom

list

established

and maintained by

established under Security Council resolution 1267

may

resolution 1373 applies,

and those

to

acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concernedby the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons and their means of delivery, and related

materials,**

dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and
international peace

and

which adds a new

also poses a threat to

security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional,
regional

and international

rious challenge

and threat

levels in

order to strengthen a global response to this se-

to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to

which they are

parties, or

have made other commitments aimed

at prevent-

ing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken
effective

measures to account

for,

secure and physically protect sensitive materials,

such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and those

recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and

Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for

all

States to take additional effective

sures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological
their

mea-

weapons and

means of delivery,

Encouraging

all

Member

States to

implement

fully the

disarmament

treaties

and

agreements to which they are party,
Reaffirming the need to combat by

all

means, in accordance with the Charter of the

United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
Determined to

facilitate

acts,

henceforth an effective response to global threats in the

area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.

Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-

State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
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transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological

weapons and

means of

their

delivery;

2.

Decides also that

all

States, in

accordance with their national procedures,

shall

adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes, as well as

participate in

3.

them

as

Decides also that

attempts to engage in any of the foregoing

an accomplice,

all

or finance them;

assist

States shall take

activities,

and enforce

effective

measures to establish

domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons and

their

means of

delivery, including

by establishing appropriate

controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a)

Develop and maintain appropriate

effective

measures to account for and

secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b)

and

Develop

maintain

appropriate

effective

physical

protection

measures;

(c)

Develop and maintain appropriate

enforcement

efforts to detect, deter,

international cooperation
in

when

effective

prevent and combat, including through

necessary, the

such items in accordance with their national

and consistent with international
(d)

Establish, develop, review

border controls and law

illicit

trafficking

legal authorities

and brokering
and

legislation

law;

and maintain appropriate

effective national

export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate
laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export

and controls on providing funds and
shipment such

as financing,

services related to such export

enforcing appropriate criminal or

trans-

would contribute to
end-user controls; and establishing and

and transporting

proliferation, as well as establishing

and

civil

that

penalties for violations of such export

control laws and regulations;

4.

Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of

its

provisional rules of

procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security
Council, consisting of

all

members of

the Council, which will, calling as

appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for

its

examination,

Craig H. Allen

on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to
present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution
to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this
resolution;

5.

Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be

and obligations of State

interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the

the Biological

Chemical Weapons Convention and

and Toxin Weapons Convention or

alter the responsibilities

Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization
Chemical Weapons;
International

6.

of the

for the Prohibition of

Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national

and

upon

Member

control

lists

earliest

opportunity the development of such

7.

Parties

calls

some

Recognizes that

all

States

may

States,

when

necessary, to pursue at the

lists;

require assistance in implementing the

provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position
to

do so

to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the

States lacking the legal

and/or resources for

8.

and regulatory

fulfilling the

Calls

upon

(a)

To promote the

infrastructure,

implementation experience

above provisions;

all States:

universal adoption

and

full

implementation, and, where

necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to

whose aim

is

which they are

parties,

to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical

weapons;
(b)

To adopt

national rules and regulations, where

to ensure compliance with their

it

has not yet been done,

commitments under the key multilateral non-

proliferation treaties;

(c)

To renew and

fulfil

particular within the

their

commitment

to multilateral cooperation, in

framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

and Toxin Weapons Convention,
achieving their

common

as

Weapons and

the Biological

important means of pursuing and

objectives in the area of non-proliferation

promoting international cooperation

for peaceful purposes;
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(d)

To develop

appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the

public regarding their obligations under such laws;

promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
Calls

9.

upon

all

to

States

or biological weapons, and their

10.

means of delivery;

Further to counter that threat,

national legal authorities

and

calls

legislation

take cooperative action to prevent
biological weapons, their

11.

Expresses

its

upon

all

accordance with their

and consistent with international

illicit

law, to

trafficking in nuclear, chemical or

means of delivery, and

intention to

States, in

related materials;

monitor closely the implementation of

resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which

this

may

be

required to this end;
Decides to remain seized of the matter.

12.

*

The 4955 th Meeting was

** Definitions for the

Means of delivery:

closed.

purpose of this resolution only:

missiles, rockets

and other unmanned systems capable of deliv-

ering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such
use.

Non-State

actor: individual

or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any

State in conducting activities

which come within the scope of this resolution.

Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties

and arrangements, or included on national control

lists,

which

could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical

and

biological

weapons and

their

means of delivery.
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Appendix

III

14 U.S.C. § 637

Stopping vessels; immunity indemnity for firing at or into vessel

Whenever any

(a) (1)

vessel liable to seizure or

examination does not stop on

being ordered to do so or on being pursued by an authorized vessel or authorized
aircraft

which has displayed the ensign, pennant, or other identifying insignia

prescribed for an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft, the person in

command

or in charge of the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft may, after a gun has

been

by the authorized vessel or authorized

fired

aircraft as a

warning

signal fire at

or into the vessel which does not stop.
(2) Before firing at or into a vessel as

command
gun

(

1 ),

the person in

or in charge of the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft shall

warning

as a

authorized in paragraph

not required

if

signal, except that the prior firing

fire a

of a gun as a warning signal

that person determines that the firing of a

is

warning signal would

unreasonably endanger persons or property in the vicinity of the vessel to be
stopped
(b)

.

The person

in

command of an

authorized vessel or authorized aircraft and

all

persons acting under that person's direction shall be indemnified from any
penalties or actions for
(a). If any

person

is

damages

killed or

for firing at or into a vessel pursuant to subsection

wounded by the firing, and the person in command of

the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft or any person acting pursuant to their

orders

(c)

is

prosecuted or arrested therefor, they shall be forthwith admitted to

bail.

A vessel or aircraft is an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft for purposes of

this section if

( 1

it is

(2)

it

a Coast

is

Guard

vessel or aircraft; or

a surface naval vessel or military aircraft

members of the Coast Guard

on which one or more

are assigned pursuant to section 379 of

title 10t

or.

*

As amended

in

2004 by PUB.

L.

No. 108-293, § 205 (2004). Underlined sections were added

2004. Strikeouts indicate sections deleted in 2004.
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subject to subsection (d),

(3)

it

is

a naval aircraft that has

members of the Coast Guard on board and
vessel described in

fd)

paragraph

The inclusion of naval

( 1 )

is

one or more

operating from a surface naval

(2).

aircraft as

section shall be effective only after the

an authorized

aircraft for

purposes of this

end of the 30 - day period beginning on the

date the report required by paragraph (2)

is

submitted through September 30,

Not later than August 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report containing

{2}

(A) an analysis of the benefits and
craft to

risks associated

perform the law enforcement

activities

with using naval

air-

authorized by subsection

an estimate of the extent to which the Secretary expects to imple -

{B}

ment

the authority provided by this section;

and

{G} an analysis of the effectiveness and applicability
of Defense of the Coast Guard program

known

to the

as the

Department

"New

Frontiers"

program.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall transmit a report annually
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
(d) Report-

Representatives describing the location, vessels or aircraft, circumstances, and

consequences of each incident in the 12-month period covered by the report in

which the person

in

command

or in charge of an authorized vessel or an

authorized aircraft (as those terms are used in section 637 of title 14, United States

Code)

fired at or into a vessel

by that

without prior use of the warning signal as authorized

section.

Notes
1

2.

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis 123 (1969).
Law of the Sea, at 40-41, para. 162,

See 2004 Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the

U.N. Doc. A/59/62 (2004).
3.

NATO

members

participating in the PSI since

the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain
several

months

its

inception include France, Germany,

Italy,

and the United Kingdom. Canada and Norway joined

later.
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Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Sept. 4, 2003, para.

4.

1

,

available

at http://www.state.gOv/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
5. Id.

para. 4.

See Agreement Between the

6.

Government of

the United States of America and the

Government of the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, Feb. 11,
2004 [hereinafter United States-Liberia
www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/32403.htm;

Bilateral

Amendment

WMD

to the

Boarding Agreement], at http://
Supplementary Arrangement Between

Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama
to the Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast
Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, May 12,
the

2004 [hereinafter United States-Panama

Bilateral

WMD Boarding Agreement], at http://www

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation
to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and
Related Materials by Sea, Aug. 13, 2004, [hereinafter United States-Marshall Islands Bilateral
.state.gov/t/np/trty/32858.htm;

WMD Boarding Agreement], at http://www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/35237.htm.
to Broaden Fight Against Spread of WMD, REUTERS, June 1,
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID

Wojciech Moskwa, Bush Seeks

7.

2004,

available

at

=530982 1 &src=rss/ElectionCoverage&section=news.
8. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
STATES 381 (2004). The commission concluded the "PSI can be more effective it if uses
intelligence and planning resources of the NATO alliance. Moreover, PSI membership should be
open to non-NATO countries. Russia and China should be encouraged to participate." The PSI
was always open to non-NATO States. And well before the commission entered its final report,
Russia had already joined the PSI and China appeared to have no interest in joining.
9. U.N. Security Council Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1540 (2004). In Resolution 1373, the
Council had earlier called on all States to, inter alia, act to eliminate the supply of weapons to
terrorists. U.N. Security Council Res. 1373, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1373 (2001).
10. Reportedly China agreed to support the resolution only after a provision that would have
permitted interdiction at sea was removed. Warren Hodge, Ban on Weapons of Doom is Extended
to

Qaeda-Style Groups,

Convention
Navigation, Mar.
11.

for

NEW YORK TIMES, Apr.

29, 2004.

the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

10, 1988,

1678 U.N.T.S. 221,

S.

TREATY DOC. NO. 101-1

(1989), reprinted in 27

International Legal Materials 672 (1988).
12. Calvin M. Lederer, Developments Involving the Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Affecting Maritime Navigation, 2004 YEARBOOK OF THE COMITE MARITIME
INTERNATIONAL 45, 50. See also Counter-Proliferation: Practising to Provoke, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 20, 2003, at 41.
13.

The commanding

officer of a

US Navy

operations in the Persian Gulf this way: "During

cruiser described the typical

MIO tempo

of

MIO, a single Navy ship can expect to run boat

ops 15 to 18 hours a day, provide three to four six-man security teams, two 12-man (VBSS)
teams, and in general ride herd on an average of 10 to 15 merchant ships daily." Chris Nichols,

SWO

Life:

available at

Operation Enduring Freedom and Philippine Sea (CG-58), SHIPMATE, Mar. 2002,

http://www.usna.com/News_Pubs/Publications/Shipmate/2002/03/SWO.htm.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122 (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; S. TREATY DOC. 103-39 (1994), reprinted in 21 INTERNATIONAL
14.
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LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982)

[hereinafter

LOS

Convention]. The United States

not yet a

is

party.

For testimony rebutting those claims, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report on

15.

the United Nations Convention
103

&

16.

The term "maritime

It

was

11

on the Law of the

Sea, S. EXEC. REP.

No. 108-10,

at 49, 64, 97,

1-12 (Mar. 11,2004).
interception operations" has taken

narrow sense to

originally used in a

refer

on

a variety of meanings over time.

only to naval operations taken to enforce the

Security Council resolutions imposing embargoes.

UN

The Navy now defines MIO as the "legitimate

action of denying suspect vessels access to specific ports for import or export of prohibited goods
to or

from

a specified nation or nations, for purposes of peacekeeping or to enforce

sanctions." See

US

Navy, Maritime Interception Operations, ^

1.5.12,

NTTP

3-07.1

imposed

1/CGP

3-

Navy MIO Doctrine] The Navy MIO doctrine does not apply to naval
2003
blockades in time of war. Id. U 1.3. In fact, Navy doctrine acknowledges there are "crucial
differences between MIOs and belligerent acts of interdiction such as blockade and visit and
search during international armed conflict." See US Navy, Naval Doctrine for Military
Operations Other-Than-War, H 3.2.2.1, NWP 3-07 (1998) [hereinafter Navy MOOTW
07.

1 1

(

)

[

hereinafter

.

Doctrine].

"Expanded MIO," when authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are designed to intercept
targeted personnel or material that pose an imminent threat to the United States. E-MIO may
involve multinational forces and may be implemented even when sanctions have not been
17.

imposed. See Navy
1

MIO

Doctrine, supra note 16, ^ 1.5.6.

The Coast Guard defines "law enforcement" as "all Coast Guard functions or actions carried

8.

Law Enforcement Manual. See
4.A.2, COMDTINST M16247.1C

out pursuant to the legal authorities described in" the Maritime

US

Coast Guard, Maritime

(2003) [hereinafter Coast

LOS Convention,

Law Enforcement Manual,

1

Guard MLEM].
supra note 14,

19.

See

20.

"Countermeasures" are directed

at

art. 110.

another State to coerce the State to comply with

international law. Historically, they included both non-forcible

Forcible countermeasures are

now

and

forcible counter-measures.

limited by the United Nations Charter. See

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF the United States § 904(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (rejecting the U.K.
argument that it had a right to intervene and clear mines in the Albanian territorial sea to
facilitate innocent passage of U.K. warships). See also Professor Heintschel von Heinegg's article,
The Proliferation Security Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation, which is Chapter IV in
this volume, at 56. As Professor McDougal pointed out in an earlier Blue Book volume, the use of
force in law enforcement activities does not constitute forcible self-help. See Myres S. McDougal,
Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, at 551, 557-58 (Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore
eds.,

1980) (Vol. 61,

US

Naval

War College

International

Law

Studies).

The term "US Maritime Forces" includes the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. See
Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1-1.

21.

22.

See 10 U.S.C.A. § 379 (West 2005).

23.

The

fact that a

given boarding

is

conducted under the

indicate the nature or scope of the boarding or the

MIO/VBSS framework

legal authority

on which

it

does not

relies. Similarly,

Guard LEDET accompanies a Navy VBSS team does not necessarily indicate
Navy MIO Doctrine, supra
of Defense and
Department
note 16, H 2.2.4. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Transportation [now Homeland Security] on the Use of USCG Capabilities and

the fact that a Coast
the boarding

falls

within the maritime law enforcement rubric. See
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Resources in Support of National Military Strategy (Oct.

3,

1995) defines five categories of the

may be made available to support the National Military Strategy, including,
maritime interception operations, peacetime military engagement and coastal sea

Coast Guard that
inter alia,

control.

The actions may also trigger an operational report (OPREP) or situation report (SITREP)
message reporting requirement. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.05
(series); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.3 (series); Office of the Chief of Naval

24.

Operations Instruction 3100.6
25.

(series).

Proclamation No. 3504, 27 FEDERAL REGISTER 10,401 (Oct. 23, 1962). The Proclamation

authorized the use of force only in cases of failure or refusal to comply, after reasonable efforts

had been made

to

communicate

and then

directly with the vessels, or in cases of self-defense,

only to the extent necessary.
26.

See

Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note

16, at 3-2 n.4.

NATO prefers the phrase Maritime

Interdiction Operations (MIOPs). In the United States "interdiction"

is

designed to "divert, disrupt, delay or destroy" the adversary's potential to

can be used effectively against friendly forces. See Joint Chiefs of

defined as activities

harm before it
Pub 3-03, Joint

inflict

Staff, Joint

Interdiction Operations (1997).
27.

The

principle of impartiality

banning discrimination.

& 227.
Navy MIO

See, e.g.,

is

also manifested in the 1982

LOS Convention,

supra note 14,

LOS
arts.

Convention's

articles

24(1 )(b), 25, 26, 42(2),

52(2)
28.

that

all

vessels

Doctrine, supra note 16, at 3-3.

be stopped. Effectiveness

is

The

principle of impartiality does not require

measured by the extent

to

which

MIO

furthers

compliance with the sanctions.
29.

Id. at 3-4.

30.

Id.

and reconnaissance

JC4ISR
approach, which also includes joint command, control, communications and computing. See
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control of Joint Military
Operations, at App. A (Second Draft, 25 June 2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
31.

Intelligence, surveillance

are part of the larger integrated

jel/ddrraafftt_pubs/3_22sd.pdf.
32.

Enforcement

vessels will

no doubt recognize the

security risks posed

by requiring

vessels to

transmit sensitive information by radio transmissions that are easily intercepted by other vessels
or shore stations.
33.

VBSS team members

attend individual and team training to learn boarding procedures,

take-down procedures and search techniques. Team
and lethal use of force techniques. See generally Navy MIO
Doctrine, supra note 16, If 4.3.1 & App. H.
34. The Navy distinguishes between "opposed" boardings and "noncompliant" boardings, the
former of which present a higher risk. See id. J 1.5. Special operations forces are always used in
opposed boardings, and may be used in noncompliant boardings. Ship's force VBSS teams are
not authorized to conduct opposed boardings, id. ^ 6.1, or noncompliant boardings on vessels

vessel control tactics, levels of force,

members

are trained in non-lethal

with high freeboard.
35.

Id. ^ 6.6.

Special operations forces

may be drawn from

a

SEAL

or

MSPF

team. The

MSPF

element

within Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) provides the direct action
capability

and

carries out the

VBSS mission

Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note
similar support

may

in

support of maritime interception operations. See

16, ^ 3.2.2.5.

On

naval vessels without an

embarked MEU,

be available from a Marine security force battalion or one of

antiterrorism security teams (FAST).
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The effectiveness of this approach was demonstrated by a team of Navy SEALs and Marines
conducted a vertical take-down in the widely-studied interdiction of the Iraqi cargo ship Ibn
Khahiun in the northern Arabian Sea in 1990. See Lois E. Fielding, Maritime Interception:
Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions in the New World Order, 53 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1191,
36.

that

1192 (1993); see also Robert

E.

Marabito, Maritime Interdiction: Evolution of a Strategy, 22
301 (1991).

Ocean Development and International Law
37.

Navy

MIO

Doctrine, supra note 16,

without the cooperation of the boarded
obstruct the boarding.

It is

1j

"Breaching" refers to boarding by small boat
and may require overcoming passive measures to

6.6.2.

vessel,

considered "extremely dangerous."

Id.

15.6.2.2.

38.

Id.

39.

Diversions have been directly addressed in the context of the belligerents' right of visit and

search. See SAN

REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT

SEA 32, «1 121 (Louise Doswald-Beck, ed. 1995). At the time the Manual was written, some
concluded that a right to compel diversion had not yet ripened into a rule of customary law. See
Louise Doswald-Beck, Current Developments: The San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to

Armed Conflicts at Sea, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

192, 202

(1995).
40.

Navy VBSS and Coast Guard LEDET teams have implemented

a

number of innovations

to

overcome the difficulties of at-sea container inspections, including the use of sophisticated
climbing equipment and techniques. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Annex D, U D.5.
41. The choice of rules can be even more complex if the operation includes military or law
enforcement personnel from other nations. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Ifll 2.4 & 2.5.
42. The legal authorities on which
interception operations may be founded are beyond

WMD

the scope of this article.

See Alfred H.A. Soons, Enforcing the Economic Embargo at Sea, in UNITED NATIONS
Sanctions and International Law 307-24 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 2001).
43.

44.

Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59

Fleck, Rules of Engagement for

Stat. 1031, T.S.

No. 993. See

also Dieter

Maritime Forces and the Limitation of the Use of Force Under the

UN Charter, 31 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1988). For an analysis of the
self-defense arguments, see Michael Byers,

Comment,

Policing the

High

Seas:

The

Proliferation

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526-^45 (2004). The French
commentators Dupuy and Vignes and their Iranian contributor Djamchid Momtaz argue
Security Initiative, 98

against a right of self-defense

on the high

seas.

Handbook on the New Law of the Sea 412-14
45.

Church

46.

See, e.g.,

v.

Hubbard, 6 U.S.

US

RENE-JEAN DUPUY

&

DANIEL VIGNES, A

(1991).

Cranch) 187, 235 (1804).
Navy Regulations (1990), arts. 0915 (use of force against another

(violations of international law

(2

and

State)

& 0914

treaties).

sometimes said, even in introductory use of force training sessions, that there is little or
no meaningful difference between the SROE, the RUF and the CGUFP. Staff judge advocates and

47.

It is

law specialists must be
distinctions

alert to correct

such simplistic assertions and their tendency to blur

between the doctrines. The more

difficult challenge will

be to

justify the

vital

need for

multiple doctrines and the potential to inject confusion into one of the commander's most

important planning and operational decisions.

The distinction is implicit in the UN Security Council's Resolution 221 imposing an
embargo on the former Rhodesia. Although not explicitly stated, the resolution was issued under
Article 41 of the UN Charter, which is limited to measures not including the use of armed force.
Nevertheless, the Council authorized the enforcing State to use force to compel compliance with

48.

the embargo. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 221, para.
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5,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966)
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(authorizing the United

Kingdom

had imposed an "embargo on
217 (1965), para. 8.
See PHILIP C. JESSUP,

oil

by the use of force if necessary" the arrival of
By Resolution 217 issued the year before, the Council

to "prevent,

tankers in (Portuguese controlled) Beira).

and petroleum products"

A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS

49.

to Rhodesia. See

U.N. Doc. S/RES/

162 (1952). Judge Jessup took the

position that a use of armed force violates Article 2(4) of the Charter only

if it is

directed against

the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.
50.

and Associated Terms, (Apr.

added) [hereinafter
51

Department of Defense Dictionary of

See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02,

Military

12, 2001, as

amended through June

9,

2004) (emphasis

DoD Dictionary].

Despite the fact that the

US embassy in Beirut had been bombed just six months

United States had not taken any additional precautions

earlier,

the

Beirut barracks, nor, reportedly,

at the

had the on scene commander requested an ROE review or revision. The incident raised serious
questions about why, in such a high-risk environment, the sentries' weapons were not loaded.
52. Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will be Fought in the 2 1st
CENTURY 1 17 (2003) (reporting that the safety of the Cole "depended totally on a handful of
twenty-year-old sailors armed with unloaded M-16s, squinting into the noonday sun and trying
to figure out why two guys in a skiff were waving at them as they approached").
53. Perhaps the best known case concerned General John LaVelle, USAF, commander of the
Seventh Air Force in Viet Nam in 1971, who was relieved of command and demoted for charges
relating to violations of applicable ROE and reporting requirements. See BERKOWITZ, id. at 151.
More recently, an Illinois Air National Guard pilot received non-judicial punishment under
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for, inter alia, violating the rules of
engagement during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The flag officer who imposed
the punishment found that the pilot "blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagement and
special instructions." See U.S. Pilot

Found

Guilty in 'Friendly Fire" Incident,

CNN.COM NEWS,

July 6, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/06/pilot.friendly.fire/.
54.

Self-defense

is

an affirmative defense under the Uniform Code of Justice. Rule for Courts-

Martial (R.C.M.) 916(e),

Manual

for Courts Martial (2002).

A

similar rule applies in cases

brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC). To prevail on a defense of self-defense
before the ICC, the conduct must have been a "reasonable" response to an imminent and

unlawful use of force.
31(l)(c), U.N. Doc.

Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,

A/CONF. 183/9,

reprinted in 37

art.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 999

Rome Statute also limits the defense of obedience to
orders. Responsibility for crimes falling within the Rome Statute is excluded only if the person
acting under a legal obligation to obey orders (1) did not know the order was unlawful, and (2)
(1998) (the United States

is

not a party). The

the order was not manifestly unlawful. Id.

art. 33.

55.

See United States

56.

See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of

v.

Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 28, 29

(

1st Cir.), cert, denied,

461 U.S. 958 (1983).

Engagement

for U.S. Forces,

CJCS

3121.01 (series). The SROE replaced what were known as the "Peacetime Rules of
Engagement." Most of the 2000 version (CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01 A) is classified, with the exception of
Enclosure A, which sets out the SROE for self-defense [hereinafter CJCS 3 12 1.01 A]. Typically,
Inst.

ROE

for joint operations are included in

Appendix

8 (Rules of

Engagement)

to

Annex C

(Operations) of the applicable operation plan or operation order.
See CJCSI 3121.01A, supra note 56, Encl. A, U 1(a) (SROE are applicable during "all military
operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial
57.

jurisdiction of the United States").

An

exception

control of a multinational force. Id. J 1(c).
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is

made

for

US

forces

under the operational
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Doctrine for

58.

(Mar. 26, 2004 draft) [hereinafter Joint Doctrine for
Id. at

59.

IV- 17. See also William

Warships Engaged

in

J.

Law Enforcement,

Homeland

Homeland Security, at

III-

1

3,

Security].

Fenrick, Legal Limits on the Use of Force by Canadian

CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-

18

45(1980).
See Coast

60.

adhere to the
even

Guard

MLEM, supra note

SROE

under the following conditions:

8,

conducting a Coast Guard mission

if

defense of itself or other

of the

1

DoD

US

^ 4.E.

1

which provides that Coast Guard units

,

( 1 )

forces in the vicinity; (2)

when

the unit (wherever located and

determines that

at the time)

when

the unit

is

must take action

NM

SROE. The SROE authority to exercise "national self-defense"

express authorization does not currently extend to the Coast Guard.

Navy

in

tactical control

any purpose) when operating outside US territory (seaward of the 12
or (3) when engaged in national self-defense, as authorized by an authority

designated in the

See

it

under the

(for

territorial sea);

61.

shall

MIO

in the

absence of

Id. at 4-3.

Doctrine, supra note 16, H 2.6.1. Naval doctrine acknowledges that the

MIO.

sanctioning body's resolution prescribes the level of force authorized in conducting

However, "the wording

is

often ambiguous." Id. Accordingly,

national interpretations of the resolution and the

MIO

units

must

also rely

on

ROE.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Rules of Engagement, MC362 (1999).
63. US forces operating under the OPCON or TACON of a multinational force commander
follow the mission accomplishment ROE of the multinational force if authorized by the National
Command Authorities; however, they always retain the right to use necessary and proportional
force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent, just as they do when under Coast Guard OPCON or TACON. See CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01 A,
62.

supra note 56, Encl. A,

ffl|

l.c

&

l.f.

Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note

64.

See

65.

Richard Zeigler, Ubi Sumus?

Operations,

16,

Ifll

& 2.5.

2.4

Quo Vadimus?
NAVAL
LAW
REVIEW
1 (1996).
43
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Mike Spence, Lessons for Combined Rules of Engagement, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 2000, at 56-60 (observing that dealing with ROE is difficult enough when
only one nation's armed forces are engaged; however, problems multiply rapidly when
consistent ROE must be developed for multinational forces).
67. It is the policy of the United States that the armed forces of the United States will comply
with the "law of war" during all armed conflicts, however, such conflicts may be characterized.
The "law of war" encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities that is binding
on the United States or its individual citizens. See Secretary of Defense, DOD Directive 5100.77,
DoD Law of War Program, Dec. 9, 1998; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Implementation of the
66.

DOD Law of War Program, CJCS Instruction 58 10.0 IB, Mar. 25, 2002.
Navy

MOOTW Doctrine, supra note

16, at 3-2.

68.

See

69.

For the obligation, see Article 0914 of the

On

occasions

when

US Navy

Regulations (1990):

injury to the United States or to citizens thereof

is

committed or

threatened in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rights
existing

under a

shall take

treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer present

such action as

is

demanded by

.

.

the gravity of the situation. In time of peace,

action involving the use of force shall be taken only in consonance with the provisions

of [Article 0915].
Article

0915 limits the use of force against another State to cases of self-defense against hostile

acts or hostile intent directed against the unit and,

their property

and US commercial

when

assets in the vicinity.
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appropriate, in defense of US citizens,

Craig H. Allen

70.

End. A,

3 12 1.01 A, supra note 56,

CJCSI

A-3. "Hostile act" and demonstrated "hostile

at

intent" are defined at A-5. See generally Richard

Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of

J.

A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 245 (1997). See also Mike
Palmer, Unwrapping the ROE Axle, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 2004, at 58
(highlighting the inherent and independent force of self-defense ROE from mission

Engagement:

accomplishment ROE).
71.

CJCSI 3121.01A, supra note
End. A, at 18(2).

72.

Id.

73.

See, e.g.,

MIO

Navy

56,

3

1

do not constitute

5.f.

U

Annex D,

team threat

1 D.3.1 ("boarding

MIO boardings).

See Secretary of Defense Directive of 16

1903Z July 2003.

75.

at

Doctrine, supra note 16,

standing rules of engagement" for
74.

End. A,

May

2003; Chief of Naval Operations message

DoD considers warning shots a signal to an approaching vessel to stop; they

a use of force.

See Joint Doctrine for

Homeland

Security, supra note 58, at GL-13.

Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse
Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of United
76.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1385

States Army

(West 2005). See

and Air Force

Although the

to

also

AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, FEDERAL271

Executive Laws, 141

PCA directly addresses only the Army (and later the Air Force), Congress directed

the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations prohibiting the
directly participating in civilian
77.

(2003).

Joint Doctrine for

law enforcement

Homeland

activities.

Navy and Marine Corps from

10 U.S.C.A. §§ 371-382 (West 2005).

Security, supra note 58, at 1-13 to 1-15.

Navy

civil

support

missions include measures to combat terrorism, counter-narcotics operations, national security

and key asset protection, support for natural and manmade
disasters response operations and for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield
explosive (CBRNE) consequence management.
78. CJCSI 3 12 1.01 A, supra note 56, End. A, 1 l(i). The Naval Doctrine for Military Operations
Other-Than-War distinguishes MOOTW involving the use/threat of force (combat) from
special events, critical infrastructure

MOOTW

not involving the use/threat of force (noncombat). See Navy

MOOTW

Doctrine,

now referred to as Security and
and counter-proliferation measures are categorized as

supra note 16, at 1-2. Such operations often overlap with what are
Stability

Operations (SASO).

MOOTW. Id. at

1-3

&1 3.2.2.

79.

W.atIV-17toIV-18.

80.

Joint Doctrine for

81.

Id. at

Homeland

Security, supra note 56, at GL-14.

IV- 18. The applicable instruction

does not apply to

Guard

MIO

US

CJCSI

in support of counter-narcotics operations.

CGUFP.

See CJCSI 3121.02A, supra note 56,

Homeland

82.

Joint Doctrine for

83.

The amended version is reproduced (in
Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, at

84.

is

3 12 1.02 A,

military units or personnel while under

ffl[

3.c

May 31,

2000.

The

instruction

OPCON or TACON of the Coast

Such units instead follow the

SROE

or

& 3.e.

Security, supra note 56, at IV- 18.

foreign governments. Id. Chapter 4

Engagement." Additional guidance

redline format) in
1-6.

Appendix

Portions of the

MLEM

III

of this

article.

are not releasable to

"Use of Force Policy and the Standing Rules of
contained in the U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Counter

is titled
is

Drug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO), COMDINST M16247.4/NWP 3-07.4
(2000).
85.

"Operational control"

is

the authority to direct

all

aspects of military operations

training necessary to accomplish the mission. "Tactical control"
specific.

It is

defined as the

for tasking that

is

command

is

authority over assigned or attached units

limited to the detailed direction and control of
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and

mission-specific or task-

movement

made

available

or maneuvers
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within the operational area necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. Operational
control includes tactical control. See

MLEM, supra

DoD

86.

Coast Guard

87.

W.14.B.l.a.

88.

14 U.S.C.A. § 637(c) (West 2005).

vessels (or aircraft)

note

1

8,

Dictionary, supra note 50.

^ 3.C. 1 .a. 1

By the terms of the statute, it
on which one or more members of the Coast Guard

applies to naval surface
are assigned pursuant to

10U.S.C. §379.

MLEM, supra note 18, at ^ E.2.
MODEL PENAL CODE §3. 11 (2)

89.

Coast Guard

90.

W.1]4.B.3.b. See a/so

Penal

Code

MPC]. The Model
and defenses for many

(1985) [hereinafter

serves as a template for defining the elements of crimes

and sets out several defenses to what would otherwise be crimes involving the use of
The Code is not legally binding.
91. Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, at 4-4.
92. The CGUFP does not distinguish between "opposed" boardings and "noncompliant"
boardings. See Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, U 4.A.3.

jurisdictions
force.

93.

See

id.

1 4.B.3.b.5.

The CGUFP prohibits warning shots other than against noncompliant vessels. Id. ^ 4.B.2.d.
95. Id. at 4-14. Note that disabling fire is permitted even when there is a risk of "minimum"
injury, but it will be discontinued if there is a "substantial" risk of injury. As phrased, the
94.

"substantiality" qualification apparently refers to the probability of risk, not
96.

Note

that the statute provides for an indemnity, not immunity.

to those acting

damages

under that commanding

officer's direction for

arising out of the action. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637(b)

The I'm Alone Arbitration (Can.
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 1609 (1933)

97.

See, e.g.,

v.

its

magnitude.

The indemnity also extends

any penalties or actions

for

(West 2005).

U.S.), 3

UNITED NATIONS REPORTS OF

fire); Ford v. United States,
272 U.S. 593 (1924) (warning shots); United States v. 63 Kegs of Malt, 27 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1928)
(warning shots); The Vinces, 20 F.2d 164 (E.D.S.C. 1927) (warning shots and disabling fire).

98.

See

159, 193

CHARLES M. FUSS, SEA OF GRASS: THE MARITIME DRUG WAR 1970-1990, at 69, 70, 1 16,
& 248 (1996). On October 10, 1980, the USCGC Point Francis became the first US vessel

to use disabling fire against a
99.

(use of disabling

drug smuggling

See U.S. Coast Guard, Operation

M3 120.2

(2003) (public access

is

vessel.

New

Frontier Procedures Manual,

restricted because the

manual

is

COMDTINST

designated for

official

use

only).
100. See

RESTATEMENT, supra note

United States

legislative history

authorize the Coast

v.

comment

c

& note 2.

Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), the court construed 14 U.S.C. § 89
and concluded that Congress did not intend that the statute would

101. In

and

its

20, § 721,

Guard

to

conduct searches that would violate international law.

Id. at 27.

Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (holding that Fourth
102. See United States
Amendment was not violated when customs officers boarded a US vessel, pursuant to their
authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to go on board any vessel at any place in the United States
and examine the vessel's documents without any suspicion of wrongdoing); see also United
States v. Flores-Montano, 542 U.S. 149 (2004) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not
require Customs officer to have "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a non-destructive search of a
v.

vehicle's fuel tank

when

vehicle crossed

US border).

CONST, amend. IV.
U.S. CONST, amend. V.
The Constitutional safeguards apply

103. U.S.

104.
105.

boarding does not have

a

to interceptions

law enforcement purpose.
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and boardings even when the
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106. See,

e.g.,

Canton

e.g.,

Saucier

v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Collins v.

Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115

(1992).
107. See,

v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that officer

to suit for alleged excessive force);

Gonzalez

v.

Reno, 325 F.3d 1228

had qualified immunity

(1 1th Cir.

2003).

108. For example, a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (forcibly assaulting,
resisting or impeding certain federal officers designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114) might assert in

defense that the defendant's use of force against the officer was justified by the officer's use of
excessive force against the defendant.

ground

that the arrest

109. See,

e.g.,

is

A person is not justified in

unlawful. See

United States ex

rel.

MPC,

Lujan

v.

resisting arrest

by force on the

supra note 90, § 3.04(2)(a)(i).

Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.),

1001 (1975). The Supreme Court has ruled that the

illegality

deprive the government of the opportunity to prove his

cert,

denied, All U.S.

of a defendant's detention cannot

guilt.

United States

v.

Crews, 445 U.S.

453,474(1980).
110. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But see United States v. Draper, 536 U.S. 194(2002)
(holding that, under the circumstances presented, the presence of three police officers on a bus
that was stopped did not constitute a seizure of the persons on the bus).
law enforcement officer has acted in a way that denies a person the freedom to
walk away, a Fourth Amendment "seizure" has occurred. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is determined by a "totality of the circumstances" test.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). The Fifth Circuit has held that the "reasonable
grounds" standard applicable to a right of approach boarding (under Article 1 10 of the 1982 LOS
Convention) satisfies the "reasonableness" test under the Fourth Amendment. See United States
v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1083 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Article 22 of the former 1958
Convention on the High Seas).
111.

Whenever

a

United States

Gomez, 633 F.2d

999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980).
7-12
113. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
(1985) (holding that the use of deadly force to stop a
fleeing suspect is only reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a significant threat of death or physical injury to the officer or others). See also MPC, supra note
1

12.

v.

90, § 3.07(b).

114.

Graham

v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).

115. Id. at 397.
116.

Mat 396.

117. Id.

205 (2001).
United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (confirming it is "well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders"). Some treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) extend
"national treatment" to nationals of the other State. Such treaties have been held to be selfexecuting. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding that the FCN treaty
between the United States and Japan "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation").
120. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a foreign search is
reasonable if it conforms to the requirements of foreign law). But see United States v. Bin Laden,
132 F. Supp.2d 168, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Fifth Amendment protections
relating to self-incrimination apply to the use, in a US court, of a statement obtained in a foreign
custodial interrogation by US government agents because the Fifth Amendment "violation"
occurs when the statement is used at trial, not when it was obtained).
118. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
119.

m

121. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 722, comment
& note 16. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004), the Court held that the Guantanamo Bay Navy Base in Cuba, over which the United
States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" under the lease, falls within the territorial
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jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of applying the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Accordingly, a federal court with venue may determine whether the detainees are being

The
Supreme Court's holding so far does not extend to detentions at other overseas locations that are
not under the "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States.
held in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.

22. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1974). In Ker v. Illinois, 1 19 U.S.
436 (1886), however, the Court held that a defendant who was forcibly abducted in Peru for trial
in the U.S. was not entitled to have the charges dismissed on grounds that his right to due process
was violated. See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 ( 1952); RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 433.
1

1

23.

Acting under Article 4 1 of the Charter, the Council cannot authorize "armed force."

Armed

may only be authorized under Article 42.

For some, that raises the question whether police
force can be used to enforce council resolutions adopted under Article 41; however, the Security
Council appears to have answered the question in the affirmative in its embargo resolutions
against the former Rhodesia. See Soons, supra note 43, at 321.
force

124. See Louis Sohn, Peacetime Use of Force

OPERATIONS 38 (Horace B. Robertson,
International Law Studies).
125.

LOS Convention,

supra note 14,

Jr.

on the High Seas,

ed.,

1991) (Vol. 64,

THE LAW OF NAVAL
US Naval War College

in

art. 88.

126. Id. art. 301.

1974 the United Nations General Assembly attempted to define "aggression" by
resolution. According to the Assembly's resolution, aggression is the use of armed force by a
127. In

State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as defined by the
resolution. U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of Dec. 14, 1974, G.A.O.R. 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31 (A/9631), at 142 [hereinafter Aggression Resolution]. For a discussion of the
US position on defining "aggression" under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
International Law 2000, at 286-91 (2001).

merchant vessels was a principal cause of the War of 1812. Similarly,
President Wilson sought a declaration of war after German submarines sank US merchant
vessels at a time when the United States had declared its neutrality in World War I. Today,
however, any response must be consistent with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, as
construed by the International Court of Justice in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua decision and the Oil Platforms case. Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits), reprinted in 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
(Nov. 6) (merits), available
MATERIALS 1023 (1986); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopframe.htm. See also William H. Taft IV, SelfDefense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2004)
(criticizing the court for its excursion into obiter dictum and criticizing the court's treatment of
the armed attack and self-defense issues). Under the General Assembly definition, an "attack by
the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine or air fleets of another State"
128. Britain's seizure of US

The definition appears
on warships and naval auxiliaries. However, in its dispute with Canada
over Canada's seizure of the F/VEstai on the high seas in 1995, Spain argued that Canada's use of
constitutes aggression. Aggression Resolution, supra note 127, art. 3(d).
to be limited to attacks

warning shots

to stop the vessel constituted a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the

465 (Dec. 4) (declining
jurisdiction). See also D. P. O'CONNELL, II, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 804 (Ivan A.
Shearer ed., 1984). However, nothing in the decision by the International Court of Justice in that
case or by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in the M/V Saiga case discussed below
suggests that either tribunal considered the use of military weapons in stopping and boarding a
Charter.

Fisheries

Jurisdiction

(Sp.

v.

Can.),

130

1998

I.C.J.

432,
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be an "armed attack" or an act of unlawful "aggression" in violation of Article 2(4) of
Charter or a violation of Article 301 of the LOS Convention.

vessel to

the

UN

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 ("Montreal Convention"); Protocol Relating to
an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, May 10, 1984,
reprinted in 23 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 705 (1984). The United States is not a party
to the 1984 protocol, presumably out of concern over its provisions for compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction. Article 3 bis of the protocol requires States to refrain from using weapons against
civil aircraft in flight. See also Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 32
(criminalizing attacks on civil aircraft). Congress later made provisions for immunity in cases
involving US assistance to foreign enforcement officials. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2291-4. See also
Phillip A. Johnson, Shooting Down Drug Traffickers, in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK
GRUNAWALT 79 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International
129. See

Sept. 23, 1971,

Law Studies).
130. See,

e.g.,

LOS Convention,

supra note 14,

art.

73 (limiting enforcement measures available

to coastal States in the EEZ). See also Continental Shelf (Tunis, v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18,

24) (Oda,

J.

be excluded from the

will likely

230 (Feb.

dissenting) (predicting that disputes arising out of Article 73 enforcement activities

LOS Convention's compulsory dispute settlement provisions by

virtue of Article 298 of the convention).
131. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/
37 (1995), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-24 (1996), reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1542 (1995) [hereinafter the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement]. Article 22 of the

agreement limits the use of force
132. See,

& art.

e.g.,

Bilateral

enforcement actions.

WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note

6, art.

4(5)

9.

133. Protocol of 2005 to the

of Maritime Navigation,
17,

in fisheries

United States-Liberia

2005,

Convention

art. 8,

for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

para. 2 (adding Article 8bis to the

IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/DC/1

The new 2005 Protocol

When

article

SUA Convention), adopted Oct.
SUA Convention"].

[hereinafter 2005 Protocol to the

provides that:

carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use of force shall be

avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its

officials

and persons on board,

or where the officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions.

of force pursuant to this article shall not exceed the

minimum

Any use

degree of force which

is

necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
134. See

United States

high seas by
matter.

might

its flag

v. Postal,

state

is

589 F.2d 862, 870 (5th

Cir.) ("the

boarding of

a vessel

on the

not an international event. The consequences are solely a domestic

The boarding of a foreign vessel is, of course, a matter of international concern that
more restraint on the part of the boarding state."), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 832

call for

(1979).

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
ICCPR]; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The United States
ratified the ICCPR in 1992 subject to five reservations, four understandings and four
declarations. See S. REP. 102-123 (1992); 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992).
136. See ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 2(1) (requiring States-parties to protect the defined rights of
all individuals "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
135. International

[hereinafter

131
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note 20, § 701. Application might turn on reservations and exceptions entered and the extent to
which the convention is deemed to be self-executing.
1

37. See,

e.g.,

United States-Liberia

138.2005 Protocol to the
139.

It is

SUA

WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note

Convention, supra note 133,

beyond the scope of this

article

art. 8bis,

6, art.

4(5)

& art. 9.

para. 7.

whether an individual would have standing

in a

US

court to object to enforcement actions by the United States that went beyond or were in

contravention of an applicable bilateral boarding agreement with the

flag State.

The diplomatic correspondence, claims and briefs exchanged between the two
governments are reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ARBITRATION SERIES No. 2 (vol. 1-7),
I'm Alone Case (1931-1935) [hereinafter I'm Alone Case]. The interim decision is also reported
140.

in the

"I'm Alone" Arbitration (Can.

v. U.S.).

Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors (United States-Great
Britain), Jan. 23, 1924, reprinted in I'm Alone Case, supra note 140, vol. I, annex B. Article II of
the Convention provided the US jurisdiction to board British vessels beyond US waters when
within a distance from the coast the target vessel could traverse in one hour. Article IV provided
141.

for arbitration of disputes.

142.

Under customary

law,

in violation of US laws, the

by acting

as a

"mothership" supplying contraband to contact boats

Vm Alone might be said to be "constructively present" in US waters.

The constructive presence doctrine is implicit in Article 111 of the 1982 LOS Convention and
Article 23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, both of which in describing the right of hot

may be commenced if the pursued vessel "or one of its boats" is in
MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM
T. BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 909-1 1 (1962, rev. 1987). Under the narrow view of
the doctrine, a vessel is only constructively present when it works with its own boats to violate
pursuit recognize that pursuit

the pursuing State's territorial sea or internal waters. See also

coastal State law.

Under

the broader view, the contact boats used to shuttle the

shore need not be from the mothership. See ROBIN R.

LAW OF THE SEA 215-16
143. Joint Interim

CHURCHILL

illicit

cargo to

& A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE

(3d ed. 1999).

Report of the Commissioners, the I'm Alone Case ( 1933), supra note 140,

vol.

6, at 5.

144. Id. Initially, the Commission concluded only that the intentional sinking was not justified
by any provision of the 1924 treaty. Later, in their final report, they added that the sinking was
not justified "by any principle of international law." Ultimately, compensation was denied to the
owners on the ground that they were US nationals, but the arbitrators ordered the United States
to apologize and pay $25,000 in compensation to the United Kingdom for its insult to the UK
flag. Joint Final Report of the Commissioners, the I'm Alone Case (1935), supra note 140, vol. 7,
at 3-4.

145. Part V of the LOS Convention, which governs enforcement of marine resource laws in the
EEZ, similarly limits "enforcement measures" available to the coastal State to those "necessary";
but it appears to take a broad view of necessity. Article 73 provides that the coastal State is
authorized to "take such measures, including boarding, inspection and judicial proceedings, as
may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted in conformity with
this Convention." LOS Convention, supra note 14, art. 73 (emphasis added). This is functionally
equivalent to the standard in 14 U.S.C. § 89 ("All necessary force to compel compliance"). Spain
took a narrower view of Article 73 in its dispute with Canada over the 1995 seizure of the F/V
Estai. Spain's counsel suggested in oral argument that because Article 73 does not expressly
authorize the use of force, any use of force would violate international law. Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Sp. v. Can.) (Oral argument for Spain by Counsel Sanchez on June 9, 1998), at http://www.icj-

cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iec/iecframe.htm.
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146. The Red Crusader Case (U.K. v. Den.), Comm'n of Enquiry, Mar. 23, 1962, 35
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 485 (1962). The two governments agreed to establish a
commission of enquiry to determine the vessel's location at the time of interception.

499 (emphasis added).
148. The use of the phrase "proved necessity" suggests that the burden of proof was on
147. Id. at

Denmark.
149. This conclusion

intervenes

may mean

and persuades the

nothing more than that

if

vessel to stop, the use of force

British intervention permitted

Red Crusader

to escape,

it is

is

the fleeing vessel's flag State

no longer

necessary.

Had

the

not clear the British intervention

would have been excused.
150. Id. at 500.
151. Id.

M/V "Saiga"

Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Int'l Trib. Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 143, reprinted in 38
International Legal Materials 1323 (1999) [hereinafter The M/V Saiga].
153. Prompt release actions maybe brought under Article 292 of the LOS Convention to obtain
the release of a vessel and crew upon payment of reasonable security.
154. The M/V Saiga, supra note 152, U 153.
152.

The

of the

155.

Sea

W.I

1999)

(No. 2) Case
120

(St.

(merits),

155.

156. Id. 1 153.

Agreement, supra note 131, art. 22.
158. Id. art. 22(1 )(f). Before extending the Article 22 limits outside the fisheries enforcement
context it might be useful to consider that some fisheries enforcement regimes do not even
permit boarding officers to be armed while conducting boardings. See, e.g., Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO), Conservation and Enforcement Measures, art. 24(8),
NAFO FC Doc. 04/1 Serial No. N4936, available at http://www.nafo.ca/activities/FRAMES/
AcFrFish.html. Unarmed boardings would be unrealistic for vessels that might be engaged in
trafficking in narcotics, weapons or humans, and any use of force policy must recognize the
157. Straddling Fish Stocks

differing risk levels presented in the various contexts.
159.

The

160. See

M/V Saiga, supra note

152, U 156.

Tim Zimmermann, If World War III Comes, Blame Fish, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

Oct. 21, 1996, at 59-60.

The article

reports that "fish are the reason that Russians are shooting at

Japanese, Tunisians are shooting at Italians,

and

a lot of people are shooting at Spaniards."

It

goes on to report that three Thai fishermen were shot dead by Vietnamese maritime authorities,

two Spaniards were injured by gunfire from a Portuguese patrol boat, Iceland authorized the use
offeree to exclude Danish fishermen from its waters, and a Malaysian naval vessel fired on a Thai
fishing boat, killing the master and his 14-year-old son. The United Kingdom dispatched naval
frigates to protect British fishing boats during the several "cod wars" with Iceland from 1958 to
1976. See also O'CONNELL, supra note 128, at 1071-72 n.67 (collecting cases and protests
involving the use of force against US vessels and those of other States).
161. The use of force to intentionally sink a vessel with persons aboard would constitute "deadly
force" (force that is likely to cause death or serious physical injury). The standards for the use of
deadly force are much more stringent than those applicable to stopping a noncompliant vessel.
162. Recent decisions by the International Court of Justice highlight the importance of clarifying
the burden and quantum of proof in such cases. See Oil Platforms, supra note 128 (Higgins, J.,
Separate Opinion, ffl| 30-39), reprinted in 42 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1334 (2003). In
the S.S. Lotus case, the tribunal ruled that France, as the State challenging Turkey's exercise of
jurisdiction,

had the burden of proving

international law. S.S. Lotus (Fr.

v.

that Turkey's action violated an applicable rule of

Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
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163. The LOS Convention prescribes an effectiveness standard for enforcement. See, e.g., LOS
Convention, supra note 14, art. 94(1) (establishing flag State's duty to "effectively" exercise its

jurisdiction

and

control).

United States protested an incident that occurred 16 miles off the
on the unarmed American merchant vessel Sister
Katingo, apparently because the American vessel failed to clear customs before departing the
Soviet port. The United States also protested a 1969 incident in which a Peruvian gunboat fired
on an unarmed US tuna boat located 40 miles off the Peruvian coast, breaking the tuna boat's
mast and radio antenna. The United States argued there was no justification under international
law for firing on an unarmed fishing vessel. See O'CONNELL, supra note 128, at 1071-72 n.67.
164. For example, in 1964, the

Soviet coast in which a Soviet vessel fired

CHURCHILL

165.

& LOWE, supra note 142, at 461; see also O'CONNELL, supra note
Vm Alone case).

128, at 1071-

74 (also relying on the

166. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 15/ 1996/ 16/ Add. 2 [hereinafter Basic Principles]. The Basic Principles declare themselves
to be non-derogable, even in times of public emergency. Id. para. 8. Although the Basic
Principles developed by the UN Economic and Social Council are not legally binding, the
European Court of Human Rights treats them as if they were. See, e.g., Ocalan v Turkey [2003]

Eur. Ct. H.R. 46221/99, 1 196.

UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the UN General Assembly

167.

Resolution 34/169, Dec. 17, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169 (1997) [hereinafter

Code of

Conduct].

The European Court of Human Rights held

168. Basic Principles, supra note 166, para. 2.

the

Government of Turkey bore

responsibility for failing to equip

its

security forces with

that

non-

equipment when they responded to a large internal civil disturbance, leaving the
no alternative to the use of deadly force. Giilec v. Turkey, [1998] Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 593/93, 1flj

lethal force

forces

71,73,83.

As noted above, under Articles 297 and 298 of the LOS Convention certain disputes
concerning law enforcement or military activities may be exempt from the Convention's
compulsory dispute settlement procedures. See LOS Convention, supra note 14, arts. 297 & 298.
Private suits for damages may be subject to the defenses of sovereign immunity or the act of State
doctrine. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
(dismissing suit by tanker owner for damage to vessel by Argentine naval gunfire). The act of
State doctrine applies only to the State's acts within its territory, not to those occurring on the
169.

high

seas.

170. See
171.

172. See,

Dana
visit
it is

LOS Convention,

Navy

MIO

e.g.,

supra note 14,

Doctrine, supra note 16,

arts.
ffl|

& 96.
& 2.5.

95

2.4

HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

ed, 8th ed. 1866)

(George G. Wilson

180 n.89 (Richard H.

rev. ed. 1936) (the "right to stop a foreign vessel

her must carry the right to use the requisite force,

if the

exercise of the right

is

and

resisted. If not,

not a right in any sense worth disputing").

173. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331,
International Legal Materials 679 (1969). The United States is not a party.

174. For example, a

reprinted in 8

WMD shipment to a suspected terrorist organization being transported by
one or more resolutions on WMD proliferation,

sea in the Persian Gulf area might implicate

global terrorism

and

State-specific embargoes.

U.N. Charter, supra note 44, arts. 24( 1 ), 39 & 1 ( 1 ).
176. Id. art. 25. The means by which a decision of the Council is to be "carried out" are not
defined; however, they must be "in accordance with" the Charter, including the purposes and
1

75. See

principles articulated in Articles

1

and

2.
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Such boarding agreements are lex specialis and therefore control in any disputes between
the parties. However, such agreements must be compatible with the LOS Convention. See LOS
Convention, supra note 14, art. 293(1).
Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9; United
178. See United States-Liberia Bilateral
Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.
States-Marshall Islands Bilateral
177.

WMD

WMD

179.

The "M/V

180. See

181.

Saiga," supra note 152, 1 156.

United States-Liberia

The boarding agreement

Bilateral

WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note

6, art. 4(5).

expressly preserves the right of the parties to exercise the right of

visit under international law. See id, art. 4(4).
Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama for Support and
Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry
of Government and Justice, Feb. 5, 2002, art. X, 2002 U.S.T. Lexis 51, available at http://
www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/32859.htm. Any use of force must comply with Article XVII of the

approach and
182.

agreement.
183. Id. art. XVII.
184. See

id.

1(6) (a). The Panama Agreement permits WMD boardings by "auxiliary
when law enforcement personnel are not available. See United States-Panama

art.

personnel" only
Bilateral

WMD

Boarding Agreement, supra note

6, art. 1, para.

4 (revising Article

XV

of the

existing agreement).
185. U.S. National Imagery 8c Mapping Agency, International Code of Signals for Visual, Sound,
and Radio Communications, NIMA Publ'n 102 (1969, rev. 2003), at 83 [hereinafter NIMA

Publication 102].
186.

Navy

MIO

Doctrine, supra note 16, U 2.4. In general, mission accomplishment

MOOTW are more restrictive than in war. See Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, supra note
187.

The

188.

need not include the enforcing
status as a warship is sufficient.

identification

nationality

and

The "M/V

vessel's

name. The

1

ROE
6,

^j

I-

in
1

vessel's (or aircraft's)

Saiga,"supra note 152, U 156.

189. Article 9 of the

WMD boarding agreements between the United States,

Liberia

and the

Marshall Islands incorporates a requirement for visual and auditory signals.
190. The Tribunal ultimately concluded, on conflicting assertions, that Guinea had failed to
warn the Saiga before opening fire. The "M/V Saiga," supra note 152, ^ 157. If warnings were
given, P35 did not document the warnings by audiotape or videotape. The Tribunal did not
identify which of the States had the burden of proof on the question whether warnings were

given.
191.

There

is

no requirement

to identify the vessel

by name. US Coast Guard

expressly authorized only in Inland Waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 88.1
192.

The

International

Code of Signals

is

(2005).

coded signals that may be
semaphore or flashing light. The meaning of

consists of alphanumerically

transmitted between vessels by radio, signal

each signal

1

and boats
The light is

cutters

often display the rotating blue light associated with law enforcement vehicles.

set forth in a readily available

flags,

publication printed in several languages. See

NIMA

Publication 102, supra note 185.

MLEM, supra note 18, J 4.3 & Table 4-1.
Doctrine, supra note 16, | 6.6. Any decision to use "full force," which might
include sinking the vessel, must be evaluated not only under the applicable mission
193. Coast
194.

Navy

Guard

MIO

accomplishment
I'm Alone case.

ROE

but also governing international law standards, such as those

195. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637(a)(2)

(West 2005).
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In Lewin

United States, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim that because
the Coast Guard had failed to fire warning shots before firing into his vessel, unintentionally
killing another crewman, the defendant was justified in resisting the boarding with "force."
196.

v.

Although the court concluded that the former statutory requirement to fire warning shots
should be "rigidly administered" "for the good of the service," it also concluded that it was
"perfectly clear that the defendant knew his boat was being chased." Lewin v. United States, 62
F.2d619, 620(lstCir. 1933).

Guard MLEM, supra note 18, 4.D & Table 4-1.
MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, 1 6.6.1.2.

197. See Coast

Tf

198.

Navy

199.

United States

665 F.2d 414, 424 (2d

v. Streifel,

Cir. 1981).

200. Id. at 419.

201. Id. at 424.

A

The court quoted

law enforcement officer

its

earlier decision in

who

.

.

.

and abandon

suspect against his

will.

.

.

v.

Gomez:

has duly announced his authority and

attempted to stop and question a suspect
shoulders,"

United States

his investigation.

Indeed, the officer

.

has

not required "to simply shrug his

is
.

who

[T]he officer has the right to detain the

"is entitled to

633 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added),

cert,

make

a.

forcible stop."

denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).

202. Streifel 665 F.2d at 424.
203.

NIMA Publication

102, supra note 185, at 83.

The port State control regime is a response
solely on flag State jurisdiction and control.
204.

205.

Adam

B. Seigel, Enforcing Sanctions:

to the ineffectiveness of a regime that relies

A Growth Industry, 46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

130, 132(1993).

206.

McDougal, supra note

20, at 557-58. Professor

McDougal

distinguished the use of force in

law enforcement measures against private actors from forcible self-help and self-defense
measures against States for violations of international law. He goes on to report "I'm ashamed to
confess that at one time I lent my support to the suggestion that article 2(4) and the related
articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-defense. On reflection, I think that was a
very grave mistake." Id. at 559. Colombos devoted a chapter to "forcible measures short of war
used in time of peace." C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA ch. X (6th ed.
1967).
207. See,

14 U.S.C.A. § 637 (West 2005).

e.g.,

Law Enforcement
Role of Navies and Coast Guards in Peacetime, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM 429, 441 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, US Naval War
College International Law Studies).
209. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18
208. Ivan A. Shearer, The Development of International

(1st Cir.) (use
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VI
The Proliferation Security Initiative in the
Maritime Domain

Stuart Kaye*
Introduction

The

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

is

one of a number of measures

community in response to the heightened concern over terrorism since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
The PSI is essentially part of a preventative strategy to deny weapons of mass detaken by the international

struction

(WMD)

to terrorist organizations

by ensuring such weapons cannot be

moved freely across the world's oceans. This article will seek to consider the implications for the law of the sea, particularly the operation of the 1982 United Nations

Convention on the Law of the

Sea, generated
1

by the

PSI,

and the possible implica-

tions of its vigorous pursuit.

Content of the PSI

The PSI was announced

W.

Bush.

2

It initially

gradually widened

its

in

was

Krakow, Poland on

May

a cooperative venture

13,

2003 by President George

between eleven

States, 3

support base to include a number of additional

4

cluding Russia. In addition to this direct support, the PSI received

from

States

but has

States, in-

tacit

approval

attending an international conference directed at international

Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

was demonstrated

security arrangements. This

in the

Maritime Domain

at the first

anniversary meeting in

Krakow on May 3 and June 1, 2004, which was attended by over sixty States. 5
The thrust of the PSI is to prevent the proliferation of
by sea, land and air,
1

WMD

although within the scope of this
be considered. The PSI

will

is

article,

only the maritime aspect of the Initiative

not a treaty, but rather a statement of intention on

the part of participating States, and, of itself,

it

does not create formally binding in-

ternational law obligations. Participating States have agreed to abide

by a

set

of in-

The interdiction principles
indicate States will undertake effective measures to combat the proliferation of
WMD, delivery systems or related materials; 6 cooperate on information exchange
and coordination of activities to combat such proliferation; 7 and review domestic
terdiction principles, set out in a formal Statement.

and,

if

necessary, international law to strengthen these efforts. 8

In terms of specific circumstances
vides a

number of instances, and

Take

specific actions in

WMD,

when interdiction will take place, the PSI pro-

these are worth extracting:

support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of

their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their

national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under

and frameworks,

international law

a.

Not

to include:

to transport or assist in the transport of

any such cargoes to or from

States or non-State actors of proliferation concern,

persons subject to their jurisdiction to do

b.

At their

another

own

initiative,

any

so.

shown by

board and search any vessel flying their

their internal waters or territorial seas or areas
is

to allow

or at the request of and good cause

State, to take action to

any other State that

and not

beyond the

flag in

territorial seas

of

reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to

or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize

such cargoes that are identified.

c.

To

seriously

consider

providing

consent

circumstances to the boarding and searching of its
States

and

may be
d.

To

to the seizure of such

identified

by such

under

own

WMD-related cargoes

the

appropriate

flag vessels

in

by other

such vessels that

States.

take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal

waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones

(when declared)

vessels that are

reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from States or non-State
actors of proliferation concern

and

to seize such cargoes that are identified;
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and

(2) to

enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports,

internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying

such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search,

At

e.

and seizure of such cargoes prior

own

their

another

initiative or

State, to

(

1

)

upon

to entry.

the request

and good cause shown by

require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying

such cargoes to or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concern

and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such
cargoes that are identified; and/or (2) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such
flights.

f.

If their ports, airfields,

or other

facilities

are used as transhipment points

shipment of such cargoes to or from States or non-State actors of

for

proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other

modes of transport

reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that
are identified. 9

These principles
Firstly,

fall

into a

number of specific categories, in relation to shipping.

PSI States agree to undertake measures to prevent shipments of

WMD, and

to cooperate with other participants to achieve this end. Ships suspected of carry-

ing

WMD destined for non-State actors may be stopped and searched in three cir-

cumstances: where the ship
the flag State

itself,

flies

the flag of a participating State in the PSI, either by

or in cooperation with other PSI States; where the ship

side in a port of a PSI participating State; and,

where the ship

is

e.

and f. above,

along-

present in the inter-

nal waters, territorial sea or contiguous zone of a participating State.
in

is

As

is

evident

similar provisions exist for aircraft, although only at airfields of a

PSI State, or the national airspace of a PSI State.

These categories were

effectively widened in 2004,

with bilateral agreements be-

tween the United States on the one hand, and Liberia and Panama on the other,
with a view to permitting US vessels to stop and search suspect vessels flagged in the
latter

two countries. 10 Liberia and Panama

will

not function as PSI States, but, in

certain circumstances, they have agreed to allow the United States to inspect their
flag vessels. 11

Subsequently, similar agreements have been concluded with a

num-

ber of other States, including Belize, Croatia, the Marshall Islands, and Cyprus. 12

The PSI has
rity

Council.

lution 1540

also

been the subject of consideration by the United Nations Secu-

On April 28,

2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Reso-

on the prevention of the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
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to non-State actors.

The Resolution provided

in the

Maritime Domain

that States could take

all

measures

consistent with international law to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass

and

destruction,

did not

fall

that States

were under an obligation to ensure that such weapons

into the control of non-State actors. Significantly, there

to interdiction of vessels,

13

so the Resolution

contemplated within the PSI; however

falls

no reference

short of the range of measures

clear the Resolution

it is

is

would render the

shipping of weapons in the circumstances contemplated to be addressed by the PSI
unlawful.

Legal Justifications for Interdiction under the PSI

The PSI draws its legal support from a number of bases, some of which are straightforward and some that are more contentious. For this reason, it is necessary to consider each in turn. These will be done without reference to the positions of the PSI
States per se, as they have largely simply asserted that the PSI itself is consistent with

international law. 14

Flag State Jurisdiction

One

of the oldest and most settled matters within the law of the sea

that a flag State retains jurisdiction over a vessel flying
basis for the identification of jurisdiction

and

beyond national jurisdiction. This principle
Convention, and

is

is

legal authority

acknowledged

this

clearly

affairs

a PSI State.

State's nationals,

Sea

owner seeks to

is

entirely valid, as flag States

comply with lawful
its

flag to

and

directions. Ac-

heave to and be boarded

submit to search and make for a designated port in

With the authorization of the

in the operation could

Law of the

vessels flying their flag, 17

aboard

cordingly, a flag State could direct a vessel flying

18

in the

and constant, giving certainty in

under the PSI

therefore can direct masters of such vessels to

by another PSI

over ships in waters

and authority aboard.

flag State jurisdiction

have the power to regulate

the notion

can only take place in port. 16 This ensures

that at sea, the flag State of a ship remains singular
identification of the applicable law

is

This provides the

reinforced by the requirement that where a ship

change the registration of their ship,

The use of

its flag.

15

be assured of the

flag State, all the participating nations

legality

of their actions.

Port State Interdiction

The second approach

to interdiction

of port State jurisdiction.
least

on

can be

made

under the PSI

is

found through the medium

A coastal State's ports are part of its internal waters, or at

so under the

Law of the

Sea Convention. 19 Since the restrictions

assertion of the coastal State's jurisdiction over vessels exercising a right of
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innocent passage in the

territorial sea

do not apply

State has a virtually unfettered jurisdiction to apply

or to deny entry to

its

Historically, there

ing

ports to foreign vessels

its

law to ships visiting its ports,

chooses.

have been some restrictions upon the port State from apply-

laws to vessels that are alongside in

its

if it

to internal waters, the coastal

its

internal waters.

With the exception of

sovereign immunity, which will be considered separately, these restrictions derive

from customary international

largely

law. For example, traditionally, vessels call-

ing at a port as a result of distress are not subjected to the law of the coastal State. 20
Similarly, States generally

do not apply

their labor laws to vessels calling at their

ports, or interfere with matters that are generally regarded as internal to the opera-

tion of the vessel. 21
unlikely that any of these restrictions existing in international

It is

would withstand the

right of a coastal State to take steps to deal with a risk to

own security, or that of its allies,
cumstances in which the
State,

it

within

in

its

its

own port. Whether knowingly or not, in cir-

visiting vessel poses a threat to the security of the coastal

would seem absurd

its

custom

would not be able to address that threat
Flag States have generally shown no objection to efforts by

own territory.

that the State

port States to take measures against vessels to curb the international drug trade,

and the consequences
reaching

On

its

in the context of the PSI for a failure to prevent a

destination are even higher.

this basis,

Port State efforts to implement the PSI would, with the caveat

of respect for sovereign
there

would seem

a PSI State.

to be

immune

no

vessels,

difficulty in its

seem

to be

on very

solid ground,

and

implementation to vessels alongside in

22

Territorial Sea

One

shipment

and Archipelagic Waters Interdiction

matter of significant concern surrounding the PSI relates to freedom of navi-

The Law of the Sea Convention provides substantial guarantees with respect to freedom of navigation, and the operation of the PSI to restrict the freedom
of certain vessels to allow search and possible seizure of cargo presents a significant
challenge. To place this challenge in context, it is useful to summarize the development and content of current arrangements in the law of the sea with respect to freegation.

dom of navigation.
Freedom of navigation has

its

origins in

Hugo

Grotius' response to the Spanish

and Portuguese claims of control over the oceans and

by

virtue of the Papal Bull

23

and Treaty of

territories outside

Tordesillas.

24

of Europe

These documents pur-

ported not only to give control over territory outside of Europe, but also provided
for exclusive seaborne trading rights in the

South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 25

In reaction to this assertion, Grotius produced his seminal work,
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asserting that the oceans were incapable of appropriation

by

States,

and

that the

on the world's oceans. 26
In the modern law of the sea, freedom of navigation was equally perceived as
important, and this status is reflected in the now superseded 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone guaranteed a right of innocent passage to vessels, which was
ships of any State could journey anywhere

non-suspendable for waters in international
plicitly that

Article 3 of the Continental Shelf

of navigation.
tice in

These

efforts

Article 23 indicated ex-

Convention ensuring that the

State's continental shelf remained as
29

and

27

Freedom of navigation on the
of the Convention on the High Seas, 28 with

such rights were available to warships.

high seas was guaranteed in Article 2

above a

straits,

high

seas, therefore

status of waters

enjoying freedom

had been prefaced by the International Court of Jus-

1949 in the Corfu Channel Case, which confirmed the right of innocent pas-

sage, available

even to warships, passing through

"straits

used for international

30

The Court was also prepared to state that foreign vessels, including
warships, during peacetime had a right of innocent passage through all internanavigation."

tional straits.

The current 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea maintains the approaches
found in the Corfu Channel Case and the 1958 Geneva law of the sea conventions. It
deals with navigation in two distinct contexts. First, it examines freedom of navigation in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. Three passage regimes are established in these waters: innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes
passage. It then considers freedom of navigation in areas beyond national sovereignty in Article 87. 31

The regime of innocent passage
torial

deals with navigation

sea of a coastal or archipelagic State

archipelagic State,

and

as

noted above,

the Territorial Sea Convention

it

by ships only in the

terri-

and archipelagic waters of an

retains the

same approach

and the Corfu Channel Case.

as that

Article 17 of the

used in

Law of

the Sea Convention grants ships the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,

while the remaining articles in Subsection 3(A) of the Convention indicate

how the

right

is

circumscribed. Essentially, vessels are required to transit in a con-

tinuous and expeditious fashion, on the surface of the ocean. Such passage cannot

be impeded, except on a non-discriminatory and temporary basis for essential security purposes. 32

The

coastal State has ability to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel

exercising a right of innocent passage. These are listed in Article 21(1) of the

the Sea Convention:
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The

coastal State

may adopt

laws and regulations, in conformity with the

provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating
to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or

any of the

following:

of navigation and the regulation of maritime

(a) the safety

(b) the protection of navigational aids

and

facilities

traffic;

and other

facilities

or

installations;

(c)

the protection of cables

and

pipelines;

(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;

(e)

the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the

coastal State;

(f)

the preservation of the environment of the coastal State

and the

prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;

(g)

marine

scientific research

and hydrographic surveys;

(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal,

and regulations of the

sanitary laws

immigration or

coastal State.

Upon their face, these controls do not provide a basis for a coastal State to assert
jurisdiction over a passing vessel in

The matters

its

territorial sea for the

purposes of the PSI.

Article 2 1 permits regulation of are clearly restricted to matters per-

taining to the safe navigation of the ship, the protection of the surrounding marine

environment, and the maintenance of customs,
migration controls of the coastal

import

sanitation (health)

Unless there was a clear intention to

and imillegally

WMD into the coastal State, which could be accomplished when the vessel

came alongside

in

coastal States to

implement the

Other
ticle

State.

fiscal,

articles

any

case, there

within the

is

no authority drawn from

Article 2 1 to assist

PSI.

Law of the

Sea Convention

may be of more

19 requires that a ship's passage cannot be prejudicial to the peace,

or security of the coastal State.

A

range of activities that

fall

utility.

Ar-

good order

outside this require-

ment are explicitly listed, including "any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage." 33 Clearly the delivery of
to terrorists may well be highly preju-

WMD

dicial to the peace,

good order and

security of a coastal State,
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made that such a passage is therefore not innocent, and the restrictions on

coastal State authority over the passing vessel are

removed.

On the other hand, there may be goods on board of which the master and crew
know

or nothing, and their only relationship with terrorists

comes from an
anonymous and unremarkable bill of lading. In these circumstances, it may seem
unduly harsh to argue the vessel's right of innocent passage is open to question.
little

However, the awareness of the crew does not render the

make

any

it

less

vessel's

cargo

safe,

nor

of a security threat. The possible lack of knowledge of the crew

should be a factor in their interaction with the boarding party, but should not be
the determining factor in the ability of a coastal State to intercept the vessel.

The

of a coastal State to close territorial waters for essential security

ability

purposes on a temporary basis

will

not

assist the PSI.

discriminatory in their application, and clearly this

is

Such closures are to be non-

not possible with the PSI. The

what resembles

a

blockade and compel the inspection of every passing ship. Further, Article 25(3)

is

PSI's objective

is

to interdict suspect vessels, not to institute

intended to clear areas of the sea temporarily, not to authorize an inspection
gime.

re-

34

Coastal State criminal jurisdiction, which would usually encompass preparations to undertake terrorist activities, can also be exercised

Law of the

under Article 27 of the

Sea Convention for vessels passing through the territorial sea. This can

occur in four circumstances:
(a) if the

(b) if the

consequences of the crime extend to the coastal
crime

is

State;

of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good

order of the territorial
(c) if the assistance

sea;

of the local authorities has been requested by the master

of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such

measures are necessary for the suppression of

narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

Of these categories, only (a) and

(b) will

(b),

it

may be

wards such an
disturb
als

its

act,

conspiracy to

commit

in

be of direct relevance to the PSI, since

the master or flag State seeks assistance as in

and

illicit traffic

35

(c),

there

is

a terrorist act

no

if

issue of legality. For (a)

and preparatory

steps to-

the consequences of which might extend to the coastal State, or

peace or good order that are the criminal matters. However, the materi-

may be intended

for a third State,

which

the coastal State.
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which

is
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For transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, the same concerns apply,
save that such passage cannot be interrupted for any reason, not even the essential
security concerns of the coastal State. This

an international

strait

would make the stopping of a

vessel in

or archipelagic sea lane of greater significance. Further, the

categories of applicable coastal State law to such vessels, as described in Article 42,
are

more limited than those for innocent passage. However, Article 39 does require

vessels to refrain

from any violation of the principles of the United Nations Char-

Article 19, so the

ter, as in

above discussion there would similarly be applicable. 36

Interception in the Contiguous

The PSI

Zone

also includes interdiction within the contiguous

zone of a participating

coastal State. This raises additional issues with respect of

freedom of navigation.

While

vessels in the territorial sea are obliged to observe the

regime of innocent

passage or be subject to the wider law of the coastal State, the contiguous zone

is

unfettered by such concerns.

Beyond the

territorial sea, the

freedom of navigation for
1.

Law of the

all vessels.

Sea Convention also confirms there

Article 87 provides:

The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a)

freedom of navigation;

(b)

freedom of overflight;

(c)

freedom to lay submarine cables and

(d)

freedom

to

construct

artificial

pipelines, subject to Part VI;

islands

and other

installations

permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;

2.

down

(e)

freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions

(f)

freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and

These freedoms

shall

be exercised by

all

States with

interests of other States in their exercise of the

and

also with

due regard

for the rights

respect to activities in the Area.
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in section 2;

XIII.

due regard

for the

freedom of the high

under

this

seas,

Convention with

is
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The impact of this provision
Article 58,

zone,
seas

it is

its

way

which expressly incorporates

While a coastal

flight.

finds

and the EEZ apply there

In terms of jurisdiction,

In a zone contiguous to

the navigational freedoms which exist

and over-

on the high

under Article 33(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention

its

power over four types of activity:

its

described as the contiguous zone,

territorial sea,

may exercise

and regulations within

the control necessary

fiscal,

to:

immigration or sanitary laws

territory or territorial sea;

punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within

(b)
its

of

as well.

prevent infringement of its customs,

(a)

EEZ by virtue

into the regime of the

rights of freedom of navigation

the contiguous zone grants a coastal State

the coastal State

Maritime Domain

State has additional jurisdictional reach in the contiguous

EEZ and

part of the

in the

territory or territorial sea.

Were WMD
attack,

it

destined to be imported into the coastal State for use in a terrorist

would seem

to

fall

clearly within the rubric of prevention of infringement

of customs and possibly immigration laws and regulations 37 under Article 33. The
coastal State could therefore argue a right to stop, search,

uphold

its

and seize was necessary to

customs laws, and prevent the delivery of highly dangerous and undesir-

able materials to

its

territory.

A more difficult situation arises where the WMD are destined for another State.
It

would not be open

to a coastal State to assert

fringed by a passing vessel carrying

had any intention to enter the

its

customs laws were to be

WMD, as the vessel's master might never have

territorial sea

of the coastal State.

unreasonable expansion of Article 33 to have

it

freedom of navigation guaranteed

contiguous zone, as a foreign
State,

and should be

flag vessel will

entitled to transit

It

would seem an

include not mere prevention of in-

fringement of customs of the coastal State, but of other States as
ularly the case given the

in-

well.

This

is

partic-

for vessels in the

have breached no law of the coastal

through the zone without interference.

Self-Defense and the Use of Force
Utilizing the PSI, based

on application of the doctrine of self-defense and the use of

number of issues. Among these issues are
whether the transfer of WMD might amount to a preparatory act to the use of force
force in international law raises a

that

might permit intervention by the PSI

suspected

States,

and whether the interdiction of

WMD vessels amounts to a use of force in the sense
150
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used in the
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United Nations Charter. In order to explore these

effectively,

sider the doctrine of self-defense in international law,

Contemporary international law

is

One

security.

necessary to con-

and the use of force.

predicated on the notion that the use of the

promote international peace

force should be extremely limited, in an effort to

and

it is

of the most significant changes to the international law sur-

rounding armed conflict over the past 150 years has been the

effective abolition of

the right of States to use force against others in pursuance of their territorial or

diplomatic aims. This restriction

Charter in Article 2(4): "All

is

Members

explicitly restated in the

shall refrain in their international relations

from the threat or use of force against the
pendence of any

State, or in

the United Nations." This

when approved by the

United Nations

territorial integrity or political inde-

any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of

ban

only modified by the authorization to use force

is

Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations

Charter in order to preserve international peace and security, or, with notification to the Security Council, in the exercise of a right of individual or collective
self-defense

One

under Article 51 of the Charter. 38

issue for the PSI

is

whether interdictions of vessels constitute an unautho-

rized use of force. In stopping

and searching a

may be the necessity to

vessel, there

use force, in circumstances where the vessel refuses to heave to and
the boarding. If the flag State

boarding,

it is

likely that

and search the suspect
However,

it is

is

not a PSI State, and has not given

litical

is

crew

resists

consent to the

some degree of force will have to be used to take control of

vessel.

important to note that the prohibition on the use of force con-

tained in Article 2(4) of the Charter

but rather

its

its

is

not a blanket restriction on the use of force,

a prohibition of the use of force "against the territorial integrity or po-

independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Pur-

poses of the United Nations." Clearly the PSI does not infringe the territorial
integrity of a State, unless the ship

was considered part of its territory, which

context would seem inappropriate. Even

forcement jurisdiction over

its

vessels

forcement jurisdiction within the

if a

State can exercise prescriptive

on the high

territorial sea

seas,

pendence of a State

is

its

if

en-

the State cannot un-

law in certain locations. Similarly, the

unlikely to be threatened

its

of another State. The ship can

hardly be said to be integral to the territory of its flag State,
dertake efforts to enforce

and en-

cannot exercise

it

in this

political inde-

by unusual instances of

vessels

being stopped and boarded in the territorial sea of another State.

The key

issue

is

whether such a boarding would be inconsistent with the Pur-

poses of the United Nations. Certainly the United Nations

maintenance of international peace and
the stated aims of the PSI. This

is

security,

and

underscored by the
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is

is

dedicated to the

not inconsistent with

fact that the Security

Council
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has considered the PSI and has adopted Resolution 1540, which supports
pects of

What

operation.

its

issue of boardings

is

needed

is

a careful

some as-

and considered approach

pursuant to the PSI to ensure there

to the

never any question that

is

they are being undertaken in a fashion that would run afoul of the principles of the

United Nations.
can be used, there

If force

is

requirement

also a

ference with the sovereignty of the State concerned.
the Caroline Principles,
tice:

"[T]here

is

40

and

also has

a specific rule

it

be in proportion to the inter-

39

This concept finds support in

been used by the International Court of Jus-

whereby self-defense would warrant only measures

which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to
well established in

customary international law."

In the case of the PSI,

ship after

way,

42

it

and

submitted the

level

a rule

of force used

is

relatively slight.

has been boarded and searched, can be permitted to continue on

if

A
its

wrongfully detained, be the subject of a compensation claim by the

flag State against the

tack which

it is

it,

41

harm of an

detaining State. In proportion to the potential

WMD would cause, the interference with the flag State

is

at-

minimal.

Anticipatory Self-Defense

The

controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defense

cation.

The doctrine

structive

is

also potentially of appli-

based on the notion that the use of

consequences for the State

able to utilize conventional

attack

is

liable to

weapons

to

imminent

remove the

WMD leads to such de-

attack, that

threat.

it

ought to be

Waiting until an actual

may effectively be too late, as the State attacked might be largely destroyed or

have millions of its citizens

remove the

threat,

it

killed. In

can be argued,

response, a small-scale conventional attack to
is

a reasonable

compromise.

The response to this notion is that it is predicated on the imminent attack of one
State on another, an event that may never occur. The possession of weaponry and a
climate of international tension do not necessarily demonstrate an intention to

launch a hostile and devastating attack in the near future. 43 Further, the use of anticipatory self-defense
as

it

would not seem to advance international peace and security,

uses the suspicion of an

imminent

attack, rather

tack, as the justification for the use of force.

than the

reality

of such an

at-

There does not appear to be any sup-

port for the concept directly within the United Nations Charter. 44

Anticipatory self-defense
law,

is

supported by relatively few States in international

and there are few instances of State practice relying upon

end of World War
with the
Israel

II.

45

Israeli attack

at least since the

One of the more direct examples of it came on June 7,

upon

had argued that the

nuclear weapons in

it,

1981,

the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osiraq, outside of Baghdad.

would have given Iraq the ability to manufacture
the near future, and it was the most likely target for the use of
facility
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such weapons. 46 Most of the international community rejected

number of the PSI

including a large

States,

47

Israel's position,

and there has been no change

in this

viewpoint evident in the international community since 1988. Concerns that the
doctrine was too fluid with difficulties of what might be judged as imminent, 48

harmful to world peace

in potentially authorizing

unprovoked

attacks

on

States

WMD they might wish to use, and capable of misapplication

suspected of having

by States seeking an excuse to attack their neighbors are cited for the lack of any rise
49
While academic opinion on the issue is
in support for anticipatory self-defense.
divided, there

is

a not insubstantial

volume of scholarship

against the validity of the

doctrine. 50

In theory, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense could be adapted to the in-

A PSI State could argue that the shipping of WMD to a terror-

terdiction of vessels.
ist

organization would lead to attack by that terrorist organization on the PSI State

or

its allies,

and therefore stopping and boarding suspect

vessels

and removing

WMD would be incidental to aiding in the defense of that State from an imminent
some undefined point of time

attack, albeit at

the State
It is

in the future,

and not

necessarily

on

itself.

submitted that such an argument would not be acceptable to the bulk of the

international

community, including most of the PSI

The uncertainty as to
difficult to meet the re-

States.

would make it
quirement of the imminent nature of the threat. The international repugnance surrounding the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense would be sufficient to ensure
that none of the PSI States would seek to use it to justify their PSI activities, if any
other ground was available.
the date

and location of a

terrorist attack

Necessity

One approach

to the PSI that could be used to justify interdiction of vessels

is

the

doctrine of necessity. Necessity has been the subject of consideration by international legal scholars for

Law Commission's
Wrongful Acts.

some

decades, and

Draft Articles

is

neatly dealt with in the International

on Responsibility of

States for Internationally

Article 25 of the Draft Articles provides that an otherwise unlawful

means
of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril;
and (b) the act does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards
act of a State can

be

justified if it

which the obligation
the International
tional law.

on

The

meets two

criteria: (a)

existed. 51 This principle has

Law Commission

to support

the act was the only

more than just the imprimatur of
its

status within public interna-

identical predecessor of Article 25, Article 33 of the Draft Articles

State Responsibility, 52

was

cited with approval
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Justice in the

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project

proval by the International Tribunal for the

When

and was

is

valid,

of a PSI State, or where there

is

While

with ap-

(No. 2). 54

it is

clear that

much of the

such as the interception of vessels flying the
a treaty

between the

such as between Liberia, Panama and the United

operation

itself cited

Law of the Sea in M/V Saiga

at international law.

PSI in relation to interdiction

States,

case, 53

Maritime Domain

applied to the PSI, necessity can provide a justification for actions that

might otherwise be unlawful

flag

in the

flag State

and the PSI

some

aspects of its

States,

maybe problematic. The interception of a vessel, flagged in a third State,

government operated and on
innocent passage,

is

a

non-commercial

one example where the

charter, while exercising a right of

legality

of the stop and search of a sus-

pect vessel presents difficulties.
In such a situation, a PSI State could note that the only way to prevent the transit

of

WMD to a non-State actor would be to stop a vessel en route at sea in

meeting the

of the criteria in Article 25. Certainly the possession of

first

would amount

hostile terrorists

to a "grave

the second criterion, provided the vessel
beit

without

its

and imminent

waters,

its

WMD by

peril" to the State.

was released and allowed

On

to continue, al-

deadly cargo, the essential interests of the flag State would not be se-

riously impaired.

The PSI States have not shown much enthusiasm for utilizing necessity as a
means to legitimize possible operations under the Initiative. This may be the case
for a number of reasons. First, the Draft Articles remain contentious, and there
might be a reluctance by some PSI States to show direct support for part of a document about which they have serious reservations. Second, to rely upon the concept
of necessity would be a tacit admission that some contemplated actions under the
PSI are unlawful. As the Initiative is designed to combat unlawful behavior, and is
seeking to gain as much support from the international community as possible, it

may

not be politic for the PSI States to indicate that the PSI might in certain

cir-

cumstances encompass unlawful action. This would be particularly the case for the

United
Iraq

States, Britain

and

Australia,

where the lawfulness of the intervention

by the "Coalition of the Willing" has become a major

governments of those three

States

political issue,

in

and the

might be unwilling to highlight the lawfulness or

otherwise of future measures in the global "war on terror."

A present unwillingness to utilize arguments based on necessity would not necessarily preclude their use in the future to justify

an interception. In the face of the

aftermath of action against a third State vessel, where

WMD had been found, the

PSI States would seemingly have a strong argument that even
for interdiction

Whether

had

necessity

were not found

is

failed, necessity

would operate

if other

justifications

would cure the legitimacy of

their action.

to provide such protection in the event

not so simple, as without
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construct what the "grave and imminent peril" to the interest of the coastal State

might

be.

Security Council Resolution 1540

Another possible

justification for the PSI

might be derived from Security Council

Resolution 1540. As already noted in the context of self-defense, one of the

mate ways

for a State to utilize force against another

is

legiti-

through the adoption of a

resolution by the Security Council, authorizing the use of force.

The Council may

make such a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, if it
feels the

application of force

peace and security.

would

assist in

combating

a threat to international

55

However, while the Security Council could pass a resolution seeking

and detain vessels suspected of carrying

to search

WMD bound for non-State actors, as such

would clearly constitute a threat to international peace and security, it has
not done so to the present point in time. Resolution 1540 extols States not to per-

vessels

mit the transit of

upon

WMD to non-State actors, but

States to undertake interdiction of

such

does not create any positive duty

it

vessels.

Indeed, the resolution only

goes so far as to authorize actions which are "consistent with international law." 56

The PSI

States

may contend

that the Initiative

is

of

and therefore

itself lawful,

consistent with Resolution 1540, which appears to be the case, but

it

is

does not pro-

vide for an explicit authorization of interdiction that would otherwise be unlawful.

One additional point in relation to Security Council Resolution 1540 can be
made. Were an unlawful interdiction to take place, and WMD discovered to be on
board, even if the interdiction was unlawful, the presence of WMD would mean
the flag State

was

in material

breach of a Security Council resolution. While not ad-

vocating the adoption of two international wrongs making a right into the lexicon,

would be regarded as secondary at
in comparison to the tremendous risk to international peace and

one imagines that the
the political level,
security posed

issue of the interdiction

by the shipment

itself.

Interaction of the PSI with the

Law of the Sea

Convention

Sovereign Immunity

One

great challenge to the operation of the PSI

doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The doctrine

is

comes from the operation of the
one of great age and significance

within the law of the sea, requiring that warships and government vessels on non-

commercial service be considered inviolate

at international law.

A warship

is

ex-

empt from the operation of law of a port State or coastal State, unless its commander voluntarily permits the application of such law. If the warship breaches the
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law of a coastal

State,

in the

no sanction can be imposed

stopped or boarded. The only measure permitted
ate departure of the vessel
it

may have caused can
The

from the

territorial

is

Maritime Domain

directly

on

it,

nor can

it

be

an order directing the immedi-

waters of the coastal State.

Any harm

only be the subject of international claim.

rules with respect to sovereign

in history well prior to the

immunity of vessels have

20th century.

their origins

back

An attempt at codification of the old rules

took place in the 1920s, and led to the adoption of the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules concerning the

Ships.

57

Article 3(1) of that

Immunity of State-owned

Convention provides that warships, State-owned ves-

on non-commercial service, hospital ships, fleet auxiliaries, and other vessels
are to receive immunity in respect of claims brought against them. Such protection
is confirmed in the Law of the Sea Convention, which provides explicit protection
for such vessels on the high seas in Articles 95 and 96, and in the context of the tersels

ritorial sea in Part II, section 3(C).

States

have jurisdiction over sovereign

vessel breaching
bility for

require

it

clear that only flag

immune vessels, and that in the event of the

an applicable law of the coastal

State, there

is

flag State responsi-

such breaches, but the only action permissible against the vessel

it

itself is to

to leave immediately. 58

Interference with a sovereign
State,

These provisions make

would amount

immune

vessel,

without the consent of the

flag

to a clear breach of international law. For PSI States, this has

the potential to be a serious problem. While

it is

WMD to non-State actors on a warship, there

is

unlikely that a State

would ship

a possibility of a State-owned ves-

on non-commercial service being used in such a fashion, particularly in the
case of a communist State where most vessels will be State-owned. While the Engsel,

lish

courts have been prepared to look behind the activity a vessel

determine

its

ists is likely

status, 59 a third State actively

to claim sovereign

immune

engaged

status.

in supplying

is

engaged in to

WMD to terror-

60

submitted that the potential use of sovereign

immune vessels to ship WMD

to non-State actors represent the greatest challenge

posed by the PSI to the law of

It is

the sea. Such vessels cannot, under international law, be interfered with by port
States or coastal States

States will

have a

without the consent of the

difficult decision to

make

flag State or the master.

in considering

whether to

such a vessel and thereby potentially undermine the status of their
sels

own

The PSI

act against

naval ves-

elsewhere in the world.

Freedom of Navigation
Of distinct concern is the impact of the PSI on
States

security notifications.

have asserted that prior to entry into their

territorial waters, foreign flagged

61
vessels are obliged to give notice of their passage.
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Most

restrict this to foreign
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warships, but some, notably North Korea, require

it

in the case of any foreign ves-

The reason most frequently cited for such action is that it is incidental to the security of the coastal State, and a transiting foreign warship passing close to the
littoral State without prior warning represents a security threat. There is no authorsel.

the

ity in

Law of the

Sea Convention to support such an interpretation.

For the maritime powers,

could

this

set

an awkward precedent. The PSI would

be encouraging them to stop and search vessels that posed a security risk because of
the possible presence of

WMD on board. A similar description, from the point of

view of China or North Korea could describe a US, British or French warship in
their territorial waters.

weapons, and

clear

The warship might be carrying

may

also

be seen

as a threat to the coastal State's security. In

comparison to stopping and searching the
seems

modest, and in time,

relatively

warning advocates. Such a

result

WMD, in the form of nu-

this

vessel, the

may

would not be

requirement of a warning

provide support to the security
a desirable

one to the maritime

powers, most of whom are PSI States.
In

its

present form, with the lack of a binding treaty, and the reiteration that

it is

consistent with international law, the PSI does not erode the position of the mari-

time powers with respect to security notification. Unless and until an actual interception, without

some other ground based on flag or port State control, takes place

and the maritime powers
curity notification will

assert the legality of their actions, those States seeking se-

remain without concrete action upon which to base

their

objections.

Military Exercises

The

issue of military activities, including surveillance, in the exclusive

economic

zone (EEZ) of another State is one not directly dealt with in the Law of the Sea Convention. 62 While the Convention

ons testing in the

territorial sea

makes

it

plain that military exercises

and weap-

of a coastal State would be contrary to the regime of

no equivalent restriction articulated with respect to other
maritime zones. However, neither is there any specific authorization with respect
innocent passage, there

to such activities,

Convention

The

list

is

which are not included within the Article 87 of the Law of the Sea

of freedoms.

lack of direct reference to military activities

conduct of such exercises in the
87(1) are by no

amples. This

is

EEZ

is

not

fatal to

the case for the

of another State. The rights listed in Article

means an exhaustive list, and are merely specifically enunciated exexplicit in the use

of the phrase "inter alia." Further, the freedoms of

the high seas are described as being subject to the conditions set

vention and "other rules of international law." The use of this
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clear that the

Maritime Domain

Law of the Sea Convention is not intended to be the only source of law

in relation to the
If the

in the

use of the high seas or EEZ.

case for freedom to undertake military exercises in another State's

EEZ can

some qualification. For this the crux of the issue will
essentially turn on the meaning of the phrase "with due regard." This qualification
is applied to high seas freedoms generally in Article 87(2), and it would seem logibe made,

cal that

it is

clearly subject to

one must have due regard to the

the EEZ.

rights of others while navigating

through

63

One issue that could be relevant in assessing the legitimacy of interdiction under
the PSI in the contiguous zone relates to whether passage
constitute a threat to international peace

and

security,

by a suspect

vessel

and therefore be

might

illegitimate

and capable of being intercepted. The Law of the Sea Convention provides limited
assistance through Article 88

which provides: "The high

seas shall be reserved for

peaceful purposes."

A wide reading of this provision would, in theory, see great limitation of the uses
of warships on the high seas, and the potential circumscription on
tivities,

particularly when read with the Preamble,

role in the furtherance of peace
ful uses

and

all

military ac-

which invokes the Convention's

security in the world, 64 suggesting only peace-

of the sea are permissible. By extension this could be drawn into the EEZ, as

Article 58 adopts the high seas
Article 88 in this

list.

65

freedoms in the Convention, and

Similarly, the provisions with respect to

explicitly includes

marine scientific re-

search under Part XIII of the Convention indicate that marine scientific research

can only be undertaken for peaceful purposes. 66 A case could be
activity

from the high

seas or another State's

made that military
EEZ were incompatible with the Law

of the Sea Convention.

Such an interpretation has not been favored by many
San

States or publicists. 67

The

Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which sought to update and consoli-

date the law of armed conflict at sea,

makes

it

clear that

armed

conflict at sea

can

on the high seas, and, in certain circumstances, in the EEZ of a neutral
State.
The Manual provides that belligerents must have due regard to the uses to
which another State may wish to put its EEZ and avoid damage to the coastal State.
take place
68

If

the motivation for interception

may be

is

international security, then an

argument

placed in the hands of those States that claim military exercises cannot

le-

gitimately take place in their EEZs. Such States have typically observed that foreign
military activity prevents
rity

them from

utilizing their

EEZ and

of the sovereign rights they possess in the EEZ.

ride navigational rights

under the PSI, these

is

If security

States

a threat to the secu-

concerns can over-

may have

a stronger case to

argue that security and due regard are inconsistent, and that permission should be

sought to exercise in the EEZ. This

is

particularly the case in so-called "security
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zones" that

may

be attached to the contiguous zones of some

States.

been the subject of protest by the United States and other maritime

These have

States.

69

Conclusion

The PSI

represents a practical solution to the threats posed by the changed security

environment since the 9/11
duction,

it is

tional law.

By virtue of the speed and manner of its

intro-

yet to be structured into formally binding obligations within interna-

Were it to be implemented, to the full extent indicated in its interdiction

principles,

law.

attacks.

it

could be

justified, albeit

not without difficulty under international

However, the implications of that justification would create challenges which

the law of the sea

would

accommodate, and might

struggle to

create precedents

which would undermine key principles the maritime powers would not wish to

see

damaged.
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progress for

all

in the

Maritime Domain

an important contribution to the maintenance of peace,
peoples of the world

justice
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and
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PART IV
CURRENT ISSUES IN OCCUPATION LAW

VII
Is

There a "New" Law of

Intervention and Occupation?

Leslie C.

At

least since the

Green*

seventeenth century international law has accepted as a fun-

damental principle that

all

States are equal,

any other. This principle has found expression

none enjoying sovereignty over
famous aphorism:

in Vattel's

Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as
coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be
regarded as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are by nature equal
and hold from nature the same obligations and the same rights. Strength or weakness
in this case, count for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic
is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.
1

As a consequence it has come to be accepted that a State
als as

it

pleases without interference

from

is

free to treat

others, a principle

its

nation-

which finds expres-

sion in the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations:

Nothing contained

in the present

Charter shall authorize the United Nations to

intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state

or shall require the

Members

to

submit such matters to settlement under the present

Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures

University Professor Emeritus, Honorary Professor of Law, University of Alberta, Canada.

There a "New" Law of Intervention and Occupation?

7s

under Chapter VII
peace].

[relating to acts of aggression

and

threats to or breaches of the

2

Nevertheless, both doctrinal writings

and

States, especially the

more powerful,

have asserted a right of intervention and even occupation in "exceptional"
circumstances.
International law recognizes
territory of

one

State

by the

two forms of occupation of the whole or part of the

forces or governmental representatives of another.

the basis of acquiring

to territory. 3 For the

purpose of this

Occupatio pacifica

is

paper, the term

used for the situation that takes place when the occupied entity

is

has agreed to the occupation or

title

has been imposed without the use of force by an

it

occupier or as a result of a multilateral treaty, although the threat to resort to force

may be the deciding factor that induces the occupied entity to agree to the occupation.
ally

Occupatio

speaking,

since there

is

bellica

is

ensues during or at the end of an armed conflict and, gener-

contrary to the wishes of the State occupied or

no other option

ing to the independence of the successor principalities of the

Montenegro, Roumania and Serbia

—

initiated

Berlin. In the case of Bulgaria, a provisional administration

[S]hall

acquiesced in

available to that State.

Examples of occupation pursuant to agreement maybe seen
Bulgaria,

is

in the treaties relat-

Ottoman Empire

by the 1878 Treaty of
was established which:

be under the direction of an Imperial Russian Commissary until the

completion of the Organic Law.

An

Imperial Turkish Commissary, as well as the

Consuls delegated ad hoc by the other Powers, signatory of the present Treaty,
called to assist

him

shall

be

so as to control the working of the provisional regime. In case of

disagreement amongst the Consular Delegates, the vote of the majority shall be

and in case of a divergence between the majority and the Imperial Russian
Commissary or the Imperial Turkish Commissary, the Representatives of the
Signatory Powers at Constantinople, assembled in Conference, shall give their
accepted,

decision. 4

Article VII, in turn, provides that:

The

provisional regime shall not be prolonged

beyond

a period of nine

the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

completed the election of the Prince of Bulgaria

As soon
force,

as the Prince shall

and the

To some

have been

shall

installed, the

Principality shall enter into the full

When

months from

the Organic

Law

is

be proceeded with immediately.

new

organization shall be put into

enjoyment of the autonomy.

extent this procedure seems to foretell the type of arrangement that

followed the operations against Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of this
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century. 5

The succession clauses in the Treaty of Berlin guaranteed protection to
religious and other minorities in each of the States concerned, but they did not provide for any form of direct sanction in the event of non-observance. In this, they
differed from the view expressed by some of the "fathers" of international law, who
envisaged the possibility of intervention by force, even resulting in occupation allegedly on humanitarian grounds in favor of an oppressed people. Thus, Grotius
was of the opinion

that:

The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to those
of kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries
against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not
directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to
any persons whatsoever.
Truly, it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of
others rather than one's own, in the degree that in the case of one's own wrongs it is
more to be feared that through a sense of personal suffering one may exceed the proper
.

.

.

mind.
[Kjings, in addition to the particular care of
burdened with a general responsibility for human society.
The final and most wide-reaching cause for undertaking wars on behalf of others is the
mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself affords sufficient ground for
limit or at least prejudice his
their

own

further,

If,

not follow that others

all

it

.

should be granted that even in extreme need

up arms

subjects cannot justifiably take

Not

.

.

rendering assistance. ...

will

.

.

state, are also

[against their sovereign]

may not take up arms on

the "fathers" of international law

their behalf.

.

.

.

nevertheless

,

it

6

would agree with Grotius

in his

view

concerning the right of a State to punish another for committing crimes against
natural law.

Among these was Vattel who

asked:

Did not Grotius perceive that ... his view opens the door to all the passions of zealots
and fanatics, and gives to ambitious men pretexts without numbers 7 ?
[However, i]f
there should be found a restless and unprincipled Nation, ever ready to do harm to
others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil strife among their citizens, there is
no doubt that all the others would have the right to unite together to subdue such a
Nation, to discipline it, and even to disable it from doing further harm.
[But n]o
foreign State may inquire into the manner in which a sovereign rules, nor set itself up as
.

.

.

.

judge of his conduct.
take action;

.

.

no foreign

.

If he

State

.

.

is

.

treats his subjects

called

follow a wiser and juster course

on

to

with severity

amend

his

it is

.

for the

.

Nation to

conduct and to force him to

by violating the fundamental laws,
gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he
brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may rightfully give
assistance to an oppressed people

who

But

if

a prince,

who ask for its aid

are defending their liberties against an oppressor

of justice and generosity.

.

.

.

But

this principle

To

by force of arms

should not be

authorize criminal designs against the peace of Nations
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As

is

made

for those

only the part

use of so as to

monsters who
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under the name of sovereigns,

act as a scourge

and plague of the human

nothing more than wild beasts, of whom every

This

last

stituting

jects

an "axis of evil." 9

on behalf of foreign

far as

Grotius in granting a third State the right to in-

nationals, he nevertheless granted that right

themselves had good cause to revolt,

[W]ho say,

that,

command and
we

race, they are

the earth. 8

comment calls to mind President Bush's reference to certain States as con-

Pufendorf would not go as
tervene

man may purge

when

10

and, while he was

critical

sub-

if the

of those:

the king has degenerated into a tyrant, he can be stripped of his

punished by the people

no one should believe, however, that
and deliver over to them their subjects, from

.

.

grant a boundless licence to princes,

.

[but]

whom we have taken away every faculty of fighting back, like cattle to their pleasure, we
are altogether of the opinion that,

if,

indeed, even an absolute prince should assume a

mind utterly hostile towards his subjects, and openly seek their destruction without the
appearance of justice, his subjects can rightly employ against him also the means
customarily used against an enemy for the sake of defending their own safety.
.

.

.

[A]ssuredly, absolute princes can be punished neither for not running the state to suit

the people, nor for private misdeeds.

.

.

.

But

after they

enemies [by their actions against their people], the

evils

have assumed the person of

which, perchance are inflicted

upon them by the right of war do not have the character of a punishment properly so
n [T]he safest principle to go on is, that we cannot lawfully undertake the
called.
.

.

.

defence of another's subjects, for any other reason than they themselves can rightfully
advance, for taking up arms to protect themselves against the barbarous savagery of
their superiors.

may be

12
.

.

.

[F]inally,

ground
oppressed, and implores our

To

when

is

no other reason,

aid, if we

can conveniently do

a great extent the military operations undertaken

political exiles.

for intervention

so.

descent alone

who

is

unjustly

13

by the United

United Kingdom against Iraq in 2003 were based on

though the plea

common

our going to the defence of one

for

a sufficient

there

this type

came not from oppressed

States

and the

of reasoning,

inhabitants, but

al-

from

However, the subsequent occupation received general support,

at

least in the early days.

By the nineteenth century

respect for sovereignty

was so highly regarded

writers generally were only willing to concede a right of intervention

and possible

occupation in the most exceptional of circumstances. Phillimore pointed out
Intervention by one Christian State

cannot be

said, in the abstract, to

on behalf of Religion has

.

.

.

that

that:

been practised and

be a violation of International Law. But what kind of

Intervention? By remonstrance, by stipulation, by a condition in a Treaty concluding a
war waged on other grounds. It may, perhaps, be justly contended that the principle
might be pushed further; and that in the event of persecution of large bodies of men, on
account of their religious belief, an armed intervention on their behalf might be as
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warrantable in International Law, as an armed intervention to prevent the shedding

of blood and protracted internal
International

Law

hostilities.

.

[N]o writer of authority upon

.

.

sanctions such an intervention, except

persecution inflicted avowedly

upon

the

upon

ground of religious

the case of a positive

belief.

14

Hall too was equally restrictive of the right:

International law professes to be concerned only with the relations of states to each

conduct of a government towards

other. Tyrannical

directly or indirectly with

at

all. It

may be supposed

which have nothing

On what ground then

such relations.

take cognizance of them? Apparently on one only,

of them

subjects, massacres

its

brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution are acts

if it

and
do

to

can international law

be competent to take cognizance

to declare that acts of the kind

mentioned are so

inconsistent with the character of a moral being as to constitute a public scandal, which
the

body ofstates, or one or more states as representative of it, are competent to suppress

[Intervention for the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of helping the efforts of a

people to free

itself is

very

commonly

regarded without disfavour. Again, religious

persecution, short of a cruelty which

would rank

as tyranny, has ceased to

recognised as an independent ground of intervention, but

Europe and the East

is still

an accessory motive, which seems to be thought by

as

be

used as between

many

persons as sufficiently praiseworthy to excuse the commission of acts in other respects
[S]entiment has been allowed to influence the more deliberately
formed opinion of jurists
[who] have imparted an aspect of legality to a species of
intervention, which makes a deep inroad into one of the cardinal doctrines of
international law [that of sovereign independence]
and which by the readiness to
which it lends itself to the uses of selfish ambition becomes as dangerous in practice as
grossly immoral.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

unfortunate that publicists have not laid

plausible in appearance.

It is

and unanimously

no intervention

that

.

is

down

broadly

except for the purpose of

legal,

self-

preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the

whole body of

civilised states

has concurred in authorising

armed or diplomatic, undertaken

either for the reason or

or oppression, or the horrors of a

supported in

reality

would have had
states unless

by the

accustomed

Intervention, whether

upon

the pretext of cruelty,

war, or whatever the reason put forward,

civil

which such facts offer to the popular mind,
when not authorised by the whole body of civilised

justification

to justify themselves,

confessedly illegal in

it.

to act together for

common

purposes, as measures which, being

and extreme

themselves, could only be excused in rare

cases in

consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary character of the facts causing them,

of the evident purity and motives of the intervening state}

modern views based on
commented that:

Westlake, almost foretelling

and popular indignation,

Intervention in the internal affairs of another state
fallen into

is

and

5

respect for

justifiable

.

.

.

when

human

rights

a country has

such a condition of anarchy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace,
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external or internal of

government may be

its

neighbours, 16 whatever the conduct or policy of

and misrule

its

ground
for intervention the view must not be confined to the physical consequences which
they may have beyond the limits of the territory in which they rage. These are often
The moral effect on the neighbouring population is to be taken into
serious enough
account. Where these include considerable numbers allied by religion, language or race
to the population suffering from misrule, to restrain the former from giving support to
the latter in violation of the legal rights of the misruled state may be a task beyond the
power of their government, or requiring it to resort to modes of restraint irksome to its
subjects, and not necessary for good order if they were not excited by the spectacle of
miseries which they must feel acutely. It is idle to argue in such a case that the duty of
the neighbouring peoples is to look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not for
creatures of the imagination, and they must not create or tolerate for them situations
which are beyond the endurance, which we will not say of average human nature, since

may fairly expect

laws

nature

Today

at

it is

as a

by their operation, but of the best human
the time and place they can hope to meet with. 17
to raise the standard

and not merely

in

for intervention either

by

increasingly the case that popular feeling at large,

neighboring

States,

may

the United Nations or

be so outraged that a

some other

the case in, for example, the
It

In considering anarchy

in that respect

demand

international organization

Sudan with regard

made,

is

to the treatment of Darfur.

particular States

and even

18

War I and

has not only been writers who, before the outbreak of World

establishment of the League of Nations, were prepared to

been

as has

condemn

the

the actions of

to advocate intervention or occupation. In his 1904 an-

nual message, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt stated:
[T]here are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar

make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavour at least to
show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by
it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable
[and] in extreme
cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must
depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity
and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we would interfere by force of

horror as to

.

arms

.

.

.

are necessarily very few. Yet

which shows by
liberty

its

and of orderly freedom ...

eagerly to give expression to
19

Jews in Kishenef,

it is

consistent practice

or

when

its
it

.

not to be expected that a people

its

it is

.

belief in the principles of civil

like

and

ours

.

.

religious

inevitable that such a nation should desire

horror on an occasion

like that

of the massacre of the

witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty

and oppression of which the Armenians" have been the victims, and which have won
for

them the indignant

21

pity of the civilised world.

The commitment of the United States to the principle of humanitarianism has
led the American writer Stowell, perhaps the most authoritative writer on intervention, to comment:
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Humanitarian intervention maybe defined as the justifiable use offorce for the purpose
of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within

and justice

act with reason

interference within

its

which the sovereign

[However, t]he right of the sovereign

is

presumed

state to act

to

without

own territory, even though it be no more than a presumption, is

of such importance to the well-being of international society, that the states in their

wisdom, as evidenced in their practice, have been jealous of admitting the pleas of
humanity as a justification for action against a sister state; and we find that intervention
on this ground has been rather rigidly limited to specific cases, and conditioned in each
of them

upon

the facts

and the determination

the existence of a certain state of facts.

true that the appreciation of

It is

as to the existence of the justifying situation

still

remains

to a certain degree a matter entrusted to the conscientious discretion of the intervening

and salutary attitude of suspicion with which every
intervention upon the ground of humanity is regarded serves as a rough check upon its
abuse. The counterpoise which serves as the sanction to prevent aggression and
subsequent conquest under the guise of humanitarian intervention is perhaps to be
found in the general readiness of states to act in defense of the balance of power and in

state; nevertheless,

the general

order to preserve the society of independent

In the light of these

comments

states.

22

the reader might be justified in assuming that a

right of intervention leading to possible occupation

is,

in certain circumstances,

recognized in customary international law. However, whether this
not, such action

is,

as Stowell asserted, a

the evidence of atrocities in Nazi

is

the case or

matter of discretion, and by 1938, despite

Germany, reaction was

largely "platonic" 23 lead-

ing Professor H. A. Smith of London University to complain:

we no longer insist that States shall conform to any common standards of

[I]n practice

justice, religious toleration

and

internal government.

Whatever

atrocities

may be

committed in foreign countries, we now say that they are no concern of ours. Conduct
which in the nineteenth century would have placed a government outside the pale of

now deemed to be no obstacle to diplomatic friendship. This means,
we have now abandoned the old distinction between civilised and

civilised society

in fact, that

is

uncivilised states. 24

In so far as occupatio pacifica as a result of treaty is concerned, reference might be

made to Article

III

of the 1903 Agreement between the United States and

the lease to the former of an area of

Guantanamo

Cuba for

"for the time required for the

purpose of coaling and naval stations" and "during the period of occupation by the
United States

.

.

.

the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control

over and within said areas

" 25

In a 1933 decision the

that "the territory of that Naval Station

is

for
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all

Cuban Supreme Court held

legal effects

regarded as foreign." 26
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armed forces sent numbers of individuals captured in Afghanistan for detention at the Guantanamo naval
base, labeling them, since there was no "war" declared, even though supporters of
the Taliban as distinct from members of al-Qaeda, carried their arms on behalf of a
de facto governing authority, as "enemy combatants" rather than "prisoners of war."
The United States, maintained that as such, regardless of the terms of the Geneva
Nevertheless, problems arose

the United States

Convention

relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, 27 they could

indefinitely,

denied access to counsel, and permitted no means of challenging their

confinement or clarifying their status or alleging mistaken
this situation

was challenged

at the

pus proceedings, and in Gherebi

government claim was
Ninth

rejected

v.

be detained

identity. 28

However,

end of 2003 by a detainee by way of habeas

cor-

George W. Bush and Donald H. Rumsfeld the

by the majority of the Court of Appeals

for the

Circuit:

[W]e simply cannot accept the government's position

that the Executive

Branch

possesses the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign
citizens included,
States,

on

territory

under the

sole jurisdiction

and control of the United

without permitting such prisoners recourse of any kind to any judicial forum, or

even access to counsel regardless of the length or manner of their confinement.

our view, the government's position

American jurisprudence and

The Court
tion, 1949,

cited,
30

raises

by

Article 5 of the Prisoners of War

as well as Article 9 of the International

arrest or detention shall

order that a court

31

is

... In

inconsistent with fundamental tenets of

most serious concerns under international

by way of explanation,

Rights to which the United States
erty

is

a party:

Covenant on

"Anyone who

is

Civil

law.

29

Conven-

and Political

deprived of his

lib-

be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
"

may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention

The United States argued to the court that while it exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo naval base, it continued to recognize the "continuance and ultimate sovereignty in Cuba," distinguishing the rights pertaining to
"territorial jurisdiction"

from those pertaining to "sovereignty" 32 leading the court

to point out that the "United States has exercised 'complete jurisdiction
trol'

and con-

over the Base for more than a century now, with the right to acquire

.

.

.

any

land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with
full

compensation to owners thereof." 33

Guantanamo
Bay as if it were subject to American sovereignty: we have acted as if we intend to
retain the Base permanently, and have exercised the exclusive right to use it as we
The court

further noted that the United States has "also treated

wish, regardless of any restrictions contained in the lease or continuing Treaty." 34

The court determined

that:
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[B]y virtue of the United States' exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo,

habeas jurisdiction
purposes,

the present case.

lies in

Guantanamo

.

.

.

[W]e conclude

that, at least for

habeas

part of the sovereign territory of the United States. Both the

is

language of the Lease and continuing Treaty and the practical reality of U.S. authority
[T]he United States exercises total
and control over the Base support that answer.
simply
a contingent reversionary
dominion and sovereignty, while Cuba retains
interest that will become effective only if and when the United States decides to
.

relinquish
territory.

exclusive jurisdiction

its
.

.

and

.

.

control,

sovereign

i.e.

[T]he United States possesses and exercises

.

sovereignty, while

all

domain over

the

the attributes of

Cuba retains only a residual or reversionary interest, contingent on a

possible future United States' decision to surrender

its

complete jurisdiction and

and continuing Treaty must be construed as
no substantive sovereignty over Guantanamo during
the period of the U.S. reign. All such sovereignty during that indefinite and potentially
Sovereignty may be gained by a
permanent period is vested in the United States.
demonstration of intent to exercise sovereign control on the part of a country that is in
35
possession of the territory in question and has the power to enforce its will.
control.

.

.

.

[W]e conclude

providing that

Cuba

that Lease

possesses

.

These statements by the court are

fully in

.

.

accord with the traditional view under

customary international law of the effect of occupation and there is nothing new or
innovative about them.
the rights

And the

which exercises sovereignty

State

accompanying sovereignty,

as well as being

is

burdened with

entitled to
all

all

the obliga-

tions. 36

As

a further instance of occupatio pacifica

ated by the arrangements

made in 1960

Cyprus, whereby Britain retained
military bases
It

may be

may happen

cited.

at the

time of the grant of independence to

sovereignty over two areas of the island as

37

that part of a State's territory

dance with a peace treaty
occupatio pacifica

full

byway of agreement the situation cre-

after a war. In

and occupatio

bellica

is

occupied by a victor in accor-

such a case, the borderline between

may be somewhat blurred. However, when

such an occupation takes place, the wartime rights and obligations of the occupant
are not normally relevant.

Under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles for example,

Article

426 provides:
As a guarantee

for the execution of the present Treaty

territory situated west of the

by Germany, the German

Rhine [the Rhineland and the Ruhr], together with the

bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen
years

from the coming into force of the present Treaty. 38

Provision was also made, depending on compliance by

Germany with the terms of

the Treaty, for the gradual withdrawal of the occupying forces. 39
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A somewhat different policy was adopted after World War II because of the unGermany40 and Japan. 41 In so far as Germany was
Allies
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

conditional surrender of both

concerned, the victorious

Kingdom and

the United
rate

—

the United States

zones governed by military

allocated to
State,

exist

all

intents

by virtue of debellatio

were under the

full

the country into four sepa-

with Berlin divided into four sectors each

one of the four powers. To

had ceased to

severally,

officers,

—divided
42

and purposes Germany,

as a

and the zones, both separately and

sovereignty and administration of the occupying

powers, which only formally ended with the establishment and recognition of the
Federal and People's Republics, respectively. In so far as Japan was concerned, the
situation

was somewhat

different.

There was no suggestion that the State had

Emperor remained as titular Head of State, although the acgovernment was in the hands of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme

ceased to exist and the
tual

Commander

for the Allied Powers.

He

ruled with virtually absolute power. Al-

though ostensibly acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, MacArthur remained subject to the authority

of the President of the United States. This situation prevailed

adoption of the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951. 43 Article 6(a) of the

until the

Treaty provides, in part, that

all

"occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be

withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present
Treaty,

and

in

any case not

Although by Article

1

later that

90 days thereafter.

stitution of Japan,
tion,

remained

.

of the Peace Treaty "the Allied Powers recognize the

sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and
44

."
.

drawn up

in 1947

its

territorial waters," the

full

Con-

under the auspices of MacArthur's occupa-

in force. Article 9 of the Constitution provided:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese

people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a

means of settling

In order to accomplish the
well as other
state will

war

international disputes.

aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the

potential, will never

not be recognized.

The occupation of Japan was

similar to that of the occupation of the Rhineland in

that both followed the unconditional surrender of the defeated State

and the

as-

sumption of absolute power by the victors. There was no suggestion that the occupier

was

in

any way limited by the

rights granted to

an occupier in accordance with

the law of war.

made to the position of Austria following World War II.
had been annexed by Germany in 1938 and was regarded as part of

Reference might also be
Austria
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Germany. 45 Recognition of the annexation was withdrawn by virtue of the Moscow
Declaration. 46 Nevertheless, Austria was not treated in the same fashion as other
States unlawfully

occupied by Germany. In 1946, an agreement was concluded be-

tween the four major Allied Powers (United

and France) and Austria

47

States,

United Kingdom, Soviet Union

that established a four-power

Commission with compe-

tence for the whole of Austria, but with each of these powers a virtual sovereign oc-

cupant in
all

its

own

zone.

By Article

of that accord, the Austrian Government and

1

subordinate Austrian authorities were

ceived from the Allied Commission, so

bound

to carry out

all

instructions re-

much so that "the Austrian

authority ...

is

no more than an executive arm of the occupying Power." 48 Although the anschluss
had ceased to be recognized, in 1955 a peace treaty was agreed to with Austria, 49 Article

20 of which stipulated that the 1946 Agreement was terminated and that the

Agreement on Zones of Occupation was

all

occupation during the actual conduct of hostilities

or,

by the end of that

Allied forces

Occupatio
after these

on the withdrawal of

bellica involves

to terminate

year.

have ceased prior to any arrangement being made for the future of the

territory in question. In such cases, reference

toms of war. Already

to the laws

and cus-

in ancient India:

Customs, laws and family usages which obtain
the country has been acquired.

.

.

.

in the latter's heart.

in a

country should be preserved

Having conquered

his foe, let

him not

when

abolish or

A king should never do such injury to his foe as

disregard the laws of that country

would rankle

must be made

50

More important from our point of view, particularly since it became the model
for much of Europe, is the Lieber Code 51 prepared by Professor Lieber of Columbia
University and

propounded by President Lincoln during the American

we find a number of regulations
which we need cite just a few:
Here,

Art. 23. Private citizens are
parts,

no longer murdered,

and the inoffensive individual

commander of the

affecting the rights of

hostile troops

is

as

little

enemy

Civil

War.

civilians

enslaved, or carried off to distant

disturbed in his private relations as the

can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a

vigorous war.

Art. 25. In

modern

regular wars of the Europeans,

and

their descendants in other

portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country
rule; privation

and disturbance of private

no longer considered lawful - on the contrary, it
breach of the law of war - to force the subjects of the enemy
Art. 33. It

is

the

relations are the exception.

is
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victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair

conquest of the hostile country or
or place permanently as

district,

Art. 35. Classical

works of art,

its

district, that

it

own and make

it

is

a portion of

libraries, scientific collections,

such as astronomical telescopes, must be secured against

when

and complete

resolved to keep the country,
its

own

country.

or precious instruments,

all

avoidable injury, even

they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded. 52

Art. 36. If such

works of art,

libraries, collections,

or instruments belonging to a hostile

nation or government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering

may

state or nation

nation.

order them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said

The ultimate ownership

case shall they be sold or be given

is to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace. In no
away by the armies of the United States, nor shall they

ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by
them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants,
especially those of women: and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the

Art. 37.

contrary shall be rigorously punished.

.

.

of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the
and continue the work of their offices, and can continue it according
to the circumstances arising out of the war - such as judges, administrative or public
officers, officers of city or communal governments - are paid from the public revenue
of the invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to

Art. 39.

The

invaded

territory,

salaries

discontinue

it.

Art. 44. All

wanton violence committed

.

.

destruction of property not
pillage or sacking,

against persons in the invaded country,

commanded by

the authorized officer,

even after taking place by main force,

all

rape,

robbery,

all

all
all

wounding, maiming,

or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other
severe

punishment

as

may seem

Art. 47.

Crimes punishable by

assaults,

highway robbery,

adequate for the gravity of the offense.

all

.

.

penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming,

theft, burglary, fraud, forgery,

and

rape,

if

committed by an

American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as
at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severe punishment shall be
preferred.

There

is

.

.

no need here

to

examine the Brussels Declaration of 1874 53 or the Oxford

Manual of 1880 54 since the former was never ratified, while the latter was drawn up
by members of the Institute of International Law and had no official standing.
Moreover, their contents were fully taken into consideration at the Hague
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Conference of 1899, which produced Hague Convention

Laws and Customs of War on Land, which was
ence by Convention IV. 56

cupation until

Convention,

57

It is

itself

as possibly

55

with respect to the

replaced at the 1907 Confer-

the latter Convention which governed the law on oc-

application was extended in

its

II

1949 by the Fourth Geneva

supplemented by the various principles

now accepted as

part of the international law concerning the protection of human rights, in particu-

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 58 and the 1966 International

lar the

Covenant on
all

Civil

Political Rights. 59 Since the

and

cases of declared

war or of any other armed

two or more of the High Contracting
recognized by one of them,"

60

it

may be

[T]he law of belligerent occupation

is

Geneva Conventions apply "to

conflict

Parties,

even

which may

if

between

arise

the state of war

is

not

said as a general statement that:

applicable whenever one State occupies, in the

course of an armed conflict, territory which was previously under the control of a
hostile party to that conflict, irrespective of whether the displaced

power was the lawful

sovereign of that territory. 61

But, this

is

only true of conflicting States which are parties to the Conventions,

though the principles embodied
62

and would,

law

Martens Clause,

in 1907

have been held to be part of customary

therefore, be applicable in

set forth in the

al-

any armed

Moreover, the

conflict.

Preamble of Hague Convention IV of 1907, pro-

vides, in pertinent part, that:

[I]n cases not included in the Regulations

inhabitants

and the

belligerents

[annexed to the Convention]

.

.

the

.,

remain under the protection and the rule of the

from the usages established among
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.

principles of the law of nations, as they result
civilized peoples,

In

advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice

its

made

clear that the

rules [laid
States

down

Martens Clause

is

relevant even today,

Hague and Geneva Conventions]

in the

and "the fundamental

are to be observed

by

all

whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because

they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law." 63
Since
tions

it is

now

established that the principles

and the Geneva Conventions,

embodied

at least to the extent that

in the

Hague Regula-

they are in accordance

with accepted customary law, are of general application binding on
sary to

draw attention

neces-

some of the basic principles relating to occupation. The
Hague Convention IV is to be found in Article 43:

to

underlying principle in

all, it is
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The authority of

power having

the legitimate

latter shall take all

occupant, the

possible, public order

and

measures

safety,

in his

hands of the
and ensure, as far as

in fact passed into the

power to

restore,

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the

laws in force in that country.

The

may be

of this provision

effect

seen from the statement by the United States

Military Tribunal in the Hostages Case:

The

an occupant of the territory having been achieved, international law

status of

places the responsibility

crime and protecting

upon

lives

accomplishing these ends

the

commanding general of preserving order, punishing

and property within the occupied

is

as great as his responsibility.

His power of

territory.

But he

is

by

definitely limited

recognized rules of international law. 64

This does not mean, of course, that the occupying power must maintain in force
gal provisions that

way of life,

run counter to morality or basic principles underlying

its

le-

own

Germany after its unconditional surrensuch German legislation as the Nazi "racial"

so that the Powers occupying

der were fully entitled to abrogate
laws, or, as has

happened more

tion directed at

recently, the cancellation of discriminatory legisla-

women.

Other relevant provisions of Hague Convention IV include Article 45

("It is for-

bidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile Power"), Article

46 ("Family honour and

rights, the lives

private property, as well as religious convictions

and

of persons, and

must be

practice,

re-

spected ..."), Article 50 ("No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be in-

upon

on account of the acts of individuals for which they
cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible"), and Article 55 ("The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public
buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State,
and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct").
The law with regard to occupatio bellica was greatly expanded with the adoption
flicted

the population

of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. This did not replace the provisions of the 1907

Convention, expressly stating that
tion

is

it is

"supplementary" thereto. 65 This Conven-

primarily directed to protecting the rights of civilians in occupied territory,

limiting the rights of the occupant in so far as such civilians are concerned. Article 4

provides that "Persons protected by the convention are those who, at a given

ment and

in

tion, in the

any manner whatsoever, find themselves,

in case

of

.

.

.

a[n] occupa-

hands of a[n] Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."

been said of this Convention

that:
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The emphasis

is

.

.

.

upon

the preservation of

minimum

humanitarian standards,

through the prohibition of reprisals and collective punishments against the

civilian

population of the occupied territory, hostage-taking, torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, deportation, slave labour, wholesale seizure of property, and compulsion to

perform work of military value. Both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva

Convention

also forbid the exploitation of the

the benefit of the occupant's

own economy.

matters as exchange rates, the
territory,

economy of the occupied

In exercising

amount of money

power

its

territory for

to determine such

occupied

in circulation in the

and the terms and conditions of trade, the occupying power must seek

to

provide for the good economic government of the occupied territory and not merely
feather

its

own

nest.

As important
cant

is

66

as these

humanitarian provisions

the provision in Article

stances," while

by

Article 2,

Conventions, Convention IV
[T]o

all

cases of declared

1

that the

which
is

perhaps even more

Convention

common

is

are,

to

is

to apply "in

all

signifi-

circum-

four of the 1949 Geneva

all

to apply:

which may arise between
even if the state of war is not recognized

war or of any other armed

conflict

two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
by one of them. [It] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party even if the occupation meets with no armed
resistance.

The provisions

in

conflict or of the

[I]n the case

Geneva Convention IV

are applicable

from the opening of the

occupation and:

of occupied territory

[its]

applications

.

.

.

shall cease

one year

after the

general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for

Power exercises the functions of
government in such territory by the provisions of [certain specified Articles relating to
the status and treatment of civilians]. Protected persons whose release, repatriation or
re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit
by the present Convention. 67
the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such

By

Article 27, the rights guaranteed

by Convention IV

are to be enjoyed

by

all

"without any adverse distinction based ... on race, religion or political opinion,"

and

women

are to be protected against "any attack

that protected persons enjoy their rights
that the "Party to the conflict in
sible for the

their

honour." To ensure

under the Convention, Article 29 provides

whose hands protected persons may be,

is

respon-

treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual

responsibility which
cal or

on

maybe incurred

moral coercion

shall

" Article 31, in

turn, states that

"no physi-

be exercised against protected persons, particularly to
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obtain information from
vides that

it is

them or from

third parties." Moreover, Article 32 pro-

prohibited to take:

A]ny measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of
protected persons in [the] hands [of any High Contracting Party]. This prohibition
applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or
scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person,
but also to any other measures of brutality, whether applied by civilian or military
[

agents.

important to note

It is

that, in

accordance with Article

8,

protected persons

may

not agree to give up their rights under the Convention either "in part or entirety."
Similarly, Article

47 declares

that:

who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or
any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change

[Protected persons
in

introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or

government of the

said territory,

nor by any agreement concluded between the

authorities of the occupied territories

and the Occupying Power, nor by the annexation

the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

by

This raises nice questions regarding, for example, the
territories
Israel

with regard to

under the control of the Palestine Administration Authority; although

contends that since

bound

Israeli actions

thereby. Moreover,

it
it

has never ratified the Fourth Convention

it is

not

has argued that since the territories in question were

never under the authority of any recognized sovereign they are merely "administered," rather than "occupied"

—whatever

Prime Minister Sharon has acknowledged,

that distinction
in

connection

it

be.

However,

connection with his undertaking to

withdraw from parts of the territory in question, that they are
this

might

in fact "occupied." In

might be of interest to draw attention to the following comment

Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict: "Whether the administration
imposed by the occupying power is called a military government or civil government is not important. The legality of its acts will be determined in accordance
with the law of armed conflict." 68 The United States Army manual, The Law of
Land Warfare, is to the same effect:
in the British

It

is

immaterial whether the government over an enemy's territory consists in a

military or civil or

authority

is

mixed administration. Its character is the same and the source of its
It is a government imposed by force, and the legality of its acts is

the same.

determined by the law of war. 69

182

Green

Leslie C.

would appear that the inclusion in the adminnationals of the occupied territory would not alter the situa-

In the light of these statements,
istration of civilian
tion. It

it

might be questioned, therefore, whether the administrations

the supervision of occupying authorities, have been established in the

that,

under

Kosovo

re-

gion of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq are truly in line with the requirements of
the Convention, for they purport to govern regardless of the provisions of the

Con-

vention or the customary law concerning occupation. In each of these instances,
regardless of the installation of "local" administrations, the occupation, even

though government might be conducted through
scribed, has continued

ing of local elections.

Although

it

is

and appears

likely to

however de-

some time, despite the holdGreenwood is relevant:

do so

A comment by Professor

local surrogates

for

obviously difficult to apply the law of belligerent occupation in a

prolonged occupation, that law

is

not thereby rendered inapplicable. Prolonged

many questions to which the Hague Regulations and the Fourth
Geneva Convention provide no express answers. In particular, there is a need for
change on a far greater scale during a prolonged occupation simply because of the way
in which circumstances change over time. Nevertheless, there is no indication that
international law permits an occupying power to disregard provisions of the
Regulations or the Convention merely because it has been in occupation for a long
period, not least because there is no body of law which might plausibly take their place
and no indication that the international community is willing to trust the occupant
with carte blanche. Any changes, it is suggested, must take place within the framework
of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the principles of which
are flexible enough to accommodate at least some of the needs of a prolonged
occupation
The longer the occupation lasts, the greater the degree of change which
occupation raises

is

likely to

be required but changes should

broad principles

It

[to

still

be made only in accordance with the

be found in the Regulations and Convention]. 70

must be borne in mind, when considering the Israeli situation, which was Profes-

sor

Greenwood's particular concern when making this comment, that Israel has re-

fused to ratify Geneva IV and

is

only bound by those provisions of the Convention

which give expression to customary law.
In so far as the Israeli situation

is

concerned, while the tendency has been until

recently to describe the contested Palestinian lands

described as Judea and Samaria

—held by

Israel as

which the Fourth Convention does not apply,

—the West Bank

region, also

"administered territories" 71 to

Israeli courts,

when

called

upon

to

consider the legality of actions by military authorities in those territories, have not

always taken such a narrow approach, pointing out as early as 1968 that the Military

Commander's

legislative

powers derive from the actual occupation and not

the Convention, but the judge stated:
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[T]he State of Israel observes the provisions of the convention in practice.
is

guided by the convention, inasmuch as the

of civilized nations,

I

assume

shall

that

I

latter

And since it

embodies humanitarian principles

must have recourse to the convention

Any Order made by the Commander is presumed

as

being

and
its validity can only be impugned if the Order is on the face of it so unreasonable and
exceptional and contrary to the most basic principles of natural justice and
international morality accepted by civilized nations, that it stands to be rejected and the
Military Court [set up under security Provisions Order issued by the Military
Commander of the Region] by virtue of its inherent authority must disregard it as
being enacted out of malice and arbitrariness rather than the achievement of any lawful
purpose.
72
of binding force

.

The

to be valid,

.

"Military Court" referred to in this opinion was established under security

Provisions Order issued by the Military

of such military courts

is

Commander of the Region.

consistent with

Geneva Convention

As to the 1907 Hague Regulations, the
was pointed out by the Supreme Court
The

rights of a resident in the area

Israeli judicial position is

under military government

Israel's belligerent

in

-

customary international law

law, insofar as they have

by

vis-a-vis the military

a court of law of the occupying state

stem from the rules governing belligerent occupation
internal law of the occupying state

very clear. As

in 1982:

commander - rights subject to judicial review in
and contractual international

IV.

Establishment

73

been assimilated into the

a valid internal act of legislation. In respect of

occupation, and in the absence of legislation which internalizes the

norms of the laws of war relating to belligerent occupation, (the rules in
Even though the Hague
force) are those included in the Hague Regulations.
Regulations serve as an authority in this respect, the accepted attitude - which has also
been accepted by this Court - is that the Hague Regulations are declarative in nature
principle

[sic]

.

and

reflect

legislation.

customary international law, applicable

in Israel

without an act of

Israeli

74

The Fourth Geneva Convention, not having been
been the subject of Israeli
will

.

.

legislation.

However,

apply those parts of the Convention which

ian in character

it

ratified

as has just

by

Israel,

has never

been noted, the courts

considers to be purely humanitar-

and part of international customary law.

It is

for this reason that Is-

Hague Regulations appended to Convention IV of 1907, even
contends there is no war since there is no State enemy, merely groups of

rael applies the

though

it

"terrorists," like the

tled to

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,

be treated as prisoners of war and

are, therefore,

who are not enti-

not protected by the Third

Geneva Convention. 75

Among the activities of the Israel military administration claimed to be contrary
to

both the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV

184
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homes of civilians who are related to an alleged terrorist. In the 1985 case of Degalis
v. Military Commander ofthejudea and Samaria Region, Judge Ben-Dror pointed
out that the goal of the 1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations permitting such
demolition:
[Wjas a deterrent effect, and

this effect

also to the family living with him.

considered

a 'collective

should apply not only to the terrorist alone, but

A

demolition of a

terrorist's

house cannot be

punishment' because the house about to be demolished

is

this

and not to people unconnected with the matter. In cases
the High Court usually instructs the respondent [the Military

Commander]

to consider other deterrent measures, such as merely sealing off the

connected to the
such as

terrorists' houses.

terrorist,

However, the

final decision

on

the nature of the measure to be

adopted lies within the respondent's competence according to Regulation
to the gravity of the acts

performed by the

1

19,

and due

petitioners' relatives, the sanction of

demolition of their houses seems quite a reasonable one. 76

The conclusion
little

to be

drawn from

these Israeli judicial decisions

is

that

it

matters

whether the occupying power regards the territory under administration

"enemy" or

"terrorist" or

to be applied

is

by some other nomenclature. For

made up of the occupation

Israel, at least,

provisions of the

Hague

as

the law

Regulations,

together with those provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which are hu-

manitarian in their purpose and as such are to be observed regardless of legislation
ratifying the

Convention.

The difference between the Israeli occupation and those that have occurred later
lies in

the fact that the former

is

the result of conflict following Israel's creation and

has been conducted between Israel and forces that, for the main part, do not
allegiance to

any other

State.

The

later

occupations have

all

involved States,

owe

all

of

which are members of the United Nations, and have followed an intervention not
of the normal conflict type, but have been based on some other ground, often in
disregard of the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.
fore, to

It is

necessary, there-

pay some attention to the basis for the intervention and the consequent

occupation.

Before doing so, however, reference must be
tions

made

to

some apparent occupa-

under the auspices of the United Nations which have nothing inherently to

do with the law of armed

conflict, and, consequently,

occupation. There have been a

number of incidents

not with the law concerning

in

which the members of the

United Nations, particularly of the Security Council, have become concerned
the

at

manner in which conflicting racial or tribal groups within a country, frequently

one that has only recently achieved
behavior, or in which

it

its

independence, have indulged in outrageous

has been feared the local hostilities might eventually
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involve

some

third power. In such circumstances the United Nations has autho-

rized the raising of a "peacekeeping" force
territory with a

view to bringing an end to

force between rival groups.
rael,

which has been stationed

Somalia, Rwanda,

78

77

as

an interposition

This has happened, for example, in Cyprus, Korea,

Kampuchea, and

do not operate

ever, these forces

by acting

hostilities

in the affected

name

East Timor, to

as occupiers,

and the

law,

but a few.

whether

it is

Is-

How-

that of the

Hague or of Geneva, has no relevance. That these forces are there as a matter of local tolerance may be seen from the manner in which the UN force in Gaza was
withdrawn

of Egypt, the host country, in 1967. 79

at the request

The intervention by peacekeepers in
for in this case

Haiti tends to stand in a position of its

own,

has been alleged that the United States, which provided the bulk of

it

the peacekeeping force, virtually forced Aristide, the democratically elected presi-

dent of the country, to depart and arranged for his removal (Aristide asserts that

removed him), which,

the United States forcibly
ing with local

if true, is

clearly

an action

government contrary to customary international
While there was some indication

States denied

doing

been popular

at the time,

so.

law.

The United

that this action

by October 2004 agitation was taking place

interfer-

may have

calling for his

return.

Before considering the legal status of such interventions
that

by Article

2,

paragraph

ternational relations

4,

of the Charter

all

Members

must be pointed out

"shall refrain in their in-

from the threat or use of force against the

or political independence of any state, or in any other

territorial integrity

manner inconsistent with the

Purposes of the United Nations." Further, as was indicated
this article,

it

at the

very beginning of

paragraph 7 of the same Article provides:

Nothing contained

in the present

Charter shall authorize the United Nations to

intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state

or shall require the

Members

to

submit such matters to settlement under the present

Charter; but this Principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures

under Chapter

Chapter VII

VII.

is

concerned with "Action with respect to Threats to the Peace,

Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Prima facie, this would suggest that,
unless

ill

treatment of nationals by one State constituted a direct threat to the well-

being of another, no State or the United Nations

itself would

have a right to inter-

vene on behalf of those persecuted. The situation might be altered by virtue of the
existence of treaty obligations concerning
cutor, although

it

must be borne

in this field confers a right

in

human

rights

undertaken by the perse-

mind that none of the presently existing treaties

of direct intervention on any other party to such

186
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In accordance with the law of treaties, unless the treaty specifically creates such a
right,

by both customary and conventional law, breach of a treaty does not give

vate citizens any right recognized

and enforceable by international

various treaties concerned with

human

rights

law, 80

pri-

and the

have not created such a right

The only other recourse to a national would depend upon the State
party to the treaty and alleged to be in breach of it having created such a right under
its national law. The only right accruing to other parties to the treaty would be by
way of damages, provided it could prove that its own interests had in fact been adexpressis verbis.

versely affected

The

by the conduct objected

to.

case that calls for consideration arose out of the dissolution of the

first

Socialist Federal People's

Republic of Yugoslavia and the conflicts which began in

1991. These conflicts were both international, as for example, between Croatia

and

and non-international,

Serbia,

as for instance,

between Bosnia and Bosnian

Serbs seeking to join Serbia. In accordance with customary international law, an

deems necessary to suppress a revolt, free from any active intervention by any other State, and it would
appear from Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, free from intervention by the
established

government

is

entitled to take such action as

United Nations. In addition, in
all

this particular instance

it

it is

important to note that

of the parties concerned in the Yugoslav fighting accepted the provisions of

Protocol

II

of 1977. 81

By Article
cumstances,

1.

3 of the Protocol, non-intervention
is

Nothing

condemned

by third

States,

whatever the

cir-

emphatically:

in the Protocol [including Part

II

concerning

Humane Treatment]

shall

be

invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of

by all legitimate
law and order in the

the government,

[it

re-establish

State or to defend the national unity

does not say "reasonable"] means, to maintain or

and

territorial

integrity of the State.

2.

Nothing

in the Protocol shall

indirectly, in the

armed

be invoked

as a justification for intervening, directly or

conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the

High

Contracting Party in the territory of which the conflict occurs.

Of course,

States, for

the Protocol,

example the United

States,

which had not become

would not be bound by this provision.

It

a party to

would, however, be bound

by the well-established principle of non-intervention under customary law and

re-

affirmed in the Charter.

Apart from the conflicts between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, a major conflict
took place in the Serb remnant, particularly as between the Serb authorities and the

Albanian population that constituted a majority in Kosovo. The attempt by the
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Serbs to reassert their authority resulted in atrocities

on both

sides,

with wide-

spread allegations that the authorities were carrying out extensive policies of "ethnic cleansing" involving expulsions, killings

would argue

that "ethnic cleansing"

and mass rapes of the Albanians. Some

was a sanitized term

for genocide. Article

II

of

the Genocide Convention of 1948 defines genocide as meaning:

[A]cts

committed with

intent to destroy, in

whole or

in part, a national, ethnic, racial

or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c)

Deliberately inflicting

about

It

members of the group;

its

on the group conditions of

life

calculated to bring

physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 82

can hardly be denied that slaughtering the men, and forcing women and children

to flee their
ing,

would

homes and

fall

take to the hills in winter without adequate food or cloth-

within this definition. While the Convention elevated genocide to a

made little provision for its punishment, nor did it give any party a right to
intervene to terminate acts of genocide being committed by some other party. In
crime,

it

any case, by failing to describe what was going on by the treaty term would suggest that
no such right could be

asserted.

when Serbia rejected a proposal that a force of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) personnel be admitted and that a plebiscite under
Nevertheless,

NATO supervision be held on Kosovo's future after three years of interim government, and followed
nian population,
inevitable

and

this rejection

NATO

in July

place to discuss the

with increased pressure upon the Kosovar Alba-

indicated that military action against the Serbs was

1999

NATO

began a bombing campaign. This

NATO intervention

tions Charter or the

83

either in accordance with the
84

North Atlantic Treaty

the Treaty defines the geographic area of

its

itself.

come

it

not the

United Na-

to say that Article 5 of

competence, which does not include

the former State of Yugoslavia, and requires an
for the obligations of the Treaty to

Suffice

is

armed

into effect.

attack against a signatory

It is difficult

to appreciate

how

member of NATO, in any way
member. NATO, however, maintained that

a non-international conflict in Yugoslavia, not a

threatened the security of any
its

intervention was not in any

NATO
way

politically directed

with the aim of breaking up

what remained of the former Yugoslavia or to recognize an independent Kosovo,
but was purely humanitarian, directed

at

terminating the ethnic cleansing and other
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committed by the Serbs against the Muslim Albanian population, and

atrocities

enable the latter to return

home

found

in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Article

In Serbia the difference of religious creed

any person

as a

ground

rights as

all

other

we have an approach that is reminiscent of provi-

Serbian citizens in the area. Here
sions to be

and enjoying the same

in safety

to

and confession

XXXV thereof provides:
shall

not be alleged against

for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the

enjoyment

of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours,
or the exercise of the various professions and industries, in any locality whatever.

freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship
belonging to Serbia, as well as to foreigners.

shall

be assured to

all

The

persons

And no hindrance shall be offered either to

the hierarchical organization of the different

communions, or

to their relations with

their spiritual heads.

While it is true that there is no established
to occupation or not, in
that international law

is

whether leading

right of intervention,

customary international law, one cannot ignore the

a developing process.

The Preamble

to the

fact

United Nations

human rights, in the dignity and worth of
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and

Charter affirms "faith in fundamental
the

human person,

small." This has led to the adoption of a variety of instruments reaffirming the exis-

tence of and support for
assertions, there

is

human rights. With few States presuming to oppose these

a tendency to assert that there

developing customary law in this
this trend,

it

may be contended

What may be more
and

a

UN

stored,

difficult to

field

now,

if not

a.

jus cogens, at least a

binding upon and enforceable by

that the

support

NATO

intervention

is

now

elections have

all.

Given

legally justifiable.

the continued presence of

is

administrator in the territory

and purportedly free

is

NATO forces

that "peace" has officially been re-

been held in Serbia. However, the form

of those elections and the persons permitted to run for office have

all

been vetted

and approved by the non-local internationally imposed administrator. While there
is

no

official

occupation in existence and no suggestion that the area

is

under the

umbrella of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the members of the "occupying"
forces are

immune from

the local jurisdiction,

and there appears

to be

little

effort

made by the sending State authorities to try their personnel in accordance with
their own national law for offenses committed against local inhabitants. 85
It

remains to discuss the situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly as

the United States has taken the lead in dealing with both these countries and continues to

do

so,

and remains somewhat indifferent to the view of other

States offer-

ing support in seeking to restore order.

On September
tive

11, 2001, three hijacked

American

weapons against the World Trade Center

189

in

aircraft

New York

were used

as destruc-

and the Pentagon

in

Is
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ashington, D.C., while a fourth plane was likely prevented by

crashing into the White

Government was

House

to declare a

the State against which this
dicate that the attacks

The immediate

itself.

passengers from

its

reaction of the United States

"war against terrorism," without any indication

war was

as to

be waged. There was strong evidence to

to

had been organized by al-Qaeda,

a

in-

group of Islamic funda-

Osama bin Laden, a renegade Saudi citizen, who had been
number of prior attacks against United States and other western

mentalists led by

responsible for a

There was also evidence to indicate that bin Laden was

interests.

in Afghanistan

where he maintained or financed a number of terrorist training camps. Afghani-

was

stan

at that

time administered by an Islamic fundamentalist administration

(the Taliban) that constituted the country's de facto government, although

it

was

not internationally recognized. The Taliban authorities were called upon to arrest
bin Laden and surrender

do

so, the

and

him

to the

country was attacked by

United States for

US

forces,

trial.

When

they refused to

supported by the United Kingdom

others.

There was no declaration of war and, despite the
representative of their "government"

and

the United States refused to recognize

treatment

emy

as prisoners

combatants," a classification not

regards

all

of war.

If

captured

clarified

tration
tainly

Taliban fighters were

such distinguishable from al-Qaeda,

them

as legitimate

combatants entitled to

of war. Instead they were described as "en-

known

to the law of

armed

conflict,

enemy personnel belonging to an organized force as

which

prisoners

not clearly recognizable as entitled to be described as such, they are enti-

be treated as

tled to

been

when captured

as

fact that

by

were not

no

if they

were prisoners of war

a tribunal. 86

It is

until

such time as their status has

true that the supporters of the Taliban adminis-

easily identifiable as

members of a regular force, but they were cer-

those constituting the Northern Alliance, which

less identifiable that

purported to be the remnant of the government overthrown by the Taliban. Moreover, in view of the camouflage
as well as
tity-

by many, particularly younger,

these too, especially those

wearing

worn by many members of modern armed forces
civilians

members who

civilian or other dress, as distinct

—

it

may well be difficult to

iden-

participate in undercover missions

from national uniform, whether

in place

of or additional to their regular uniform. 87 Having displaced the Taliban, the

United States treated as an

ally the

Northern Alliance

as representatives

ernment displaced by the Taliban, and subsequently

among

its

members, together with some

selected personnel

tribal leaders, to

form

government under the leadership of an individual acceptable
In the

meantime the

latter

was able to persuade some third
been undertaken by
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States to assist in the

administration and rebuilding of Afghanistan, and, as in Kosovo,
tary supervisory activities have

of the gov-

some of the
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there has
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been no attempt to explain

how such an activity so far from the North Atlantic area

NATO's competence. At no time has it been suggested that there is an
occupation or that there is any room for any of the Geneva Conventions to be
within

falls

applied.

Moreover, a new development in the practice of occupation has been intro-

duced

in Afghanistan.

servicemen,
batants,

88

A number

who may well be

of armed western security personnel, often ex-

described as mercenaries and therefore

have been recruited to

assist the

illegal

com-

occupying authority and the Afghan ad-

ministration in protecting commercial interests, usually western in character. Such

personnel have no interest in or concern for restrictions imposed by the Hague or

Geneva Conventions and their activities go largely unchecked by either the allied or
authorities. 89

Afghan

Despite the existence of an acceptable Afghan administration and the participation of other States, the United States has

removed captured personnel from Af-

Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, where it has a naval base leased in virtual
perpetuity from the Cuban government. 90 Among the captives are members of the
Taliban, who, it may be suggested, were legitimately engaged in combat on behalf
ghanistan to

of their government against the United States "invader," and

who might

be

re-

garded, prima facie, as entitled to Third Convention protection, instead of being
denied, until recently, 91 any form of independent legal protection. Also

Taliban captives are non-Afghan Muslims

who

among the

volunteered to defend a Muslim

administration against rebels or foreign forces seeking to overthrow that administration.

may

It

be suggested that they were entitled to the same treatment as the

French Foreign Legion, the LaFayette Squadron or any American
allied forces in either

World War before

who

joined the

the United States itself became a belliger-

ent.

Even when these captives have held the nationality of one of the American

lies,

as

treat

al-

have a number from Britain or Pakistan, the United States has declined to

them

as in

ceptions, has

it

any way protected by the law of armed

conflict nor, with rare ex-

been prepared to hand them over to their

own government

treatment in accordance with their national law. Moreover,

where some detainees are concerned no
tion are

known.

details as to

name

it

would seem

for

that

or even place of deten-

92

In practice, despite the existence of a nominally independent government, Af-

ghanistan

ment"

is

under

effective

acts only with the

US occupation since it would appear that the "governconsent of the United States, even though the

contends that any actions taken by them against local "terrorists"

(a

latter

term which

is

being used somewhat indiscriminately both in Afghanistan and Iraq even against
those

who might be more correctly described as "insurgents")

at the request

are only undertaken

or with the consent of the Afghan administration. Both the United
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and the Afghan authorities deny

States

States has indicated that

which

due

is

it

withdraw

will

an occupation

that

if

exists,

and the United

requested after the Afghan election

to take place shortly. Until then,

it is

the United States that

seeking

is

to ensure that conditions exist for such an election to be held.

At

least in so far as

tection offered
threats

Afghanistan

is

concerned,

by the Taliban to the al-Qaeda

and actions against third

States

it is

possible to argue that the pro-

movement with

terrorist

was enough

the latter's

to regard the Taliban as an ally

of Osama bin Laden's supporters and, as such, sufficient as a coconspirator to warrant action against

it.

Additionally, the Taliban governmental authority was ex-

tremely restrictive and in virtual denial of

women

were concerned, although

this

human

all

rights, particularly

argument was not

originally of

where

any major

significance.

In the case of Iraq,

ence was

made to

no

similar contentions could be put forward. Instead refer-

the United Nations resolutions terminating hostilities at the end

of the conflict with Iraq consequent upon
687,

93

which was adopted

and biological weapons

in 1991, Iraq

as well as its

its

invasion of Kuwait.

was required

to get rid of

By Resolution
all its

chemical

weapons of mass destruction and to submit

to

international inspection to ensure compliance with these requirements. After 9/11,

the United States contended that Iraq was not fulfilling

cooperating with the United Nations inspectors.
to take the further action desired

by the United

its

obligations

and was not

When the Security Council failed

States, the latter,

United Kingdom, launched a military offensive against

supported by the

Iraq, while

adding to

its

complaint the assertion that Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, was a partisan of
al-Qaeda and even claimed that Iraq was party to the September attacks on the

United

States, a

claim for which there appears to have been no substantive evidence

The United Kingdom added the complaint that Iraq was in breach of every international obligation concerning human rights and that the administration
should be overthrown even on this ground alone.
As in the case of Afghanistan, there was no support from the United Nations nor
was there any declaration of war. 94 The actual combat operations were not of great
duration, the Iraqi armed forces soon surrendered, and President Bush proclaimed
whatever.

that the operation

was successfully terminated. In that

Third Geneva Convention,
trial as

95

all

war criminals must be

released,

an obligation only partly complied with.

Saddam Hussein and many of his

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as well as crimes against

particularly against dissident Iraqi nationals.

that these latter

leading

and scientific advisers had committed war crimes during the

Gulf War following the
ity,

accordance with the

prisoners of war other than those held for potential

Further, the United States declared that
military, political

case, in

were to be treated

in

first

human-

There was again no suggestion

accordance with the Geneva Conventions,
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Saddam at least was permitted to see International Committee of the Red
Cross representatives. Moreover, the United States arranged for Saddam and some
of the others to be handed over to the new Iraqi administration for trial, thus raisalthough

ing the possibility of trials by vengeance, even though

it

precautions would be taken to ensure that they receive a

was asserted that proper
fair trial.

With the overthrow of the government, the United States, without acknowledging that it was an occupant subject to the restrictions imposed by the Hague or
Geneva Conventions, became the governing authority in Iraq, appointing a United
States citizen as supreme governor, although he was later replaced by an Americansponsored Iraqi interim administration, with the United States making clear which

The United States signed an agreement with
this administration undertaking to withdraw from Iraq should the Iraqi government request it to do so. In the meantime, the United States remained the supreme
authority for security purposes and agreed not to undertake offensive operations
against "terrorists," even though some of those so described might more properly
be considered as insurgents. It must be kept in mind that the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein and his government and the disbandment by the occupant of the Iraqi
armed forces did not mean that all support for the legitimate Iraqi government had
local politicians

it

would not

tolerate.

many of these forces found themselves without prosof employment. Many of them did in fact continue operations of a warlike

terminated, particularly as
pects

character against both the "invading" military forces
Iraqi administration. Subsequently the

and representatives of the

United States began allowing members of

the former Iraqi forces, after proper vetting, to rejoin the newly-created Iraqi

armed or

police forces.

When it became clear that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and had destroyed under United Nations supervision

chemical and biological weapons, a

confirmed by the head of the United States Iraq Survey Group

fact later

Report,

its

96

the United States and

its allies

in his Final

changed the balance of their arguments

concerning the invasion and subsequent occupation.

It

now seemed that the most

important aim of their operations was to bring democracy to Iraq, sometimes
claiming that this would prove an example for other Middle East States, the gov-

ernments of many of which were dictatorial

in character. This claim that the spread

of democratic governments everywhere the United States and
ered

it

to be desirable

obtained

—

is

— even absent United Nations approval

its allies

if this

consid-

could not be

reminiscent of policies pursued by the Concert of Europe in the nine-

teenth century.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, backed by

ported

its

nominee

in the local administration in organizing

American protection. The presumption appears
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though

might not make

local conditions

new

pied area, a

it

be held throughout the occu-

feasible to

era will be created with a popular

government taking over, one

human rights, will not constitute a threat to any neighbor and
acquire weapons of mass destruction or others now considered

that will fully respect
will

not seek to

contrary to international law.

This view that the introduction of the trappings of democracy to a society that
has never

known

it

and the history of which

hatreds and jealousies
existence for

the answer to

is

all

is

riven with local lustings for power,

problems and the way to

a future peaceful

similar to the situation that existed particularly in former British

all is

colonies in Africa during the disassembling of empire. At that time the attitude

seems to have been,
[Y]ou are

now

independent.

railway terminus which

ceremonial chair which

your

is

is

We

are giving

you

London

a building that looks like a

legislature. In addition,

we

the 'Speaker's Chair', although the

are providing

you with

man who sits in

it

a

does not

somewhat like Little Lord Fauntleroy known as the
who will sit in the Speaker's Chair from which he is not allowed to speak. Then

speak. There will be a person dressed

Speaker,

we will present you with an ornamental mace as a symbol of the Speaker's authority, but
which must not be used as you were accustomed historically to use a mace. Finally, we
will give

you

a presentation

hold an election. After

this,

copy of Erskine May's Parliamentary Procedure and you will
the world will

know that you

are a democracy.

Unfortunately, the years since those "heady" days have

shown how

artificial

these

hopes were. There is no reason to assume that the situation in either Afghanistan or
Iraq will be any different.

While there may be good grounds
former Yugoslavia and

and Iraq are contrary
the

members, and

in

for arguing that the operations against the

Kosovo, together with the invasions of both Afghanistan

to the Charter of the

are thus illegal,

in that organization to

it

United Nations and the obligations of

should be noted that there has been no attempt

condemn any of them, not

that there could have

decision by the Security Council to this effect in view of the vetoes that

been exercised by the United States and the United Kingdom.

97

It

been any

would have

must, however,

be noted that the governments responsible for the invasions have sought to justify
their interventions

on the

basis of the

need to protect and

assert

human

rights. In

endeavor, they argue, they have done nothing contrary to the principles

relat-

ing to humanitarian intervention discussed earlier in this paper, particularly

when

this

the international
case, this

human

community as such has

contention

rights

protected by

is

is

failed to take action collectively. In their

strengthened by the generally accepted view that respect for

now part of the international jus cogens that must be respected and

all.

194

Leslie C.

Green

In these instances, however, since the enforcing powers maintained that they

were present only for the good of the country affected and the welfare of the world,
they, or at least the

United

States,

tended to argue that their opponents were not

entitled to the protection of the law.

For the main part, however, military person-

nel captured in Iraq have, while in detention,

been treated

in

accordance with the

regulations concerning prisoners of war, subject to the exceptions respecting

members of both

the United States and United

Kingdom

some

forces responsible for

holding and interrogating Iraqi military and civilian detainees. 98 Given the circum-

which the invasions took place, the existence of interim governments

stances in

both Afghanistan and Iraq and the tendency to describe
it is

all

opponents

in

as terrorists,

perhaps not surprising that the occupying authorities have not been too con-

cerned about the application of the Hague or Geneva Conventions.
pear, therefore, that

It

would ap-

by and large there has been no "new" law of occupation, but an

application of behavior conditioned by the circumstances of the case.

For the future, perhaps, and to avoid the controversies that these operations

have given

ward

rise to,

the writer

may be permitted to refer to a proposal he first put for-

in 1994:

When

a

human

government

rights of large

disintegrated that law
for the

is

unwilling or unable to protect, or persistently infringes the

segments of its population, or the government structure has so

and order have virtually ceased to

conditions have been restored.
this

exist,

it

may then well be time

United Nations to take over the administration until such time
.

.

.

However,

it

would perhaps be more

as

normal

desirable that

be done not on an ad hoc basis - nor by a group of States assuming such authority

made up of trained
The members of such
administrative or governing commission should not be drawn from nationals of the
great powers among whom, despite the end of the cold war, political rivalries and
manoeuvering is still likely to take place."
unto

itself-

but on the basis of a permanent United Nations body

personnel from a variety of countries and regions.

.

.

.

would be necessary to establish rules, probably by way of a convention somewhat similar to Geneva Convention IV, indicating the manner in
which persons in the country taken over are to be treated.

At the same time,

Such

a proposal

suggested they be
well be called

whose

it

left

upon

activities

would be met by opposition from the

great

powers since

it is

out of the administration to be established, while they might

to assist in

its

financing and in the training of personnel over

they would have no control. In addition, opposition would almost

certainly be forthcoming

from some of the smaller newly independent and devel-

oping countries which are jealous of their sovereignty and are aware that they are

more likely to be the

"victims" of such a procedure than any other State. However,
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if

such a policy were adopted, there might be

intervention

less

doubt

and consequent occupation, and a more

contending that

it is

in

as to the legal basis for the

substantial foundation for

accordance with the rule of law.
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Current Issues in Occupation Law:

2003 Civilian Deaths in Baghdad

Fred Abrahams*

This

documents and analyzes

article

civilian deaths

Baghdad from the end of major combat operations
ber of that year.

It is

October 2003 for

based on

field research

conducted

in

US

forces in

May 2003 until Octo-

in Iraq in

September and

Human Rights Watch. During that time, the author interviewed

the witnesses to civilian deaths, family

members of the deceased, victims who were

non-lethal casualties, Iraqi police, lawyers and

US Army judge

caused by

human rights activists, US

advocates stationed in Iraq, and

members of the United

soldiers,

States-led

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), responsible at the time for governing Iraq.

The research revealed many
the

US

cases of upstanding

military in Iraq's capital.

their obligations as

Many

soldiers

and

legally respectful

work by

and commanders were aware of

an occupying power under international humanitarian law and

took appropriate measures to

fulfill

those obligations. At the same time, there were

disturbing cases during the period under review in which soldiers used force in an
excessive or indiscriminate
ians.

Many

manner, sometimes resulting in the death of Iraqi

civil-

of these cases went uninvestigated, contributing to an atmosphere of

impunity.
Clearly Iraq was
tacks

and remains a hostile environment

for

US troops, with daily at-

by Iraqis or others opposed to the United States and coalition

* Senior Researcher for

Human

Rights Watch.

forces.

But such

Current Issues in Occupation Law: 2003 Civilian Deaths in Baghdad

an environment does not absolve the military from

obligations under interna-

its

and discriminate manner, and
only when strictly required. Soldiers and commanders found to have used or tolertional law to use force in a restrained, proportionate

ated the use of excessive or indiscriminate force must face appropriate administrative

or criminal action.

Conditions in Iraq have changed a

lot since the

second half of 2003, particularly

with the growth of the insurgency and the transfer of power to the Iraqi govern-

ment and security forces. But the concerns about civilian casualties remain, both
Iraq and as a lesson for military occupations.

in

Numbers
United States military and coalition forces in Iraq keep meticulous records of soldiers killed in duty, providing daily accounts to the press, but they
1

on

tistics

response to a

civilian deaths. In

Human

Rights

do not keep sta-

Watch

information about civilian casualties, the coalition's press office sent

It is

tragic that civilians

have died as a result of our operations and we are

that every time a civilian

among

is

civilian casualties for the overall

statistics,

we

campaign.

It

would be

believed civilians had been

aware

irresponsible to give firm

we have had

cases

where

wounded and perhaps

the time our forces have a chance to fully assess the

killed, but by
outcomes of the contact, the

wounded or dead civilians have been removed from the scene.
make it impossible for us to maintain an accurate account. 2

Factors such as this

While the coalition claims an accurate account of civilian deaths
obtain,

fully

fire, we potentially lose allies
we have no definitive estimates of

estimates given the wide range of variables. For example,
conflict,

this reply:

caught in the line of coalition

the Iraqi population. In terms of

during a

request for

is

impossible to

Human Rights Watch collected data from a variety of sources for a database

of post-war civilian casualties in Baghdad. Given

its

vast resources, the

should be able to do the same, and not doing so suggests that

US military

civilian deaths are

not

of paramount concern.

Based on the data collected,

soldiers in

Baghdad

killed ninety-four civilians

May and September 30, 2003, in legally questionable circumstances that
an investigation. Human Rights Watch researchers did not verify each of

between
merit

US

1

these individual allegations but, taken as a whole, they reveal a pattern of alleged

unlawful deaths that should prompt concern and investigations.

More

man

concretely, based

Rights

on interviews with witnesses and family members, Hu-

Watch confirmed

the deaths of twenty Iraqi civilians in

gally questionable circumstances

between

Baghdad

in le-

May and September 30, 2003. Eighteen
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Human

of these deaths are documented in the

Minds: Post-war Civilian Deaths

Rights

Watch

Baghdad Caused by

in

Minds), 3 published in October 2003. In addition,

Human

report, Hearts

and

U.S. Forces (Hearts

and

Rights

Watch

collected

US forces from the Iraqi police, human rights organizations, Western media and US military statements on the topic. In total, Human
Rights Watch estimated the US military in Baghdad killed ninety-four civilians in
questionable circumstances in the period May to September 2003. 4
data

on

civilian deaths

While

this article

umented

in Hearts

by

does not present

and Minds,

namely, a disturbing trend by

it

US

all

is

the individual cases of civilian deaths doc-

worth looking

they reveal;

at the pattern

forces of over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate

shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force. In some cases,
forces faced a legitimate threat,

which gave them the

right to

respond with

US

force.

But that response was sometimes disproportionate to the threat or inadequately
targeted, thereby

harming

civilians or putting

them

at risk.

Categories of Excessive Force

In Baghdad, civilian deaths can be categorized in three basic incident groups. First

US military raids on homes in search of arms or
The US military said in the fall of 2003 that it was im-

were deaths that occurred during

members of armed

groups.

plementing less aggressive

But Baghdad residents in
havior, physical abuse,

armed

from

resistance

tactics,

late

and

and was increasingly taking Iraqi police on

2003

complained of aggressive and

by US troops.

theft

families

still

who thought

against thieves, they sometimes resorted to

When US

soldiers

raids.

reckless be-

encountered

they were acting in self-defense

overwhelming

force, killing family

members, neighbors or passers-by.
Second were

civilian deaths

caused by

US

tionately and indiscriminately after they had

the road.

soldiers

who responded

dispropor-

come under attack at checkpoints or on

Human Rights Watch documented cases where, after an improvised explo-

sive device

US convoy, soldiers fired high caliber weapons in mulinjuring and killing civilians who were nearby. While the threat in

detonated near a

tiple directions,

those cases was often

Third were

real,

killings at

the indiscriminate response put civilians at risk.

checkpoints

the research was conducted in the

when

fall

Iraqi civilians failed to stop.

of 2003,

US

At the time

checkpoints constantly shifted

throughout Baghdad. They were sometimes not well marked, although sign visibility

was improving.

A dearth of Arabic interpreters and poor understanding of Iraqi

hand gestures added
civilians. Soldiers

guns

to the confusion, with results that

were sometimes

sometimes shouted conflicting instructions

raised: "Stay in the car!" or

"Get out of the car!"
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In

all

were seen putting their

Male

US soldiers were sometimes arrogant and abusive. They

of these scenarios,

soldiers

on detained

feet

Iraqis'

heads

—

a highly insulting offense.

sometimes touched or even searched female

unacceptable

although

act,

female soldiers

or

Iraqis, also a culturally

were increasingly

searchers

deployed.

Of course,

US

not

all

military personnel

train police,

guard

behaved

soldiers

who

in this way.

Human Rights Watch met many

dealt respectfully with Iraqis

and pursue criminals

facilities

and were working hard

to

Some

of

in difficult conditions.

these soldiers expressed frustration at the lack of sensitivity
leagues. "It takes a while to get the

A Case Study:
On

the evening of August

7,

Rambo

stuff out,"

The Checkpoint

one

Regiment of the

ons search in the Tunis

district

residents, troops blocked the

1st

their col-

officer said.

in al-Slaikh

2003, soldiers from the Alpha

ion, 3rd Field Artillery

shown by

Company, 2nd

Armored Division conducted

a

Battal-

weap-

of Baghdad's al-Slaikh neighborhood. According to

main

street at

two points with armored

vehicles as

went through homes and shops. One checkpoint was established on the

soldiers

corner of Bilal Habashi Street and Street

Around 9:15

5.

p.m., a transformer blew

electricity in the

on one of the

immediate area was out, although

electrical poles nearby.

it is

The

not clear whether this was

because of the blown transformer or whether the lights had been out before the ex-

Two cars drove down Bilal Habashi Street, apparently unaware of the checkpoint. The first car with three young men approached the checkpoint at a high speed,

plosion.

music blaring. Soldiers yelled
said,

at the driver to stop

and

fired

warning shots, a witness

but when the car passed the checkpoint, the soldiers opened
v

v

vived but the driver, Saif Ra'ad Ali Sa id

v

al-

Azawi, was

killed.

fire.

Two men sur-

Behind him, a car

members of the al-Kawwaz family was fired upon without warning before
reached the checkpoint. The father and three children were killed. 5

with six
it

Car One: The
As US

soldiers

9:00 p.m.
to

Killing of Saif Ra^ ad

—

'

AH Sa^id al- ^Azawi, 20

were searching homes and shops
v

Saif

Ra ad

v

station

wagon.

Juburi,

—around

A student at the industrial high school, Saif

was excited by successful exam grades he had

up two

neighborhood

Ali Sa id al- Azawi, age 20, asked his father for permission

borrow his blue Opel

Saif picked

in the

v

friends,

and drove off to

"Abbas Shihab

visit a

third friend
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just received. 6 His father agreed so

Ahmad al-Amary and
named Ahmad.

v

Ali

Hussain

al-

Fred Abrahams

young men were driving home around
9:30 with the music playing loud. "The district had electricity but before we arrived
7
at the top of the side street which takes us home there was a dark area," he said.
A resident of the neighborhood who lives and works near the corner of Bilal
Habashi Street and Street 5 had a better view from the front of his tire repair shop.
According to "Abbas

al- Amary,

the three

Ahmad Abd al-Samad Fatuhi said that Saif s car was moving fast and the music was
loud. The soldiers warned him to stop, he said, but he did not slow down. He told
Human Rights Watch:
was cut off and the interior light of Saif s car
was turned on, which prevented him from seeing outside clearly. He was accompanied
by two other passengers, it seems that they were his friends. The Americans gave Saif a
warning to stop the car by one of the African- American soldiers who yelled "Stop!
Stop!" but Saif did not stop the car because I think he was afraid of hijackers. As I
mentioned earlier, the area was dark and without electricity. After that, one of the
American soldiers started to shoot warning shots at the ground, but Saif did not stop
the car and he penetrated the American checkpoint. The result of this action was an
immediate shooting at Saif s car, which led to Saif s death and to the injury of his two
At that time, the

friends.

electricity in the district

8

This account was confirmed by another resident,
Bayati, interviewed separately.

He

v

Muhammad

N

Sa d Adil

al-

said:

saw Saif s car driving very fast. He was accompanied by two other people in the car.
The person in the backseat had his head out the sun roof, the inside lights were on and
the stereo was playing loudly. I shouted at him loudly: "Saif stop! There is a checkpoint
there! There is an American checkpoint ahead!" but he did not hear me because he was
driving very fast. I shouted at him, "the Americans will shoot you
there is an
9
American checkpoint!" but he did not stop.
I

—

v

The passenger, Abbas

al- Amary,

said that

none of the men

in the car

any signs to indicate a checkpoint or any soldiers asking them to
understood they were

at a

checkpoint, he said, they had

had seen

stop. Before they

come under

fire

from US

troops:

Suddenly Saif s car was
family below]

I

fired

on and another

car

which was behind us

the back seat of the car because

when

the shooting started

I

shooting was full-automatic and the source of the gunfire was
guns.

It

continued for several minutes. After

face because

[see

could not see where the shooting was coming from.

he was on the

side,

and

his face
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it

stopped,

I

I

al-Kawwaz

was

sitting in

lowered my head. The
more than two machine

raised

my head,

was opposite me. As

I

said,

I

I

saw Saif s
was in the
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middle of the back

seat.

started shouting

I

and so did our friend

pAli] but Saif did not

We realized he had passed away. 10

reply.

On the side of the street, Muhammad Sad
in the right leg, suggesting that the

Adil al-Bayati was also hit by a bullet

shooting was not targeted exclusively on Saif s

He was hiding behind a parked car, he said, but was shot when he tried to crawl

car.

home. 11
According to both the passenger al-Amary and the witness Fatuhi,

approached Saif s car and pulled the two surviving

and Saif s body was

inside,

men

but no one tried to put the

from the wreck. Al-Amary explained what happened
They came to the

car

and opened the

front

out.

The

car

US

was burning

out or to take the body

fire

next:

and the back doors of the

right side, pointing

guns to our heads. They took us out of the car and told us through an interpreter

and

up. Ali

"Shut up,
lay

it's

I

nothing to do with you." After they removed us from the

place ten to fifteen meters

While they took

They

away from the

car

where the American

—

me there saw the front of Saif s car burning
I

Saif in the car while

Abbas al-Amary and

we were

lying

on

they

made us

car,

girl

vehicles

were parked.

the engine was burning.

but the interpreter did not reply.

the ground. 12

his friend Ali al-Juburi

wounded man and young

car,

the ground. After five minutes, they took us to another

asked the interpreter to take Saif from the

I

left

to shut

begged the interpreter to take Saif from the car but the interpreter said

down on our stomachs on

Again

soldiers

were eventually put

from the other car joined them, and

in a truck.
all

A

four were

The man and girl, both from the al-Kawwaz family,
were taken to another room, and "Abbas and Ali soon learned that they had died.
While all this was happening, Saif s father had no idea his son had been killed.
Around 9:30 p.m., when he returned home from evening prayers, he went looking
for Saif. Neighbors told him that US troops had killed several people in cars and
taken to a

that

US

one of the

military base.

cars

was burning. He told

was horrified and rushed
car was completely burnt
I

contains the car's spare parts.

They

killed

v

I

an honest, peaceful

Ali al-Jaburi

Rights Watch:

found the car there with no American troops. The
nothing could identify it except a small iron box, which

to see.

—

Human

I

knew the car was ours and
young man who wanted to

Saif s corpse was charcoal.
live in peace.

and Abbas al-Amary were held and interrogated

13

for

two days

at

They received medical treatment for their light wounds. In
total, they were held for more than one month, first at a center near the Shaab
Stadium, then at the airport, and finally at a juvenile facility in al-Salihiyya before
the base,

Abbas

said.

206

Fred Abrahams

at the

Amary, the judge

were

al-Adhamiyya

being released by a judge

Car Two: The

said they

K

K

According to Abbas

go because no charges had been

filed.

'

19,

al-

'

Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 42, Haidar Adil Abd
^Ula ^Adil Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 17, and Mirvat

Killing of Adil

al-Karim al-Kawwaz,

free to

court.

^

"

Adil ^Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 8
v

Around 9:20 p.m. on the same evening, August 7, Adil Abd al-Karim alKawwaz began the short drive home from his in-laws' house. His pregnant wife,
Anwar Kadhim Jawad, was in the front seat and their four children sat in the back.
By 9:30, Adil and three of his children were dead.
Anwar Jawad told Human Rights Watch what happened:
The Americans were stopping

There were no

cars.

the Americans began to shoot. Their cars
car

had

signs.

We came close to them and

lights on.

There were two tanks. Our

We were 100 meters away. heard nothing first—we were
My husband was shouting but they were shooting
saw the

lights on.

its

had no

I

astonished by the shots.
bullets flying.

get hit

on the

It

According to
shooting,

US

was the

left.

I

first

Ahmad

soldiers

had seen someone

I

get shot

and

I

saw

who

Fatuhi, the neighborhood resident

opened

were dimmed," he

lights

time

my husband

14

on the

car without warning.

"The Americans opened fire on

said.

warning or signal to stop the

fire

car,

Haidar Adil al-Kawwaz, age

witnessed the

"The

car's front

that car without

any

and they killed four members of one family." 15

19,

and Ula Adil al-Kawwaz, age

17,

were

killed

Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, age 42, and his daughter
Mirvat Adil al-Kawwaz, age 8, were badly wounded but still alive. US soldiers took
instantly.

Their father Adil

them from

the car and brought

them to

a military base in a truck, together with the

two survivors from the first car, "Abbas al-Amary and
Mirvat died, either there or perhaps

at a hospital

Ali al- Juburi.

Both Adil and

where they were taken that

night.

A Human Rights Watch researcher inspected the al-Kawwaz family car on September

26, 2003, a 1984 white

on the

holes

front

and

Volkswagen

left side,

Passat.

The

car

had twenty-eight

bullet

including four in the front windshield.

Anwar Jawad, who gave birth to a baby boy named Hassan one week after the incident,

was summoned

she thought were

to visit the

named Colonel William Rabena and Colonel

fered her $1 1,000.

16

diers
1st

Peter Mansoor, of-

A document she signed said she received the money "as an

pression of sympathy." 17

US

US military on September 24. Two officers, who

The family

is

ex-

requesting formal compensation as well.

military authorities conducted an investigation to determine whether sol-

from the Alpha Company, 2nd

Armored Division had

Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery

Regiment of the

acted inappropriately by shooting at the two cars.
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According to the military coalition's public

US

military's efforts in Iraq, the shootings

dent," but

it

was determined that the

rules of engagement."

Kawwaz

car,

US Army judge

Combined Joint Task Force 7, then the organisation running

advocates assigned to
the

affairs office, as well as

18

It is

which was

unclear

were considered

had "acted

soldiers

in

how this was determined

a "regrettable inci-

accordance with the
in the case of the al-

upon without warning.

fired

Training and Transition from Combat
In late 2003, a

fundamental problem

Baghdad was

in

asked to perform law enforcement and policing tasks
quately trained or attitudinally prepared.

Of the

combat troops were
for which they were not adethat

documented

cases

Minds, for instance, eight Baghdad incidents resulting in sixteen
volved either the 82nd Airborne Division or the
soldiers

1st

in Hearts

and

civilian deaths in-

Armored Division. Many of the

from these divisions had fought their way into

Iraq,

and were then asked

to

switch quickly from warriors to police who controlled crowds, pursued thieves and

rooted out insurgents. According to soldiers and commanders, there was inadequate training and equipment for these Stability and Support Operations (SASO)

and an inadequate supply of Arabic

interpreters.

The problem was explained in detail by an unnamed US
an After Action Report
hours

filed April 24,

after the first battlefield

Members of

this

infantry

commander in

2003, since declassified. "After

engagement," the commander

company team were

less

than 48

said:

tasked to conduct checkpoint operations

southwest of al-Najaf. With no training, soldiers were expected to search vehicles,
interact

with civilians with no

Operations]

support, detain

weapons. Less than 48 hours

CA

[Civil

EPW's [Enemy

Affairs]

or

PSYOPS

was again heavily engaged in combat
change from combat operations to SASO and back to

after this, the unit

operations. The radical and
combat operations over and over again causes many points of friction
and their leaders. 19
swift

With the exception of a
classes or training

diers received

[Psychological

Prisoners of War], and confiscate

class given to the

for the soldiers

platoon leaders, there were no formal

conducted by Civil Affairs personnel prior to the operation. Sol-

no training on checkpoint operations or

The commander

also

interacting with civilians.

noted that the unit's limited supply of construction and

barrier materials for checkpoints

was exhausted by the time they had reached

Baghdad. Soldiers had to use "destroyed

cars, flower pots, bicycle racks,

ever else was available for force protection." 20 Interpreters, he wrote:
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[W]ere not available to the company team

at

any point during the operation. These

interpreters are critical to the team's ability to interact with civilians, discern their

problems, and broadcast friendly unit intentions. Often times the unit had crowds and
upset civilians to deal with and absolutely no

them.

way

to verbally

communicate with

21

The report emphasized the "fundamental shift in attitude" demanded of the
troops as they shifted from combat to law enforcement tasks:
from killing the enemy to protecting and
The constant shift in mental posture greatly
complicates things for the average soldier. The soldiers are blurred and confused about
the rules of engagement, which continues to raise questions, and issues about force
protection while at checkpoints and conducting patrols. How does the soldier know
exactly what the rule of engagement is? Soldiers who have just conducted combat

The

have been asked
and back to killing

soldiers

interacting,

to go

again.

against dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes have difficulty trusting dark

skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes.

Other

officers reflected the

above concerns. In an interview published on a

US

Army-related website, a second lieutenant from the 82nd Airborne Division described the complications of Iraq's post-war scene:

was easy compared to this post-war
environment where we are still taking casualties daily. Understanding why one village
waves and blows kisses at you while the next one down the road sets up ambushes and
IEDs is not as easy as friendly/enemy, don't kill/kill. We are ambassadors with our
thumbs on the selector lever and always scanning for a set-up. It's so hard to help and
Pulling the trigger against groups of fedayeen

interact with a people

when you trust no

need to be hot/cold, on/off,
very challenging.

An

article

at

is

22

from the August

based in Iraq described
cause the tasks in Iraq

combat exercises

one. Getting your soldiers to understand the

war/at peace with only milliseconds between the two

for

10, 2003, newsletter

how platoon

—

leaders were adapting

patrols, raids

which they had

of the

and checkpoints

1st

Armored Division

urban operations be-

—were

different

trained. " [I]n Iraq, civilians are

from the

not merely an

occasional presence, as urban terrain training often depicts civilians," the author

wrote, "instead, interactions with civilians often comprise the entire mission." 23

"Our mentality as soldiers is combat," said Lieutenant Lucas Hale, who was trying to modify urban combat techniques (Military Operations in Urban Terrain, or
MOUT) in the field. "We don't deal with civilians well as a whole. But in Iraq, you
have to understand that 99 percent of the people [we encounter] are simple people

who just want

to get

on with

their lives." 24

209

Current Issues in Occupation Law: 2003 Civilian Deaths in Baghdad

US
Watch
not

all

CPA

judge advocates and
in the fall

who spoke

legal officials

Human

with

Rights

of 2003 were sympathetic to these concerns, and they agreed that

combat troops had received adequate training for post-war tasks.

Special in-

Armored Division, they said. "They must
come to terms with this kind of environment," Australian Colonel Mike Kelly said,
structors were brought in to assist the 1st

"Policing requires a different

skill set."

25

US Marines performed better in the
role because they were "quicker to adapt." And Military Police were

According to the judge advocates, the
peacekeeping

better trained for

crowd

control, checkpoints

general, they said, the biggest

environment and the high
later fighting in Falluja

problems were

level

in

and other peacekeeping

Baghdad due

tasks. In

urban

to the intense

of armed resistance. Clearly this was before the

and Najaf and the insurgency's development

in central

and

western Iraq.

Accountability

Coalition forces in Iraq are not subject to Iraqi law. According to Coalition Provi-

Number

sional Authority Regulation
local criminal, civil

17, coalition

personnel are

"immune from

and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or

detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent states." 26

Given the absence of Iraqi
it is

gate

legal structures to

hold coalition forces accountable,

incumbent on the occupying powers of the participating countries
all

allegations of abuse,

and

to punish those

found to have violated domestic

military codes, international humanitarian law, or

the laws of war

and non-derogable human

to investi-

human

rights standards.

Both

rights standards require the investiga-

tion of suspicious or apparently unlawful killings, even during times of

armed

conflict.

In 2003, the United States military did not

fulfill

that obligation.

The

lack of

timely and thorough investigations into questionable incidents created an atmo-

sphere of impunity, in which soldiers

felt

they could pull the trigger without com-

ing under review.
Specifically, as

there were

of October

1,

no known criminal

or disproportionate force by

when Human

Rights

Watch completed its research,

investigations into cases of alleged use of excessive

US

soldiers in Iraq.

The US

military said

pleted five administrative investigations above the division level,
the authority of the

Deputy Commanding General

all

it

had com-

of them under

in Iraq, but the findings of these

investigations raised serious concerns. In four of the five investigations, soldiers

were found to have operated within the rules of engagement. In the
licopter pilot

and

his

commander

fifth case, a

faced disciplinary action for trying to tear
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a

Shia banner

in

Sadr City in Baghdad, an incident that provoked a violent clash

with demonstrators on August

13.

Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation into two of the five cases,
and found evidence
shooting a person
also

had used excessive

to suggest that soldiers

who had

hands

his

in the air

many questionable civilian deaths

for

and beating

force, including

a detainee.

There are

which no investigation had taken

place.

The most notable example is the killing of up to twenty people by the 82nd Airborne Division in Falluja on April 28 and 30, documented in a June 2003 Human
Rights Watch report, Violent Response: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja. 27
Iraqis rarely

knew

the unit of soldiers responsible for inflicting casualties.

Through its own research or media reports, however, Human Rights Watch

identi-

fied at least the military division, if not the specific unit, in eight incidents involving

Of these,

sixteen civilian deaths.

which seven

incidents in

the

civilians

82nd Airborne Division was involved

were killed and the

1st

volved in four incidents in which nine civilians were
killed in

in four

Armored Division was inFour

killed.

civilians

were

an operation by Task Force 20, a combined CIA- Army special forces team

established to capture Iraq's former rulers, but

it is

not clear

if

they were responsi-

ble for the shooting.

The following is
the specific

US

a

list

of civilian casualties in Baghdad in the year 2003 for which

military unit

is

known:

82nd Airborne Division

Mardan Muhammad Hassan and Farah Fadhil al-Janabi on September 1 in
Mahmudiyya killed by soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry
•

Regiment. 28
•

Iraqi guards

v

Raad Fahd

Shallal,

Sa id Majid

x

v

Sadun and "Abbas Uday

v

"Abbas Aday killed on July 10 in the al-Bayya neighborhood. 29
•

Muhammad Subhi Hassan al-Qubaisi killed on June 26 in the Hay al- Jihad

neighborhood. 30
v

•

Dora

Uday Ahmad Mustafa killed on

Patrol Station.

1st
•

Ali

Muhsin,

killed

v

•

Lt. Ala' Ali Salih

Abu Ghraib road by
Brigade.
•

Armored Division

on August

and Sgt.

soldiers

1 1

by the

1st Battalion,

36th Infantry. 32

Muhammad Hilal Nahi, killed on August 9 on the

from the

1st Battalion, 41st

Infantry of the 3rd

33

Izhar

soldiers

July 10 behind the Baya'a Police Station/al-

31

Mahmud Ridha killed on August

from the 3rd Brigade. 34
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from

Soldiers

•

v

Regiment 35 shot and
a checkpoint. In a

Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery
Saif Ra ad Ali Sa id al- Azawi when he failed to stop at

Alpha
killed

second

v

v

v

Adil

car, soldiers killed

Abd al-Karim Abd al-Karim

v

al-Kawwaz and three of his children, Haidar, Ula and Mirvat. 36

Recommendations

US

some steps to reduce civilian deaths in
Iraq. Checkpoints became more clearly marked and combat troops received additional training for police tasks. Iraqi police and military were more frequently escorting US soldiers on raids, or conducting those raids themselves, and over the
Since late 2003, the

military has taken

past year the Iraqi security forces have

countability has apparently

But more

improved

initiatives are required.

assumed the burden of policing

after the

One

abuse scandal

basic step

is

at

Abu

Ac-

tasks.

Ghraib.

to continue improving the

language and cultural training to teach soldiers hand gestures used and understood

by

Iraqis

and

essential Arabic

words and phrases, which would minimize confu-

sion at checkpoints or during raids.

The US

military's rules of engagement are not

cerns, but Iraqi civilians

coalition should

mark

have a right to
all

made public due to security con-

know the guidelines

checkpoints

for safe behavior.

and inform

clearly, for instance,

through a public service campaign of how to approach checkpoints and
have during

US
tense

The

Iraqis

how to be-

raids.

soldiers

and other coalition

non-combat

forces should also be better trained to defuse

situations without resorting to lethal force. Lethal force should

be used only when necessary to meet an imminent threat to

life

and only in propor-

tion to the actual danger presented in conformity with international standards.

To properly perform post-conflict policing, US
of non-lethal crowd control devices

hance communication with

local

like tear gas

soldiers

need adequate supplies

and rubber

communities should be

bullets. Efforts to en-

intensified, starting with

adequate provision of interpreters.

When

civilian deaths

do occur, they should be documented and

investigated.

Military authorities should keep records, observe and analyze trends related to specific

units

and commanders,

as well as tactics, in order to

minimize

civilian

casualties.

Of central importance
appropriate or

illegal

are

prompt

investigations of and

for

all

in-

use of force, as required under international law. In 2003

US

soldiers operated with a large degree of impunity in Iraq.

be held accountable

punishment

will

Knowledge

that they will

be a helpful restraint on the excessive, indiscriminate, or

reckless use of lethal force.
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Notes
Between

1.

May

and September

1

more than 800 wounded. During
hostile injuries

among US

troops. See,

Bombing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.

and a Translator

in Iraq,

30, 2003,

1,

e.g.,

soldiers

were

killed in hostile deaths

and

were also 94 non-hostile deaths and 197 non-

Robert H. Reid, One U.S. Soldier Killed

2003, and Alex Berenson, Roadside

NEW YORK TIMES, Oct.

Human

US

88

that time, there

7,

Bombs

in Iraq

Kill 3 Soldiers

A 18.

2003, at

Watch from coalition press office on September 29, 2003.
Hearts and Minds: Post-war Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces,
E-mail sent to

2.
3.

Rights

Oct. 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraql003/.

Human Rights Watch used six sources to obtain data:

4.

Direct interviews with witnesses or

1 )

the family of victims accounted for twenty-one deaths; 2) Records from Iraqi police in

account for

fifty- four civilian

A

deaths; 3)

local

human

The

rights group,

Baghdad

Human

Rights

Organization in Iraq, reported thirty-three cases of civilian casualties in Baghdad; 4) Western

news media reported

fifteen civilian deaths,

but

Human

Rights

Watch included only

those

deaths reported with a victim's name; 5) Other non-governmental organizations reported six

US military press releases reported three civilians killed in two incidents, and
US Combined Joint Task Force 7 Judge Advocate General's office confirmed a fourth.

civilian deaths; 6)

the

Twenty-three deaths were reported by two or more sources, leaving a

Some media

5.

reported that on the same night

US

Salman, on a road nearby and, in an interview with

supported

this claim.

Human

Rights

Watch

total

of ninety- four.

Human

v

man, Ali Hikmat
Rights Watch, Salman's family

forces killed another

interview with Ali Salman's mother, Samira Sabri,

on interviews in the neighborhood, however, Human Rights
Salman probably died on the highway in a traffic accident unrelated to
US troops. See also Scheherezade Faramarzi, Jittery U.S. Soldiers Firing in the Dark Kill Six Iraqis
Trying to Get Home Before Curfew, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10, 2003, available at http://
Baghdad, Oct.

Watch

5,

2003. Based

believes that "Ali

www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20030810-1225-iraq-adeadlynight.html.
v

Human Rights Watch interview with Ra'ad Ali Saied al-Azawi, Baghdad, Sept. 26, 2003.
Human Rights Watch interview with "Abbas Shihab Ahmad al-Amary, Baghdad, Sept. 26,

6.
7.

2003.

Human

8.

Oct.

5,

Human

9.

Rights

Watch

interviews with

Rights

Watch

interview with

Ahmad Abdel Samad

Fatuhi, Baghdad, Sept. 29

and

2003.

Muhammad

N

v

Sa d Adil al-Bayati, Baghdad, Oct.

5,

2003.
10.

Interview with "Abbas Shihab

Ahmad al-Amary,

Muhammad Sa

s

d Adil

supra note

7.

11.

Interview with

12.

Id.

13.

Interview with Ra'ad Ali Saied al-Omran al-Azawi, supra note

14.

Human

15.

Interviews with

Rights

Watch

interview with

Ahmad Abdel Samad

al-Bayati, supra note 9.

6.

Anwar Khdim Jawad, Baghdad,
Fatuhi, supra note

Sept. 26, 2003.

8.

commander of the 1st Armored Division's 1st Brigade and
Lieutenant Colonel William S. Rabena was commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery.
17. The receipt, viewed by Human Rights Watch, calls the money a "Solatia payment from
CERP" and is from Captain Robert Brewer and ordered by Captain Casey D. Coyle.
18. Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Marc Warren, Colonel Mike Kelly, and Major
16.

P.

J.

19.

Colonel Peter Mansoor was

Perrone, Baghdad, Sept. 23, 2003.

Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review Comments, Apr. 24, 2003, available at http://

www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20030912.asp.
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20.

Id.

21.

Id

22.

Interview with Second Lieutenant

Andy Blickhahn 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd

Airborne Division, available afwww.companyteam.army.mil, as of October 2003.
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IX
Treatment and Interrogation
of Detained Persons

David E. Graham*

Media

reports of abuse of

enemy

prisoners of war

(EPW) and

Security

Detainees in Iraq, as well as other reports questioning certain interroga-

employed

tion techniques

to gain intelligence

from those

in the custody of the

United States have raised concerns regarding the adequacy of the guidance dealing
with such matters provided to U.S.
rent U.S.

Army personnel. This article addresses the cur-

Army regulatory and doctrinal guidance relevant to the treatment and in-

terrogation of

EPW and Security Detainees.

Before turning to this subject, however,

I

would like to briefly focus on an event

The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (LCS), in
Charlottesville, Virginia. In the summer of 2004, the LCS hosted its annual Noncommissioned Officer Conference, at which Army paralegals from around the

that occurred at

world gathered to discuss ongoing issues. One of the highlights of this conference is
always the presentation of an annual award to an outstanding junior paralegal. The

award winner,
graduate,

this year,

jump

had the looks of a recruitment poster

qualified. In fact,

* Colonel, JA,

US Army

(Ret.).

early 30s, a college

he was a Jump Master. As he accepted his award,

he expressed thanks to his colleagues, of course, and saluted

work that they had accomplished

—

—and then he

all

of the good legal

related this story.

While he was

in
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Iraq,

he had served as a Convoy Commander. In

well over 50 times.
as the vehicles

fact,

he had served

in this capacity

On one such occasion, the convoy became stalled in traffic and,

were

sitting at a

dead

halt, a

grenade was dropped from an overpass.

At that moment, every weapon in the convoy swung in that direction.

lowed next, he

fol-

made him exceptionally proud to be an American soldier serveven though every weapon had been pointed at the overpass, not a

said,

ing in Iraq. For,
single shot

What

was

fired.

Why not?

Because, he said, a target could not be identified.

The personnel in that convoy had complied with the Rules of Engagement. Not a
single round was fired. And, I would submit that such behavior is the norm
not

—

the exception.

Do

accidents occur? Are crimes committed? Are investigations conducted? Are

crimes prosecuted and defended equally aggressively? In each instance, the answer
is

yes. Yet, if one focuses

only on the negative, such as the abhorrent conduct

at

Abu

Ghraib, one loses sight of the fact that the overwhelming majority of U.S. personnel
serving in Iraq consistently

do the

right thing

—simply because

Mistakes are made, crimes are committed, investigations
overly extended period of time to complete. But, again,
tions taken
lated

by

by those servicemen

in that

I

now to

is

found

—

norm not the exception.
the subject at hand: the current Army regulatory and doctrinal

in several

Army publications.

EPW and

ery public international lawyer

would

agree.

are subject to either the Third or Fourth

Security De-

In terms of their application to the

situation in Iraq, each publication begins with a premise with

to

take an apparently

would submit that the ac-

guidance dealing with the treatment and interrogation of
tainees

the right thing.

convoy, on that particular day in Iraq, as re-

that junior enlisted soldier, represent the

Turning

may

it is

Almost

all

which

essentially ev-

individuals present in Iraq

Geneva Convention. Thus, with respect
1

EPW taken captive in Iraq, the process is a relatively simple one. If the individual

was a member of the

As such, he was

Iraqi

armed

to be afforded the

forces,

he was entitled to Prisoner of War

numerous

rights

and

Third Convention. In terms of the interrogation of

privileges accorded

EPW,

status.

by the

this, again, is a

very

straightforward matter. Article 17 provides:
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject,

surname,

first

number, or

No

names and

rank, date of birth,

is

bound

to give only his

and army, regimental, personal or

serial

failing this, equivalent information.

form of coercion, may be inflicted on
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of

physical or mental torture, nor any other

prisoners of war to
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war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Clearly, coercing

insulted, or

exposed to unpleasant or

EPW into divulging information is forbidden.

Although the Third Convention

is

clear

and unequivocal in

requirements for

its

humane treatment of EPW and the prohibition of coercive interrogations,
some have contended that the law is somewhat less certain with respect to Security
the

The

issue that

must be addressed

Detainees.

I

manner

which an individual might become

in

disagree.

first

in this regard

a Security Detainee in Iraq.

is

the

That

is,

how does an individual lose his status as a "protected person" under Article 4 of the
Fourth Convention 2

—

a status that carries with

it

a

broad range of protections and

The answer is found in the fact that Article 5 of the Fourth Convention
enables the Occupying Power to arrest and detain individuals who pose a security
threat. 3 Article 78, in turn, enables the Occupying Power to detain or to incarcerate
those arrested under the authority of Article 5. These individuals, then, are no lonsafeguards?

ger protected persons; they are, in fact, Security Detainees.

Again, there have been those
status as a protected person,

who have argued that once an

individual loses his

he essentially loses those protections accorded him

under the Fourth Convention. This, of course,

is

simply not true. Even with respect

to the interrogation of Security Detainees, Article 5 clearly indicates that such indi-

viduals

The

must be
U.S.

treated humanely.

Army provides

both regulatory and doctrinal guidance regarding the

treatment and interrogation of

been

criticized

by some

as

EPW

and Security Detainees. This guidance has

being unclear or that, given their "nuanced" nature, the

relevant regulatory provisions are subject to varying interpretations. Contrary to

such assertions, however,

it is

my view that there is simply no lack of clarity, no lack

of precision with respect to the relevant regulatory requirements.
1

90-8,

Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,

tainees,

4

addresses the treatment of both

Army Regulation

Civilian Internees

and Other De-

EPW and Security Detainees.

Paragraph

l-5(a)(l) provides:

All persons captured, detained, interned or otherwise held in U.S.

Armed

Forces

custody during the course of a conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment.

The inhumane treatment of EPW, civilian internees, and retained personnel
prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or by deep provocation.

is

Paragraph l-5(b) further notes:
All prisoners will receive

humane

religion, political opinion, sex

treatment without regard to race, nationality,

or other

criteria.
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acts are prohibited:
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murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory
deprivation, collective punishment, execution without
all

cruel

by proper authority, and

trial

and degrading punishment.

Additional guidance on the issue of the treatment of
tainees

is

found

and Security De-

Army Field Manual 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettle-

in

ment Operations?

Specifically,

paragraphs 5-1 and 5-2 state that physical torture or

moral coercion must not be used

connection with

in

They must be protected
reprisal, and sexual attack.

Detainees.
injury,

EPW

civilian internees

and Security

against violence, insult, public curiosity, bodily

The photos of abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib generated much of the initial attention focused on the treatment and interrogation of those individuals held by the
United

States,

and the

issue of interrogation, in particular, has continued to be a

matter of intense media scrutiny.
tion,

6

deals with both

Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interroga-

EPW and Security Detainees. This FM provides that "EPWs,

captured insurgents, civilian internees, other captured, detained or retained persons, foreign deserters, or other persons
tions."

7

It

.

.

.

are protected

by the Geneva Conven-

and U.S. policy expressly

further states that "the [Geneva Conventions]

prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture,

exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interro-

threats, insults or

gations.

Such

illegal acts

are not authorized

8

Army." Very importantly,

it

also goes

Intelligence Interrogation

gation techniques.

It

will

not be condoned by the U.S.

to say that violations of these prohibi-

under the Uniform Code of Military

tions are criminal acts, punishable

The

on

and

manual

Justice.

specifically addresses prohibited interro-

provides that "physical or mental torture or coercion revolve

around eliminating the source's
[Geneva Conventions]."

10

free will,

Torture

is

and

are expressly prohibited

by the

defined as "the infliction of intense pain to

body or mind to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure."
amples of physical torture cited

in the

for

'

Ex-

sit

or kneel in ab-

prolonged periods of time; food deprivation; and any form of

beating. Cited examples of mental torture include
sleep deprivation,

1

FM include: electric shock; infliction of pain

through chemicals or bondage; forcing an individual to stand,

normal positions

mock

executions, abnormal

and chemically induced psychosis. "Coercion"

actions designed to unlawfully induce another to

compel an

is

defined

as:

act against one's will ... to

include: threatening or implying physical or mental torture to the subject or to his

family or others; intentionally denying medical assistance or care in exchange for

information

9

or cooperation;

and,

finally,

guaranteed by the [Geneva Conventions]

will

forthcoming. 12
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is
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Questions have been raised as to whether the Intelligence Interrogation manual
accurately reflects both the domestic

United

States.

Operational

I

can assure you that

it

and international law obligations of the

does. Twelve years ago, the International

and

Law Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army

conducted an intense

review of

legal

spaced, legal opinion detailing the

FM

34-52 and produced a 12-page, single-

manner in which US legal obligations were to be

set forth in this publication.

Once again, I would submit that the
to the treatment
tainees,

can

is

and interrogation of

quite clear,

—and cannot—be

and

it

regulatory and doctrinal guidance relevant

EPW

and, very importantly, Security De-

should be well understood as to those actions that

taken. Equally clear

gages in proscribed activities, he or she

is

is

the fact that,

if

an interrogator en-

subject to prosecution

under the Uniform

Code of Military Justice. This is precisely what U.S. Army military intelligence personnel are taught. The Intelligence Collection manual, published in 1992, provides
carefully considered, thoughtful,

and lawful guidance, guidance

that has never

been modified.

Some have

suggested that, given the nature of the "Global

detainee interrogation techniques that obviously go well
in current

beyond those sanctioned

Army doctrine should be permitted. I would object to the use of such in-

terrogation
tion

War on Terrorism,"

methods

number of reasons.

for a

First,

once you cross that interroga-

Rubicon dictated by both international and domestic law, you immediately

subject individual service

members

to potential civil

and criminal

litigation.

I

am

unconvinced that any form of a "necessity defense" argument would protect these
individuals
in

from prosecution under either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or

an international forum. Second, instructing military intelligence personnel to

now

engage in questionable interrogation techniques would contravene 30 to 40

years of previous training. Third, as the Intelligence Collection

"Revelation of use of torture will bring discredit

manual observes,

upon the US and its armed

forces,

while undermining domestic and international support for the war effort." Finally,
there

is

Once

the matter of reciprocity.

beyond those always considered

to reflect accepted international

practices will almost automatically

rogation methods
all

deemed

of these reasons,

it is

the United States condones actions that go

become, in

suitable for use

critically

norms, these

my view, the benchmark for inter-

by both

State

and non-State

actors.

For

important that the United States continue to ad-

here to the humanitarian treatment standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions

and other relevant international agreements.
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Liberation and Occupation:

A Commander's Perspective

Fabio Mini*

One

of the main challenges for the

side his national territory

commander of a military operation out-

to deal with the international laws that should

is

apply to the operation and the constraints his

Such

limits

stem from

international image,

political aims,

own

nation

may impose upon him.

diplomatic convenience, economic interest,

media opportunity, budget

priorities, force structure

national law jurisdiction applicable to the area of operations. For the

of a multinational force the challenges are even greater because he
ditional constraints

is

coming from the international organization he

the international organizations he

is

and the

commander

subject to ad-

is

working

for,

working with and the national caveats each

contingent of his force brings with them. The legal constraints influence his auton-

omy and command

action during the conflict, but,

post-war operations

when he becomes

most importantly, they

—and often

the target of scrutiny

criticism.

While the military code of conduct and the customs of war are embedded
tary education

known and

in mili-

and can help guide the commander's action, the legal constraints af-

fecting war or peace support operations are

be

affect

sometimes ambiguous. The latter must

studied, with the support of legal advisors, but, unfortunately, they

are largely neglected in military education

Lieutenant General, Italian Army.

and during the

specific

pre-deployment

Liberation

training. In

many

and Occupation: A Commander's Perspective

the formal program, but then they are skipped because there

important" to do or they are
litany of what

left in

is

the hands of boring lawyers that simply

list

the

you cannot do.

In particular, in

teaches

them only in
something "more

countries, the military education systems include

how to

many Western war

no one

colleges or military academies

handle a post-war situation. Strategy and

tactics refer

only to com-

Management deals only with our own military organization and
A little bit of management is devoted to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC),

bat situations.
units.

but because of the emphasis given to peace support operations rather than to post-

war management, CIMIC

perceived

is

more

as a

candy bar distribution

initiative

than a military methodology to control the post-war situation. Military control
over

civil institutions is a

nation and

blasphemy

army pretends

for democratic armies

and nowadays every

am

remember the
"Tomorrow the dis-

to be democratic.

warning posters of the occupying powers
tribution of food will be suspended"

after

I

old enough to

World War

II:

and "Public gathering

is

prohibited. Of-

fenders will be arrested," signed Captain Charlie or Kurt or Martini.

Nowadays

captains are not even given the authority to ask questions and the generals

questions are not entitled to any answers.

planned for military control over
surgency.

I

remember

I

also

who ask

belong to the generation that

civilian administrations in case

of internal in-

the plans to replace civil authorities, to exercise censor-

ship, limit individual liberties

and so on. Those times

are

gone and, we

all

hope,

for good.

Our democratic system

is

strong and the military does not have to plan for the

assumption of power. However, while war
in the

West have avoided and,

the last ten years

than war"

at the

is still

very

much

present and

same time, subverted the

alive,

idea of war.

we

During

we have avoided the reality of war. We invented operations "other

— humanitarian

intervention, international police operations, peace

support operations, with their aggregate of peacekeeping, peace enforcing, peace

making, and so on.

word "war" or
world,

e.g.,

We

to soften

invented hundreds of expressions in order to avoid the
its

meaning. In the United States and other parts of the

China, there was the opposite phenomenon. The same word was largely

abused and everything became a "war," including market competition, family

The result was again an illusion because when war
resumed in its traditional form as confrontation and violence, often asymmetric
and non-linear, many people did not recognize it. War on terror in many countries
is still considered to be the equivalent of the war on inflation, or the war on corrupquarrels

and

tion, or the

social endeavors.

war on drugs.

The "Global War on Terror" and its many forms suggest a vision of Star Wars,
with the Empire striking back and Luke Skywalker saving the Galaxy or similar
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fantasies, instead

of inspiring the idea of a worldwide disaster. This substantial

elusion has also disrupted our awareness about wartime responsibility; the conse-

quence has been the separation of military operations from pre- and post-conflict

management. Contrary
fifty

to

to

what was taught

years ago, the armies of the democratic

combat operations. They

to junior officers at military schools

West today are told to

limit themselves

are taught to deal with "army-like" threats

and leave

"internal" security problems to the civil authorities responsible for law enforce-

ment.

I

have seen national caveats forbidding the employment of soldiers to quell

public unrest. Subsequently,
the soldiers did not

when they were caught in the middle of civil disorder,

know how to

respond. There are

many NATO

nations that do

not agree with the use of their soldiers in anti-crime, anti-extremism or even antiterrorism roles.

We all have seen our officers and professional soldiers witnessing,

without taking action, the looting of national museums, public and private property,

or ethnic minority assets; saying that they are not policemen.

The separation between
the security situation

is

military

stabilized

and

and

civil

powers

necessary, but not before

is

democratic and effective institutions, a

real

functioning judicial system and reliable law enforcement resources are in place.

Whoever rushes in to

declare the

end of military operations (or even the end of the

war) and transfers the responsibilities for public order to immature local authorities

or to inefficient international organizations or to puppet governments

is

not

responding to security and reconstruction requirements, but only to nearsighted

and narrow-minded

political interests.

ates civil -military disconnects

Such

a rush

is

conducive to

and increases risks for the

instability, cre-

forces in the area of opera-

The fact of the matter is that modern military operations do not end with the
cessation of combat. Victory is no longer defined just by successful military operations, if it ever was. The aims of modern operations are purely political and this is
true down to the platoon level and lower. Therefore, until the political aims are
tions.

achieved, victory cannot be declared.

Furthermore, the occupation of a foreign territory
tion but the beginning of another phase of the

is

not the end of an opera-

same effort. Modern wars and oper-

ations are not undertaken to acquire territory or sovereignty. In particular, the

annexation of a territory is no longer the aim of the modern Western democracies

which tend,
tries

be.

1

instead, to respect the integrity

no matter how mean

Modern

their political

operations are undertaken

and the sovereignty of foreign coun-

regime and their social behavior might

more

to further ideals

and

interests than

for territorial acquisitions, even if that territory has valuable resources or can be-

come

a profitable marketplace. Therefore, the military have specific responsibili-

ties that

cannot be ignored by simply declaring the end of combat. This

especially the case in the absence of a safe

and secure environment
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Liberation

a declaration or if the

We

same "victorious"

cannot say that we have

won

forces are continuously suffering attacks.

the battle in the field against the opposition

forces while the civil authorities have lost the battle to create a basis for democrati-

development and

zation, peace, reconstruction,
lost

our

enhancement.

We all have

common war.

Unfortunately this

and

social

civilian responsibilities

or, at least, leads to

money, time,

and

is

a critical factor in the failure of

military

modern operations

lengthy and inconclusive operations, delays, and a waste of

and human

effort

tary objectives with

and hasty separation between supposedly

artificial

little

lives. It

leads the military to concentrate

on

mili-

concern for post-war problems related to possible side

ef-

meantime it gives the civilian
authorities an alibi for their failure in reconstruction. They can put the blame on
the military and use extensive war damage, the lack of internal stability and even
popular unrest stemming from economic difficulties as an excuse. From the military standpoint, and under the influence of this civil-military "separation," the opfects

so-called "collateral damage." In the

erations tend to be planned
•

and executed

to:

Achieve absolute military supremacy even when

there are

no symmetric

supremacy. There

manage. Terror

and because
political class

is
is

it

is

threats that can challenge the

it is

not necessary. Today

US and Western

military

not a lack of military power to cope, but an excess of power to

achieving

some

results only

because

it is

not a military threat

completely asymmetric. In addition, terror directly affects a

and an international leadership

largely unfit

and untrained

to

cope

with this problem.
•

Make no

distinction

between combatants and noncombatants. 2

If

war

is

no

mistakenly considered a "police operation" or a "humanitarian effort" there

is

enemy but only

from

a "criminal."

However, dealing with

dealing with a "just enemy." Here begins the

While avoiding the idea of war and eluding
training, ethics

and procedures

related to

Our armies
But many situations

old fashion, destructive war.
forces.

And rightly so.

different

many

different

—

the military forces

a classic, traditional,

are completely different

to

when

still

have

symmetric,

from police

cope with

military units attempt to change their ethics

conduct. Unfortunately,

times.

that militaries have to face are not that

from international law enforcement. In order

ambiguity,

is

main contradiction of our

its reality,

war

a criminal

this

and code of

the ethics of war change, the applicable rule of law

changes as well and often with undesirable consequences. The majority of our

know how to deal with the enemy, a traditional combatant, but do not
know how to deal with criminals. So we tend to abuse the terms "criminal" or
soldiers

"terrorist" in order to

enhance the aggressive behavior and determination of our
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but

soldiers,

enemy

same time

at the

this

lowers our ethical threshold.

unclear, "criminal" can

is

become

a potential

If the definition

enemy, even

of

if legally

belonging to the category of noncombatant.
•

Destroy

infrastructure

all

communications, government
infrastructure

is

bridges,

plants,

concern for safeguarding

little

needed by the country to recover quickly. Some

infrastructure

essential

with

facilities)

power

roads,

(factories,

safeguarded but only

if

useful to the subsequent military

occupation. This generally creates the impression that the "real aims of the war"
are other than humanitarian undertaken in the pursuit of international justice.
•

Selectively

overthrow rogue regimes and dictators. There are many dictators

and rogue regimes that do not "benefit" from our military

some of them

benefit

attention. Instead,

from our protection, while the current "bad guys" have,

—

times, conveniently been our best allies

all

at

of them. This also gives an erroneous

perception of the aims of war.
•

Carry on preventive operations in the sense that they come

prevent

crises, losses

war

but do not

or damages. In our Western terminology, "prevention" has

A

war

to prevent another

not perceived as true prevention.

It is

an "anticipation" of

assumed the meaning of
similar or worse

first

is

an event whose necessity

crisis

is

and war avoidance.

not yet defined or proven

—

a scenario.

Our

societies,

following a legalistic approach, do not accept war as a preventive measure and the
use of force can be gradually applied only if balanced against a threat that

immanent and imminent. Scenarios

are not threats

solutions
•

is

not evidence. This

set

and adds suspicion about the

legalistic

outcome of

a

state."

approach,

of perceptions further limits possible
legality

of the military use of force.

Carry on operations in the complete absence of an achievable

economical "end

visible,

and worst-case scenarios

cannot lead international policy as a matter of routine. In our
intelligence

is

Here "achievable"

refers to a result

political

planned

as

and
an

pre-determined period of time and clearly allocated resources

(including those for security). While democratization, liberty, rule of law, and

good ideas and ideals, in areas where peoples have lived through
hardship and economic or ideological slavery for centuries, they are not political
reconciliation are

end

states "achievable"

intervention. That
•

the

is

through a defined and predetermined foreign military

why many military operations appear

Show force and pursue humiliation both
enemy is a "criminal," the ethics of combat

tool to exercise superiority.

confine

it

to the

enemy.

When

It is

endless and useless.

of the antagonist and the
suffer

and humiliation becomes a

humiliation becomes a tool,

also easily applied to allies

Refusing an offer of help because "this operation
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"bound to

secrecy"

perceived as a humiliation by

is

many allies.

Not sharing essential intelligence, abuse of the "blue eyes only" criteria and
sharing uneven responsibilities can become a humiliation in the event of difficult
missions and indefinite

risk.

On the other hand, the transitional civil administrations
tional or national

and

(either

under interna-

local control) that are so eager to intervene after the military

operations, tend to:

Apply the same

•

society.

map"

set

of measures to

The drawers of the

or one

list

all

and

situations

international planners

seem

to every kind of local

to contain only

one "road

of "benchmarks" or a single "eight-point plan," and these are

used indifferently for East Timor, Kosovo, Palestine or Iraq. Hundreds of

sums of money for their consultancy and then
the output is the same plan over and over, often repeating the same mistakes and
making some new ones because differences of social, cultural and economic
international experts are paid huge

environment are not taken into account.
Establish a

•

existing culture

on the

Western -style democracy regardless of its compatibility with the

and development needs. Western-style democracy, which

ideals of liberty

and freedom of expression of the

product of two bloody and lengthy
revolutions. In both cases,

democracy, and
continuous

it

will

is

of the people,

based
is

the

American and the French

conflicts: the

took hundreds of years to attain the

full

benefits of

now this model, which is far from perfect and which requires the

checks

and balances provided by the

different

branches

of

elections,

is

imposed on

populations that neither understand the system nor really want

it.

Additionally,

government and the ultimate control of periodic

main

the

corollary of modern democracy, "the market democracy," has, in

cases, a devastating effect
•

on immature, archaic or former

the existing network of institutions

glue surviving after the war.
to get there.

legal

and

illegal

structures
reality,
•

socialist societies.

Dissolve existing social institutions (welfare, health care, wages, local

councils, family systems, etc.) with

do

many

no acceptable or efficient alternatives. Often
and set of customs is the only organizational

The people know where

They know what belongs
according to their

own

to

whom

the hospitals are and what to

and why. They know what

old set of rules.

and age old points of reference

is

The rapid change of social

gives the impression,

and sometimes the

of anarchy.

Divide

et

impera (divide and

rule).

This principal

is

often applied

when there

are ethnic or religious differences within a society. Additionally, these differences

when they exist among other States in the region. The result is that
crisis stemmed from religious or social hatred, coexistence between

are exploited

where the
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becomes impossible. In the meantime the basic
unified under the control of foreign powers and they

diverse ethnic or religious groups
social infrastructures are

soon prove
•

ineffective.

Change standards

standards of living, social relations) and

(legal system,

disband existing organizations (army, police,
•

Impose an ambiguous

culture.

judicial).

rule of law often based

on

alien

law methodology and

For example, the Balkans used to have a mixed system of

socialist

and

Roman law. The new international administration introduced many English
common law-based regulations that were often perceived as unfair and frequently
incomprehensible to local judges, lawyers and the people.
•

Concentrate on aid and emergency assistance but not on sustainable

development.
Lessons Learned

All the operations so far

conducted by the international community,

if seen

as inte-

grated efforts including pre-war, war and post-war phases, have demonstrated that

they can

fail,

not because of military blunders or lack of power, but because

Dimensional Disconnect. The preparation and conduct of the war
the post-war

management

is

local;

of:

global while

is

or vice versa (unilateral war and multilateral

post-war management). All operations since the 1991 Gulf War have required a
global engagement. All nations have been asked to unite in the effort of

war and

subsequently for peace support operations. However, immediately after the fighting, all solutions

of the crises have looked for divisions

The new imperatives have been
ing, regional security actors

—

the

Dayton syndrome.

divide, separate, cantonize, decentralize. In so do-

have been neglected or seen as part of the problem but

not part of the solution. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the trend of war was the opposite,

but the multilateral post-war effort

still

does not include the regional forces and

their responsibilities.

Elusion and Illusion. In this post-Cold
the use of military arms
are

is

good and we produce

humanitarian;

we do not wage war, we ensure peace. We

a "success story" every day. This irenic

the concept of war and produces

many

War era, we have developed the belief that

military organizations

many illusions that are present

approach eludes

in the

behavior of

and administrators. Their claims of successes are so

evanescent and groundless that trusting them becomes a real
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Oversimplifications. Politics seems to have lost the sense of complexity

ways had and that made
plexity

and elaborating

management a real art. Instead of understanding comnew approaches to the problems, our political system has

Democracy means

and often oversimplification. For example:

elections

organizations

international

—the sooner the
devoted

are

to

this

better.

Huge and powerful

mantra and rush

populations that have never had a democratic system into elections. But
the candidates?

How

the

are

and

rights

protected? During the crises, whoever gets in

guns or the protection of foreign
legalizing the

al-

its

resorted to simplifications
•

has

it

forces. In

fair

entire

who

are

representation of minorities

power normally has the support of
both cases the "free" elections

change of power and strengthening the power of unknown

risk

entities

or individuals.

Freedom means free markets. Free market means free competition; but what

•

about local economies that cannot compete? Local resources

chance to grow independently. In

from

will benefit

are

a

many instances,

local

never have the

will

and international mafias

market where everything has to be imported and where there

weak governments or

collusive forces facilitating the evasion of taxes

and

controls.
•

Free

economy means

monetary authorities take
what?

is

a unified currency.

The

first

step international

But converting

to establish a convertible currency.

Coming from where? Acquired through what? What about money

laundering?

The managers of after- war periods tend to assume that the basics of the
society hit by a crisis have not changed during the war. This is not only an
•

oversimplification; nothing
particular

it

is

less true.

War

changes almost everything, but in

changes the people. Before, during and after the war entire

generations are lost because of the killed and missing in action, the wounded, the

massacres and reprisals on

mothers are

lost.

civilians.

Generations of "could be" fathers and

But during these periods, generations are also

educational opportunities during the war. This

lost

deprived of

compounds the inadequacy of the

education they received from the previous regimes, and the ideological,

racial,

ethnic biases of their upbringing, biases reinforced by the vicious cycle of violence.

We in the West tend to face the problems only when violence erupts. But in
almost all instances
is already too late. We started dealing with East Timor in
•

it

1999, but the crisis started in 1975.

The most dramatic genocide

in the

world

(in

terms of the percentage of the existing population) was perpetrated during that
period and nobody seemed to care. Everybody

1980 would

start the dissolution

knew that Marshall

Tito's death in

process of Yugoslavia, but from 1980 to 1992 no
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one seemed to
1999, but the

care.

NATO brought war to Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in

problem had started ten years before,

in 1989,

when

Milosevic raised

his nationalistic stance against the province. In those ten years, the Serbs

away the autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed

took

and the Albanian ethnic

since 1948,

groups were forced out of the government and denied an adequate education;
finally resorting to

open violence.

takes a lifetime to shape a
life.

A Catholic priest in Kosovo once said to me: "it

man and

All these kids that tasted the

24 hours with a gun in the hands to spoil his

power of violence

never be the same."

will

those children that lived in constant contact with war

And

unexploded

relics,

ordnance, landmines and under the protection of foreign military forces will
never be the same. Generations that are supposed to reshape the future of the

country are simply non-existent or wholly unprepared for the
international observer noted in Western Africa,

more

violent than the fathers." This

Balkans,

Afghanistan,

is

"The sons are

An

educated and

less

an equally unfortunate truism

Timor, Somalia, Rwanda, Palestine,

East

task.

in the

Iraq,

and

elsewhere visited by the violence of war. These are historical defeats for our society

because the "fathers" were raised through colonialism,

and fundamentalism

—

all

manifestations of the "evil"

communism, extremism
from which we liberated

them. The international community tends to replace every loss with temporary
foreign

manpower and in so doing they perpetuate the delay in recovering the lost

generations. Finally, within these societies, there are also lost expectations, lost

hopes, and lost ideals, and these losses aggravate the recovery plan.
•

Reconstruction by the few. In

all

of the after-crisis periods a handful of

international companies are given the task of reconstruction.

Normally these

companies belong to the same nations that "donate" the resources
reconstruction.

manpower

is

The money

basically returns to those

scarcely involved

advanced, their costs tend to be

and

since such

who

gave

local

the average local standards. In

periods of emergency, through so-called international

community and then

replacing the governmental structures that existed before the crisis

money and

The

companies are technologically

much higher than

exercise control over the foreign

it.

for

is

not ready to

over the reconstruction plans.

Therefore the opportunities for speculation, profiteers, black market, crime, tax
evasion and so on are great.
•

Another maniacal

effort

immediately undertaken

is

State-owned enterprises, cooperatives, farms, and industries are

thousands of workers

laid off.

The

Former
disbanded and

"privatization."

international administrators

do not want

to

appear undemocratic and they immediately tend to shape the local economy
according to free market models that

it
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everywhere, this abrupt effort does not
unclear, ethnic or religious divisions

fit

a situation

where property

rights are

make it difficult to be fair, and where societal

needs require labor occupation and not unemployment.
Last but not least, intervenors intervene without defining the desired "final

•

status" of the crisis area.

It is

a sign of hypocrisy

and

inefficiency to give

hopes and

would be difficult to keep. It is also difficult to think that one
model of society could work for every corner of the world. Furthermore, the delay
fuel expectations that

of the realization of the final status in the absence of a strong,

and transparent administration supports the creation of

The

efficient, impartial

failed States, quasi-

must be defined and agreed
upon before the international intervention with clarity and courage. That status
States,

rogue States and mafia

States.

final status

must be compatible with international standards but first and foremost must be
compatible with the local and regional reality. No single hot spot can be dealt with
in isolation

Fire

from

its

environment.

and Forget. This tendency

during the

last

decade.

The

is

not new, but has regained conceptual support

military instruments are the only readily available

and

organized tools to turn to in emergency situations. The political imperative to "do

something" (which
tary action

first.

is

also a sign of political weakness) finds

it

easy to resort to mili-

Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensive planning of the pre-war,

war and post-war phases and of any kind of holistic approach makes
identify the

emergency circumstances, respond

to the crisis areas

them, leaving the military behind. Peacekeeping missions

it

also easy to

and then

forget

start in the spotlight

of

public support and emotion but very soon are neglected and forgotten.

Civil-military Relationship.

Another lesson drawn from recent operations

it

becomes

that

and the non-military administration

the relationship between the military forces

always problematic, but

is

a disaster

when

the international

is

community

or the sending States allow:
•

Multiple chains of command.

•

Different reporting lines (national, international, private).

•

Different priorities, concepts of secrecy, concepts of reliability (vis-a-vis the

locals).
•

Different approaches: emergency vs. sustainable development, bureaucracy

vs. results, local vs. regional, politics vs.

administration, success story

vs.

true

story.
•

Uneven

access to the political leadership

organizations and corporations have

much
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than do the military commanders. Normally layers of

diplomatic,

political,

economic, religious and other advisors screen the access of the military to the
decision makers who, often unable to get the military assessment as
stated

stories those advisors

want

to present.

and reconstruction

Security not to be integrated in the development

strategy. In the

minds of many

often confined to

not

has been

by the commanders, tend to take the wrong decisions or prefer the always

"good news"
•

it

civil

administrators and politicians, security

"armed protection." The international

like to see the military

around or inside

their briefing

mistakenly seen as a pacifistic and idealistic effort and
peacekeepers (administrators)

civil

is

administrations do

rooms. Peacekeeping

is

many international civilian

come from personal backgrounds of conscientious

and other "noble" endeavors. Many, of course,
without the military it would be impossible to cope with emergency

objection, anti-military activism,

know

that

situations,
if

but

many others think it would be better to leave the military home or,

military forces are absolutely necessary, to send

once the

initial

emergency

is

in

hand. Almost

them away

all

as

soon

as possible

do not

these administrators

include the military aspects of security in the plans they

make

— roads and bridges

are rebuilt without considering defensive or military requirements; industrial

complexes and plants are rebuilt and managed regardless of their vulnerability to
internal
left

and external sabotage; mines and minerals or other natural resources

in the

hands of engineers and managers

totally

unaware of security

Furthermore, the reconstruction plans do not consider the indirect
military presence has

on local development and the

of minorities and their patrimonial

sites.

granted or completely missed. There

is

indirect

are

issues.

effect a

and direct protection

This security factor

is

either taken for

always a great push towards a so-called

"de-militarization" or effort to diminish the presence of the military without

having restored an effective security system.

A

reduction in the foreign military

must undertaken only
when accompanied by a real improvement in the security environment, and, most
force

is

always a great confidence building measure, but

it

of all, the diminution of visible aspects of security must be balanced by invisible,

but not

less effective,

measures of security

(intelligence, deterrence, reassurance,

reserve forces, civil-military cooperation, information campaign, psychological

operations and military- to-military cooperation). Finally, the great value that the
military-to-military relationships have in the regional context

considered.

The occupying

is

very seldom

military forces are denied opportunities for regional

or wider contacts with the military forces of the area on the assumption that a
relationship with neighboring foreign forces could invade the realm of foreign
policy. In this

way

a basic

and

effective tool of cooperation
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The
alone.

latest international

No

friends

is

matter

operations have also demonstrated that nobody can act

how powerful and

strong a nation, the participation of allies and

always advisable and necessary. Coalitions of the willing are not enough

they exclude traditional partners or potential

critics. Critics

must be always

if

in-

volved and their views solicited and considered. Furthermore, the single-sided ap-

manage pre-war and post-war) creates
further disconnects and a vacuum of power that is immediately filled by thugs,
criminals and extremists. Without an integrated approach to pre-war, war and
post-war operations, the transition periods, no matter how smooth or short, emproach (the military wage war,

bed the seeds of failure

civilians

for the entire operation.

It is

major contrasts between military operations and

during these periods that the

civil

administration are most ap-

parent and that both the military and civilian sides are most vulnerable. During the
transitions the

huge amount of money

that international "solidarity" has

into the crisis area cannot be controlled

and these monies

criminal organizations and other profiteers.

bilities for

sition periods that oversight of the local political

struggle for internal

power

create

It is

poured

enormous

possi-

also during these tran-

system

is

reduced. Often a

delays political development.

The "Liberation Syndrome." It is often stated that modern military operations
and wars are not waged just to defeat an enemy but to free a country or a population.

that

Of course this is a true statement and it is the only appropriate motivation
a modern civilization can have to justify war against someone that does not

pose a direct threat to the sovereignty- of our countries nor possess the military capability or

power

in

whatever form to threaten our basic

"liberation" cannot be misused or abused. Liberation

is

security'.

But the aim of

not a status granted by in-

tervening foreign forces or freely claimed by insurgents, but

it is

acquired through a

self-determination process guided by internationally recognized legal institutions.

Self-determination

Nations system
Charter.
in the

The

two

is

a

is

built

fundamental principle of international law. The United

on the concept of self-determination as expressed in the UN

inalienable right of self-determination stands as the very

treaties, the International

International Covenant

Covenant of Civil and

on Economic,

Social

and Cultural

first article

Political Rights

3

and the

4

Rights, both adopted in

5
1976, which, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, comprise

the International

Bill

of Rights. The right to self-determination

may

be claimed

and asserted only by the legitimate representative of a people or nation. The

real-

ization of the right to self-determination, through the attainment of sovereignty

and

legal personality,

is

governed under international law according to the follow-

ing recognized factual criteria of Statehood: "The State as a person of international

law should possess the following qualifications:
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defined territory;

(c)

government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with

6

other States." In addition to these factual criteria, recognition

is

an important

fac-

The General Assembly, responsible for admitting members to the United Nations, is the most authoritative forum for State
recognition, although bilateral recognition by other States is also an important factor. However, the right to self-determination is not the same as an absolute right of
secession from an established State. The territorial integrity and sovereign equality
tor in the granting of legal statehood.

of States are also basic principles of international law recognized in the

UN Charter

and subsequent treaties. In the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law,
the General Assembly affirms that every State

must

aid in the realization of the

"self-determination of peoples" in accordance with the provisions of the Charter,

but also that "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs
ing or encouraging any action which

shall

be construed as authoriz-

would dismember or impair

.

.

.

the territorial

7

integrity or political unity of a sovereign State." Similarly, the 1961 Declaration

the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
right of

and

all

on

and Peoples affirms both the

peoples to self-determination and the principles of territorial integrity

inviolability of State borders. 8

more than an expression of self-determination
of the poor and oppressed, has become a "syndrome" of the powerful. It has also
created dangerous ambiguity in the role of belligerent parties and occupying powers. The misperception induced by the "politically incorrect" word "occupation" is
greater than the reality, while the "good" word "liberation" fuels many misunderIn the last decade, "liberation,"

standings. These include:
•

Liberators are not occupants; they cannot behave like occupying forces

•

Immediate

soon

liberation. In the

as the liberating forces

minds of the

liberated peoples they are free as

assume the control of the

territory

and come

in

contact with them. If small local irregular units happen to have contributed to the
fighting, they

become

demand immediate
prisoners

the heroes of the nation

actions in

and the "freedom

fighters."

removing the previous authority, freeing

or internees, arresting former

They

political

disbanding former State

officials,

administrative agencies and State security organizations, including intelligence,

law and order and administration. They expect the international community to
allow freedom and rights not previously enjoyed. They expect that power will be
transferred to
•

them without any interference or

Another perception

is

that of those

delay.

who were

persecuted by the previous

regime want the power too. They are martyrs. They want the leading positions and
they want revenge.
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Then there is the perception of the liberating forces. In this modern age
are no longer wars for territorial control or annexation. Nobody wants to

modify the existing borders. Therefore, unlike the occupying forces of the 19th

do not want to control the territory; they
simply want to accomplish whatever objective was set and then go home as soon as
century, the so-called liberation forces

possible.

They want

to transfer the

power

to

whoever could

continuing responsibility. The liberators do not

feel

free

them from any

additional responsibility

towards the "liberated" and are not psychologically prepared to use force against

them; even

if

the failure to

do so would allow the thugs

disbanding the previous administration would
All this

what

is

is

to

come

mean chaos

into

power or

if

for decades.

very far from what the reality of the situation requires and far from

anticipated by international humanitarian law (IHL). Liberation

is

a syn-

onym of self-determination as far as the people or the nation that strive to attain independence are concerned and

when

it is

a

form of external "aid"

foreign forces intervene. However,

to such an endeavor

no matter the purpose of the

status of occupation paradoxically provides a greater legal basis than
tification for military

conflict, the

any other jus-

presence and best ensures the protection and basic rights of

the civilian population. Let us turn to the case of Iraq

and

see

what occupation

should imply.

The following
the

analysis contains extracts taken

International

lengthy,

it

from a paper prepared

Humanitarian Law Research

Initiative.

9

as part of

While somewhat

provides an excellent discussion of the principles of IHL in the context of

the military occupation of Iraq.

The Fourth Geneva Convention [1949] and the Hague Regulations [annexed to 1907
Hague Convention IV 1907] regulate the situation of belligerent occupation. They set
forth a series of duties and obligations for the parties involved from Coalition forces to
relief agencies and the Iraqi population itself. Their purpose is to ensure minimal
protection of the civilian population and favor the stabilization of the security and
living conditions in the territory

What

is

under the control of invading

forces.

an occupation?

The IHL

follows a very practical approach in defining military occupation.

factual control over a territory or a population.

declaration or intent of the invading forces.
military forces

on the

emptive doctrine, are

refers to

does not require any form of

The motives

for the presence of foreign

be they liberation, self-defence, or enforcing pre-

territory,

irrelevant.

It

It

.

.
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What is the law of occupation?
From

the point of view of IHL, civilians in occupied territories deserve

The

particularly detailed rules of protection

civilians

and need

have no obligation of loyalty

towards the occupying power, regardless of the motives of the invading forces. The
only obligations they have relate to their civilian status,
hostilities.

resisting

.

.

.

[Because of that obligation,

IHL

i.e.,

not to participate in

prohibits civilians

from

violently

occupation of their territory and from attempting to liberate that territory by

violent means.] [Conversely,] the occupying

power

pertaining to the administration of the territories
controls as a substitute

and caretaker

is

subject to a series of obligations

it

occupies and the population

it

for the national authorities.

When does occupation begin?
The criteria for the application of the law of occupation are relatively straightforward.
The law of occupation applies whenever, during an armed conflict, a territory and its
population come under control of the enemy of the State authorities previously
controlling that territory. (See Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations and Art. 2(1) and Art. 4
of Fourth Geneva Convention.) The overriding concern of the IHL rules is to regulate
the relationship between the civilian population and the invading forces as soon as the
two are in contact, independently of the duration or motives of the military operations.
In this context, even a military platoon occupying a village for a period of a few hours,
has obligations to take care of the population (emergency health care, food and water
supplies, etc.), not as a matter of charity but as a duty under the rules of IHL. The
longer this occupation lasts, the more detailed the obligations become. In the case of
Iraq, the fall of the

regime certainly creates long-term obligations pertaining to

all

spheres of public services, from the maintenance of law and order, the administration

of justice, the supply of food, water, and health services, and the administration of the
Iraqi resources for the benefit of its people.

When does occupation end?
Occupation ends whenever one of the conditions of occupation

1.

An

The

international

armed

conflict.

occupying

no longer met.

conflict has ended.

agreement has been signed between the parties

armed

is

at conflict

bringing to an end the

In general, such agreement will involve the withdrawal of the

forces.

There

may

be situations, however, where the former occupier

will

maintain a military presence in the country, with the agreement of the legitimate

government under a security arrangement (e.g. US military presence in Japan and
Germany). The legality of such agreement and the legitimacy of the national
authorities signing it are subject to international recognition, whereby members of the
international

community

reestablish diplomatic
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national government. In this context,

it is

in the interest

of all the parties involved to

maintain a clear regime of occupation until the conditions for

stability

and peace

created allowing the re-establishment of a legitimate national government.

A

are

post-

occupation military presence can only be construed in the context of a viable, stable

and peaceful

situation.

Foreign military forces have withdrawn from

enemy

territory or are

no longer

In case of an ongoing conflict, the withdrawal of the forces also brings an

end of the

2.

exerting control over the population of that territory.

applicability of the

law of occupation.

regained control over

from

certain

its

It

implies however that the

enemy power

has

population and territory. The mere withdrawal of troops

conquered places does not end or suspend the application of IHL

leaves a

vacuum of authority. The control of the territory and

remain

in effect until the front lines

have

rules if it

the legal duties involved

stabilized. Evidently, in the

course of a

campaign where front lines can move back and forth many times and
and population is unclear, the implementation of such
rules can become impractical. However, in the case of the collapse of enemy forces, as
in Iraq, the law of occupation applies to territories and populations entering into
contact with invading forces, and remains applicable regardless of further tactical
deployment of troops. In other words, there is no vacuum of authority or
responsibility once troops have moved into a given territory. Obligations for the
maintenance of law and order as well as all other obligations pertaining to occupying
powers are applicable to the Coalition forces as soon as they drive Iraqi forces out of
military

responsibility over the territory

civilian areas.

In both cases:

•
The hand-over of administrative functions
Occupying Power of its obligation;

The set-up of government

to civil servants does not relieve the

by opposition groups with the continuing
military presence of Coalition forces does not fulfil the conditions for the end of the
occupation. If changes to the Constitution are required, it can only be amended under
its own provisions and procedures or, in exceptional cases, under applicable
international law and procedures. Agreements concluded by the U.S. or the U.K. with
local authorities of the occupied territory or changes introduced by Coalition Forces to
Iraqi institutions or to the government of Iraq cannot deprive protected persons from
•

the protection offered by

•

In

all

cases, the

IHL

structures

(see Article

47 of Fourth Geneva Convention).

law of occupation applies until one year after the general close of

military operations,

and even beyond

that date basic rules continue to apply,

if

the

occupying power exercises the functions of government in the territory. (See Article
6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.) In addition, Protocol I contemplates the
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extension of the

full

application of occupation law until the termination of occupation.

(See Article 3(b) of Protocol

I.).

What are the obligations of the Coalition
•

In principle,

life

in the

forces in Iraq?

occupied territory must be allowed to continue as normally as

power can be summed up as permitting life
in the occupied territory to continue without being affected by its presence. As
authority has passed into the hands of the occupant, it becomes responsible for public
order, safety and welfare in the occupied territory. IHL is strong in protecting the status
quo ante, while weak in responding to new needs of the population of the occupied
territory. The longer the occupation lasts, the more shortcomings of the regime
established by IHL therefore appear. Only international institutions such as the U.N.
possible.

or

The

new local

obligations of the occupying

authorities established in conformity with the right of the Iraqi people to

self-determination can establish a

The

legal implications

new political system

in Iraq.

of this approach are the following:

Regarding internal security, the maintenance of law and order and public welfare

The occupying power's only protected interest is the security of the occupying
armed forces; it may take necessary measures to protect that security, but it is also
responsible to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety (see Article 43 of the Hague Regulations). In this context, while
•

the U.S.

must

is

not responsible for every looting occurring in the territory

exercise

sufficient in

•

due diligence to avoid such

number or not

Similarly, the U.S.

looting.

appropriately trained

and the U.K.

is

The claim

that

its

it

controls,

it

forces are not

not a sufficient excuse;

and
Geneva Convention) and the provision of food
55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
are responsible for ensuring public health

sanitation (see Article 56 of the Fourth

and medical supplies

(see Article

Regarding the administration of justice

•

Except concerning the protection of the occupying power's security, local laws

remain in force

(see Article

Geneva Convention) and
Geneva Convention);

•

Civilians

may

43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of Fourth

local courts

remain competent

only be detained in anticipation of a

(see Article

trial

66 of the Fourth

or for imperative security

which must be individually determined, allowing for a right of appeal (see
Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Such civil internees benefit from a very
detailed protective regime under the Fourth Geneva Convention (see Arts. 79-135 of
Convention IV);
reasons,
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It'civilians commit hostile acts, they may be punished under legislation introduced
by the occupying power, but do not lose their civilian status. They may however lose
their communication rights (see article 5(2) of Convention IV). Unless they directly
•

participate in hostilities, they benefit
hostilities (see article

In

•

( 1 )

no

case

may a

from the protection of civilians against

51(3) of Protocol

civilian

effects

of

I.)

be deported outside the occupied territory (see Article 49

of Fourth Geneva Convention).

Regarding property and resources

Except

•

may

when rendered absolutely necessary by military operations,

private property

not be destroyed (see Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and

it

may

only be confiscated under local legislation (see Article 46 of the Hague Regulations).

The government previously

•

controlling the territory can obviously

no longer

administer public property (other than that of the municipalities (see Article 56 of the

Hague

may

Regulations). Such property

therefore be administered

by the occupying

power, but only under the rules of usufruct (see Article 55 of the Hague Regulations).
Iraqi oil wells

were government owned, the U.S.

According to some opinions,
local population,

but

it

may

may administer them and

sell

the

If

oil.

use the proceeds not only for the benefits of the

also, similar to levies, to

cover the cost of the occupation (but not

of the whole war) (see Article 49 of the Hague Regulations).

As can be

seen, the

aim of liberation does not

alter the relevant obligations. "Fire

IHL

and

forget"

for.

is

of occupation nor

not the kind of responsibility the

pay and leave"

assigns to occupying powers. "Fight,

population can ask

affect the status

is

not what the civilian

The criteria set by the law of occupation

exactly

fit

the situ-

ation of Iraq.

Case Studies
Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, the "liberation" by the Coalition was neither requested nor

wanted by the Taliban regime

that constituted the

government

of that country. The so-called "Northern Alliance" was not a resistance force but
the

remnant of a group of warlords opposing the unifying power of the Taliban.

The Taliban regime, which itself pretended to "free" the country from the previous
regime and the mujahideen under the banner of self-determination, was not recognized by the United Nations. In fact, after the Coalition's "liberation" the same
warlord system of the mujahideen regime that preceded the Taliban has taken over
local

power, while the central government

is

able to perform a sort of loose control

only over Kabul, and that thanks to the presence of US and
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the mujahideen regime there were around 28 warlords

war/drug

and now there are at least 32

lords.

Iraq. In the case of Iraq, there will
tive, stable

and

legal (internally

be no liberation until the Iraqi people have

and internationally recognized)

effec-

State institutions.

Unfortunately, they have been prevented from liberating themselves from

Saddam's regime. The assumed and promised popular revolution and participation in the "liberation" did not take place.

take of evaluation

on the

part of

scholars, intelligence agencies

was

It

many

a gross misperception

a mis-

worldwide renowned Islam

experts,

and naif politicians.

and

On the other hand, there was no

attempt to organize the participation of the local population in the coalition operation

was not organized, not foreseen and not even symbolically pursued. Perhaps

remembered symbol of the end of the Saddam regime was the pulling down of the large statue in central Baghdad. But this was done by a US Marine,
and the small crowd of Iraqis around it was chanting more for the sake of TV cameras than for joy. Most Iraqis had longed to liberate themselves from the Saddam

the most widely

regime, but were not given the opportunity to organize their
a symbolic level.

own fight, not even at

Although coalition leaders brought with them

lieved to be potential leaders, these

had no

political credibility;

Iraqis that

were be-

they were viewed as

puppets of the Western forces that had imposed hardship on the Iraqis for too long.
Because there was no participation by the Iraqi population, the people had no opportunity to rid themselves of regime propaganda

did not have the chance to understand the

and the

atavist fear

new situation and

of the regime. They

finally react.

Paradoxically, like any other peoples that did not have the opportunity to free

themselves from their
the "liberators"
self-sacrifice

—

is

dictators, the Iraqis are

the Coalition. Liberation

and cannot simply be given

tus of "liberator"

erators"

own

is

to

now

freeing themselves

from

and freedom must be earned through

them

for free

by someone

else.

The

not one recognized by international law and liberation by

sta-

"lib-

not a guarantee of democracy or humanity. The Jewish internees of the

Nazi lagers gained their freedom through their
free in the face

of

God and

own martyrdom; they were already

in the face of the international

community when

the

Americans and the Soviets opened the gates of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau,
etc.

Nevertheless, they saw their liberators as angels regardless of whether those

military forces belonged to a
ity

Western democracy or

a Stalinist regime.

The major-

of Iraqis view the Coalition forces as liberators, but they know that this recogni-

tion does not give the Coalition

any

specific right over

them, their resources, or

their sovereignty.

The majority of Iraqis recognized the Coalition
sible for restoring and ensuring public order and
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safety,
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knew they
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were incapable without that assistance of overcoming the resistance forces or even
the criminal gangs that plagued their country.

establishment of their

But

security.

up

their

the

if the

own

own freedom because of their

up

useful role to play

have the right to free their

ambiguous

own

and should

and want

sponsibility to ensure security

lawful occupants,

lawful

to

leave.

The people them-

is

better than an indefinite stay

become

soon

as the "occupiers" give

just "liberators," ignoring their re-

and freedom of movement, they can be seen

making the

i.e.,

country. Therefore, from the legal point of

status of liberators. Furthermore, as

their legitimate status

them

lack of capability to maintain

responsibility as occupying forces in order to appear "liberators,"

view, a temporary consensual military occupation
in the

willing to postpone the

occupying forces prove unable to ensure security or want to give

good guys, they have no

selves

They were

as

un-

struggle for liberty, or self-determination, against

and justified. That's why in the periods of immediate

post-conflict, or

even during the phase of active combat against rebels or insurgents, the status of

occupants
teed

and

is

better than

any other funambulism,

civil institutions

at least until security is

guaran-

are able to control the internal situation. Until that

mo-

ment, the coalition forces should retain the status of occupying forces and comply
with their relevant responsibilities under international law. Liberation and occupation

is

not a matter of self-labeling, but of international obligation.

composed of belligerent and non-belligerent nations,
responsibility of ensuring respect for the norms of international humanitarian

In the case of a coalition

the

law as occupying forces resides with the individual nations even though the operational or administrative leadership has

nation. Although

been assumed by or delegated to a leading

some national forces may not accept the rationale for the war, the

status of occupation

is

independent from their acceptance or non-acceptance of

that rationale. Their de facto control over part of a territory even

by

a small unit

render the national forces responsible for the fulfillment of occupying obligations.
In Iraq,

it is

likely that the so-called

assuming the responsibility of a

supporting nations

sector, implicitly

ing forces even though that status

is

(Italy,

ever, coalition forces

specifically recognized

by the relevant

was formally handed over to

Kingdom.

UN resOn

Iraqi authorities.

June

How-

highly questionable whether the nominal control residing in the

is

hands of the

local authorities

it is

when

have not changed or given up their de facto control of Iraqi

territory. It

tainly

etc),

assume the obligation of occupy-

olutions only with respect to the United States and the United
28, 2004, the control of Iraq

Poland,

not sufficient to

is

sufficient to

end the "occupation regime," but

cer-

amend the obligations that the coalition has towards the

civilian population.
It is

in Iraq

clear that in their formal

new

status of "invited" forces, the national forces

cannot have fewer obligations than they did when their status was that of
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occupying

forces.

Furthermore, Iraqi forces have no power to control the security

situation, lack intelligence

and surveillance resources, and do not possess even the

capability to adequately support the Coalition. In fact, the Coalition

still

has

full

control of the security instruments and their apparent status of "supporting" the
local authorities

is

a fiction.

As a matter of fact, the so-called "passage of sover-

eignty" (in reality, according to international law, Iraq never lost

the Iraqis has added the Iraqis themselves
fective security forces to the

list

and

their

its

sovereignty) to

immature, unprepared,

inef-

of enemies of the criminals and the rebels. The early

disengagement of Coalition forces from the obligations of occupation law, their
desire to regain the fallacious status of "liberators,"

and their formal transfer of re-

sponsibility of security to the provisional local institutions has

ended the regime of

occupation and also the right of resistance that such law recognizes to the Iraqi

armed groups. 10 But

it

has also relieved the civilian population from their duty to

not engage in violent resistance to the occupation. The formal end of the occupation has paradoxically increased the risk of legalizing
civil

war; the rebels can

now clearly identify the

mass rebellion and fueling

a

Iraqi security forces either as col-

laborators of the unlawful occupants or as internal enemies.

Kosovo. In Kosovo,

legally speaking, the

and Montenegro was waged by
to protect a minority legally
to transfer to such ethnic

war

against the sovereign State of Serbia

a regional security organization

and lawfully integrated into

(NATO)

in order

a sovereign State, but not

group the sovereignty over the parts of Serbia, Albania

and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) where they live. "Liberation" in this case
relief.

That

is

and in

this

phase has the value of humanitarian protection and

why UN Security Council Resolution 1244 11

led mission in

authorizing the

NATO-

Kosovo and the UN administration did not foresee any loss of sover-

eignty by Serbia and Montenegro.

The

international administration of

Kosovo

that followed Operation Allied

Force was often discussed both before and after the war with regard to
bility to Iraq.

applica-

Many experts and UN officials wanted to export the "Kosovo model"

to Iraq. In fact several international officials

transferred

its

from Kosovo

personal experience that

and national military

to Iraq in the early days of the invasion.

I

officials

can

testify

were

from

among those international officials there were some good

persons who had performed effectively, but there were others that had failed miser-

The suggestion of the "Kosovo model" for Iraq
was a serious concern to all those who had lived through that painful, ongoing
peacekeeping process. Kosovo has nothing to do with Iraq and the poor performance of the most prominent international organizations there did not justify any
ably during their tour in Kosovo.

attempt to make a "model" out of

it.

The Kosovo model becomes even more
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when being exported

of practical problems. The United Nations

set

men-

to a completely different situation, culture,

may have had little choice

because other models were not available and the donor countries and the international

somehow

organizations had

accepted the bureaucracy established in

Kosovo. Because the different circumstances in Iraq were not understood,
cision

was not very promising. Iraq required a new and

clearly

this de-

determined ap-

proach; the failure to provide that approach does not bode well for the future.

The United Nations imprimatur has great political value and good diplomatic
value. Worldwide operations or initiatives cannot be effectively undertaken without the consent and the support of the United Nations. That said, in Kosovo, as in
other missions
tive

it

has undertaken, the United Nations proved completely ineffec-

and even dangerous when administering

a country or a territory.

small spot in the Balkans; officially a province of Serbia.

It

Kosovo

is

a

has a territory of 10,000

square kilometers and a population of 2. 1 million. United Nations Interim Administration

Kosovo and
tions.

(UNMIK) 12

Mission in Kosovo
is

is,

responsible for running this province

A Special

Representative of the

NATO, which

Montenegro because of the Kosovo humanitarian

ond ranking

crisis,

is

brought war to Serbiamaintains Kosovo Force

still,

as

international official in Kosovo, but

of the time

manitarian work

some

is

this article

finished

is

mili-

KFOR commander (COMKFOR) is the sec-

The

is

not subordinate to the SRSG.

Personnel of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
are

the highest

composed of NATO and non-NATO

security force

tary contingents, in the province.

on behalf of the United Na-

UN Secretary-General (SRSG)

international authority in that province.

(KFOR), an international

governing institution in

in effect, the

written,

working

and they are reducing

in

Kosovo. Their main hu-

their staff

responsibilities to the civil administration, but they

(UNHCR)

still

and handing over

provide assistance to

the local minorities.

UNMIK is divided into four sections, which

for

under UN management,

•

Pillar

I,

•

Pillar

II (civil

all

health,

judicial

telecommunication, public
Pillar III,

operation

in

utilities

calls "pillars," as follows:

responsible for police and justice

administration), also under

aspects of organization of normal

transportation,

•

is

it

life; e.g.,

UN management,

responsible

finance and payment, education,

UNMIK

affairs,

is

affairs.

police,

post

and

and many more.

an institution run by the Organization for Security and Co-

Europe

(OSCE),

is

in

charge

of

media

development,

democratization, police training, and elections/registration.
•

Pillar IV,

run by the European Union,

trade and industry and public

utilities.
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The SRSG is responsible
Group of eight nations. In

QUINT Nations
many, France,
took over as

must report

to the Secretary-General, but
theater, a special supervisory

(the missions in Pristina,

mandate

is

to a Contact

given to the

Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Ger-

the United States and the United Kingdom). In 2002,

Italy,

COMKFOR, UNMIK had

32,000. In the period

which followed,

received the task to reduce

KFOR to

1

16,000 personnel assigned to

and

it

when

I

KFOR

UNMIK was to slightly reduce its size, while

I

7,000 personnel by the end of 2003. Other in-

terlocutors included the staffs of the international non-governmental organizations (400

non-Kosovars and 3000 Kosovars) and the police force composed of

5000 international police

officers

and 5000 indigenous personnel.

From the international humanitarian law point of view, the NATO-led forces in
Kosovo should not have the

ment allowing

an agree-

status of occupation forces. Serbia signed

the foreign military presence

the requirement to use whatever

means

on

its

own

However, under

territory.

"to establish a secure environment" 13

KFOR could have acted as a "de facto" occupant rather than a force "allowed" to be
deployed there for a long time. This was prevented by the hurry the
political authorities
liar that

KFOR.

NATO

were

in to declare the situation safe

and Serbia did not

and

UN and NATO

secure.

It is

also pecu-

sign a status of forces agreement regarding

immunity granted to the forces is regulated by the Framework
for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo issued by UNMIK itself.
When I assumed command of the Kosovo Force in October 2002 (three years
Instead, the

after the war),

because

I

I

had the good fortune

had served

as

Chief of Staff of Joint Forces

that had, during the previous

Balkans.

I

was

to be aware of

two

years,

most of my

legal limitations

Command Southern Europe

been responsible for

also fortunate in that exactly ten years earlier

I

all

operations in the

led a

mechanized bri-

gade in the very first phase of an operation against organized crime in

Sicily.

time, in the aftermath of the assassination of two magistrates, the local

At that

government

institutions

were unable to cope with the distrust of the population and were not

effective in

countering organized crime. The Italian

tion with special police powers

ing

full

and deployed

Army undertook

this

opera-

in Sicily for nine years before return-

control of the region to civilian law enforcement.

When

I

assumed

command of KFOR, I thought I understood all of the difficulties related to the relationship with

civil

administration and law enforcement.

I

was

also

convinced that

NATO forces had "liberated" the Albanian population and that both the Albanians
and the Serbs were under

control.

During the previous three years there were no

incidents or deliberate attacks against

KFOR and the official

reporting always de-

some improvement.
On taking command, I was also immediately challenged by some unusual legal
aspects of my mandate. The first meeting scheduled after bidding farewell to my

picted
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predecessor was with the Russian Representative at

NATO who

from

traveled

Brussels to Pristina for the sole purpose of complaining about the exclusion of a

Russian liaison officer at

some

regular meetings with the Serbian Security Forces.

The second meeting was with my Chief of Staff and the legal advisors to examine an
official complaint presented by Amnesty International in reference to the alleged
mistreatment of two Islamic diplomats by KFOR troops. The two diplomats had
been arrested with clear evidence of conducting

working

for

an Islamic

NGO.

I

while allegedly

settled the dispute with the Russians in five

but Amnesty International

utes,

illegal activities

not satisfied with the answer

is

NATO

min-

provided

with regard to the two diplomats and that issue remains open.
I

soon discovered that the national caveats (the guidance provided by the partic-

ipating countries with regard to their contingents), previously seen as "political

gadgets" the diplomats like to play with, were directly affecting the mission of the

contingents and limiting their rules of engagement.
additional
force

and unnecessary

risks to

our

soldiers.

was allowed only in case of direct attack or

rect attack

is

clearly recognizable,

Some of them were also posing

For example,

hostile intent.

minimum

The meaning of di-

but not so hostile intent. Generally speaking, the

national caveats were clear, understandable and justifiable.

More problematic was

the interpretation of existing local law, the national law every soldier

and international

use of

must

respect,

law.

Any concerns that I had with potential legal matters and dealing with the differing national caveats were insignificant when compared to the overwhelming practical

problems associated with carrying out KFOR's

In exercising

Kosovo,

its

responsibilities.

responsibility for ensuring a safe

and secure environment

in

KFOR had passed security tasks related to the protection of sensitive and

patrimonial

sites,

border control, and freedom of movement, to local police

forces.

What I discovered after the first couple of weeks was that the situation was far from
being safe and

stable.

The

endless "successes" that contributed to the rosy picture

were exaggerations, when they were not plain
cesses

precipitating the

In

most

cases,

when

real suc-

way into the reports.
only regarding KFOR self-protection. The ethnic hatred

were reported, the following

Security was sufficient

lies.

failures did

not find their

war was still there and had worsened the situation of the minority,

the Serbian population of Kosovo.

The Albanian majority was conducting a steady

"Albanization" of the province through blackmail, intimidation, assassination,

and

attacks

on Serbian

citizens

and property.

In addition, the reconstruction

program was behind schedule with no prospects

of improvement. The final political status of Kosovo was not even being discussed.

The

relationship with Belgrade

was a

disaster,

with daily clashes and insults be-

tween the SRSG and a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. The transition of power to
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the provisional

government was not implemented. The

and the ministers wanted only more

cars, cell

Assembly was rioting

local

phones and bodyguards. Notwith-

standing three rounds of democratic elections, there was not a functioning govern-

Some

ment. Politically motivated assassinations were a norm.
organized

northern

Many

riots,

demonstrations and the export of violence to southern Serbia and

FYROM.
of these security and governance issues stemmed from Kosovo's non-

functioning economy.

Unemployment impacted 80% of the population, crime in-

fested every field of activity, the decentralization of

had not even
cial

started,

more about

political

UN administration was thinking

games than "administration," extremists had taken over the

control of legal parties and

civil

protection institutions, schoolteachers were

and the miners were claiming

and not one

powers to the municipalities

energy infrastructure was under constant sabotage, the judi-

system was compromising with the thugs, the

strike,

extremists had

single social system

below the average requirements
or farms had been reactivated.

their jobs.

had been

Kosovo was importing every item

good news

for

billion,

Energy production was

re-established.

No industries,

for domestic electricity use.

The money poured

into the province

tripled the initial estimate for the full reconstruction.

vestment (US $9

on

The

results

mines,

had already

of this huge in-

without counting the military expenses) brought some

housing and roads, but the

rest

was

a disaster.

Nobody knew where

$8 billion of the $9 billion had gone.

War criminals were free to walk the streets and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the Security Council to
prosecute those

was

1990s,

who had committed war

crimes during the ethnic conflicts of the

afraid to indict the Albanians that

The

international police,

was

largely ineffective

committed crimes against humanity.

composed of police officers coming from 80 countries,
and under continuous threat. Some of them were com-

pletely unaware of the local legal system, or of any kind of legal system for that
ter.

mat-

Corruption was widespread. The local police were not only ineffective but also

involved in crime through clan and family links.
called

"former freedom fighters"

privileges,

who

Many

of these officers were so-

believed this entitled

them

to claim certain

but did not impose upon them obligations to carry out their law en-

forcement responsibilities.

The

entire system

population.

was biased by a

"Do not upset the Albanian

We liberated them." Kosovo not only was going nowhere; even worse,

would become a mafia State. The dangers were, in fact,
than they had been two years earlier. It was not more military and law en-

there was a real risk that
greater

diffuse blackmail:

is

forcement forces that were needed, but a better and tougher use of a few forces
against extremism, terrorism, crime, corruption
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Kosovo was oriented towards the wrong

intelligence asset that existed in

threats.

These resources were focused on a supposed military threat from the Serbian Army

and completely overlooked and neglected the destabilizing power of the Albanian
former freedom fighters in the region and
threat to the safe

and secure environment

in

Kosovo.

that

It

KFOR

was

clear that the only

was tasked

to create

and

maintain came from within Kosovo and not from outside.
It

was

also clear that dramatic

started to arrest

change was required. Within a few months, we

war criminals of any

ethnicity indicted

by the ICTY. Detention

way and cooperation was improved with a weak
judicial system that was relying on international and local judges. We started
downsizing and changing methods of operations, allowing more cooperation with
and support to the police, more participation in anti-crime operations, and increased utilization of the Over the Horizon NATO-led reserve forces. We built a
powers were used

in a very discrete

comprehensive intelligence database and created

a Joint Intelligence

all

possible sources

and

present in Kosovo. Within two

months we were

able to identify

Center, which incorporated

all

Operation

the intelligence agencies

more than 5000

criminal links within the government, the political parties, the social institutions

and within the organization supposedly in charge of civil protection. Nevertheless,
it

took our Joint Forces

months

to "socialize" a

Commander (JFC) and the Strategic Commander six
new assessment of the situation with NATO political

authorities.

When

the

SRSG and

I

finally

North Atlantic Council the
our assessment.

facts

had the opportunity

to present

our views to the

on the ground had already proven the accuracy of

KFOR had arrested the first Albanians indicted by the ICTY while

two members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, the
agency established by a 1999

civilian

emergency

UNMIK regulation, had just blown themselves up in a

terrorist attack against a railway bridge. Attacks against the police stations
tensified, while

we were

service

had

able to disrupt a spring offensive in southern Serbia

in-

and

FYROM through the arrest and detention of prominent extremists and criminals.
Through cooperation with the judicial system, we were
ees

under

also able to put the detain-

judicial control.

Unfortunately, as of the time this article

is

written,

all

these efforts

now seem

The fight in Kosovo is not over yet and inter-ethnic clashes erupted again
March 2004. Recently, the SRSG, a former prime minister of Finland, a gentle-

useless.

in

man and a highly respected politician, resigned.
sults

and goodwill on the part of all concerned

The bottom

line in

Kosovo

is

His frustration with the lack of reled to this harsh decision.

that the seeds of a persistent, frustrating situation

were planted:
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In the pre-war period

1.

when

trust

was placed

in

and help given

to the

wrong

persons and priority was given to the military campaign without integrating war

and post-war requirements;
In the war period when the so-called freedom fighters were allowed to assume

2.

power with guns and perpetrate

a sort of ethnic cleansing against the minorities;

and

when

power of extremists was consolidated
and "democratic elections." Furthermore, the UN admin-

In the post-war period

3.

the

through

illegal activities

istration

was inefficient and plethoric; the international security forces were too

in-

dulgent towards the extremists, allowing them to become de-stabilizers and even

some nations and international organizations, still linked to the
pre-war mentality of the extremists as victims, continued to assist them after the
criminal clans; and

war by providing

assistance

and funding.
Conclusions

Because of a misperceived sense of "democratic" division of responsibility, military
forces tend to be used as legitimate interpreters of the

and liberation only during combat operations. As soon

tion
is

power of invasion, occupa-

artificially

as the fighting ends, or

declared over, civilian authorities, with no understanding of the situa-

assume decision-making responsibility. By the time local civilian

tion,

lished

rule

is

estab-

and functioning, permanent damage has been done: pre-war structures have

been destroyed by the war or no longer function, and the new structures are biased

by compromise and corruption.
During planning

who

clear

must be determined and made
administration during the war and in its immediate

advance of an operation,

in

will direct the civil

it

aftermath, to include the kind of social, economic and security system that will be

put in place,

how the regional framework will be affected and what to do in order to

prevent destabilization.
In the last ten years

post-war.

we have tested the system to

We have identified the actors responsible for each phase as separate enti-

And we have proven

ties.

separate war from pre-war and

that the system does not work! Pre-war

is

the realm of

and diplomacy, but the military could be used much more than as a tool of
diplomacy (coercive diplomacy). The military consequences must be dealt with in
politics

this

period by defining the potential risk for our forces and also the destabilizing

fects

of war on society.

War is the realm of the military,
in

its

ef-

but political leadership has an important stake

execution. Particularly, political leaders

must respect the

priority of military

operations and ensure that each provides a political value that contributes to the
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crisis.

What has to be avoided

is

the use of operations as a substi-

tute for political action or to maintain ambiguity. Politicians

and then keep them going

cannot ask for short,

They cannot camouflage
war-like operations behind other names. Pre-war and war must be connected and
surgical operations

for years.

have a unified political-military-diplomatic control center. The time for reaction
during crises

becoming shorter and shorter not because

is

overnight, but because the international

is

very slow in acquiring the

an honest and independent assessment, and then decid-

right intelligence, getting

ing what to

community

emerging

threats are

do without indulging

in bureaucratic politics.

With fewer and fewer

States maintaining standing armies, the preparation of the military instrument

becoming more
growing

faster:

In the meantime, military strategy

difficult.

the major risk of the pre-emptive war doctrine

military operations even before diplomacy

is

and concepts are
is

that

it

requires

ready or has clear ideas on what to do

afterwards. Early operations (pre-emptive) are at their extreme

the

is

when

anticipating

war before the enemy is recognised or before the friendly forces are ready or be-

fore the objectives are set.

During the war, any political request to end military op-

erations, or to pretend they have ended, before a reasonable level of security

achieved has to be,

During the

last

if

possible, contested.

ten years the post-war phase has been the most dangerous and

both State and international, have applied the man-

unfruitful. Decision makers,

agement model of divide
under discussion

is

et

imperato to Bosnia and Afghanistan, and

for application in

Roman Empire

nity has applied this

Kosovo and

Iraq.

The

it is

currently

international

commu-

most unhistorical way:

rule in the

it

has been

applied indifferently to enemies within occupied territories, and, most importantly,

it

has been applied to us and to our

allies.

thing that was too big and strong to handle as

were able to control the separate
trol

it:

force,

money,

pieces.

The Romans used to divide everya whole, but they made sure they

For each situation, they had a tool to con-

favors, or corruption. Every tool

was legitimate. Instead of us-

dividing entities without understanding

it is

community

focuses

on

losing any possibility of control.

We

ing a variety of mechanisms, today the international

have also divided ourselves by not only breaking alliances in order to form coalitions,

but by dividing the leadership and the tools to exercise power.

We have established a substantial separation between civilians and the military,
between the United Nations and national structures, between governmental and

non-governmental

OSCE and

entities,

between

NATO

and the United Nations, between

the European Union, and so on. This separation has given birth to a

myriad of chains of command, reporting channels,
ments. The results are that in

all

situations,

to Kosovo, to East Timor, Afghanistan

and

differing assess-

from Somalia to Bosnia-Herzegovina,

and

248

priorities

Iraq, international forces are

not

Fabio Mini

we have missed the main
point: the three phases of pre-war, war and post-war are not separate. Any attempt
to keep them separate is artificial and the gaps between them favor the destructive
forces, allowing them to infiltrate and destabilization to prevail.
Another missed point is that conflicts are never limited to the hot spots. The reacontrolling the situation. In fact, in the last ten years

We cannot
hope to control a crisis just by pouring troops and missiles on the hotspot. We need
to consider the regional balance and the international environment. We also have
sons for crises are often very far from the time and space of the hotspot.

to consider the kind of side effects that can be expected in the

medium/long term,

and we must be prepared to cope with them. Nowadays, these side effects

are rarely

of a nature that the military can control. They are related to the economy, political
balance, strategic resource

The

management,

three phases of pre-war,

each phase there

is

social fields and, lastly, security.

war and post-war

a subtlety, a slightly different aspect of security,

the prerequisite. In the pre-war period, security

There
a

is

are connected

something that threatens

it.

is

mainly a

whom we

fight.

security. In

which remains

stability

problem.

During combat operations, security is mainly

primacy problem in order to gain control over destabilizing

people for

by

After the war, security

rule of law problem. Military forces have a

prime

is

forces, including the

mainly a self-protection and

role to play in every phase,

but

they cannot act in isolation or be separated from politics, diplomacy, administration

and reconstruction. Some type of war cabinet must assume control over the

crisis in

the very early stages

and provide oversight and

direction, while respecting

the unity of command. This war cabinet
before, during

and

after actual

must also provide guidance on what to do
combat operations. No vacuum of power can be

no transition can take place if the security requirements are not
achieved, and no transfer of power can be executed if the political and administra-

permitted,

tive

bodies are not ready to take responsibility.

My

suggestion

is

very simple,

maybe even simplistic. War cannot be rushed into before all solutions are explored
and attempts

must

refrain

to peacefully solve the crisis are

from rushing

into

war "hoping"

made.

that

it

Politicians

will solve the

and diplomats
problem or just

because "something has to be done."
In the pre-war phase, military forces have the vital role of preparing for war,

while emphasizing to the politicians and diplomats that waging war
ferred option. Military leaders have a duty to highlight
their consequences, including the side effects

all

is

not a pre-

possible options

on the economy,

and

social system, re-

gional and global assets. Military forces have a duty to prepare for short, intense

operations that do not annihilate, and for a long, painful, uncertain and costly pe-

They have to focus on strengthening their powers of deterrence,
and "reassurance" more than their capability to destroy. Reassurance

riod of insecurity.
dissuasion,
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has a focal point in the military because

it

has to be credible and flexible, but

it

comprises both economic aid and confidence building measures. The military

have to be prepared to participate

in the

temporary

administration of

territorial

foreign countries, under different cultural situations.

When

operations begin, the military should use a reasonable excess of power to

secure major objectives and defeat the
excess of power

and safeguard basic

enemy

forces.

They have

critical infrastructure

"manage" the

to

needed

for post-war op-

erations

and reconstruction. After major operations have been completed, they

must be

in control of those providing security

framework

for rehabilitation.

police until security

is

ized violence

is

They must not hand over control

re-established

effectively functioning, until

and must guarantee the necessary

and

to so-called local

stability ensured, until a judicial

freedom of movement

is

system

is

and general-

re-established

extinguished. In this phase, the military have to resist the desire to

declare their mission completed

and depart, the wish of the politicians to claim vic-

tory and leave, the desire of the profiteers to transfer

power to the

civilian agencies

or to the local clans, and the wish of the local population to have the military forces

on the ground

as a nice,

money spending,

non-interfering, gentle "close your eyes

and open your wallet" organization. The military

also has the

gional security and therefore they have to engage

regional

tors in projects that build regional or

all

duty to build

re-

and international

ac-

wider security. Security in

only self-protection or the fight against extremists. Security and

economic recovery,

this

phase

is

not

stability also entail

reconciliation, return of refugees, prosecution of war crimes,

maintenance of law and order, an

effective judicial system,

employment, resources

management, nation building and regional confidence. Security

is

also bringing

maturity and social development to the system: you are not free and safe

if

you

are

hungry or humiliated.

Does accomplishing these things
rule?
tice?

necessitate a long occupation

under military

A difficult and extended period of responsibility for law and order and jusA significant share of responsibility over a long and painful period of recon-

some circumstances, perhaps. Until international law evolves and
becomes more relevant to current circumstances, occupation law must be considstruction? In

ered not as an instrument of invasion or prevarication, but as the only tool available to clearly

assume responsibility

population.

not the best tool

mean an

we can

and obligations towards the

ask for, but

it is

civilian

a rule of law that will not

endless sequence of uncertainty, lack of control, civil-military separation,

instability,

guilty

It is

for

and deaths.

It

will

not allow compromising with the thugs, becoming

by association, and pouring

indefinite, infinite

and unaccountable resources

new failed States, rogue States,
non-States, quasi-States and mafia-States instead of new democratic entities. It will

into a black hole and, consequently, supporting
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prevent spreading violence, destabilization, drugs and terror
will

mean

a real unified

engagement

all

over the world.

It

for a real liberation.

Notes
1

This

is

based on the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."

International law views occupation as a temporary status during which the occupier
first

to

end the occupation

as quickly as possible

and second

on the

the occupier to infringe

rights of the

obligated

to safeguard the rights of the

occupied population during the temporary period in which the occupation

move by

is

is

maintained.

Any

occupied or change the status of the

occupied land through, for example, annexation, confiscation of resources, population transfer,

under the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
or destruction of civilian property,

U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in

is illegal

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

301

(Adam Roberts & Richard

Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000).

The legal status of combatants for the right to self-determination was defined by the General
2.
Assembly in 1973 according to the following principles: first, such struggles are legitimate and in
full

accord with the principles of international law; second, attempts to suppress struggles

against colonial

and racist regimes

are incompatible with the

UN Charter. Universal Declaration

GA Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.
of Human Rights,

U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). Such attempts themselves constitute a threat to peace

No.
and

security.

3.

Adopted Dec.

19, 1966,

4.

Adopted Dec.

16, 1966,

5.

Supra note

16, at 66,

999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS

368.

993 U.N.T.S.

3.

2.

Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S.
19, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
7.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, art. 2, GA
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).

6.

8.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note

2.

Program on Humanitarian Law and Conflict
Research, an international research and policy program based at the Harvard School of Public
Health. The discussion set forth above is taken from Military Occupation of Iraq: I. Applicability
of IHL and the Maintenance of Law and Order, Apr. 14, 2003, available at http://
9.

The IHL Research

Initiative

is

a project of the

www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/pdfs/briefing3423.pdf.

Occupied people have the right to resist the occupation itself, as well as the specific illegal
However, it is beyond dispute that attacks on unarmed civilians
whether by an occupying army or an armed resistance group always constitute a violation of
fundamental human rights and can never be justified under international law.
10.

practices of the occupier.

—

11.

SC

Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999), available at

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/

N99/ 1 72/89/PDF/N99 1 7289.pdf?OpenElement.
12.

Established by the Secretary-General under the authority provided by

13.

Id.,

para 9(d).
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PARTY
MILITARY COMMISSIONS

XI
Military Commissions:

Old Laws for New Wars

William K. Lietzau*
Introduction

The

President's exercise of his constitutional authority to direct the Secretary

of Defense to detain

enemy combatants and to convene military tribunals to

prosecute war crimes and other crimes triable by military commission
lawful

and
2

practical response to the ascendance of terrorism.

by many, and

initially

military commissions

is

both a

Though unpredicted

challenged as anachronistic, the exercise of jurisdiction by

comports both with domestic and international law and can

serve to advance the values that long have animated

The apocalyptic

1

effects

US national security strategy.

of al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001

—

the deaths

of thousands of innocent civilians and the immutable gash in the skyline of our

most populous

city 3

—were

pale harbingers of the significant changes to be

wrought across the international and domestic landscapes when the United
initiated the Global

duced

War on

legal challenges that

States

Terrorism in response. That war, in turn, has intro-

perhaps represent the quintessential example of the en-

during impact of the attacks and the

US

response thereto. That the President

should instigate a metamorphosis of old law to address the unique challenges of
this

*

new war was not

surprising. History teaches that changes in the law are often

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps. The remarks contained herein are personal

and do not necessarily represent the position of the US Marine Corps or the
Department of Defense.
reflections
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significant

consequences of war. So too,

this

Laws for New Wars
war on terrorism has challenged and

continues to challenge the limits of the constitutive tenets that have defined our international

and domestic orders throughout the last half of the 20th century.

ure to participate thoughtfully and deliberately in fashioning the legal
are being developed

—would

century

US

— norms

constitute a

A fail-

norms

that

community for the next
missed opportunity of substantial moment.
that will guide the global

post-9/11 counterterrorist activities, particularly in the legal realm, have

been the subject of much
alleged terrorists

is

criticism.

The decision to use military commissions to try

US

a notable example.

tant law necessary to prosecute the

efforts to cultivate those

changes in ex-

war on terror frequently have appeared uncoor-

dinated and ill-composed in immediate application. But this awkwardness

is

most

accurately attributed to the fact that the progression in law required to deal with

terrorism highlights both the confluence of what might previously have been

viewed as disparate

regimes

legal

that reveal themselves in

—law enforcement and war—and the lacunae

our attempts to merge the boundaries of these separate

disciplines.

Paradigm

Shift

To comprehend fully the issues raised by the decision to use military commissions,
one must

first

recognize the significant strategic and operational shift associated

with the 9/11 response. Historically, the strategy of the United States in responding
to terrorism

and accepted
tion of the

was grounded
that the

solely in

law enforcement. 4

magnitude of the 9/11

attacks,

It

was widely recognized

coupled with their penetra-

American homeland, rose beyond mere criminal conduct, amounting

instead to an act of war. 5
terrorist attacks

The almost

would not

exclusive law enforcement responses to past

suffice; the

use of military force had

legitimate option, but also a necessity.

The US Congress recognized

nature of the terrorist threat when, on September 14th,
authorizing the President to use

"all

become not only a
the changed

enacted a joint resolution

it

necessary and appropriate force against those

nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,

or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and harbored

such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States." 6

The

military response to the events of September

1

cant use of military force in response to terrorist acts to

been viewed and addressed

as a criminal act

limited to domestic observers.
9/1

1

marked the most signifiwhat had for years
date

1th

—

now had started a war. This view was not

The use of military force in Afghanistan in response to

was well received both internationally and domestically. 7
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the Security Council passed a resolution expressly recognizing the right of the

United States to respond in self-defense. 8 Days

(NATO) took

Organization

Article 5 of the

manifest

the unprecedented step of passing a resolution citing

condemned

memberships.

Though

the North Atlantic Treaty

NATO Charter. 9 Separate resolutions of the ANZUS and Rio

nations similarly
tive

later,

the 9/11 attacks as attacks

on

Pact

their respective collec-

10

the need to respond to terrorism via the

—primarily

as a preventive

measure

—

it

armed

conflict

model was

was undoubtedly attended by

punitive aspects traditionally associated with law enforcement concepts. Similarly,

new legal paradigm,

in crafting the associated

the United States incorporated ele-

ments of both law enforcement and warmaking. This was no mere academic
choice, but

one required by the circumstances

at

hand. Oliver Wendell Holmes's

of the law has not been logic, but

observation

is

appropriately recollected, "the

experience."

11

We were and remain clearly at war, but the stated objective of that

war was and

is,

at least in part, to

life

bring wrongdoers to justice. 12

In theory, an act subordinate to and lawfully consistent with the decision to en-

gage in armed conflict should enjoy support commensurate with that attending the
core decision

itself.

13

But that has not been the case. 14 The armed conflict model for

addressing terrorism, most prominently embodied in Operation Enduring Free-

dom, 15 was accompanied by a number of subordinate actions that did not enjoy
such a sanguine reaction within the international community. Issues related to the
detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba, 16 and the proposed plan for prosecuting alleged terrorists before military tribunals 17 are most
conspicuous among those that have been the object of international condemnation. Yet, these decisions are a natural outgrowth of the paradigm shift from one of
law enforcement to one of war. Legally and logically, military tribunals are a natural extension of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces; they are

claimed.

18

not a function of the United

States' judicial authority as

is

so often

Domestic and international criticisms of the President's decisions have

been cloaked

in

sweeping allegations of

those claims, however,

most frequently

is

The apprehension animating

illegality.

a misperception of

an abuse of judicial

authority or misidentification of policy concerns generated by the imperfect

merger of the two relevant bodies of law. 19
Executive versus Judicial Authority

The

first

Much

misperception

of this criticism

is

is

the

most widespread and

also the

most

easily defeated.

simply the natural consequence of continuing to address

discrete acts related to the

war on terrorism
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as if they

fell

squarely and solely within
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the law enforcement arena.

—
involved — invokes

forcement paradigm
viduals

A

is
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response to terrorism framed solely in the law en-

particularly

when

the detention

body of law requiring

a

and

trial

of accused indi-

significant procedural

due

process and according a suspect or accused a plethora of substantive rights. In addition, the

law that

concept of trials by military commission invokes a feature of domestic

itself

the criminal

has been scrutinized substantially: procedures and rights attending

trials

of accused persons in civilian courts have been the subject of ex-

tensive legislation, have

been implemented

in detail

by the executive branch of our

government, and continue to be the object of considerable judicial scrutiny during
the process.
Critical aspects

of a wartime terrorist

rules of evidence akin to those

trial

employed

militate against using procedures

and

in times of peace in civilian jurisdictions.

Criminal justice systems are not attuned to

—

— nor could they be

readily adjusted to

accommodate unique aspects of the law of war such as the indefinite incarceration of enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities. Processing an alleged terrorist through the civilian court system would likely implicate speedy trial and pretrial detention review norms that could be completely unworkable during armed

An

conflict.

alleged terrorist detained for trial in the United States, for example,

would have the

right to appear before a federal judge within forty-eight

hours of

apprehension. At that juncture the judge would receive evidence to determine

whether there existed probable cause that the crime had been committed, that the
accused had committed

it,

and

war cannot be expected

tion at

that pre-trial detention

to pull military

was necessary. 20 But a na-

commanders from the battlefield to

present the necessary evidence for such a judicial determination.

War

crimes investigators would likely be hamstrung by a civilian court's

rules of evidence.

tion

and defense

Such

rules could prove counterproductive

perspectives. For example,

investigators will be able to secure evidence

admissible in most

it is

from both prosecu-

far less likely that

amounting

to

strict

law enforcement

more than hearsay

(in-

US courts) or to document the chain of custody associated with

the warrantless seizure of evidence from a remote Afghan cave by a military unit

under

fire.

ment of
tainee's

In civilian courts, these rules are often thought to operate to the detri-

the government, but in a war crimes

trial

held outside the accused de-

country of residence, a rule favoring the admission of relevant evidence

without regard to hearsay or established chain of custody might greatly

assist the

accused as well.

Another
system

is

difficulty created

by deferring to an extant peacetime criminal

that the circumstances

trial for acts

and evidence associated with a war crimes

justice
trial

or

of transnational terrorism during an ongoing conflict are likely to re-

quire the production and disclosure of intelligence collection methods and

258

William K. Lietzau

sensitive intelligence products to a degree rarely, if ever,

ian

trials.

The presentation of classified information

prosecutions, while not routine,

cedures Act of 1980. Those
conflict,

peak.

is

encountered during

in sensitive federal criminal

possible under the Classified Information Pro-

armed

are not normally conducted during an

trials

however, when the sensitivity of relevant intelligence information

It is

civil-

is

at its

reasonable to presume that the presentation of classified information

under seal and the requirement that defense attorneys submit to security clearance

background checks would
creasing the scope
ically the cost

affect

each and every terrorism case, substantially in-

and volume of procedural safeguards required,

escalating dramat-

of mounting such prosecutions, and contributing to extensive delay. 21

There also

exist a

number of

civil rights

and prophylactic

judicial rules that

have no practical currency in a wartime prosecution regime. For example, a
Miranda-like rights advisement
of

US ground

when

troops

is

unlikely to be part of the operational doctrine

they take

enemy combatants

prisoner; 22

and an

exclusionary rule in such instance would do nothing to further the rule of law or
civil liberties

terrorists

of cave-dwelling

during

initial

tion only those detainees

And

if

there

is

statements

made by

alleged

interrogations are unlikely to have been preceded

rights advisement. Certainly

lawyer.

terrorists. Similarly,

we cannot intend

who have waived

no extant

by a

for intelligence debriefers to ques-

the right to silence and to consult a

right to a lawyer during the debrief, there

is

no

value in an exclusionary rule to guarantee compliance. These and like issues invoke
legitimate concerns that have

been addressed incrementally over years of practice

in civilian courts.

Conversely, most actions associated with the conduct of war are governed by far
less

developed

ity in

legal

frameworks

—

domestically, the President's executive author-

the war-making arena and internationally, the law of armed conflict.

It is

those arenas to which the law of war does not speak that hiatuses in the nascent
gal

paradigm associated with the Global

selves.

in
le-

War on Terrorism naturally reveal them-

That these matters have been subject to heavy regulation in the law

enforcement

field exacerbates

perceptions that the law of armed conflict

is

inappli-

cable or insufficient. Critical sensibilities are understandably influenced by familiarity

with the criminal justice system. Those

sensibilities yield negative visceral

reactions to war-related actions that are readily, but inappropriately, analogized to

law enforcement. 23

The problem
areas in

is

compounded

further

by the existence of parallels between the

which war-related decisions may appear to correlate

associated with the criminal justice system

and

the criminal justice system from another camp.
ciencies

mar our

criticisms of those very aspects of

Some

argue that substantial defi-

—

deficiencies associated with

criminal law enforcement system
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an overly charitable extension to criminal defendants of due process and other substantive rights. 24

The

and unregulated norms associated with the
law of war may then be seized upon as affording a welcome opportunity to avoid
relatively flexible

the overdeveloped procedures of federal criminal practice.

Simpson

trial

and

its

The shadow of the OJ

sensationalized treatment in the press cast a pall over any

thought of a significant terrorist

This backdrop, coupled with the under-

trial.

standable need to protect classified intelligence in the national security
alleged terrorist,

may cause some to

fear a Republican-led

tion to the prospect of a media-focused

trial.

They may

of an

trial

governmental overreac-

also fear use of the intelli-

gence protection rationale as a subterfuge to hold secret proceedings that

human rights. This persome who would question the

conceal a related erosion of civil liberties or trial-related
sistent

undercurrent lends a patina of credibility to

will

25

motives of those that elect to proceed within the law of war framework.

may prompt the conclusion that there exists no rubric under which terrorists can be held accountable for their crimes. What
All things considered, past experience

some

see as criminal justice deficiencies

protections

may

and others view as appropriate procedural

in fact yield only systemic ineffectiveness

when

applied to the

problem of international terrorism. The standard "extradite or prosecute" model

made to work in individual cases,
one may question our ability to prosecute any sizeable number of alleged terrorists
in the context of an expensive and over-laden US federal court system. 26
Despite the contumely of some pundits, military commissions are not the novel
simply has not worked, and to the extent

it

can be

concoction of clever Bush Administration attorneys. Since before the birth of the

United

States, "warriors

have used such tribunals to determine the

commission.

28

as

inno-

The Supreme
constitutional the trials of belligerents by military

cence of their fellow warriors for violations of the law of war."

Court has consistently upheld

guilt or

27

In establishing military commissions, the President has sought to

navigate adeptly the confluence of law enforcement and the law of armed conflict,

and

at the

same time

to

fill

gaps in our legal landscape in a principled

way that fur-

thers the interests of the rule of law.

In addition to being well-grounded legally, the military commission decision
is

logically

sound

as well. President Bush's use of the military

instrument in-

volved a prolonged, deliberate, "boots on the ground" operation with the objective

of killing or capturing terrorists and destroying their networks.

to a law-enforcement

paradigm

after capture

might appease certain

To then

human

shift

rights

would create a perverse dynamic on the battlefield
that could undermine the most fundamental tenets of the law of war. By further exactivists in the short-term,

but

it

tending the use of the military instrument in authorizing the use of commissions to
try

enemy combatants,

President Bush eliminated that potentially absurd
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for the

US

soldier

on the

clearly will continue to

battlefield

—whether

to capture or

pose a threat to the United

States,

kill

an enemy

and who,

who

in this case,

maintains no affiliation with a parent organization that, in more conventional

cumstances, could direct surrender.

cir-

29

Enforcing the Law of War: Military Commissions versus Courts-martial

Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban described
the law "the wicked do not obey and the righteous do not en-

Almost 50 years ago,
international law as
force." 30

Israeli

For years, the international law of armed conflict has lacked an enforce-

ment mechanism. 31 The President's Military Order of November 2001 created a
framework for military commissions and set in motion a process to fill this void in
the enforcement of the laws and customs of war. 32 Conversely, cynics view the Order and the commissions it establishes as an attempt to circumvent normal criminal procedures
a kangaroo court that eschews burdensome due process
requirements, providing a mechanism to bring alleged terrorists to justice in a
fashion that favors efficiency over human rights and civil liberties. 33 These con-

—

cerns are partly a consequence of the changed circumstances associated with terrorism.

More

simply, however, they reflect that the President's chosen path

regarding the prosecution of alleged terrorists

—by

military tribunal

—has not

been traveled in decades and improvements to that path, although identified

as

necessary years ago, have not yet been implemented.
After defining persons subject to the President's Military Order (terrorists and

who

those

aid

clarifies that

tried

and abet them

such persons

will

by military commission

rights groups,
tively

and

and foreign

substantially

if

be held by the Department of Defense and,

as

opposed to some other forum.

capitals criticized the

Order

shift.

36

Critics

35

—

later,

steps in the direction of trial, such as the publication of additional

structions restoked the anti-commission

fires.

dom,

their

regardless of the

37

but subsequent

implementing

in-

In the almost three years subsequent

to promulgation of the Order, only eleven individuals have
ject to its jurisdiction;

human

were somewhat quieted by the Sec-

implementing order issued four months
38

Lawyers,

if tried,

for derogating so substan-

from relevant due process guarantees

war/law enforcement paradigm
retary of Defense's

designated as such by the President), 34 the Order

been designated

as sub-

two of these were subsequently transferred to the United King-

country of citizenship, and released. Although truncated preliminary

hearings have been held in several cases,
tion of evidence

on

the merits.

no

trial

has yet proceeded to the presenta-

39

Delays and difficulties notwithstanding, however,

we simply cannot avoid

the

mandate to conduct trials. Every United States president who has faced terrorism has
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perpetrators to justice. 40 Moreover, international crime

growth industry, and

its

law enforcement complement has not kept pace.

useful to note that historically, military

It is

means of

commissions have been viewed

component

injecting a civilized, judicial

chaotic world where killing

is

as a

into an otherwise uncivilized

authorized and the fog of war often obscures the

is

moorings of civilization. This military authority41 has been used previously in three
different roles: 1) to try individuals
justice in

an occupied

territory;

martial law has been declared

War on

Global

Terrorism,

flict-related offenses,

we

and

From
derives

is

violate the laws of war; 2) to administer

3) to serve as a general court in

and the

civil

courts are closed.

42

are primarily dealing with the

may

With

first

an area where
respect to the

category of con-

may be needed in the fu-

but the likelihood that commissions

ture under other circumstances

establishment

who

play into the analysis of whether their

a worthwhile endeavor. 43

a domestic perspective, the authority to

from the President's

Article

II

Douglas noted, the executive's power

convene military commissions

Commander-in-Chief powers. 44 As

"is vastly greater

Justice

than that of any troop com-

He not only has full power to repel and defeat the enemy; he has the power
occupy the conquered country and to punish those enemies who violated the

mander.
to

law of war." 45 Congress has also explicitly acknowledged the President's preexisting authority in this regard.
Justice

tary

(UCMJ)

A pertinent provision of the Uniform Code of Military

provides, "The provisions of this chapter ...

do not deprive

mili-

commissions ... of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or

fenses that

by statute or the law of war may be

tried

by military commissions

of" 46

A subsequent provision of the UCMJ authorizes the President to adopt regulations
for military

commissions. 47 Further, in subsequent related

legislation,

Congress

appears to have taken great pains to ensure continued recognition of the President's authority with respect to military commissions. 48

A common

cry

among

uniformed judge advocates, many of whom have spent years defending the
tary justice system

from claims

rights of the accused,

cause courts-martial

49

is

it is

inferior to civilian courts in protecting the

that military

commissions are no longer necessary be-

that

now have jurisdiction over the same

military commission. 50 Therefore, the

UCMJ

as a guide

the outset,

because

we should

mili-

it

argument

goes,

set

of offenses triable by

we now should

use the

contemplated, or should have, wartime exigencies. At

recognize that the extension of jurisdiction over law of war

violations in the latest rendition of the

UCMJ is not as revolutionary as some might

think. In enacting the current version of the

UCMJ,

first

introduced in 1950, 51

Congress made a conscious decision to continue including the identical language

found

in a

Articles of

1928 version of a Manual for Courts-Martial, 52 which clarified that the

War

did not "deprive military commissions ... or other military

262

William K. Lietzau

tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or

by the law of war may be

tary tribunals." 53

tried

The 1950 Manual

tion to general courts-martial

by military commissions

—but only

to the extent that military
54

trial

meditated murder related to the
footnote that there had been

My Lai

courts-martial to try terrorists

—or war crimes

World War,

the

to trying another alleged
." 56

.

.

weakness in the argument for the use of
in a

evolution over the years has weakened

the end of the Second

fact,

massacre, an appellate court noted in a

some consideration given

historical use aside, the real

UCMJ's

Since adoption of the

of Lieutenant William Calley on charges of pre-

perpetrator for war crimes, "by military commission.

the

commissions

has ever been successfully tried by court-martial. 55 In

during the well-documented

Lack of

or other mili-

for Courts-Martial also extended that jurisdic-

already possessed such jurisdiction as a matter of custom.

UCMJ, no war crime

...

UCMJ

more

general sense

its utility

—

is

that

in this regard. Since

has been continuously modified,

not to account for expanded jurisdiction involving violations of the law of war,

but in response to perceived due process deficiencies in the forum
ity

—

the possibil-

of trials inadequately sensitive to defendant rights that prevailed during

War

and the years immediately

II

courts-martial look very

What

much

thereafter.

The response has been

like federal district courts.

for violations of the law

to

make

57

has never been addressed in the court-martial system

war criminals

Word

is

the ability to try

and customs of war. While elements of

crimes have been the subject of extensive drafting and judicial interpretation for
of the offenses specified in the

all

UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial has made no

attempt whatsoever to define violations of the laws of war. Similarly, court-martial
procedures

to contemplate the trial of any defendant

who is not a service mem-

UCMJ establishes no appellate process for a convicted war criminal and the

ber; the

Manual
service

fail

for Courts-Martial

member accused.

likely to

makes no attempt

to

modify procedures

for the

non-

Public perception to the contrary, courts-martial are un-

be a panacea for the problems associated with trying

terrorists.

Substantive Due Process

In

March of 2002,

military

the Secretary of Defense issued basic rules for the conduct of

commission

trials.

These rules were the subject of subsequent elaboration

in a series of "Military Commission Instructions." 58 In keeping with the President's

Military Order, these rules

mandated

to strike an appropriate balance

—

a "full

and

a balance that,

59

purportedly designed

on the one hand, recognizes the

on the other hand, demonstrates faithful
and due process that animate our domestic

exigencies associated with warfare, and,

adherence to the principles of fairness

fair trial"
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criminal jurisprudence. 60

What the rules did not do is replicate the level of detail or

procedural due process found in other

For

this,

Laws for New Wars

more developed

criminal justice systems.

the rules have been vociferously criticized. 61

Anticipating the need for greater evidentiary
sion rules promulgated by the

the military

flexibility,

Department of Defense

many procedural and

leave

evidentiary determinations in the hands of the triers of fact.

commis-

62

This same policy ani-

mates the International Criminal Court's rules of procedure and those of the International Criminal Tribunals for the

Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 63 Though

similar in nature to the concept of military commissions, they operate
ferent conditions (e.g., post-hostility),
crasies

and

are

hampered by

under

dif-

the unique idiosyn-

of their respective international processes. Because the tribunals used to

prosecute 9/11 terrorists will play such an important role in defining available legal
structures for the future,

it is

imperative that

we

identify

and attach

process elements to the tribunal's conduct, but do so in a

way

essential

due

that accounts for

unique mission.

their

Military commissions afford defendants several important protections that ad-

here faithfully to immutable principles of fairness and due process that animate

our domestic criminal jurisprudence

—protections such

as the

presumption of in-

nocence, the ability to confront witnesses, and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 64 They also explicitly

make

available to the

as closed trials, intelligence shielding protective measures,

cedure and evidence

—

unlikely to carry with

it

e.g.,

on the

battlefield

a chain of custody or a judicially approved warrant neces-

to bring criminals to justice while concurrently
is

and relaxed rules of pro-

that evidence seized

sary to satisfy the reticulated requirements of judicial

war; and that war

tools such

tools that recognize the national security-related difficulties

associated with war-time prosecutions,
is

government

trials;

that flexibility is required

accommodating the prosecution of a

attended by concomitant operational security concerns and the

imperative to protect intelligence information, methods and sources. 65 The rules
fect

af-

an appropriate balance with a view to providing justice in the context of a war

against terrorism.

ance

Whether the balance may be off is open

that, at present,

no other forum has attempted

for debate

—but

it is

a bal-

to strike.

Compliance with the Law of War
Another common criticism of military commissions
bility

is

that,

admitting the applica-

of the law of war and the propriety of using military commissions in general,

the incarceration and intended

of war. Here

we must look

trial

at the

of enemy combatants simply violates the law

law of war
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applicability of various
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provisions. In

most

of noncompliance are based on an

cases, specific accusations

inappropriate application of particular tenets.

Given the eminence of the Geneva Conventions, 67 one might think that simply
abiding by their terms

—

regardless of applicability as a technical matter

commitment to
Chairman of the

consistent with a

the rule of law. Indeed,

pressed in a

Joint

US

—

is

most

military policy ex-

Chiefs of Staff Instruction mandates

"compliance] with the law of war during

armed

all

conflicts,

however such con-

68

The language regarding conflict characterization refers
to the traditional parsing of international and internal armed conflicts. While
most of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are applicable to only international armed conflicts, military policy is to apply those provisions even if the conflicts

flict

are characterized."

"not of an international character."

is

One could

reason, then, that the

war on terrorism should not impact US policy as it pertains
the handling of captured enemy combatants or any other matter. The problem

characterization of the
to
is

that

complying with a body of law and applying

While a

ferent endeavors.

may not

legal

its

provisions are two very dif-

regime might be applicable, a particular provision

apply.

By way of analogy, one might

elect to

gardless of whether the jurisdiction in

comply with

safe driving standards re-

which one drives

effectively applies or en-

forces those standards. Self-imposed compliance does not

drive 45 miles per
limit

is

arguably

To

—even though the lower

may change.

Viscerally, failing to ac-

safer; applicable

others,

standards

it is

a simple recognition of

tomary provisions of the law of armed
ble as a matter of policy;

Note that

to

hour when the speed limit goes up to 65

cord prisoner of war status to enemy combatants
safely.

mandate continuing

69

to some, a decision not to drive

changed circumstances.

dependent on circumstance.

circumstance could be a matter of either permis-

sion or prescription/proscription. Absent a required
to drive 65 miles per

Many cus-

conflict are appropriately rendered applica-

others, however, are

this relationship to

is,

minimum,

the authorization

hour does not preclude one's decision to drive slower.

If

the

particular safety

norm at issue involved, for example, on which side of the road one

was to

changed circumstance would require adjustment or head-on

sions
(III),

drive, the

colli-

would inevitably result. The pertinent provisions of Geneva Convention
which pertains to prisoners of war, detail specific requisite circumstances for

—demonstrating

applicability

that the rights

and regulations associated with

oner of war status were not intended to be reflexively applied in

all

pris-

circumstances.

Like the speed limit, however, they are clearly permissive in nature with respect to
denial of prisoner of war status.

Nevertheless, the concern that the Global
nificantly sized

group that appears to

War on Terrorism has identified a sig-

fall
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protections of various Geneva Conventions and Protocols 70

mate concern militating
sion

in favor

of developing

may indeed be a legiti-

new international norms. A discus-

appropriate, but that discussion should be based

is

understanding that seizing on the

regime associated with law enforcement as

legal

the basis for criticizing the treatment of captured

application of law by analogy.

71

common

on the

enemy combatants is a misguided

In addition, useful dialogue can occur only subse-

quent to recognition of the legitimate, but differing perspectives on the current
state

of the law of armed

conflict.

We benefit from the insights of Paul Grossreider,
Committee of the Red Cross

the former Director General of the International

(ICRC),
1 1

who

September

in the days following

of war

terrorist attacks, the nature

emerging new type of belligerent,

.

.

is

1

1th asserted, "with the

changing.

.

.

.

With

transnational networks.

.

change, [the international law of armed conflict] must adapt
marginalized."

al

September

Qaeda, we face an

To cope with

itself for fear

this

of being

72

Nowhere does Geneva Convention

(III)

preclude, or even discourage,

trials

by

military commission. Indeed, Article 84 reflects a preference for "military courts"

term was broadly understood in 1949. 73 As opposed to mandating a particu-

as that
lar

procedure or forum, Geneva Convention

(III)

requires certain

minimum stan-

dards of fairness in the forum choice elected. For example, the prosecution of
prisoners of war
tiality as [are]

must include

"essential guarantees of

generally recognized."

"willfully depriving a protected

74

long as any particular military

ments,

it

The Conventions

person of the rights of a

scribed in the applicable convention."
established by the United States

independence and impar-

75

It is

identify as a grave breach
fair

trial

pre-

unimaginable that any judicial system

would not meet these minimum requirements. So
commission meets those broad fairness require-

would appear that even prisoners of war might be tried in such a forum. 76

A more

specifically applicable

standard has been established since the 1949

Conventions, however, that provides greater detail regarding
dards. Article 75 of Additional Protocol
to,

and regular

"persons

who are in

the

I

minimum trial stan-

defines that article's applicability as being

power of a Party to the

conflict

and who do not benefit

from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under
," 77

this Proto-

among other things, a moderately extensive list of trial
rights that represent a minimum standard for the due administration of justice. 78
Although the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, many have
opined that we should accept certain of its provisions, including Article 75, as recol.

.

.

flective

rules

It

then provides,

of customary international law. 79 The United States' military commission

appear to comply with

all

requirements of Article 75. Perhaps the only

colorable claim that military commissions, as contemplated, are noncompliant

with the general normative due process standards enumerated in the Geneva
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Conventions

found

is

in the

"independence" requirement

of the Third Convention. 80 The standard for independence
erally recognized."

81

Some may

84

set forth in Article
is

that

which

is

"gen-

interpret the "independent" requirement as pre-

cluding a military commission's utilization of a trier of fact or lawyer

subordinate to the military chain of command.

82

who

is

Such a reading, however, would

be inconsistent with State practice since the 1949 Conventions were negotiated.
Military tribunals have always involved military triers of fact,

and there

is

no

evi-

dence in the Geneva negotiating records suggesting that anything to the contrary

was intended. 83 Certainly, any such proposition should be

The bottom
terrorists to

line

when

assessing the substantive

be tried by military commission

is

forcefully rejected.

due process accorded accused

that there

is

no reason

to anticipate

any derogation from fundamental fairness guarantees normally accorded to criminal defendants.

The

President's Military

require commissions to provide a "full

Order and the Secretary of Defense's

and

fair" trial.

Even

if

there were

rules

no other

protections provided by the rules or applicable instructions, military officers constituting a military

commission should be expected

The absence of particular

full

and

tify

potential abuses that could occur

though
trials

fair trial.

it is

likely a natural

have proceeded. At

is

rules,

thus permitting pundits to iden-

hardly fodder for a substantial criticism,

consequence of the slow and deliberate means by which
this juncture, criticism

dures amounts to nothing

to follow orders in providing a

more than an

attack

of military commission proce-

on worst

case hypotheticals.

Nondiscrimination Principle

Another principle of humanitarian law of potentially even greater impact on future
terrorist trials

is

that

which appears to require nondiscrimination

in judicial pro-

members of the armed forces of the detaining power.
To date, the United States has made no statement regarding its
interpretation of the principle's relevance to the trials of alleged terrorists. The
most extreme textual articulation related to this norm is found in Article 102 of
ceedings applied to prisoners of war and
84

Geneva Convention

(III),

which

states:

A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by
same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present

the

Chapter have been observed. 85

While arguably not directly relevant to

trials

currently contemplated

(if only

be-

cause the defendants are not entitled to the protections associated with prisoner of
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war

status),

from the

86

other potential military commission

conflict in Iraq

as those deriving

—may involve persons who do meet Geneva Convention
norms are worth noting bethose found in the law of war para-

cause they envisage circumstances similar to
for trials.

—such

prisoner of war status. 87 Moreover, the

(III) criteria for

digm

trials

And as a

principles of the

Some would

matter of policy, the United States has agreed to apply the

Geneva Conventions

to the extent practicable. 88

read the language of Article 102 as precluding the use of military

employed

tribunals were they not also

US

to try

troops. Given that

no US

citizen

may be subject to the President's Military Order or to trial by military commission,
the principle of nondiscrimination

missions to try prisoners of war.

The language of Article 102

would appear

to bar the use of military

com-

89

ambiguous

is

in several

important respects, how-

Probing these ambiguities renders premature and overly simplistic the un-

ever.

questioning acceptance that Article 102 bars absolutely the use of military

commissions

—even with

Geneva Convention

(III).

respect to the

In particular,

it is

only to post-capture offenses, or whether
well.

90

Second, the language

"same procedure."

fails

of prisoners of war protected by

trial

it

unclear whether Article 102 applies

may

to clarify the

apply to pre-capture offenses as

meaning of either "same courts" or

91

The language of Article 102 was carried over from Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva
Convention. 92 In the famous post-World War II war crimes trial, In re Yamashita
that language was interpreted by the US Supreme Court to apply only to postcapture offenses committed by an individual who already was a prisoner of war. 93
}

While

drafters of the 1949

Conventions

clearly intended to provide procedural

protections for those accused of pre-capture offenses,

was the intended vehicle

for those protections.

it is

Nothing

not clear that Article 102

in the

minor verbiage ad-

justments of the 1949 Convention appears to affect this original intended applicability

(and terrorism-related

Geneva Convention

Yet,

became

Article 102,

1929 Convention. 94

it

trials

(III)

are likely to involve only pre-capture offenses).

not only retained the 1929 language that ultimately

added a new provision

—

Article 85

—with no

Some view the combination of Articles

parallel in the

102 and 85 as eviscerat-

ing the Yamashita limitation and requiring that the courts and the procedure utilized

be the same for prisoners of war as for the armed forces of the detaining

—even with regard

power

to pre-capture offenses. 95

power's procedures should apply

when

Reasoning that the detaining

the detaining power's substantive law

play appeals to both logic and fairness. But the claim that future war crimes

is

in

trials

must exactly mirror courts- martial should not be viewed as dispositive of the current
state

of the law, particularly given that the text of the 1949 Conventions
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variety of competing interests. 96

And a closer

review of Article 85 reveals a

cused orientation toward post- conviction treatment than to

trial rights

more

per

se.

fo-

97

Additionally, a narrower read of Article 102 as requiring nondiscrimination

only in the prosecution of post-capture offenses

is

consistent with the underlying

theory of prisoner of war "assimilation" in the armed force of the detaining power;
that

is,

once captured, a prisoner of war must obey the rules and regulations that

apply to the armed forces of the detaining power. 98 Such assimilation has no application

when

the issue

Setting aside for a

is

pre-capture, that

is,

pre-assimilation crimes. 99

moment the colorable argument that Article

102 does not ap-

would be prosecuted,
the question persists as to the meaning of "same courts" and "same procedure."
"Same" may be read to mean: what is jurisdictionally available, what has been used
ply to pre-capture offenses such as those for which terrorists

historically,

what would likely be used

in the future, or

some other criteria. Indeed,

no US court has considered the meaning of this term in this context. Although the
"same courts" language may have a straightforward meaning and application when
applied to a detaining power that prosecutes its service members in only one forum,

it is

not so straightforward in the case of the United

may prosecute members

United States

including Article

III

Article 102

of the armed forces in any

courts, courts-martial,

different aspects of "sameness" that

may be read to

by any of the same courts

States.

number of fora,

and military commissions, there

are

may apply.

require only that prisoners of war

that

Given that the

must be sentenced

may have jurisdiction over a US service member. 100

Because jurisdiction can be determined without regard to subjective intent, the
greatest degree of clarity

and precision inhabits

ing of Article 102

it

is

that

this interpretation.

Another read-

requires prisoners of war to be sentenced

courts that have historically sentenced

US service members.

by the same

This approach would

look beyond bare jurisdiction to determine what courts and procedures have been
"typically"

courts

used and require that prisoners of war be subject to

and under the same procedures

as past trials of

US

analysis illuminates another potential problem, however.

would

militate in favor of the court-martial

forum

trial

service

by the same

members. This

While recent history

for standard military or civilian

would not be the case for violations of the international law of armed
In fact, law of war violations by service members have only been prose-

offenses, such
conflict.

cuted, as such,
Finally,

by military commission. 101

another possible reading

is

that the cases to

which prisoner of war pros-

ecutions should be

compared are those hypothetical cases that could arise from the

same area or same

conflict.

to prosecute

its

service

Thus, to the extent that the executive evidences intent

members

prisoners of war from that

in a particular

manner

in a particular conflict,

same conflict should be subject to those same courts and
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exercise of court-martial jurisdiction in

contradistinction to historic uses of military commissions for

war crimes warrants

some consideration of this possibility. 102
The above discussion of the last two possibilities posed begs the question of
what crime would apply for purposes of conducting the analysis. 103 Certainly the
type of offense must play some role. If US soldiers most frequently find themselves
in traffic court to deal with moving violations, does that mean that traffic court is
an appropriate forum for war crimes committed by prisoners of war? If we limit
our review in this regard only to violations of the law of war, we are left either with
the conclusion that violations of the law of war must be tried by military commissions or a determination that future

war crimes

will

be tried by courts-martial. 104

The idea that any "same courts" and "same procedure" procedure analysis must
assume that the crime charged is the same as well is also consistent with the other
relevant provisions in Geneva Convention (III). 105 Assuming this to be the case,
note that Article III courts, courts-martial, and military commissions, each have
certain jurisdictional authority to prosecute war crimes.
Article III courts probably have the narrowest range of authority with respect to

law of war violations, 106 although recent developments with respect to the "material

support to terrorism" charge

stantive

the

conduct of terrorism.

War Crimes

may give them equal or better coverage over sub-

107

Only

specified

Act, including crimes identified as "grave breaches" under the

Geneva Convention. 108 Subject matter
prisoners of war) only

if

jurisdiction extends to aliens (including

the victim of the

war crime

forces or a national of the United States. 109

US

service

war crimes are chargeable under

members

The Act

is

a

member of the US armed

also authorizes prosecution of

irrespective of the status of the victim. 110

Were prisoners of war to be prosecuted in Article III courts, a pure jurisdictional
understanding of "sameness" would support an argument that the requirements
of Article 102 had been met. That

is,

because

enumerated violations of the laws of war

maybe.

Historically, though,

US

service

members may be tried

for

in Article III courts, prisoners of war also

US service members have not been tried in Article III

courts for violations of the laws of war or even for crimes that could have been

charged as such.

As previously mentioned, prisoners of war are subject
for violations of the

Additionally,

to trial

by courts-martial

UCMJ committed after establishing prisoner of war status. 111

U.S. C. § 8 1 8 appears to establish jurisdiction over a broader group

1

of persons triable under the law of war. 112 This could include jurisdiction over prisoners of war during the period of time preceding their attainment of prisoner of

war
been

status.

113

satisfied

The claim

that Article 102's nondiscrimination requirement

had

then could be grounded in jurisdiction or perhaps historical use.
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Historical use, however,

would cut

in different directions.

though courts-martial have jurisdiction to

US

the one hand,

al-

try violators of the laws of war, they

UCMJ

have not been employed for that purpose since the
other hand, the United States has sent

On

service

members

crimes that could have been charged as war crimes.

was enacted.

On

the

to courts-martial for

114

Nevertheless, there are other complications attending the court-martial route

worth noting. Because courts-martial have been designed with an emphasis on
prosecution of US service members, certain adjustments to the procedures would

have to be effected to permit the process to function properly in the

of a pris-

trial

oner of war. From a practical perspective, procedures such as rules for membership

on panels 115 and the conduct of
modification to
over,

fit

pretrial

confinement reviews 116 would require

More-

the unique circumstances attending prisoners of war.

one might argue that given the Calley precedent of charging what could be a

war crime

as

UCMJ, one

an enumerated offense under the

could not claim that

prosecution of a prisoner of war was proceeding under the "same procedures." For

example, for the same factual offense, a

murder

US service member would be charged with

(subject to the elements of that charge as well as the sentence limitations)

while a prisoner of war would be charged with a law of war violation (with no enu-

merated elements or sentence limitations). Thus, although the court-martial
at first

seem

veals a

more complicated and

a comfortable

fit

Finally, assessing military

they easily

fit

with the requirements of Article 102, a closer look repotentially problematic relationship. 117

commissions from an Article 102 perspective, we find

a jurisdictional

method of analysis.

Past precedent

military commissions

may be used to try US citizens.

and non-citizens

—whether or not members of

rection

alike

and control, maybe subject

Y

18

for a similar crime.

sions have been

From

clear that

"citizens

the military, or under

its

di-

to the jurisdiction of a military commission for

would be by one of the same courts

member

makes

As one court held,

violations of the law of war." 119 Thus, trial of prisoners of war

sion

may

by military commis-

that has jurisdiction over a

US

a historical use perspective, military

convened against US

service

members,

120

service

commis-

indeed, even against

"camp-followers and other civilians employed by the government in connection
with the army." 121

On

the other hand,

no

military

commissions have been con-

vened since the period immediately following World

War

II.

One adjustment to the current state of affairs could improve the perception that
the

trial

of prisoners of war by military commission comports with the nondis-

crimination principle; that would be to modify the President's Military Order establishing

commissions so

course, an even stronger

as not to exclude

US

citizens

from

its

jurisdiction.

Of

argument that the military commission forum complies
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with the requirement of nondiscrimination could be

were brought before such tribunals.

actually

In fact, were

it

not for the wartime setting,

martial nor military commissions

propriate offenses.
that military

123

It is

only

made

if

US

service

it

would appear

that neither courts-

would have sufficient jurisdiction

when

members

122

terrorist

to address ap-

conduct amounts to an act of war

commission or expanded court-martial jurisdiction engages. 124 Thus,

the concept of military commissions languished in desuetude during the
years. This, in turn, explains

why the
after

50

parameters of the governing substantive law

were not addressed during the same period. As has always been the

ment of the law of war comes

last

changes to war

case, develop-

itself.

Conclusion

So what

is

the best

way to bring terrorists to justice?

prior to September 11, 2001, but the collapse of

posed on

us, as

Certainly that question existed

New York's

tallest

buildings im-

Americans, and as citizens of the world, a mandate to find an an-

we have moved toward an answer, but there
remains much work yet to be done. Our challenge is to answer that question delib-

swer. Today, almost three years later,

erately.

As the United

terrorists, history will

Nuremberg, we are

States proceeds with military

trials

be written. As in the aftermath of World

in the process of establishing a future

of alleged

War

II

and

world order. September

2001 stands out conspicuously as a historic inflection point, but the long-term

1 1,

impact of that day ultimately
in

commission

its

may prove to be the new legal paradigms established

wake.

The manner and tempo at which legal transformation takes place is important
to preserving and improving international cooperation. Many US allies evinced
discontent early in observing the shift from addressing terrorism solely as a law enforcement matter. The best United States response will be in making a point of
consciously influencing appropriate and useful changes to the law of war. The law
needs to adapt and adjust, and we are in the best position both to identify that need
and to lead the way in satisfying it. It has always been both "our national interest"
and "in our national interest" to establish the rule of law domestically and internationally.
lish

And

the United States today has an unprecedented opportunity to estab-

an international order based on the rule of law. The war on terrorism should be

pursued to victory, but

most

it

should also be pursued in such a way as to develop the law

effectively.

It is

too easy to simply criticize something that represents change

—and

that

is

the case with most criticism of military commissions. Over the past several years,
the United States

Government has faced

the challenge of attempting to apply the
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existing laws of

war

to the Global

please everyone, but neither does

War on
it

may

Terrorism. That application

not

deserve the condemnation associated with

claims of denigrating the rule of law. As in the aftermath of past conflicts, interna-

moved forward by effectively establishing a pattern of State practice
eventually may be adopted as customary law or codified by convention. That

tional law has

that

process

is

at

If there is

sions,

it is

work today.
one legitimate criticism of the US decision to

the failure to explain adequately

its

legal

initiate military

commis-

reasoning to reluctant

allies.

A

key component to any planned evolution of existing law through a consistent State
practice

is

the public articulation of the norm, values, and principles guiding that

practice. State practice

is

almost meaningless

nation does not accompany

its

execution.

125

if a

deontologically acceptable expla-

Our

State practice, without explana-

more than fuel for criticism based on inconsistency or
ignorance. In this regard, enough cannot be said about the importance of clearly
engaging and communicating with the international community. To shape the law
intentionally, we must communicate why certain decisions are consistent with the
both to effectuate the
rule of law as we see it, and, if change is needed, our intent
tion,

amounts

to nothing

—

change

itself,

and

to

maximize our standing

to

do

so.

Alone, neither the law governing domestic criminal enforcement nor that governing war
future

is

is

to adjust or perhaps

future. Military
legal

and

The work of the

well situated to address the ascendance of terrorism.

merge these paradigms in a way that contemplates the

commissions are

as

good

a potential

component

to such a future

regime as any. They represent both a well-founded precedent from the

a forward-looking

change for the future. The task before us

cedent, but rather to build
law, criminal law,

on the foundation of existing law

and the law of armed conflict

tenets, justly, to the challenges

—

as

is

past,

not to reject pre-

—national

security

we seek to apply their relevant

of the war on terrorism.

We

can expect that such

change will be accompanied by a bit of anguish and perhaps a few missteps, but we

must not be dissuaded by the fact that change never comes easily.
The law of war has been written primarily in the aftermath of crisis
address the concerns of past conflicts

—with the hope of providing

ance for those of the future. That hope having seen

its

—

crafted to

relevant guid-

limitations as applied to our

current conflict, the law of war must be retooled to address the changed circumstances of the

war on terrorism.

A commander with whom I once had the privilege

of serving was fond of saying, "if you want a

new idea, go

been done before." In military commissions,
foreseen adversary,

we do
heroes

read an old

as reshaped to

fit

we have something that is both old and new.

well to recall the paradoxical

among common law

—

book

a unique

In this

it's all

and un-

same vein,

words of Alexander Bickel who, praising the

judges, characterized
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them
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who "imagined
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the past

and remembered the

missions to try terrorists,
seeking to

make

it

is

future." 126
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The United

States, in

using military com-

shaping the law imparted by the past,

relevant, not just for today, but for

all

the while

tomorrow.
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Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 9, Review of Military
Commission Proceedings (Dec. 26, 2003).
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exists vis-a-vis the common law characteristics of our domestic criminal law system
incremental changes in the law are rooted in a priori reasoning and guided by past practice. The

legislative activity

baseline procedural

common

law of war, however,

State practice with respect to
is

is

truly a function of the practice of nation States. Fortunately,

many elements of the law of war has been limited;

unfortunately,

it

perhaps most limited with respect to the prosecution of violations of the law of armed conflict.
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[hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.S.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
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Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]; all reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) at 197, 222, 244 and 301, respectively.

Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5820.02B,
Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program (Mar. 25, 2002).
69. For example, Article 36 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
Jun. 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF War, supra note 67, at
68.

422 [hereinafter Additional Protocol

I],

requires that the acquisition process include a legal

new weapons

to determine whether they comply with pertinent provisions of
Note that the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, but see
Michael J. Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
American University Journal of International Law & policy 419, 428 (1987) (declaring
that it is US policy to consider parts of Additional Protocol I customary international law). The
Defense Acquisition Program in turn requires a legal review of all intended weapon
acquisitions
regardless of whether the treaty is applicable regarding a conflict with the likely
adversary against whom the weapon might be used. Department of Defense, Directive 5000.1,
The Defense Acquisition System (May 23, 2003), para El. 1.15.
70. See Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III) and (IV), supra note 67; Additional Protocol I, supra
note 69; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to

review of

all

international law.

—

the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflict (Protocol

U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in

II),

June

8,

1977, 1125

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 67, at 483. This is not

to say that the law of armed conflict

is

silent

regarding the persons in question.

that belligerents can be detained without charge until the

It is

well accepted

end of hostilities. See Ex Parte Quirin,

Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F. 2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956); In reTerrito,
156 F. 2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). But Geneva Convention (III) only regulates the detention of
those entitled to participate in hostilities. Moreover, additional questions not specifically
addressed by relevant treaties arise in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, such as when
the conflict that pertains to a particular unprivileged belligerent ends or what status a detainee
has when apprehended in a location away from a traditional battlefield.
71. See A Nation Challenged; Agency Differs with U.S. Over P.O.Ws, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at A9; Seth Stern & Peter Grier, Untangling the Legalities in a Name, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
317 U.S.

1,

MONITOR,
72.

31, 37 (1942);

Jan. 30, 2002, at 3.

Interview with Paul Grossreider, Director, International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC), Le Temps, Jan. 29, 2002 ("Le droit humanitaire doit s'adapter sous peine d'etre
marginalize" translated as "Humanitarian law must adapt or risk marginalization.").

The ICRC

itself from the Grossreider comment, clamoring for the trial or repatriation
Guantanamo Bay detainees. See generally Report of the 28th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Dec. 2-6, 2003 (emphasizing throughout that international

has since distanced

of the

humanitarian law

is

specifically

designed to take account of both State security and individual

rights).

Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 84 (stating, in part, "A prisoner of war shall be
by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit
the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the
particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.").
73.

tried only
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74.

Id., art.

84 ("In no circumstances whatever

Laws for New Wars

shall a prisoner

of war be tried by a court of any

kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and

means of defence provided for in Article 105.").
75. Id., art. 130; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 67, art. 147.
76. Some Geneva Convention requirements are not reflected in the Military Commission
Instructions promulgated for al Qaeda. For example, pursuant to Geneva Convention (III),
supra note 67, art. 105, a prisoner of war is entitled, among other things, "to assistance by one of
his

These

prisoner comrades."

accommodated with

substantively important

less

additional implementing instructions were

technical provisions of Geneva Convention

(III),

Article 102

provisions could be easily
it

to be decided that

all

unlawful combatants.
77.

Additional Protocol

78.

Id. Article
3.

art. 75.

75 reads, in pertinent, part:

Any person

shall

supra note 69,

I,

arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the

armed

be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons

conflict

why

measures have been taken. Except

in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences,

persons shall be released with the

minimum delay possible and

the circumstances justifying the arrest,
4.

No

sentence

may be

these

such

any event as soon as
detention or internment have ceased to exist.

passed and no penalty

may be

in

executed on a person found

armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally
recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
guilty of a penal offence related to the

(a)

The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;

(b)

No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;

(c)

No one
act or

shall

be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any

omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national

or international law to which he was subject at the time

committed; nor

shall a heavier penalty

applicable at the time

commission of the

when

when

is

it

was

be imposed than that which was

the criminal offence was committed;

offence, provision

made by law

if,

after the

for the imposition of a

lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;

(d)

Anyone charged with an

offence

is

presumed innocent

until

proved guilty

according to law;
(e)

Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;

(f)

No

(g)

Anyone charged with an

one

shall

be compelled to

testify against

himself or to confess

guilt;

offence shall have the right to examine, or have

examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions

as witnesses

against him;
(h)

No one

shall

be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in

respect of which a final judgment acquitting or convicting that person has been

previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
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Anyone prosecuted for an
pronounced publicly; and

(i)

(i)

offence shall have the right to have the judgment

A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other

remedies and of the time-limits within which they
Persons

6.

who

may be

are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the

provided by

conflict shall enjoy the protection

repatriation or re-establishment, even after the

end of the armed

conflict.

and

trial

accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles
Persons

(a)

(b)

of persons

shall apply:

who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of

prosecution and
law;

armed

this Article until their final release,

In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution

7.

exercised.

trial in

accordance with the applicable rules of international

and

Any such

who do

persons

not benefit from more favourable treatment under

the Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by
this Article,

whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute

grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol.

No

8.

provision of this Article

may be

more favourable provision granting

international law, to persons covered
79.

by

construed as limiting or infringing any other

greater protection,

by paragraph

under any applicable

See Matheson, supra note 69. In the only recognized authoritative statement
a

US Government

official,

rules of

1.

Mr. Matheson, then US Department of

State

on the subject
Deputy Legal

armed conflict conference on those provisions of Additional
deemed to constitute customary international law. He included

Advisor, expounded at a law of

Protocol

I

the United States

Article 75's provisions

among them.

80.

Geneva Convention

81.

Id.

(III),

supra note 67,

art. 84.

Cf Melvin Heard, Robert P. Monahan, William Ryan & E. Page Wilkins, Military
A Legal and Appropriate Means of Trying Suspected Terrorists? 49 NAVAL Law
REVIEW 71 (2002) (criticizing the "most significant weakness" in MCO No. 1 the lack of an
82.

Commissions:

—

independent appellate court).
83.

See

MCM, supra note 57, Rules for Courts-Martial 504, 505

the trier of fact). Moreover,

if Geneva is

(prescribing a military panel as

interpreted as requiring that the trier of fact function be

segregated in a different branch of government, several hundred years of military courts-martial
practice

would have

appropriate

to be invalidated as well.

modifier

for

the

To an American

audience, "ludicrous"

above postulate that a military jury

"independent" to comport with modern standards.

is

not

may be

an

sufficiently

would be equally ludicrous to suggest that
the United States Senate, in ratifying the Geneva Conventions, was acceding to an international
law standard that would afford alleged war criminals theoretically superior trial rights than those
accorded

US

soldiers.

We

It

should be aware, however, that others

may

see things differently.

Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has done just that. In Findlay v. United Kingdom,

24 E.H.R.R. 221 (1997), that court found insufficient independence in British courts-martial to
comply with parallel human rights provisions found in the European Convention on Human

The European Court of Human Rights, which has authority over the
United Kingdom, nullified a British court-martial and established a rule that required an entire
revamping of the United Kingdom's military justice system. See Simon P. Rowlinson, The British
Rights. Findlay at para. 59.

System ofMilitary Justice, 52 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 17 (2002). In articulating the rule of law we
deem both correct under currently accepted norms and appropriate for a future that involves an
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ongoing war on terrorism, we must be cognizant of European and other

sensibilities in this area

and ensure we are not unwittingly setting undesirable precedent.
84. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, arts. 84, 85, 102.
102.

85.

Id., ait.

86.

See Legal Counsel

87.

See Geneva Convention

Memo for Gonzales, supra note 41.
(III),

supra note 67,

art. 4.

88. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet Status of Detainees],

—

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207- 1 3.html.

President's Military Order, supra note

89.

1,

One of the negotiators of the 1949
now legally available for war crimes trials.

at Sec. 2.

Conventions has argued that only courts-martial are

Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL Law 393 (July 1952). It is not clear what consequences
See, e.g.,

reading of Article 102 might impose on the United States, but at the very

this

least,

the

Order language prohibiting trial of US citizens becomes problematic, if not
as a legal issue, then certainly as one of international public relations.
90. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 99 (beginning the chapter in which article
102 is contained with language implying that the chapter will discuss offenses relegated under
President's Military

the detaining power's law

—

i.e.,

post-capture offenses).

102.

91.

Id., art.

92.

Geneva Convention, supra note

93.

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.

1

67.

(1946).

Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 85 (providing that "[prisoners of war
prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall
94.

retain,

even

if

convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.").

See Yingling 8c Ginane, supra note 89 (concluding, in an article published shortly after the

95.

negotiation of the 1949 Conventions, that the courts and the procedure utilized must be the

same

for prisoners of war as for the

pre-capture offenses).
the

US Department

96.

97.

forces of the detaining

(III) essentially

new additive

Geneva Convention

(III),

retained the 1929 language that ultimately

provision, Article 85,

supra note 67,

art. 85.

had no

An

make superfluous another provision of the Convention
(suggesting that

if

a choice of courts

is

is

98.

Id., arts.

99.

Id.

100.

no choice of courts

to

became

1929 work.

expansive reading of Article 85 would

—

Article 84

—

also first added
must be used unless

in 1949
civilian

must be used for pre-capture crimes, however,
and the language is meaningless.

as described in Article 84,

99-100.

The terms of

jurisdiction;

parallel in the

available; military courts

courts have jurisdiction.) If the "same" courts

then there

—even with regard

power

of State, reached this same conclusion.

Geneva Convention

Article 102, but the

armed

A more recent paper authored by Ed Cummings, Deputy Legal Advisor to

it

Article 84 suggest just such a reading of Article 85. Article 84 turns

requires

expressly permit the

trial

civil

by

on

of the Detaining Power
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in

a military court, "unless the existing laws

courts to try a

member

committed by the prisoner of war."
was some discussion among prosecutors about
whether Calley should be charged under provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 821 with the commission of
war crimes in addition to the UCMJ charges for the substantive offenses underlying such war
crimes. Prudential concerns resulted in the charging only of non-law of war charges. U.S. v.
Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
respect to the particular offense alleged to have been
101. In the course of the Calley case, there

286

William K. Lietzau

A random sampling of the meaning of
would
probably
yield a belief that the provision
Article 102 among uniformed judge advocates
simply because that is the forum with which most have the
requires trial by court-martial
102. This interpretation

with inherent subjectivity.

is rife

—

greatest familiarity.
103.

That

martial

is, if

a certain subset of criminal offenses

is

applicable for consideration, then a court-

would undoubtedly be the most prevalent forum, both

historically

and with respect

to

future probability.
104.

That courts-martial charges have been brought against those accused in the prisoner abuse

scandal of Abu Ghraib provides continued support for this proposition. See,
S.

Davis

—Charged under the UCMJ with conspiracy

e.g.,

Sergeant Javal

to maltreat detainees; dereliction of duty

from abuse, cruelty, and maltreatment; maltreatment of
and making a statement designed to deceive an investigator; and
Corporal Charles Graner Charged under the UCMJ with conspiracy to maltreat detainees;
dereliction of duty for willfully failing to protect detainees from abuse, cruelty, and
maltreatment; maltreatment of detainees; assaulting detainees; committing indecent acts;
adultery with Private First Class England; and obstruction of justice. Charge sheets available at
for willfully failing to protect detainees

detainees; assaulting detainees;

—

Edmund

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/. See also
Contrite

GI Pleads Guilty

to

Sanders

&

Richard Serrano,

ANGELES TIMES, May 20, 2004 ("Choking back tears and
Jeremy C. Sivits pleaded guilty Wednesday in Baghdad, Iraq,

Abuse, LOS

US Army Spc.
Abu Ghraib detention center and was demoted, sentenced to a year in
military prison, and expelled from the Army. The sentence makes him the first US soldier courtexpressing remorse,

to abusing detainees at the

martialed in an evolving scandal that authorities say could reach beyond the seven soldiers
implicated so

See also Hearing Scheduled for

far.").

Pfc.

Lynndie England on Prisoner Abuse

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2004 (noting that "Army Pfc. England,
who appeared in Abu Ghraib prison photographs pointing at Iraqi prisoners' genitals and
holding a leash attached to a detainee, will face a military court hearing known as an "Article 32,"
Charges, Lawyer Says,

scheduled for June 21-25, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Article 32 is a proceeding where
military prosecutors present evidence and a judge decides whether to go forward with a courtmartial.

It is

similar to a civilian grand jury.

Abu Ghraib

charges in the

England

prison scandal. England

is

is one of seven soldiers facing military
charged with assaulting Iraqi detainees,

Jr. to mistreat the prisoners and committing an indecent
by forcing prisoners to masturbate."), available at http://ap.tbo .com/ap/breaking/

conspiring with Spec. Charles Graner
act

MGBOZ4HGSUD.html.
105. See,

e.g.,

Geneva Convention

(III),

supra note 67,

art.

84 (authorizing

trial

by

civil

courts

when such

courts have jurisdiction over "the particular offense alleged to have been
committed"). See also Yingling & Ginane, supra note 89 (arguing that Geneva limited the
Supreme Court's decision in Yamashita approving differing treatment of POWs vis-a-vis US

members "for a like offense").
The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18U.S.C. §2441 (war crimes); 18U.S.C.§371 (conspiracy).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 702(a),

service
106.
107.

110

Stat. 1214,

1291-94 (codified

at 18

U.S.C. § 2332b) (defining the charge of "material support

to terrorism").
108.

The War Crimes

Act, supra note 106, at § 2441(c).

109. Id. at § 2441(b).

110. Id.
111. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (prescribing that "prisoners of

subject to the
112. See

UCMJ).

MCM, supra

note 57.

113. Id.
114. See,

e.g.,

U.S.

v.

Calley, 46

C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
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115.

MCM, supra

note 57, part

III

Laws for New Wars

(2002).

116. Id.

117. Treating prisoners of
issues as well.

committed

war "the same"

For example, the

after the

member

is

UCMJ

at a court-martial raises

limits

its

jurisdiction over

problematic jurisdictional

US armed

forces to crimes

under military control, and thus has no jurisdiction over pre-

enlistment or pre-commission crimes. Because Article 102 requires that prisoners of war be
treated the

same way US armed

forces are treated,

one might argue

that a court-martial has

no

jurisdiction over pre-capture crimes.

Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
119. Mudd v. Caldera, 134F.Supp.2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Ex Parte Quirin) Only one case
has limited the reach of military commission jurisdiction over US citizens. See Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2 (1866). In Milligan, the Court determined that a US citizen who was not a belligerent
and who resided in a state without active hostilities and where the civil courts were open and
operating could not be tried by military commission. Id. These considerations would not serve
to limit the jurisdiction of military commissions over military members, however. Id. at 118
(citing accused's lack of military status as a factor in finding that military commission lacked
118.

.

—

jurisdiction).

120. See

WlNTHROP,

supra note 42.

government detectives, medical cadets, and
by military commission in the Civil War).
122. This would, however, not only create obvious political concerns, it would also raise
constitutional issues. For example, in response to a defense argument that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments required trial by jury, the Quirin Court held that the "offenders were outside the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because they had
violated the law of war." Quirin, supra note 118, at 44. Read broadly, the decision may be
interpreted as placing all military commission proceedings outside of the realm of
Constitutional guarantees. Id. at 45 ("We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not
restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of
war by military commission. ."). But there is some risk that a reviewing court may read Quirin
more narrowly and find that some constitutional provisions do apply at military commissions
convened to try US citizens. In the case of a US citizen for example, if the 6th Amendment
Confrontation Clause was found to apply, commission hearsay rules might be restricted to
reflect that right. This would raise the concern, of course, that the trials of prisoners of war would
no longer be using the "same procedures" as trials of US service members (most of whom are
121. Id. (noting that, inter alia, officers' servants,

lieutenants in the revenue service were tried

.

.

citizens).

unique case when a service member was prosecuted for terroristusing either an enumerated violation of the UCMJ or an assimilated crime

123. Except perhaps in the

related activities

charged as a violation of Article 134 of the
124. See

MCI No. 2, supra note 38

UCMJ.

(requiring that the contextual element for each offense,

when

read in light of definitions, mandates a war nexus).
125. See

Remarks by Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, American Bar Association
Law and National Security, Washington, D.C., Feb. 24, 2004, available

Standing Committee on

at http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Mar/ 1 7-83430 1 .html.

was quoting Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier in an address originally delivered in the 1 969
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture series at Harvard Law School, reprinted in ALEXANDER BlCKEL,
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 13 (1970).
1

26. Bickel
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XII
Military Commissions: Constitutional,
Jurisdictional,

and Due Process

Requirements

Jordan
Presidential

The

J.

Paust*

Power to Create a Military Commission and
Jurisdictional Competence

up a military commission and the jurisdictional competence of a military commission apply only
during an actual war within a war zone or a war-related occupied territory. As
President's

power

as

Commander-in-Chief to

set

1

Colonel William Winthrop recognized in his
tary

commission

.

.

.

classic

study of military law: "A mili-

can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences committed

within the field of command of the convening commander," and regarding military occupation, "cannot take cognizance of an offence
territory

—

ment or

martial law

committed without such

The place must be the theater of war or a place where military govern-

may be legally exercised;

have no jurisdiction

." 2

The

otherwise a military commission

.

.

up within the United
States during World War II and recognized in Ex parte Quirin 3 had been created
during war for prosecution of enemy belligerents for violations of the laws of war

will

.

.

.

military

that occurred within the United States

of command

—which

United States Army.
*

in that case

commission

set

and within the convening authority's

was within the Eastern Defense

4

Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center

Professor, University of Houston.

field

Command of the

Military Commissions

Limitations with Respect to Place

What
at

is

unavoidably problematic with respect to military commission jurisdiction

Guantanamo, Cuba

ther in a theater of actual
military

commission

at

US

the fact that the

is

war nor

military base at

in a war-related

Guantanamo

will

occupied

Guantanamo

territory,

5

is

nei-

and, thus, a

not be properly constituted and

be

will

without lawful jurisdiction. Moreover, alleged violations of the laws of war during

war in Afghanistan or Iraq clearly did not occur in Cuba. Another problem with
spect to prosecution of certain persons in a military

commission

who

Guantanamo

Any person who

involves an absolute prohibition under the laws of war.

prisoner of war and

at

Time of War 6

mandates that "[ijndividual or mass

.

.

.

not a

49 of the Geneva Con-

territory. Article

vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

territory

is

captured in occupied territory in Afghanistan or Iraq

is

must not be transferred out of occupied

from occupied

re-

.

forcible transfers

.

.

expressly

of protected persons

are prohibited, regardless of their motive." 7 Further,

"unlawful deportation or transfer"

is

breach" of the Geneva Convention. 8

not merely a war crime;

To

it is

also a "grave

correct such violations of the laws of war,

who are not prisoners of war and who were captured in occupied territory
and eventually found at Guantanamo or other areas under US control outside of
persons

occupied territory should be returned to the territory where they were captured.

Limitations with Respect to

Time

The

a military commission's jurisdiction are limited in

President's

power and

terms of time to a circumstance of actual war until peace
General Henry Halleck wrote early during the
"are established
chief,

are

last

is

finalized. 9

century, military commissions

by the President, by virtue of his war power

and have jurisdiction of cases

war courts and can

exist

arising

As Major

as

commander-in-

under the laws of war," adding: "[they]

only in time of war." 10 Similarly, in 1865 Attorney

General Speed formally advised the President:

A

military tribunal exists

Congress

under and according to the Constitution in time of war.

may prescribe how all such tribunals are to be constituted, what shall be their
and mode of procedure. Should Congress fail to create such tribunals,

jurisdiction,

must be constituted according to the laws and
They may take cognizance of such offences as the laws of

then, under the Constitution, they

usages of civilized warfare.

war permit .... In time of peace neither Congress nor the military can
military tribunals, except such as are

made

in

Constitution which gives to Congress the power "to
the land and naval forces."

11
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create

any

pursuance of that clause of the

make

rules for the

government of

Jordan J. Paust

From

the Attorney General's opinion, one can recognize that relevant presidential

power is tied to a war circumstance and law of war competencies such as the competence of a war-related occupying power to set up a military commission to try
violations of the laws of war in accordance with the laws of war.

Crimes Triable Before Military Commissions
Since their authority is tied to war powers, military commissions generally have ju-

war crimes, which

risdiction only over

are violations of the laws of war. In fact,

some writers have stated that military commissions have jurisdiction only over war
crimes. 12 In 10 U.S.C. Sections 818
military

commission

statute or

and 821, Congress has only expressly conferred

jurisdiction for prosecution of "offenders or offenses that

by

by the law of war may be tried by military commissions." Such a congres-

sional grant of competence, without additional grants of jurisdiction over offenders or offenses

by statute,

that the law of

limits the offenders

war permits

and offenses

that are triable to those

The Supreme
when Congress enacted the 1916 Articles of War,

to be tried in a military commission.

Court has also recognized that

which contained similar language, Congress "gave sanction" to uses of a "military

commission contemplated by the common law of war." 13 Section 4(A) of the
Order

dent's 2001 Military

by military commission."
military

commission

In practice,

some

15

14

states that

convened

war,

war (such

on

A war-related occupying power ac-

competence under the international law of war to maintain law

is

bound

and

to prosecute various crimes. 17 Since inter-

faithfully to execute here or

power

abroad

when

in

time of peace or

to execute laws of

competence

war

the United States

19

is

trial

that

Con-

in 10 U.S.C. Section 821, since the

of war with respect to war-related occupation permits the
offenses. Thus,

United States and law

occupying power to prosecute such crimes.

a war-related

gress has also conferred such a

and

humanity occur-

when, but only when, the military commissions were

the President actually has an enhanced

confer powers

as crimes against

a constitutionally based part of the law of the

that the President
18

II)

in the occupied territory
is

war crimes.

military commissions have addressed other crimes under in-

in war-related occupied territory. 16

national law

whether the law of war allows a

is

to address crimes other than

World War

tually has a greater

and order

accused shall be tried for "offenses triable

Thus, one question

ternational law that occurred during
ring during

Presi-

law

of such offenders

exercising a war-related occupying

power, a military commission in such territory could prosecute crimes other than

war crimes because of a special competence conferred by the law of war concerning
war-related occupation.
it is

Where

the United States

is

not such an occupying power,

apparent that military commission jurisdiction can be permissible in a theater

of war but will be limited to prosecution of war crimes.
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Guantanamo

Again, military commissions at

are not within a theater of war or

war-related occupied territory and have no such jurisdiction. 20 Even

if

they were

constituted in an actual theater of war such as Afghanistan or Iraq, questions have

been raised whether the current
struction No. 2

21

is

partly

list

of crimes

set forth in Military

improper because

it

attempts to

list

Commission

In-

crimes that are not

prosecutable as war crimes as such despite a statement that the "crimes and ele-

ments derive from the law of armed

conflict,

.

.

.

the law of war" and "constitute vi-

olations of the law of armed conflict or offenses that, consistent with that

by military commission."

law, are triable
stated that the

22

Human

For example,

23

which the laws of war apply.
se;

Rights First has

includes crimes that are not war crimes and that offenses

list

prosecutable by military commission must occur during an

crimes per

body of

The

list

armed

conflict to

does include some crimes that are not war

but conduct relevant to some of the crimes, such as "hijacking or

hazarding a vessel or aircraft" 24 and "terrorism," 25 could constitute a war crime

during actual war in a given circumstance and the Instruction requires that "[t]he

conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed
fact,

terrorism

crimes.

27

is

Some

not

conflict." 26 In

new to the laws of war and some forms of "terrorism"

crimes on the

list

can be war crimes

if

are

war

they are committed against

persons or property protected from attack or destruction by the laws of war. These

could involve murder or destruction of property28
or destruction were war crimes.

29

Yet,

a given context the

some of the crimes

against the state as such or "pure political offenses"
include: "aiding the

if in

30

listed are

murder

merely crimes

and are not war crimes. These

enemy, spying, 31 perjury or false testimony, and obstruction of

justice related to military

commissions." 32 The

correctly notes that definitions of

"armed

Human

Rights First Report also

conflict" are too

broad with respect to

the laws of war and that an attempted jurisdictional reach through such a definition

and concepts such

proper.

as "associated with"

an armed conflict are potentially im-

33

Other Constitutional Limitations
General Conferral of Competence by Congress

Some have argued that Congress must
sions

and

that Congress has not

authorize the creation of military commis-

done so with

respect to military commissions ad-

dressed in the 2001 Military Order of the President. However, as noted Congress

has generally conferred military commission jurisdiction with respect to prosecution of war crimes in 10 U.S.C. Sections 818

and 821; and

it

has done so in the same

general language that existed in the 1916 congressional Articles of War 34 addressed

by the US Supreme Court

in

Ex parte Quirin and In
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re

Yamashita which not only
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when a military commission is otherwise propand is being used in a manner "contemplated by the common law

allows such jurisdiction to obtain
erly constituted

of war," 35 but also incorporates the laws of war by reference as offenses against the
laws of the United States whether they are committed by United States or foreign
nationals here or abroad. 36
jurisdictional
gress

competence

must do so again

gress has not

in

The President

expressly mentioned such a conferral of

in his 2001 Military Order. 37

1

do not agree

more specific legislation, although it is the case that

approved the type of military commissions or procedures

the 2001 Military Order 38 or in subsequent Department of Defense

commission

A

that

ConCon-

set forth in

(DoD)

military

rules of procedure or instructions.

Violation of the Separation of Powers

Nonetheless, a serious violation of the separation of powers exists with respect to

by the President in his 2001 Military Order to preclude any judicial review of US military commission decisions 39 concerning offenses against the laws of
the attempt

war and other international crimes over which there
competence

in federal district courts.

40

is

concurrent jurisdictional

Additionally, under Article

clause 9 of the United States Constitution, Congress merely has
tute Tribunals inferior to the

supreme Court" and,

mate control by the Supreme Court.

41

For

power

I,

Section

[t]o consti-

thus, tribunals subject to ulti-

this

reason,

the congressional

authorization for creation of military commissions in 10 U.S.C. Section 821
essarily subject to the constitutional restraint

clause 9

8,

tt

contained in Article

I,

is

nec-

Section

8,

and the President's attempt to preclude any form of judicial review is con-

stitutionally

improper whether or not a military commission has support

eral congressional authorization.

in a gen-

42

Problems Concerning Present DoD Rules of Procedure for
Military Commissions
Since 9/1
military

1,

we have witnessed

the deliberate creation of rules of procedure for

commissions that would

guarantees

43

human

rights

and Geneva law

and can create war crime civil and criminal responsibility for those di-

rectly participating in their creation

rules are not

violate

US

changed and are

and application

utilized. 44

if

the military commission

We have seen a refusal to even disclose the

names of persons detained and false Executive claims are made before our courts
and media that human beings have no human rights or Geneva law protections, no
right of access to

an attorney or to their consulate, and no right of access to a court

of law to address the propriety of their detention without

mendable

efforts

by professional military lawyers
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trial.

45

to stretch the

Despite

DoD

com-

rules of

Military Commissions

procedure where they can in order to follow the mandate of the President's Mili-

Order requiring that all accused have "a

tary

for military

human

DoD rules

commissions would assure denial of the customary and treaty-based

rights to trial before a regularly constituted,

impartial court;
fair

and fair trial," 46 present

full

47

to counsel of one's choice

procedure and

fair rules

and

competent, independent, and

to effective representation; 48 to

of evidence, including the right to confrontation and

examination of all witnesses against an accused (an important due process guarantee that

can be violated, for example, by use of unsworn written statements, declas-

summaries of evidence, testimony from prior

sified

forms of hearsay, other testimony from witnesses
military commission,

and

impartial court of law;

50

reports);

and

49

to review

to various other

by

trials

who do

not appear before the

a competent, independent,

human

from discrimination on the basis of national origin

or proceedings, certain

rights, including

and

freedom

(since only aliens will be subject

to prosecution before the military commissions), rights to equality of treatment

and equal protection, and "denial of justice"

man

rights to

due process are

Geneva Conventions

armed

as

also incorporated

minimum due

conflict, regardless

to aliens. 51 Relevant

customary hu-

common Article

through

process guarantees for

3 of the

persons in any

all

of their status as combatants or noncombatants 52 and

whether or not the due process requirements are mirrored elsewhere

in the

Conventions.
Clearly, the

DoD rules should be changed. Moreover, they should be construed
and

consistently with the President's requirement of a "full
possible, since in case of a potential clash

Military Order

and subsequent DoD

quent

DoD

rules

is

rules of procedure or military

bound by international

Order must

must

Order and subse-

and instructions should be construed consistently with interna-

rules or instructions are

tional law

commission in-

prevail. 53 Additionally,

law, 54 the Military

tional legal requirements wherever possible. 55 In cases

DoD

wherever

between lawful portions of the President's

structions the lawful portions of the Military
since the Executive

fair trial"

prevail as

where the Military Order or

unavoidably violative of international law, interna-

supreme law of the United

States. 56

Conclusion
Military commissions are "war courts" and their jurisdiction

is

limited in terms of

context and time to a circumstance of actual war and in terms of place to a theater

of war or a war-related occupied territory.
ater of war or war-related

ated there

Guantanamo

Bay,

Cuba

is

not in a the-

occupied territory and, thus, a military commission

would not have lawful

jurisdiction.

Some

of the crimes that might be

charged are also not within the competence of a military commission.
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situ-

A

serious
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violation of the separation of

powers

exists

Guantanamo Bay do not comply with

because the military commissions

Article

I,

Section

Court" and, thus, subject to

rules of procedure

and instructions have
olate the President's

"inferior to the

supreme

and instructions

missions do not comply with international law, which

supreme law of the United

US Con-

ultimate control.

its

Some of the present DoD

clause 9 of the

8,

which requires that tribunals be constituted

stitution,

at

States,

is

the constitutionally based

and they should be changed. Some

a potential to create violations of international

requirement of a

"full

and

DoD

rules

law and to vi-

They should be

fair trial."

preted consistently with international law or changed

com-

for military

if compliance is

inter-

not possible.

Serious short- and long-term consequences can ensue for the United States,

other countries, United States and other military personnel, and other
als if

violations of human rights

and

rights

US nation-

under the Geneva Conventions occur.

They would degrade this country, its values, and its influence. They can fulfill terrorist ambitions 57 and pose serious long-term threats.
As military officers, we took an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution and
we are bound to comply with the laws of the United States, not to violate or degrade
them here or abroad even at the order of a President. 58
Violations are unnecessary.
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7-9, 169-92, 488, 493-94 (2d ed. 2003),

and views of the Founders and Framers cited; Paust, supra note 7, at 517-22; Jordan J. Paust,
Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and
Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATONAL LAW 811, 856-861
1 1; see also U.S. CONSTITUTION, arts. Ill, § 2, VI, cl. 2.
Concerning the enhancement of Executive power by international law,
supra note 18, at 9, 16, 44-47 n.55, 79, 82, 180, 185, 457, 468-69, 480-81.

(2005); supra note
19.

20.

See Part

21.

Military

I

Commission

see, e.g.,

PAUST,

A supra.
Commission
(rev. ed.

Instruction No. 2, Crimes

and Elements

for Trials

by Military

Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/

d20030430milcominstno2.pdf [hereinafter Instruction No.

2].

22.

See

id. at

23.

See

Human

24.

In a given case, a hijacking can involve hostage-taking covered under the

1-2, § 3(A).

Rights First Report, supra note 12, at

Convention. See GC, supra note

6, arts.

3(1 )(b), 34.

2,

8-9, 13.

Some might

Geneva Civilian
inhumane

involve cruel or

treatment, and so forth.
25.

See Instruction No.

2,

supra note 21, at 13-14, § 6(B)(l)-(2). The definitional elements of

"terrorism" are, however, too broad since they do not require an intent to produce "terror" or
intense fear or anxiety but merely an intent to "intimidate or coerce." See

id.

§ 6(B)(a)(4).

Minimum standards of fairness and common sense dictionary definitions require that terrorism
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Jordan J. Paust
involve an intent to produce "terror" in or to "terrorize" a given

human

target. Interrogation

techniques approved by Secretary Rumsfeld and others would be "terrorism" under such a
definition

note

when

they violate laws of war such as those in the Geneva Civilian Convention, supra

31-33, 147.

6, arts. 3, 5, 27,

26.

See Instruction No.

27.

See, e.g.,

BASSIOUNI, ET

AL.,

Commission of
International

2,

supra note 21, at 13-14, § 6(B)(l)(a)(3) and (2)(a)(4).

GC, supra note
supra note

the

Paris

Geneva Protocol I, supra note 7,
32 (1919 list of war crimes adopted by the
33;

6, art.
9, at

Peace Conference), 998; Jordan

Law of War, 64 MILITARY LAW REVIEW

28.

See Instruction No.

29.

"Murder," for example, involves the unlawful

2,

some

supra note 21,

at

1

J.

Paust,

51;

art.

PAUST,

Responsibilities

and

Terrorism

the

(1974).

13-14, § 6(B)(3)-(4).
killing

of a

human

being,

which partly begs

some contexts, can be lawfully killed during a war. As an
in
example, once any person is "taking no active part in the hostilities" "violence to life
particular murder" of such a person would be both murder and a war crime covered by common
Article 3(1 )(a) of the Geneva Conventions. See also GC, supra note 6, arts. 32, 147. It would not
the question because

persons, in

.

matter whether the perpetrator was "military or civilian."
Yet,

is

a

178,

.

T]

,

499.

the unlawful killing of one soldier by a fellow soldier that constitutes "murder" under

domestic law a war crime merely because

by

FM 27-10, supra note 7, at

.

noncombatant or unlawful

Yoram

it

happens

in a theater of war? Similarly,

belligerent necessarily a

war crime

committed

if

"murder"

is

in a theater of

who

kills on the
combat immunity and, therefore, becomes subject to domestic prosecution for
any applicable domestic crimes over which there is jurisdiction, but that the law of war "merely
takes off a mantle of immunity from the defendant, who is therefore accessible to penal charges
for any offense committed against the domestic legal system." YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 31 (2004). See also Ex

war? Professor

Dinstein has written that an unprivileged belligerent

battlefield lacks

who engaged in
combatant operations of sabotage out of uniform in violation of the laws of war); MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 712

parte Quirin, 317 U.S.

1,

28-31, 35-37, 44 (1942) (prosecution of combatants

(1961); Paust, supra note 6, at 331-32 (regarding combatant immunity).
30.

Concerning the concept of "pure

supra note
31.

9, at

political offenses," see, e.g.,

PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET

AL.,

332-33, 367-69.

Spying as such

is

not a war crime.

See, e.g., id. at 854;

FM

27-10, supra note

7, at

33,

ffl|

77,

78(c).
32.

See Instruction No.

2,

supra note 21, at 14-16, § 6(B)(5)-(8). See also Smith

v.

Shaw, 12

Johns. 257, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (civilian who allegedly was an enemy spy exciting mutiny
and insurrection during war cannot be detained by the US military for trial in a military

wartime
aid of the enemy, since

tribunal); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (habeas writ issued in

against a military

US
33.

commander holding a civilian charged with treason

in

military did not have jurisdiction despite the alleged threat to national security).

Human Rights First Report, supra note

21, at 3, § 5(B)-(C). In this regard,

it

9-12, addressing Instruction No.

2,

at

war with

al

Qaeda

as such.

supra note

war

in

Thus, armed attacks by

al

should be noted that although the United States

Afghanistan and Iraq, one cannot be

Qaeda outside of an

12, at

is at

actual war, such as those that occurred outside the context of the civil

war in

Afghanistan between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban or that occurred outside of
Afghanistan and prior to the war in Afghanistan involving

US armed

forces that started in

October 2001 might be criminal under some laws but cannot be war crimes. See, e.g., Paust, supra
note 1, at 5-8 & n.16; Paust, supra note 6, at 325-28. However, the fact that a state of war or

armed

conflict

cannot

exist

between the United States and
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as

such does not preclude
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United States use of force in self-defense against such non-State actors (and the mere fact that the
United States engages in such self-defense actions abroad does not create a state of armed
Jordan J. Paust, Use ofArmed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan,
CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 533, 534-35, 538-39 (2002).

conflict). See, e.g.,

Beyond, 35

and

619, 653 (Aug. 29, 1916).

34.

39

35.

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.

Stat.

Iraq,

1,

19 (1946).

Ex parte Quirin, 317

28-30 (1942); In re Yamashita, id. at 7-8, 11; United
States v. Schultz, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 519, 4 C.M.R. 104, 1 1 1 ( 1952); Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai:
The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 6, 10-12 (1971); reprinted in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 447
36.

See, e.g.,

U.S.

1,

(Richard Falked., 1976).
37.

See Military Order, supra note 14, para.

1

("By authority vested in

Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including
title

10

38.

Congress certainly did not do so

.

.

.

.

me as president ... by the
.

.

sections 821

and 836 of

.").

in

its

Joint Resolution to Authorize the

Use of United States

Forces Against those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States,

No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, since there was no mention of military
was passed nearly two months prior to the President's Military Order. See
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (stating merely that Congress thereby
impliedly authorized the "trial of enemy combatants" covered therein
not that any type of
forum was authorized or, especially, that any type of military commission or procedure
operative outside an actual theater of war or war-related occupied territory would be
appropriate). For a well-argued view contrary to the view that Congress has generally approved
military commission jurisdiction and that general approval should suffice, see, e.g., Neal K.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
Sept. 18, 2001, Pub. L.

commissions and

it

—

LAW JOURNAL
39.

1259 (2002).

See Military Order, supra note 14, § 7(B)(l)-(2). See also

US Department

of Defense,

Military Commission Order No. 1, Mar. 21, 2002, §§ 6 H (4)-(6), 7 B, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. He cannot do so lawfully. See, e.g.,
Paust, supra note
40.

Concerning

U.S. Const., Art.
41.

1,

at

10-11, 15; Paust, supra note

judicial
Ill,

§

2;

7, at

518-24; infra note 50.

power and concurrent competence

in federal district courts, see,

See also James E. Pfander, Federal Courts: Jurisdiction- Stripping

Power

to

Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78

provisions of Article

I

e.g.,

28 U.S.C. § 3231; Paust, supra note 36, at 17-28, and references cited.

TEXAS

LAW REVIEW

that operate as restrictions

on

Clause underscores the inability of Congress to fashion

and

the

Supreme Court's

1433, 1454-56 (2000) ("Like other

power, the Inferior Tribunals

legislative

new courts to displace the constitutional

supremacy of the one supreme court.").
42. The Supreme Court has already recognized the propriety of habeas review concerning
detention at Guantanamo. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also Jordan J. Paust,
Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 677, 690-94 (2002); Paust, supra note 7, at 517 8c n.47, 519—
not unlikely that the Court will

20 n.67.

It is

military

commissions

43.

See, e.g.,

September
1,

at

1 1

Steven
th,

if

W.

insist that there

be habeas review with respect to

not other forms of review. See also infra note 43.
Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall

37 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY

.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),

Kingdom's Attorney General Goldsmith

.":

Assessing the Aftermath of

LAW REVIEW 563, 580-86 (2003); Paust, supra note

10-18; Paust, supra note 42, at 677-90; Joshua Rozenberg,

Terror Suspects Fair Trial,

.

identifies
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Law Chief Calls on US
Sept. 19, 2003, at

1

to

Give

(United

some of the British complaints about lack of a

Jordan J. Paust

jury, secret hearings, restrictions

Evan

J.

on counsel

LAWYER

40, 43-45 (Nov. 2003);

18,

Administrations Military Tribunals

REVIEW 433

FA Mann
12,

for the accused,

and the lack of judicial review);

Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama: Does the Sauce Suit the Gander?,

18,

see also

Michal R. Belknap,

in Historical Perspective,

A

THE ARMY

Putrid Pedigree: The Bush

38 CALIFORNIA

WESTERN LAW

Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, Twenty- Seventh
of International & Comparative Law (Nov. 25, 2003) at 1 1-

(2002); Lord Johan Steyn,

Lecture, British Institute
available

and

http://www.nimj.org/documents/Guantanamo.pdf; Jonathan Turley,

at

The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 649 (2002); Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security for the Post-September 1 1 United
States 57-58, 60-61 (2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/
Tribunals

Tribulations:

AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf; Blair Wants Britons' Legal Status Resolved,
Oct. 23, 2003, at A23 (Prime Minister

[UK

they

nationals] will have

See, e.g., Paust,

44.

under

HOUSTON CHRONICLE,

Tony Blair reiterated concerns "about the form of trial that

a military commission.").

supra note 42, at 694; Paust, supra note

1,

at

4 n. 12, 10 n. 18, 28 n.81; Wallach,

supra note 43, at 45-46.
See generally

45.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542

U.S. 507 (2004); Paust, supra note

7, at

503-04

(also

addressing numerous cases recognizing judicial power to review Executive or military decisions,
id.

at

520-24). See also White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales,

Memorandum

for the

President (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek;

John Yoo

&

Robert

J.

Delahunty of the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of

Justice,

Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense (Jan. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek.
46.

See Military Order, supra note 14, § 4(C)(2).

47.

See, e.g., Paust,

supra note 42, at 687-88; A. Christopher Bryant

&

Carl Tobias, Quirin

2003 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 309, 360-61 (2003); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in
Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal
Order, 81 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1, 10-12, 58-59 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, The
Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 337, 33839 (2002); Detlev F. Vagts, Which Courts Should Try Persons Accused of Terrorism?, 14 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 313, 322 (2003); see also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTITERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 330-31 (2003); Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary, 2 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

Revisited,

LAW

1,

3-4 (2003), quoting the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, Article

which "framed by John Adams, boldly declares, 'It is the right of every citizen to be tried by
judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit,'" and adding:
"Individual judicial independence is necessary if each case is to be resolved on its own merits,
according to the facts and the law."
29,

See, e.g., Paust,

48.
18,

supra note 42, at 690;

Human Rights First Report, supra note

12, at 2-3,

17-

21-24; supra notes 43, 47.

49.

See, e.g.,

First Report,

Koh, supra note 47,

at 339; Paust,

supra note 12, at 3-4, 27-28, 30; Military Defense Attorneys

Office of Military Commissions, letter to the United States Senate

Committees (June

1,

Human Rights
and Counsel, DoD

supra note 42, at 678-79, 688-89;

Armed

Forces and Judiciary

2004), available at http://pegc.no-ip.info/omc_def_letter_20040601.html;

supra notes 43, 47.
50.
at 4,

See, e.g., Paust,

supra note 42, at 678-79, 685-86;

Human Rights First Report, supra note

31-32; supra notes 43, 47. The Executive's military "Review Panel"

conviction, reverse or

amend

may

12,

not overturn a

a decision, or order dismissal or release of the person (or order
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anything

else), since

it

"shall either (a)

recommendation as to disposition, or
proceedings"

if a

forward the case to the Secretary of Defense with a

(b) return the case to the

Appointing Authority for further

majority of the panel decides that "a material error of law occurred." Military

Commission Order No.

1,

member of the panel must
a judge," and no member of the

supra note 39, § 6(H)(4). Further, only one

member must "have

be a lawyer, since only one

experience as

panel must have been a judge with expertise in the laws of war, international law
or criminal law

more

generally. See

"recommendation" system
6(H)(2),

(6).

See also Reid

THE FEDERALIST NO.

will

v.

See,

e.g.,

§ 6(H)(4).

made by

be

The

final "decision" in

more generally,

such a "review" and

the Secretary of Defense or the President. Id. §

Covert, 354 U.S.

1,

36 n.66 (1957), quoting Alexander Hamilton,

78 ("Liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would

have everything to fear from
51.

id.

its

union with either of the other departments

Paust, supra note

1,

at

.

.

.

.").

10-17; Paust, supra note 42, at 678-85 (including

impermissible discrimination on the basis of national origin, denial of equal access to courts and
to equality of treatment

and equal protection of the

law, "denials of justice" in violation of

human

customary international law, and denial of the

right to fair,

meaningful and effective

judicial review of the propriety of detention).
52.

See, e.g.,

GC, supra note

6, art. 3(1 )(d);

Paust, supra note 7, at 511 n.27, 514

& n.32;

Paust,

supra note 42, at 678 n.9.
53.

See Military

54.

See, e.g.,

Commission Order No.

1,

supra note 39, §§ 7(B) and

8.

supra notes 11, 18.

Even federal statutes must be interpreted and applied consistently with international law.
See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (6 Cranch)
64, 117-18 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 1, 43 ( 1801 ); 1 1 Opinions of the Attorney
General, supra note 1 1, at 299-300; 9 Opinions of the Attorney General 356, 362-63 (1859) ("law
must be made and executed according to the law of nations"); PAUST, supra note 18, at 99,
120, 124-25 ns.2-3.
55.

.

.

.

56.

See, e.g.,

supra notes 11, 18.

57. See also Adam Roberts, Role of Law in the "War on Terror": A Tragic Clash, 97 PROCEEDINGS
of the American Society of International Law 18, 19-20 (2003); Steyn, supra note 41, at 3
("unchecked abuse of power begets ever greater abuse of power"). Terrorists may seek to

produce governmental overreaction that sends a message that the targeted government does not
follow law, thus deflating its legitimacy and possibly enhancing terrorist recruiting, support, and
influence or deflating for some the effects of the illegality of terrorist tactics. Claiming to be at
"war" with certain non-State terrorists might also unwittingly enhance their status and serve
other terrorist purposes.
58.

See United States

v.

Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-21 (1882); supra notes 11, 18; see also Reid

v.

government is one of delegated powers and one
that is entirely a creature of the Constitution and has no power or authority to act here or abroad
inconsistently with the Constitution); Paust, supra note 1, at 19-20. As the Supreme Court
reminded in United States v. Lee:

Covert, 354 U.S.

No man

5-6, 12, 35 n.62 (1957) (our

1,

in this

country

is

so high that he

is

above the law.

No officer of the law may set

that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government,

to the lowest, are creatures of the law,
It is

the only

supreme power

accepting office participates in

and

are

bound

to

obey

from the highest

it.

in

our system of government, and every

its

functions

is

and to observe the limitations which
the authority which it gives.

to that supremacy,

106 U.S. at 220.

302

it

man who by

bound to submit
imposes upon the exercise of

only the more strongly

XIII
Military Commissions

—Kangaroo Courts?

Charles H. B. Garraway*

The

decision to use Military Commissions to try persons held at

has attracted massive worldwide opposition. Unfortunately,
1

been caught up

in the increasing political vitriol that

whole question of the so-called "war on
genuine
its

legal debate.

The advent of the

terror." This

is

Guantanamo

much of it has

seems to be marking the
marring what should be a

International Criminal Court (ICC) with

emphasis on the doctrine of "complementarity" 2 should have encouraged States

to discuss

domestic

how best crimes
level. Is it

arising out of armed conflict should

be dealt with on a

appropriate in the 21st century to use military justice in this

way or should "democracy" require a civilian response? Instead the issue has become polarized so that people tend to be either "for" military commissions and
support them without criticism or alternatively "against" in which case nothing is good about them at all.
Part of the difficulty is the confusion over the term "war on terror." Is it an
"armed conflict" to which the laws of armed conflict apply? Is it a matter for law
enforcement, in which case the laws of armed conflict may be irrelevant? Or is it a
new form of conflict to which the law of armed conflict can only be applied by anal-

—

—

—

ogy? Traditionally terrorism has been dealt with in the law enforcement para-

digm

—and

traditional

to a large extent

armed

still

is.

3

In the view of most, Afghanistan was a

conflict with the Taliban being the

de facto Government of that

Senior Research Fellow, British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
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country. As such, the law of armed conflict applied to that conflict. 4
area

is

when attempts are made to expand that conflict

against "terrorism" in general

and Al Qaeda

The

into a worldwide

difficult

campaign

in particular.

The attempt to extend the law of armed conflict

into

what has traditionally been

enforcement area has been confusing and, frankly, badly handled. There has

a law

been a lack of clarity in the pronouncements on law by members of the

made

istration that has

it

very difficult to ascertain what the

official

US Adminposition

is.

There has been a degree of "pick and mix" about the application of the law so that
the impression

is

given that the United States

purpose and rejecting those

is

as "unsuitable" that

selecting those parts that suit

do

However

not.

its

unfair this as-

may be, there is no doubt that this is how it is seen in many parts of the
world including among traditional allies. The campaign against terror does raise
sessment

some

difficult legal issues

which both domestic criminal lawyers and international

come to terms with, but a unilateral
not necessarily the right way forward.

lawyers have to

paradigms

is

Further confusion
It

implies that those

is

reinterpretation of traditional

caused by the use of the loose term "unlawful combatant."

who

take part in hostilities

become "combatants" and

lose

5

The argument is put forward that it is ridiculous to describe a civilian who has chosen to take up arms as anything other than a "combat-

their status as civilians.

ant."

However,

this

is

not necessarily as ridiculous as

it

may sound.

that only certain persons are allowed to take part in hostilities.

der the law of

termed

armed

"civilians"

conflict "combatants."

who have

direct part in hostilities, they

6

—

but,

Those who are not so

do not change

status,

any more than a wounded

—

"unprivileged belligerent."
"unprivileged." That

means

entitled are

protected status. 7 If these "civilians" chose to take a

They lose their protection.
coming from Richard Baxter well
9

accepted

They are termed un-

dier or prisoner of war changes status.

the old fashioned

It is

Such people,
that they have

in

8

sol-

Less confusing

is

established term

taking part in combat, remain

no combatant immunity and therefore

even acts that to a combatant would be legitimate under the law of armed conflict
are criminal in so far as the unprivileged belligerents are concerned.

ant

The combat-

who tries to masquerade as a civilian remains a "combatant," and while he may

be committing perfidy, he does not become an "unlawful
This background has helped to hide what

may be the

civilian."

real issue

here

—

a distaste

modern world for the concept of military justice. The United States, United
Kingdom and some other nations, mainly of the common law tradition, have well

in the

established military justice systems going back centuries. Based

on

but modified to meet the peculiar requirements of service

military justice as

is

applied in those nations

tems that

it

replicates.

is

life,

civil

procedures
it

often fairer than the ordinary domestic criminal sys-

For example, in the United Kingdom, there was never any
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requirement for a judge in a domestic criminal

understood the nature of his plea

if he

pleaded

to ensure that an accused fully

trial

guilty. In military courts, a detailed

procedure was followed to ensure that the accused did understand the conse-

not guilty plea entered.

uncommon for guilty pleas to be refused and a
Ironically, many of these safeguards are being abandoned

in the attempt to reflect

more

quences of his plea and

However,

it

it

was not

closely the civilian system. 10

has to be admitted, this

military justice has got a

norm worldwide.

not the

is

bad name through the misuse of the system by repressive

regimes both military and

civilian.

Could

a military court in Stalin's Russia or in

Argentina under the junta be trusted to administer justice?

It is

because of these

abuses that military courts are looked at askance by so many. The

Committee has

Rights

Since 1945,

UN Human

criticized military jurisdiction, particularly over civilians,

stating that the use of military courts to try civilians "could present serious prob-

lems as

far as the equitable, impartial

and independent administration of justice

concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts
exceptional procedures to be applied which do not

who was

UK

to enable

comply with normal standards

of justice." 11 The European Court of Human Rights
just that issue in relation to

is

is

may soon be asked to examine

courts-martial in the case of Alan Martin, a 17-

murder by a general court-martial in Germany in 1995. The UK system has had to undergo radical overhaul in the last ten
years because of human rights concerns, but in none of the cases that have gone to
year-old dependent

tried for

12

made its

Strasbourg have the Court found an actual injustice. 13 The Court has

on the

basis that justice

must be

seen to be

done and thus

reliance

on the good

who run the system is not sufficient. The Convening Officer
Authority" in US terminology has been abolished, not because of any

—

powers but because of the perceived

had survived

in the

Navy though

the

faith

—"Convening

of those

his

rulings

abuse of

possibility of abuse. Military judges,

Army and Air Force had used civilian

who

"judge

advocates" since 1948, were abolished in 2003 for the same reason. 14 The world

has swung
It

full circle.

was not always

so.

At the end of World War

II,

military justice

was seen

as the

most appropriate means of dealing with cases in a wartime situation. Prisoners of
war were made subject to the disciplinary laws of the forces of the Detaining
Power 15 and civilian court proceedings were to be the exception rather than the
rule. 16

The penal laws passed by an Occupying Power could be enforced by

the

"properly constituted, non-political military courts" of the Occupying Power. 17
is

interesting

how military courts were then seen as essentially apolitical. In the case

of war crimes, the majority of cases were tried by military courts
powers.
as the

18

It

Although,

at

set

up by the Allied

Nuremberg itself, the trials were conducted primarily, so far

Western powers were concerned, by
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and the military played a major role. Nuremberg was, however,

the exception, not the rule.

On June

14, 1945,

by Royal Warrant, Regulations

were established by the United Kingdom.
this

19

for the Trial of War Criminals

These established "Military Courts" for

purpose and a "war crime" was defined as "a violation of the laws and usages of

war committed during any war in which His Majesty has been or may be engaged
any time since the 2nd September 1939." Procedures were established and
evidence laid down. This Royal Warrant

is still

extant today though

it is

at

rules of

in grievous

War Crimes Act of 1991, designed to enable the Government to deal with the legacy of World War II war crimes arising out
20

need of updating. The United Kingdom

of the opening up of the records in Eastern Europe, was,
sary except in so far as

granted jurisdiction to

it

speaking, unneces-

strictly

civil courts, as

military courts al-

ready had jurisdiction under the Warrant.

Even today,
risdiction in
this

is

in

many European

war crimes

not always a

fair

cases.

nations, "military courts" have the primary ju-

This

comparison

is

as

example, in Switzerland. 21 However,

so, for

now carried out by
lawyers who hold re-

much "military justice"

the civilian authorities, occasionally using special courts or

is

servist posts.

There
nals

—

is

call

nothing inherently wrong with military courts, commissions, tribu-

them what you will

—

as a

forum for dealing with cases of this nature.

therefore necessary to examine the commissions in a

It is

more technical manner rather

than attacking them as a matter of legal principle.

The

Presidential Military

Order of November

200

13,

22

alarm due to the starkness of its terms. For example, Section

caused considerable
1(f) stated "that

it is

not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles
of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
in the

United States

district courts."

The concern was not

so

evidence" as with "principles of law." These concerns were
limitation of the Military

Order to non-US

citizens.

into the controversy of prisoner of war status

This

it

of criminal cases

much

with "rules of

compounded by
is

the

not the place to go

and the possible

82 of the Third Geneva Convention. However,

cle

23

trial

conflict with Arti-

would appear from the

text

that in the case of US citizens, the impracticability referred to in Section 1(f) does

not
is

exist!

Why the mere fact of nationality should affect the issue of practicability

not explained. While

it

may be argued

stitutional rights of which they
cability"

that

US

citizens are entitled to their con-

cannot be deprived,

this

is

not a matter of "practi-

but one of law.

Other provisions of the Order
provisions

on evidence,

24

also gave cause for concern, including the

the lack of any judicial appellate structure

clusion of the supervisory jurisdiction of the civil judiciary.
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wide

and the ex-
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provisions appear in the British Royal Warrant of 1945.

The problem, however, lies

may not any longer
The world has moved on,

primarily in the failure to appreciate that the language of 1945

be appropriate in the 21st century, some 60 years
particularly in the field of

played a major part.

One

human

rights, a field in

essary problems.

is

which the United

States has

only has to consider the role of Eleanor Roosevelt in the

drafting of the Universal Declaration of

back to old precedents

later.

enormous, but

Those assigned to

Human

Rights. 27

in this case,

it

The temptation

to go

undoubtedly caused unnec-

translate the Presidential

Order into other Or-

up old language with modern
position of antagonism by civil rights orga-

ders and Instructions were then faced with marrying

day commitments and starting from a
nizations that might, with

were

easily foreseeable

The

Military

more

have been prevented.

care,

and could have been

Commission Order No.

1

Many of the criticisms

forestalled with a bit

more thought.

of March 21, 2002 28 and the subsequent

Instructions 29 were greeted almost with a sense of relief in

some

circles!

They ap-

peared to row back to a considerable extent from the blunt language of the Presi-

They merely expressed that Order in slightly
more acceptable language for the 21st century. After all, it was the Presidential Order that was the overall authority for the subsequent Orders and Instructions and
they thus had to be consistent with it. Nevertheless, there was, and still remains,
dential Order. In fact, they did not.

criticism of the structures proposed.

This will not be a detailed analysis of the Orders or Instructions, nor an analysis
of them under

US

domestic law. That

is

better carried out

by

others. This article

some of the key issues of contention and attempt to give an
international perspective to them. This means that it will not examine the scope of

will,

however, look

at

jurisdiction including the crimes themselves

primarily an issue governed by

US

based on those prepared for the

ICC

specifically

court

It is

ironic that

many

for the inchoate crimes.

carry out for the

ICC

is

and, where there are changes, these are often

international one. This
30

as this

of the elements are

designed to meet the different nature of the law. This

—not an

ements

law.

and the elements of crimes,

is

is

a

US

domestic

particularly true in the decision to draft el-

This would have been far too difficult a task to

given the differences between legal systems. Despite

US

en-

down that particular
route. However, here, in a court operating under a single domestic legal system, US

couragement, the Preparatory Commission decided not to go

law, there

is

merit in drafting such elements. However, these elements should not

necessarily be taken as a
tive

framework for other jurisdictions where different substan-

law applies, particularly

civil

law jurisdictions where some of the

common law

terms are simply not known. 31

While on elements, one particular innovation

mand

responsibility

is

between knowledge before the
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split in

and knowledge

com-

after the

Military Commissions

fact.
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liability for

separate offense of failing to act. This

is

the offenses committed, the latter for a

a step in the right direction

and provides

a

answer to the problems arising from the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in

partial

Hadzihasanovic. 33
Criticisms have centered

and the appellate

On

on the
Each

structure.

evidential provisions, the role of the defense

will

be looked

at in turn.

evidence, the Presidential Order provided that the

Commissions could

admit
Such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military
commission (or instead, if any other member of the commission so requests at the time

commission rendered at
by a majority of the commission) have probative value to a reasonable

the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the
that time

person. 34

This has been substantially tempered

No.

1

itself

by the Military Commission Order

firstly

which required that the Presiding Officer be

a lawyer (to be exact "a

judge advocate of any United States armed force"), 35 as well as laying

more detailed evidential admissibility criteria.

36

It is still

down slightly

unfortunate that the deci-

by lay members but this was so, even
comparatively recently. However, modern

sion of the Presiding Officer can be overruled
in the

UK court-martial

system, until

trends are to leave issues of admissibility of evidence in the hands of a judge, thus
separating the role of judge and juror.

The

criticism of the scope of permitted evidence

would seem

mark. In domestic jurisdictions, particularly those of a
are extensive
are

—and often

much more

illogical

relaxed in

—

rules

admissibility. 37

is

38

rules

apparent also in the

ICC

Statute, for example,

Court "the authority to request the submission of all evidence that

siders necessary for the determination of the truth."

sion

Such

this is

rules governing international courts. Article 69(3) of the

gives the

wide of the

common law nature, there

on evidence

law jurisdictions and

civil

to be

it

con-

This extremely broad provi-

countered slightly by Article 69(4) which allows the Court to rule on

admissibility "taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evidence"

against any prejudicial affect.

While the Rules of Procedure address methods of

dealing with admissibility questions, 39 they do not detract from the breadth of the
admissibility provisions in the Statute

the Military

Commissions

The second

the International Covenant

own choosing."

It

Compared

to that, the provisions for

are comparatively modest!

area of concern

40

itself.

on

is

the provision of defense counsel. Article 14(3) of

Civil

and

Political Rights refers to "counsel

also refers to the right "to
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in

any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him

any such case
latter

if

he does not have sufficient means to pay for

requirement

Order No.

is

concerned,

met by the provisions

41

In so far as this

in Military

Commission

that "Detailed Defense Counsel" will be assigned "for each case." 42

1,

Such counsel are

free of charge. Criticism

military judge advocates.

all

it is

it."

in

However,

made of the

is

this

fact that

such counsel are

appears to be merely another facet of

the distrust of military justice that pervades the world today (and in particular the

human

rights

community). Military judge advocates assigned

are fiercely independent as they have already indicated. 43

sel

of military defense counsel. The concern
It

does not matter

It is

at

because of

human rights courts have discouraged the use

the possibility of such influence that

than substance.

coun-

However, they are

of coming under pressure from within the chain of command.

risk

therefore one of presentation rather

is

how independent

they will not be seen to be so by vast swathes of the
the

to be defense

military defense counsel are,

community

—and

particularly in

Muslim world.

Of greater concern is the requirement to provide "counsel of his own choosing."
It is

true that, subject to certain requirements, the accused can select a military

judge advocate. 44 However, his choice outside that
services of a civilian attorney "at

that attorney
citizen

tion No. 5
his

SECRET

Government" but

including being a

eligible for access to

In addition, Military

retain the

information

Commission

US

classi-

Instruc-

required such counsel to sign an affidavit placing severe restrictions on

movements,

his

power

communications with
British lawyer
ethics

or higher."

45

He may

States

number of requirements

a

and having been determined "to be
46

limited.

no expense to the United

must himself fulfill

fied at the level

is

to seek assistance,

his client.

47

Such

and even on

restrictions

his right to confidential

would be unacceptable

to

any

and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued an

opinion "that

it is

unethical for a criminal defense lawyer to represent a per-

son accused before these military commissions because the conditions imposed

upon defense counsel before

these commissions

provide adequate or ethical representation."

48

make

it

impossible for counsel to

This resulted in some amelioration

of these rather draconian provisions, in particular the requirement that counsel

pay for their

own

security clearance and,

on the monitoring of

attorney-client communications. Nevertheless, the role of

the "Civilian Defense Counsel"
tailed

though here the changes are ambiguous,

Defense Counsel.

is

very definitely subordinate to the military De-

He can be

excluded from closed sessions and prevented

from obtaining any information on what went on during such sessions. 49 If, for
whatever reason, it was decided to hold the complete trial in closed session, the role
of the civilian defense counsel would effectively be denied completely.
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The balance between security considerations and the requirements of fair trial
are always difficult and it is clear that an attempt has been made to find a way
through these two conflicting interests. However, it must be said that it is a compromise that, on paper, can satisfy nobody. Only time will tell if the efforts of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Bar
Association 50 bear fruit sufficiently so that the civilian defense counsel actually has
a genuine role to play.

undoubtedly

While presiding

strive diligently to

needs of security

is

maintained,

would almost have been

at present,

the risk of abuse

is

will

too great and

and dispense with the

would undoubtedly

lead to an outcry

it

civilian de-

from human

but in some way would be more honest than introducing such an

option hedged around with so

The

accordance with their duty,

ensure that the balance between fairness and the

better to bite the bullet

fense counsel altogether. This
rights activists

officers, in

third area of concern

many restrictions

is

the appellate

make it impracticable.
structure. The Presidential Order
as to

re-

quired the "submission of the record of trial, including any conviction or sentence,
for review

by

me

and

me or by the Secretary of Defense, if so designated
The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the US civil courts

final decision

for that purpose." 51

by

further illustrated that the appellate process

would not be through the judiciary but

through the Executive. Again Military Commission Order No.l sought to ameliorate this

which

by the insertion

"shall

in the process of a

have experience as a judge."

including the appointment of senior

52

civil

"Review Panel"

at least

one member of

There have been further developments
judges to the Review Panel

(all

being

53

The "Review Panel" has been given enhanced powers which do seem to go far beyond the original terms of the Order.
The original provisions were again based on old precedents. The British Royal
given two-star rank for the purpose!).

Warrant of 1945 provides for petitions to the Confirming Officer

(the equivalent of

Commission Order No. 1) and reference to the Judge Advocate General "for advice and report." 54 Beyond that, the relevant authorities were the Secretaries of State (in this case for War and Foreign
Affairs) or various other designated officials, principally High Commissioners in
the "Appointing Authority" under Military

occupied

territory. 55

generally.

However, again times have moved on

This reflected the procedures adopted under military justice
as has

been reflected in some of the

modifications introduced.

The

International Covenant

on

Civil

and

Political Rights gives the right to "ev-

eryone convicted of a crime" to have his conviction and sentence "reviewed by a
higher tribunal according to law." 56 In 1951, the United

Courts Martial Appeals Court, from where appeal lay to

Kingdom introduced the
the House of Lords 57 and

there are similar appeal provisions applicable in the United States military justice

system. 58 Here, there was initially a regression back to the position where appellate
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structures are wholly within the discretion of the Executive.

the United

Kingdom, the

ian courts through the
rarely used.
It is

cial

medium

was subject to control by the

of the prerogative orders, even

if

that

in

civil-

power was

However, here, even that supervisory jurisdiction has been excluded.

worthy of note that

years to deal with

been

military justice system

Even before 1951,

in

all

the international tribunals established in recent

war crimes and similar

offenses, a judicial appellate structure has

built into the system. 59

matters, or even a

The days of the Executive having the final say in judisingle judicial body with no right of appeal, have gone. The

United States would have been the

first

to protest

if

US

citizens

— and

executive-controlled processes in the former Soviet block

good

for the goose

is

good

for the

had faced similar
rightly so.

gander and the argument of "Trust

me

What is

— I'm

the

good guy" no longer washes.

To

conclude, this article has looked at three particular areas of concern. There

are others but these are the ones that have attracted the

most opposition.

It is

un-

fortunate that the Executive chose originally to revert to precedents from the

first

half of the last century, appearing to ignore the developments in procedures over

many championed by the United States. The problems are real.
If these proceedings are commenced in a manner that, rightly or wrongly, is seen as

the last sixty years,

unfair, the effects could

be incalculable. There

is

already a growing view, particu-

Muslim world, that these Commissions are designed for convictions
and that nobody can receive a fair trial before them. That is wrong. Military judge
advocates of all armed services in the United States are proud of their profession

larly in the

and

do

will

their best to ensure that justice

is

done. Military defense counsel and

military judges will act "without fear or favor"

and

highest standards of military justice. However, there
a political battle to be

made on
side the

The

won and

it is

the original Order and

its

here ground

is

is

be conducted to the

more to it than that. There is

being

lost.

deficiencies, there has

While great play was

been

little

publicity out-

United States of the ameliorating changes that have been introduced.

authorities have

made great efforts to listen to criticism and to

those criticisms within the parameters laid down.

volved that they have not "hunkered
tions.

trials will

It is

a great tribute to

down" and sought to defend

However, the damage has been done by the

seek to meet
all

their

way outsiders have looked

at

own

posi-

failure to present the case

properly. There has been an apparent lack of transparency in the process
affected the

those in-

which has

it.

Whether or not anybody accepts such a concept as a "war on terror," all may
unite in the view that there is a campaign to be fought and that it must be won, at
least in part, in the hearts and minds of ordinary people. If convicting a few people
of crimes by what are seen as dubious means simply antagonizes hundreds of others, driving them into the hands of extremist organizations, the end will be worse
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than the beginning. The United States has been a beacon of liberty and democracy
for

most of its

existence.

It

would be unfortunate

if

the light from that beacon was

obscured by the apparent pursuit of short-term advantage

term

expense of long-

at the

security.
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PART VI
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

XIV
Using Force Lawfully in the 21st Century
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Jr.

and Lee A. Casey*

Introduction

War

is

not a law- free zone. There have always been rules governing when a

armed force. In one familiar ancient example,
in the 12th century BC the Mycenaean Greeks most likely sacked the city of Troy
because it was rich and vulnerable. As summer 2004 moviegoers saw, however, by
800 BC the poet Homer felt compelled to clean up the story with a justificatory act
of Trojan perfidy the kidnapping of a Spartan queen by a Trojan prince. Accordingly, a more respectable casus belli, rooted in revenge, love and passion, was provided in The Iliad for what otherwise would have been blatant Greek aggression.
Thus, even in the Age of Heroes, when armed combat was glorified and gods were
believed to fight side-by- side with men, unalloyed aggression was viewed as morally questionable. The perceived need for some legal justification for unleashing
the dogs of war has remained a constant ever since.
State can legitimately use

—
1

At the beginning of the 17th century, Hugo Grotius noted
grounds of war are
for

as

numerous

as those

of suits

at

that,

although "[t]he

Three justifiable causes

law

war are generally cited: defense, recovery of property, and punishment." 2 There

is little

doubt that the casus

350 years

fell

into

belli

regularly invoked

one or more of these

categories.

by

States over the subsequent

To be

sure, given the

broad na-

ture of such concepts as "defense" or "punishment," the potential for their abuse

or bad faith application has been quite obvious. Only a hopelessly unimaginative
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and Casey

are partners in the
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statesman would have been unable to articulate some plausible sounding basis for

whatever they might be.

his belligerent aims,

Not

some

surprisingly, while

elasticity

leaders took full advantage of the considerable

inherent in the traditional resort-to-force legal and ethical strictures,

dubbed jus ad bellum, others have sought to leash the dogs of war by devising ever
more rigid and proscriptive rules. Indeed, the efforts to ban armed conflict altogether (of which the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact 3
ple),

or

perhaps the best-known exam-

constrain the use of violence, are as old

at least substantially

instances, even older, than

is

or in

some

war itself. The search for legal limitations has intensified

in the 20th century, as the carnage of mechanized warfare
sualties suffered

as,

and the horrendous

ca-

during the two World Wars have substantially diminished com-

bat's erstwhile heroic luster.

These regulatory

efforts featured

whereby force could be used only

most prominently

in response to

a no-first use concept,

an attack, rather than

strument of aggression. However, given the

fact that waiting to

an enemy before responding can be a risky

strategy,

have sought to protect the option of using force

enemy's

an

in-

absorb an attack by

most statesmen and generals

first,

albeit in anticipation

of the

been a hardy perennial

attack. This anticipatory self-defense doctrine has

in international law.

as

4

Anticipatory Defense's Historical Record

Burning the Caroline

The 1837 Caroline incident, 5 involving the British destruction of an American ship
in US territorial waters, buttressed the modern international law doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense." In accepting the British explanation that the Caroline

destroyed in "self-defense," anticipating that she would again be used to

was

assist the

Canadian insurgents, American Secretary of State Daniel Webster acknowledged
in 1841 the doctrine's validity, although

most extreme circumstances
ing

—where

he attempted to limit

the need

no choice of means and no moment

is

"instant,

its

application to the

overwhelming, and leav-

for deliberation" 6

—leading many subse-

quent commentators to conclude that the doctrine could be invoked only when the
threat

Of

was imminent. 7
course, robust anticipatory self-defense

had been

a well-accepted rule,

firmly grounded in all-important State practice, for centuries before the Caroline

went crashing over Niagara
this rule

was driven

Britain or

force

largely

Falls.

Indeed, Webster's rather restrictive wording of

by the US desire

to limit the circumstances in

which

any other European power could claim a legitimate basis for using

on American

soil.

In a sense, the Caroline doctrine was
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meant

to provide
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some

additional legal scaffolding for the

law authorities evidenced

many an

Webster; indeed,
cient casus

much

an

Doctrine, promulgated in 1823.

attenuated or distant threat were judged to be a suffi-

belli.

Queen

Elizabeth

I

sent a

fleet,

Drake, to attack Spanish and Portuguese harbors

effort to prevent, or at least to delay, the arrival

Forty years
tise,

Monroe

regard for the notion of instantaneity invoked by

In 1587, for example, England's
Sir Francis

and Lee A. Casey

nor the writings by the various international

Significantly, neither the practice

in

Jr.

later,

commanded by

—primarily Cadiz

of the "Invincible Armada."

Grotius endorsed the practice as lawful in his

monumental

trea-

The Law of War and Peace, noting that self-defense was permissible, both upon

being attacked and also before, where "the deed

one hundred years

later,

Emmerich de Vattel,

may be anticipated." 8 Writing over

another of modern international law's founding fathers,

The Law of Nations that a country "may even
design, being careful however, not to act upon

also asserted in

anticipate the other's [aggressive]

vague and doubtful suspicions." 9 Over the next three centuries, anticipatory

self-

defense was regularly employed, whether openly or by implication.

By the 20th century,

a robust self-defense prerogative

national law. For example, in 1939 Britain

Germany

defense, warning

Poland to be a casus

armed forces were

belli,

was firmly rooted in

and France acted

inter-

in anticipatory self-

would consider an attack on
war when that attack occurred. Germany's

that the democracies

and going

to

not, of course, at that time

menacing

either Britain or France

and

—

would have had to threaten Hitler since Poland
was not British or French territory must have been based in their rights to anticipate future attacks. In fact, it is this same fundamental rule that justifies the Atlantic Alliance's "collective security" scheme
where more than two dozen States
pledged armed support if the territory of any one were attacked and the United
the only legal right either State

—

—

—

Nations Charter's approval of "collective" self-defense.
Anticipatory Defense Today

Preemptive use of force has always been an implicit component of American
egy,

and during the Cold War the United

States resolutely refused to

claratory no-first use position with respect to nuclear weapons.

June

1,

in a

2002, West Point speech, President Bush articulated a traditional policy

the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans

emerge" and that
long."

adopt a de-

More recently,

justification for the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, noting that

10

strat-

"if we

"we must take

and confront the worst threats before they

wait for threats to fully materialize,

we will have

waited too

These themes were further elaborated in the National Security Strategy of

the United States (NSS),

1 1

issued by the

Bush Administration
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in

September of 2002.
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Despite anticipatory self-defense's venerable pedigree, the Bush Administration's critics

NSS went

claimed that the

cumstances involving imminent
place,

too far by not limiting preemption to

threats,

by giving preemption such a pride of

and thereby alienating many friends and

American declaratory

cir-

allies.

strategy has always been

This criticism

meant

is

misplaced.

to serve a variety of pur-

and reassuring friends. Most of the time both of

poses, including deterring enemies

these goals can be accomplished simultaneously.

Whenever

an unusually acute threat from groups or regimes

difficult or

faced, however, with

impossible to deter

—the deterrence imperatives may

the situation the United States faces today

rea-

sonably prevail. Thus, emphasizing the vigor of the American preemption strategy
is

meant

to enhance, to the greatest extent possible, the quality of US deterrence.

Europe's Angst
For
It is

ample

all its

legacy,

however, anticipatory self-defense remains controversial.

attacked for a variety of reasons, ranging from the

more

not

idealistic, albeit

necessarily prudent, desire to abolish war, or at least to limit the circumstances in

which force can be used, to the

belief that the application of the anticipatory self-

defense doctrine inherently leads to abuses and causes instabilities, to the desire to
limit

American freedom of action. Indeed, many European

officials assert that,

ab-

sent a

UN Security Council authorization, force can be used only to repel an armed

attack

on

a State's territory

—

after

it

has been initiated. This was certainly the posi-

tion articulated with considerable vigor during the Iraq-related debates

Germany and

countries as France,

by such

Russia.

What explains Europe's embrace of the restrictive view of self-defense? To begin
with, the

European

criticisms

anti- Americanism, since

it is

on

this subject are often laced

the United States that

is

with a heavy dose of

currently viewed as the most

obvious beneficiary of the anticipatory self-defense option. 12 Anti- Americanism
aside,

Europe's defense analysts appear to be more concerned with the possibility

that the States'
strike first

embracing the anticipatory defense strategy

will overreact

and

without sufficient provocation, rather than with the danger that a de-

layed response to a

weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) -wielding

foe

would

prove disastrous.

Meanwhile, the more academically inclined pundits,

who

used to describe the

Soviet nuclear buildup as a reaction to the United States-initiated

argue that the key to maintaining international stability and peace

arms

is

race,

now

to keep as high

of a threshold as possible against the use of force and that allowing States to attack,

based upon suspicions or intelligence warnings, would make the use of force a

more frequent occurrence. Their common underlying assumption
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is

that
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misperceptions, mistakes and hair-trigger military deployments, geared towards

preemption, are destabilizing and the main cause of wars.

These

however, even in their more refined versions, are fundamen-

criticisms,

The strategy, which would require States to wait until the smokestacks of an enemy fleet rose over the horizon and the first broadside was fired
before responding, was hopelessly unrealistic even when the UN Charter was
adopted in 1945. Particularly in the post-September 11 environment, when adtally

misplaced.

may be calculated in seconds rather than days or weeks, or may not
come at all, the consequences of allowing an enemy to get in the first blow may well

vance warnings

be catastrophic. As President Bush has pointed out, even the most robust deter-

shadow terrorist networks with no nation or citizens
to defend," and containment is not possible "when unbalanced dictators with
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons surreptitiously to our
shores or secretly provide them to terrorist allies." 13
In fact, far from being inconsistent with deterrence, a preemption strategy essentially broadens the range of conduct to be deterred to encompass not just the
use of force as was the case with the traditional deterrence model but also efforts to acquire prohibited weapons (or even the efforts to pursue a strategy that
appears to flirt with
development and acquisition) or render aid to terrorist
groups. As such, preemption both buttresses and extends deterrence.
rence "means nothing against

—

—

WMD

Distant Threats
Additional criticisms of the Administration's recasting of the anticipatory

self-

defense strategy come from those who claim that, even under the traditional centuries-old

view of that doctrine, to

justify

response the threat had to be imminent.

This argument, however, does not hold water. First of

all,

although Webster's

Caroline letter indeed formulated the anticipatory self-defense doctrine in terms
that stressed the instantaneousness of the threat, leaving
eration, this

no opportunity for

was not the formulation used by many of the

tional law experts.

In any case, the concept of an
lead time threat.

is

imminent threat

is

this area featured

threats.

not synonymous with a short-

A threat can be strategically imminent, albeit years away from full

fruition. In today's world, for

group that

earlier leading interna-

Moreover, centuries of State practice in

preemption against both immediate and more long-term

delib-

committed

to

example, a rogue regime or a pan-national terrorist

our destruction and

mass destruction, while undertaking

is

seeking to acquire weapons of

in the interim

more conventional

attacks,

poses a strategically imminent threat to the United States fully sufficient to justify
the preemptive use of force.
threat situation that

With regard

we have been

to al

facing for a
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Qaeda,

in particular, this

number of years now.

was the
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Moreover, given the nature of the

empt

al

successfully against such groups

Qaeda-style attacks, the only

is

to

do so months, and even

vance of these attacks being launched. This

is

way

to pre-

years, in ad-

because the way the

enemy

is

preparing and carrying out such attacks makes near-term preemption by the

United States inherently

ineffective.

toppled the Taliban regime in the

For example, even

States,

1 1

attacks.

the United States

had

summer of 2001, or succeeded in eliminating bin

Laden himself during that time period,
September

if

Most of the

it

would not have

necessarily prevented the

perpetrators had already infiltrated the United

and they could have proceeded without additional help or instructions from

their superiors.

To be sure, to the extent that preemption is being contemplated in response to a
long-term strategic threat,

it is

reasonable to hold that the threat involved must be

extremely serious in nature. (Conversely, an immediate and certain threat,
Caroline-style
tifies

gun running, even if not particularly grave in nature,

a preemptive response.)

To proceed

e.g.,

potentially jus-

otherwise would admittedly render the

anticipatory self-defense doctrine infinitely elastic, eroding

all

limitations

on the

use of force.

Intelligence Mistakes Revisited

Another oft-invoked anti-preemption argument builds upon the Bush Administration's failure to find

WMD stockpiles in Iraq, claiming that

inherent unreliability of

all

weapons programs

intelligence

it

underscores the

and mitigates against

trying to use force to forestall attenuated, long-term threats. This claim has

may well

some

some erroneous
uses of force. On balance, however, given the threats faced, erring on the side of being too cautious may not be a wise strategy. This is especially the case when dealing
with Saddam Hussein and other regimes that have engaged in aberrant and unpremerit; prosecuting a robust preemption strategy

lead to

dictable conduct.

Even more fundamentally, the fact that Saddam apparently eschewed, following
the

end of the

first

Gulf War, retaining and enhancing actual

render his regime harmless. Iraq retained active

engaged

in

WMD stocks did not

WMD development programs and

an elaborate strategic cat-and-mouse game, denying any WMD-related

ambitions, while behaving as

if it

already had substantial

weapon

stockpiles. 14

Moreover, since Saddam himself was in the best position to determine when he

would require

a particular set of weapons,

and producing

sufficient quantities of

chemical and biological agents and weaponizing them could have been done in a
relatively short time, this just-in-time

deployment strategy was perfectly viable. In

any case, from beginning to end, the burden was on Saddam Hussein to prove that
he had

fully

disarmed

—not on the anti-Saddam
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coalition to prove that he retained
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The broader point, repeatedly made by
Bush Administration during the months leading up to the war, was that rogue

weapons
the

Jr.

stockpiles or research programs.

regimes, instead of playing hide-and-seek games, were supposed to put forward

various confidence-building measures capable of reassuring the international

community that they were fully and irreversibly disarmed.
The real danger in today's world comes from rogue regimes and
nizations that care not a whit about international law.

As

terrorist orga-

a result, the requirements

more onerous, with many of our foes believing that
bin Laden's famous words, is "a weak horse." 15 In this situa-

of deterrence have become far
the United States, in
tion, for the

United States to accept the proposition that the anticipatory

defense doctrine

no longer

is

valid

and

that, aside

from responding

to

self-

an armed

on one's territory, all uses of force require the blessing of the UN Security
Council, would be nothing short of suicidal. More generally, adopting this model
would create an unprecedented dissonance between the policy imperatives and
attack

the legal rules. This
tual

demise of all

is

a strain that the law cannot bear.

legal restrictions

Not

would lead

to the even-

on the use of force.

What about the
Stassen's

It

UN Charter?

Revenge

surprisingly, since the policy

arguments about the benefits of narrowing the

circumstances in which law-abiding States can use force are ultimately unpersuasive, its

proponents have also sought to use the law as a trump card. They claim that

the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, however venerable or consonant with real
politik imperatives, did

portion of which

not survive the adoption of the United Nations Charter, a

—

Article 2

—

members of the United Nations to "refrom the threat or use of force." The propo-

requires

frain in their international relations

all

nents of this restrictive view argue that, absent the Security Council's blessing, the

Charter limits the lawful use of force to circumstances,

set forth in Article 51, in

which an armed attack already has taken place and, even then, only pending action

by the Security Council. This
of Article 51 and of other
reflects

and

an erroneous,

assertion,

however,

UN Charter provisions.

albeit

on an implausible reading
Even more fundamentally, it also
relies

widely held view, that the

vitiated the entire pre-existing

UN Charter has superceded

body of customary and treaty-based

interna-

tional law.

upon which many of the Bush Administration's critics rely,
neither abrogated the pre-existing body of international law nor abolished the anticipatory self-defense doctrine. To be sure, the goal of at least some of the individuals involved in the negotiations leading up the United Nation's establishment was
In fact, the Charter,
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to outlaw

war and

to limit the right of self-defense so far as to require a State to ab-

sorb an aggressor's

Harold Stassen,

who

right of self-defense

an enemy

fleet

limitations

ally prohibits

served

Indeed, this appears to have been the position of

on the American delegation and suggested

was so narrowly crafted

that the

that the United States could not attack

steaming towards the Jersey shore. 16

Yet, whatever
its

first strike.

Governor

Stassen's purposes,

when the Charter is read as a whole,

on the use of force are far more modest. Article 2 of the Charter actuthe use of force in only three circumstances:

(

1) to seize territory; (2)

manner "inconsistent with

the

Purposes of the United Nations." Thus, the use of military force that does not

in-

to

impose

a colonial-style

government; and

(3) in a

volve territorial expansion, or does not threaten a

not forbidden so long as
purposes.

The

first

it is

among

peace and security,"

17

member State's independence, is

not otherwise inconsistent with the United Nation's

these "purposes"

a goal which, while

is

the maintenance of "international

worthy and laudable,

inherently

is

am-

biguous. For example, fierce debates have raged over whether a given use of force,

be

it

against Slobodan Milosevic or

and

tional peace
tional peace
costs,

security."

Saddam Hussein, advances or retards "interna-

Meanwhile, the

fact that Article 2 refers to "interna-

and security" and not just peace also suggests that war avoidance,

was not the policy goal advanced by the Charter's

at all

drafters.

The notion that the Charter, taken as a whole, allows the unilateral use of force
only in response to an armed aggression is also belied by the actual language of
Article 51. If this restrictive interpretation was correct, Article 51 would have
granted to the UN members the carefully defined self-defense rights. 18 Yet, Article
51 conveys no such authority; instead, it merely acknowledges the continued vitalof the pre-Charter's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,"

ity

rooted in customary international law.

It

also

employs a rather casual language,

in-

dicating that "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence [attaches]

an armed attack occurs"; the term "armed attack"
dication that this inherent right arises only

This level of precision
lustrative

is

all

sovereign States.

It is,

set

of

not defined and there

an armed attack takes

perfectly acceptable

example of a much broader

available to

if

is

if

no

in-

place. 19

one construes Article 51

self- defense- related

is

if

as

an

il-

powers that are

however, manifestly deficient

if

that article

provides the only legally permissible avenue for using force, short of obtaining a
Security Council authorization. 20 Moreover, a restrictive reading of Article 51, as

the exclusive venue for using force, essentially renders Article 2's broad and rather

permissive language regarding the use of force entirely superfluous.
the

common

of course,

principle of statutory or treaty interpretation that any construction

some of the provisions is disfavored. By contrast, viewing Article 2 as
Charter's main provision for assessing the legitimacy of the use of force, with

that vitiates

the

It is,
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the Article 51 being a rather narrow "safe harbor" 21

—

the use of force

if

the Article 51 -compliant set of circumstances, there no

broader

"all facts

and circumstance" -type

is

fits

into

need to perform the
Article 2

by

analysis envisioned

—

is

both consistent with the relevant statutory language and gives meaning to both of
the Articles.

Moreover, given the nature of the
the permanent

members of the

members an opportunity
powers,
state

of affairs. Indeed,

both during the Cold

it is

Security Council,

to block the Council

was predictable that

it

UN system, which features veto authority by
and

gives even

from exercising

a Security Council deadlock

significant that

War and

throughout

thereafter, the

non-permanent
its

Chapter VII

would be

a

common

entire operating history,

its

Council has never acted in the way

that the proponents of the restrictive reading of the Charter expected

it

to act; while

the Council has determined

on

threat to the peace existed,

has never engaged in enforcement measures, involv-

ing the

it

several occasions that a breach of the peace or a

mandatory use of military force. 22 It is, therefore, implausible to believe that

the Charter's drafters, aside

from

a few pacifists like

Harold Stassen, would have

exclusive authority to use force.

When one considers that

the Charter's drafters were only too aware of the extent to

which the obsession with

vested that

body with an

the Kellogg-Briand Pact

World War

II,

and the policy of appeasing

this interpretation

is

Hitler

had paved the way

for

even more incomprehensible.

Anticipatory-Defense "Lite"

Some international law scholars also espouse the view that, while a broad version of
anticipatory self-defense has been blocked by the Charter's adoption, a more modest version of this doctrine has survived. Professor Dinstein, who is one of the leading proponents of this claim, has even coined the term "interceptive" 23
defense. This right

is

armed attack that is "imminent" and

evidently triggered by an

"unavoidable," but that has not yet reached

self-

its

intended victim. 24 In fleshing out

concept of interceptive self-defense, Dinstein has used such examples as the

this

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Thus, he argues
that

if the

groups

United States were to have destroyed Admiral Yamamoto's carrier battle

as they

been engaged

were steaming towards Pearl Harbor, the Unites States would have

in interceptive self-defense.

When it comes to the

wide range of hostile measures taken by Egypt
the

Gaza

Strip

and

Sinai, the closure

—

ejection of the

1967 War, given a

UN observers from

of the Straits of Tiran, military mobilization

and movement of forces, accompanied by shrill anti-Israeli rhetoric
view

Israel's early

From

—

in Dinstein's

use of force was another example of interceptive self-defense.

the policy perspective, Dinstein's

somewhat
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elastic

formulation

is

certainly
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most

preferable to the

rigid

"victim" actively to absorb a

formulation of Article 51, which would require the
first strike.

however, not a particularly useful analytical tool for determining, on a pro-

It is,

spective basis, the legality of any particular use of force.

The reason

for this

quite

is

simple; unless one adopts a rather crude Marxist interpretation of historical events,
in

which certain events become inevitable because of the underlying workings of
nothing

history,

is

truly unavoidable

and

Thus, unless one awaits until

inevitable.

the attack has been physically launched (in which case, the doctrine
ally indistinguishable

missiles are in the air

History

is

from the

traditional

—one never knows

in

becomes virtu-

narrow reading of Article 51)
advance when an attack

up

replete with examples of crises building

is

to a crescendo,

—

i.e.,

the

unavoidable.

when

the use

offeree seemed imminent, only to dissipate because of last-minute diplomatic interventions. Indeed, before the "lights
tion, in 1914, there
last

minute.

went out,"

in

Lord Gray's famous formula-

were several instances when European war was avoided

Examples include the

1909 Austrian Annexation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, the 1911 "Agadir Crisis," and the 1912-13 Balkan wars.
looks at the Pearl Harbor example,
that the Japanese
ral

it is

is

true

when one comes

US-Soviet diplomacy could have prevented

However, the
trine

is

that

uses the

it is

word

single greatest

When

one

certainly conceivable, albeit highly unlikely,

government could have issued last-minute

Yamamoto. The same

at the

it.

weakness of

recall orders to

Admi-

to the 1967 situation; an adroit

25

this anticipatory defense "lite"

doc-

not based upon the Charter's actual language. Article 51's language

"occurs," rather than "launched or

commenced,"

in describing the

triggering circumstances. Yet, to justify Dinstein's "interceptive" concept, the

word "occurs" would have to be stretched to the point where it loses any
discernable meaning. Once this is done, "occurs" may just as well be construed to
mean the birth of a future aggressor or the early hatching of an aggressive plan.
The bottom line is that anticipatory self-defense "lite" is less supportable by the
Charter's language, than either the permissive or restrictive interpretations of Articles 2

and

51.

Assault on National Interest
In parsing the

UN Charter and assessing the legal merits of the various arguments

relating to the legitimacy of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine,

it is

also signifi-

cant that the arguments used by the Administration's critics are internally inconsistent.

For example, in trying to figure out whether a given use of force violates

Article 2,

one must ascertain whether the action

poses of the United Nations. In this regard,

removing from power a

man

like

it is

at issue

certainly reasonable to argue that

Saddam Hussein
328

would promote the pur-

—who

for decades clearly
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sought to acquire nuclear weapons; developed, deployed and used both chemical

and

biological

modern day
cade

—was

It is

weapons on

Saladin;

his

own

people and his neighbors; viewed himself as a

and defied Security Council resolutions

entirely consistent with the

UN Charter.

also possible to opine, of course, that the strategy of

was not

likely to

promote international

security. Indeed,

regime change in Iraq

some

scholars argue pre-

some other uses of force, which they happen to
against Milosevic's Serbia, were more consonant

cisely that,

while also claiming that

favor, like

NATO's

use of force

for well over a de-

with United Nation's purposes. However, whatever one thinks about the analytical
merits of the argument that Milosevic posed a greater threat to international peace

Saddam Hussein, or that the Kosovars were oppressed (and
thereby deserving of a rescue) more than the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds, the very elastic nature of these claims renders them utterly unsuitable as legal arguments.
and

security than did

It is

also disingenuous to argue that, as a matter of law,

humanitarian interven-

tion to aid the residents of another country that are being brutalized
is

legal

under the

UN Charter, presumably because

it is

by their

always consistent with the

Charter's laudable goals, but a national interest-driven intervention

not similarly legitimate.

26

ing of the Charter, which,
tions,

it is

not obvious

1 1

world,

is

somehow

Leaving aside the issue of the rather idiosyncratic read-

on

its face,

does not legitimize humanitarian interven-

why this humanitarian

intervention principle only applies

to the protection of foreign nationals, rather than a State's

September

rulers

own

citizens. In a post-

US actions to destroy terrorist organizations and their spon-

sors are the clear equivalent of a humanitarian intervention in defense of

American

citizens.

Collective Action

Then

there are scholars who, perhaps realizing the utter un-workability of a pure

UN Charter, try to read into

some modified version of the Security Council's primacy in the use-of- force area. They do this by extolling the legal legitimacy of collective actions, even if these do not command the
support of the entire Security Council. From a policy perspective, an approach
restrictive interpretation

of the

it

which postulates that force can be legitimately used even though one or two
have blocked the Security Council from acting

is

perhaps more manageable than

requiring a Security Council's blessing; the only problem
slightest

support in the

States

is

that there

is

not the

UN Charter or any other international legal document for

this theory.

There are also commentators who purport to discover in the

UN Charter provi-

sions that bless regional actions, while leaving nation States acting "unilaterally"
entirely to the mercies of Article 51.

However, those provisions (found
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in
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VIII of the

zation of

UN Charter), do not permit a regional organization, such as the Organi-

American

States

(OAS) or NATO,

to operate as the Security Council's

surrogate. Indeed, for example, the imprimatur of regional organizations, while

perhaps valuable as a diplomatic
sile Crisis,

the

OAS,

is

of little legal value. During the

for example, the foundation of both the right of the

to take action against the Soviet

of individual and collective
defense.

tool,

As

self defense,

any one of

its

all

one has to do to

and

right
self-

group of States has no more inherent

nation-State members.

qualify, in

States,

including the right of anticipatory

Chapter VIII of the Charter also do not seem to
approach:

United

Union and Cuba was their inherent

a matter of international law, a

right to use force than

Cuban Mis-

The champions of

realize the inherent frailty

an otherwise

ronment, for a broad anticipatory self-defense option,

of their

restrictive regulatory envi-

is

to create a cooperative re-

gional organization. This can be accomplished in a fortnight.

The Actual Practice of States
Moreover, the notion that anticipatory self-defense

is

barred by the

UN

Charter

has not been supported by the actual practice of States in the years since the

United Nations was established. That,

Anyone attempting

to determine

conventional, truly provides

people

tell

is

the critical point.

what international law, whether customary or

on any

Marquise de Merteuil's maxim

in the final reckoning,

particular point

would do

in Les Liaisons Dangereuses

you, watch what they do. Here, the evidence

is

27
;

well to heed the

don't listen to what

overwhelming that the

traditional law of anticipatory self-defense has survived the adoption of the

Charter.

As Michael Glennon

notes, since 1945 two-thirds of the

UN

members of the

United Nations have fought 291 inter-State conflicts in which over 22 million
people have been

Among

the

killed. 28

more important post-Charter

instances of "anticipatory"

self-

defense must be counted the 1956 "Suez Crisis," where France, Britain and Israel

launched military operations against Egypt based on Nasser's seizure of the Suez
Canal.

The

affair

was

a political disaster for the

governments involved, but

highly significant that Britain and France, both charter
tions

it is

members of the United Na-

and permanent members of the Security Council, claimed

that the Israeli-

Egyptian military clash, which took place in a close proximity to the Suez Canal,

was a threat to the world's economy and therefore adequate to justify armed action.
Needless to say, this was a very broad formulation of a classical anticipatory

self-

defense argument, perhaps even broader than the argument used by the Japanese

Prime Minister Tojo, who justified Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor by the claim that

American economic sanctions were strangling imperial Japan.
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In 1967, Israel acted preemptively against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, rather than

await the attack of their massing forces. Israel was neither

tioned by the

sanc-

UN for this action. Similarly, Israel attacked and destroyed an

nuclear power

facility in

though, this time,

Israel's

was taken to address

this

Iraqi

1981, again citing "self-defense" as justification. Al-

action was

condemned in the Security Council, no action

supposed "aggression." Recalling the Marquise's maxim,

whatever the verbiage used,

this strongly suggests a

fundamental recognition that
anticipate,

and

of course, has not been alone in exercising the right of anticipatory

self-

Israel acted in
foil,

condemned nor

accordance with

its

rights

under international law to

attacks before they are launched.

Israel,

defense. In 1986, President

Reagan ordered attacks against terrorist targets

to prevent their use against

US

interests. In 1982, Britain

in Libya

claimed a 150-mile ex-

clusion zone around the Falkland Islands as a preventative measure, and in 1983,

Sweden

armed

asserted the right to use

force against any foreign submarine sailing

W. Bush Administra-

within 12 miles of her territorial sea. In 1989, the George H.
tion used force to oust

Panama's strongman Manuel Noriega, arguing that he

posed a threat to the safety of the American service members present

and their families.

All of these actions can

Panama

in

be justified only by a right of anticipatory

self-defense.

Yet, perhaps the

most important modern example of anticipatory self-defense

before Operation Iraqi

Freedom

—came during

the Soviet efforts to install ballistic missiles

Cuban Missile Crisis caused by

the

armed with nuclear warheads

in

Cuba.

Although there were absolutely no indications that the Soviets intended to launch
these missiles against the United States, immediately or in even the distant future,

the

Kennedy Administration claimed

— provide
ments
sphere" —was
"to

a

that the purpose of the Soviet deploy-

Hemi-

nuclear strike capability against the Western

sufficient justification for the imposition of a naval "quarantine." 29

Although the
leader

US

threat assessment

Khrushchev had engaged

States in Berlin

was

also

shaped by a perception that Soviet

in nuclear saber rattling, threatened the

and elsewhere, and may have been

irrational

United

and impulsive,

Presi-

dent Kennedy's bottom-line conclusion was clearly that, in a nuclear age, a precipitous effort by an avowed American foe to change the strategic balance of power was

enough of a threat to American

security to justify the resort to an anticipatory self-

defense doctrine.

To argue that all of these uses of force have been illegal under the UN Charter, as
some proponents of the restrictive interpretation of the Charter have done, (or
even that most of them were illegal has been done by those who advocate anticipatory defense "lite" or allow its use only when invoked by regional organizations)
constitutes both a rejection of the validity of State practice
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traditionally, the

most

Using Force Lawfully in the 21st Century

reliable

ular

and authoritative way to

establish international legal

dogmatic approach to the Charter's interpretation.

norms

UN

Charter

is

a partic-

Significantly, the fact that

States involved have consistently claimed that their actions

with the

—and

have been consistent

neither hypocritical nor an effort to re-write the Charter

through subsequent practice; rather,

it is

a

proof of their embrace of the permissive

interpretation of the Charter.

Conclusion

Overall, the

UN Charter,

far

from being

a

comprehensive

legal edifice barring all

uses of force, except for the Article 51 -compliant situations and various forms of
collective action,

is

actually a far

more modest document.

It

basically reaffirms a

long-standing rule, which was not always honored, but nevertheless, frequently

announced, against an aggressive use of force,
use of force in response to an
one's

allies,

harbor rule for the

sets forth a safe

armed attack against one's territory or the territory of

while not inhibiting a broader range of defensive uses of force, includ-

ing in anticipation of an attack.

Although a nuclear Armageddon

is

far less likely today, the actual use

of weap-

ons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological, has become a very

real

and immediate threat. The principal danger is not that one State will attack another
with these weapons, but that non-State actors, such as
tion

beyond deterrence,

will obtain

and use

WMDs.

al

Qaeda,

This

is

who are by defini-

because, for the

first

time ever, modern technology has enabled private individuals, aided and abetted

by

failed States, to create military-style forces capable

the globe. That, of course,

is

precisely

of projecting power across

what al-Qaeda achieved on September

11;

it

projected power. Traditional deterrence works poorly in this novel strategic

environment.
This means that the traditional rules of international law, which permit States to
anticipate threats

and

to act before

an attack actually

is

more im-

initiated, are far

portant than in the past. Unfortunately, while these rules have not been vitiated by
the

UN Charter and have been reflected in ample State practice, both prior to and

post- 1945, they have been subjected to strident legal
States, international organizations

importance of

legal

and

and policy

and most international law

ethical considerations in

attacks

experts.

with these rules in place can the United States hope to protect

maintain international

stability,

and defeat rogue

that pose a grave threat to the entire civilized world.
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Given the

American policy-making, the

United States must continue to defend the validity of these traditional

tack,

by many

States

its

and

rules.

citizens

Only

from

terrorist

at-

groups

David B. Rivkin,

and Lee A. Casey

Jr.
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MATERIALS 1565 (1990)), which many regard as its strongest actions, all it did was to
recommend that member States render assistance to South Korea and Kuwait. Since both of
these countries were victims of armed aggression, and countries coming to their aid were acting
squarely within the ambit of Article 51, the Security Council's blessing of these actions was
primarily of a rhetorical and diplomatic value; it did not alter the legal landscape.
23. See Professor Dinstein's article, The Gulf War: 1990-2004 (And Still Counting), which is
in a

the

Chapter
24.

XV in this volume, at 337.

Dinstein, supra, note

4, at 172.
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and quite inconsistently with the Dinstein's anticipatory defense "lite," it is often
upon an analysis of the long-term trends, what is eventually going to
happen, rather than what will happen tomorrow. Thus, the quality of strategic threat forecasts is
25.

Ironically,

easier to predict, based

often better than the assessment of tactical threats. Accordingly, anticipatory self-defense against

medium- and long-term

threats

may

well

make more

sense and be

interceptive self-defense, geared for dealing with unavoidable
26.

more

and imminent

reliable

than the

attacks.

Unfortunately, only a few proponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention espouse

the view that the Charter

is

similarly permissive

when

it

comes

to national security-driven

interventions. For a notable exception to this idiosyncratic reading of the Charter, see Lee

Feinstein

& Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

136, Jan.-Feb 2004.

Pierre Ambroise Francois Choderlos de Laclos, Les Liaisons Dangereuses (1782).
28. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2003,
27.

at 16

and Michael

J.

WEEKLY STANDARD,

Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.

John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (Oct 22, 1962), Public Papers of the Presidents of the
29.

United

States:

PRESIDENT JOHN

AND STATEMENTS OF THE

F.

KENNEDY: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES,

PRESIDENT: JANUARY
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The Gulf War: 1990-2004
(And Still Counting)

Yoram Dinstein*

There

is

a popular notion (based

on some loose language used by the Bush

Administration) that the hostilities conducted by the American-led Coalition of the willing against Iraq in 2003 were based
forcible action against a potential threat.
this

popular notion

set the

is

as

untenable as

proper predicate for the

article will

a legal doctrine of preemptive

From the standpoint of international law,

it is

legality

on

unnecessary.

The present article will first

of the action taken against Iraq. Then, the

turn to the spurious contention of preemptive action.

A Legal Analysis of the Various Phases of the Gulf War
It is

common practice to refer to the hostilities in Iraq in 2003 in a manner discon-

nected from the

hostilities

of the early 1990s: some media stories have even used

the expressions "Gulf War I" and "Gulf War

II."

However,

only a single Gulf War which started in 1990 and
tedly, that

war has consisted of a number of phases,

as a part of the whole.

*

is still

The

three

in reality there has

been

not over in 2004. Admit-

yet each phase

main phases of the Gulf War

must be viewed

are:

Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights and Pro-President, Tel Aviv University,

Israel.

The Gulf War: 1990-2004 (And Still Counting)

The Invasion and Liberation of Kuwait (1990-1991)
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Within a few

hours, the United Nations

Security Council adopted Resolution 660, which determined the existence of "a

breach of international peace and security," and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. This
1

was (and

lution in the history of the Security Council in

international peace"

which

and then proceeded to take

still is)

only the second reso-

it

used the phrase "breach of

action.

(The first being Resolution

82 of 1950 relating to the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, 2 although that
resolution used the slightly different phrase "breach of the peace.")

Following Resolution 660, the Council adopted a string of other resolutions
which, inter

alia,

imposed on Iraq mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter

VII of the Charter (Resolution 661 3 ) and even a blockade (Resolution 665 4 ).

When
1990

Iraq did not relent, the Council

—authorized

the

"Member

—

in Resolution

678 of November 29,

States co-operating with the

Government of Ku-

comply with previous Council resolutions by January
15, 1991, "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace

wait," should Iraq not fully

in the area." 5

The formula "to use all necessary means" has since become the common and accepted euphemism for the use of force.
Pursuant to Resolution 678, and upon the expiry of the ultimatum, the armed
forces of a large American-led Coalition struck at Iraq on the night of January 16/
17, 1991. It is important to understand that at no time did the Council establish a
United Nations force for combat purposes against Iraq. 6 The legal foundation of
the use of force against Iraq by the coalition was collective self-defense. 7 Under Article 5 1 of the United Nations Charter, when an armed attack occurs, any State is
entitled to respond by exercising its right of individual or collective self-defense. 8 A
and security

specific affirmation of "the inherent right

of individual or collective self-defence, in

response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51

of the Charter," was already incorporated into Resolution 66 1. 9 Even the phrase

"Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait"
are "nations engaged in collective

[self-]

defense with Kuwait."

suggests that these
10

The meaning of Resolution 678 is that, while the Security Council abstained
from deploying a veritable United Nations force as an instrument of collective security,

it

gave

defense by the

its

blessing in advance to the voluntary exercise of collective self-

members of the Coalition

(following an interval of several weeks de-

signed for the exhaustion of the political process).
the prospective approval of future action.
States first

employ

11

The core of the

resolution was

In an ordinary constellation of events,

force in individual or collective self-defense

and only then

re-

port to the Council about the measures that they have taken, so that the Council
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investigates the nature of the hostilities retrospectively. In the particular case of
Iraq, the Coalition

sought and obtained from the Council a green light for the exer-

of collective self-defense against the perpetrator of an armed attack (Iraq) well

cise

before the projected military clash. Thereafter, the Coalition did not have to worry

about the reaction of the Council, inasmuch as that reaction had predated the ac-

combat.

tual

Considering that the military operations of the Coalition in 1991 were a manifestation of collective self-defense

—

rather than collective security

—there was

no need for the specific mandate of Resolution 678 to legally validate
the employment of forcible measures against Iraq. 12 Article 51 per se ought to have
technically

sufficed in authorizing the Coalition to resort to force in response to the Iraqi

armed

attack,

and arguably Resolution 678 only tied the hands of the countries co15. 13

Of

and psychological terms, Resolution 678 had an incalculable

ef-

and swelling

its

operating with Kuwait in that they had to hold their
course, in political

fire until

internationally (cementing the solidarity of the Coalition

fect:

January

ranks) as well as domestically (mobilizing public opinion to political support of the
action against Iraq).

The Cease-Fire Period (1991-2003)
Cease-fire terms were dictated to Iraq

Resolution 687.

arm

itself

14

by the Security Council,

These were rigorous terms, which compelled

of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD),

in April 1991, in

Iraq, inter alia, to dis-

but Iraq accepted them.

It

must

be appreciated that, although the conditions of the cease-fire were delineated by Resolution 687, the ensuing cease-fire constituted an agreement between the Coalition

—

rather than the United Nations (which remained above the fray)

The

cease-fire in Iraq

went on

for a

dozen years, yet

it

failed to

—and

Iraq.

spawn peace.

In-

moving towards a peaceful settlement, the Coalition and Iraq were constantly at loggerheads, inasmuch as Iraq
from the very onset of the cease-fire
was unwilling to fully comply with its agreed-upon terms, especially as regards disarmament of WMD. Huge quantities of chemical weapons agents, and a variety of
biological weapons production equipment and materials, were destroyed under
the supervision of UN inspectors. 15 However, quite frequently between 1991 and
stead of

—

2003

(in particular, in 1998/1999), Coalition

warplanes struck Iraqi

targets, striv-

ing unsuccessfully to compel Iraq to abide by the cease-fire conditions and especially to

cooperate with

the Coalition

UN

disarmament inspectors. 16 The sundry

must be construed

as a

air strikes

resumption of combat operations

by

in the face

of Iraqi violations of the cease-fire terms. 17

Already under Resolution 688, adopted within a few days of the entry into force
of the cease-fire, the Security Council (without naming Chapter VII) held that the
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Iraqi repression of the civilian population (particularly the

Kurds) "threaten

inter-

national peace and security in the region" and insisted that Iraq "allow immediate

by international humanitarian organizations to

access

tion."

those in need of assis-

and to make available all necessary facilities for their opera-

all

parts of Iraq

As

a result, with the military help of armed forces of the

tance in
18

all

United States and

other Coalition countries, "access" to humanitarian aid was achieved through the
creation of an air exclusion ("no-fly") zone securing a Kurdish enclave in the north

of Iraq. In 1992, another "no-fly" zone was established over the Shiite areas in the

south of the country. In the next decade,

many air strikes were conducted by Coali-

tion warplanes against Iraq in response to Iraqi defiance of the "no-fly" zones. 19

The Occupation of Iraq (2003)
The state of war between Iraq and
suspension of general

the Coalition continued notwithstanding the

hostilities in 1991.

When

the friction between Iraq

and the

Coalition culminated in the resumption of general hostilities of 2003, events were

commentators against the backdrop of a doctrine of "pre-

examined by

a host of

emption"

out by President George

set

the Legal Adviser of the

W. Bush

(see below). 20 But, as

Department of State: "Was Operation

ample of preemptive use of force? Viewed

Iraqi

conceded by

Freedom an

ex-

as the final episode in a conflict initiated

more than a dozen years earlier by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it may not seem so." 21
There

when

is

absolutely nothing preemptive about the resumption of hostilities

a cease-fire disintegrates.

—

alition against Iraq
gal basis

The leading partner of the United

the United

As indicated,

the position that the

le-

the Iraqi material breach of the cease-fire. 22

upon

Iraqi reluctance to

ment brought about numerous
its

—formally took

Co-

of the 2003 hostilities was a revival of the Coalition's right to use force

against Iraq consequent

fire

Kingdom

States in the

comply with

its

obligations of

WMD disarma-

clashes with the Coalition throughout the cease-

period. Ultimately, in the face of persistent reports about Iraq's violations of

obligations in this regard, the Coalition decided to terminate the cease-fire.

fact that

no

WMD were found in Iraq after

of the resumption of
lieved that Iraq

hostilities,

had not

fully

its

occupation

is

irrelevant:

The

on the eve

— including the UN inspectors—be-

everybody

observed

its

UN

disarmament undertakings. 23

Iraqi re-

inspectors led to a series of Security

fusal to cooperate unreservedly

with

Council resolutions branding

conduct a "material breach" of its disarmament

its

obligations.
It is

wrong to argue

(as

was done by the United Kingdom)

Coalition's right to use of force against Iraq in 2003 hinged

that the legality of the

on

a revival of Security

Council Resolution 678. 24 Resolution 678 gave the blessing of the Security Council
to the military action taken in

1

99 1 and surely it had nothing to do with operations
,
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conducted a dozen years

was no need

there

need for
acted

later

under

totally different circumstances.

for a revival of Resolution

Both

original adoption in 1990.

its

on the

678 in 2003,
in 1991

just as there

and

However,

was no

strict

in 2003, the Coalition

basis of the right of collective self-defense with

which

it

was

directly

vested by Article 51 of the Charter and by customary international law.

A

cease-fire,

which merely suspends

hostilities

without terminating the war,

does not extinguish the right of collective self-defense that remains legally intact
for the duration of the war. 25

The criteria for the legitimate exercise of this right remain anchored to the circumstances of the outbreak of the war (in this case, in
1990). The disintegration of a cease-fire by dint of its violation by one belligerent
party and the forcible response of the adversary is not to be confused with the

—

—

initiation of a

new war.

Under Article 40 of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899
and to Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, a serious violation by a party to a cease-fire ("armistice" in the original
wording of the Regulations) empowers the other side to denounce it and, in cases
of urgency, to resume hostilities immediately. 26 The modern practice is to refer not
to a serious violation but to a "material breach." This phrase appears in Article

60(1) of the Vienna Convention

on the Law of Treaties

(as a

ground

for termina-

27

The applicability of the "material breach"
criterion to general cease-fire agreements had been recognized in the international
legal literature even before the Vienna Convention was crafted in its final form. 28
The meaning of the phrase "material breach" is not unequivocal. 29 Article 60(3)
tion or suspension of bilateral treaties).

of the Vienna Convention defines a "material breach" as either "a repudiation of
the treaty not sanctioned
essential to the

provision

is

by the present Convention" or a "violation of a provision

accomplishment of the object or purpose of the

to be considered "essential"?

text of a material breach, the
treaty. 31

Thus, the

It is

treaty." 30

Which

generally recognized that, in the con-

term covers any "important ancillary provision" of a

WMD disarmament clauses in the cease-fire agreement with

Iraq were decidedly essential (albeit ancillary to the suspension of hostilities),

and

their violation constituted a "material breach."
It is

therefore noteworthy that, as early as August 1991 (a few

months

after the

entry into force of the cease-fire suspending hostilities), the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Resolution 707 (1991)

demned

Iraq's serious violation of

its

—already con-

disarmament obligations and established

that the violation "constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of reso-

lution 687.

32

Eleven years

late, in

Resolution 1441 (2002), the Security Council

(again acting under Chapter VII) decided "that Iraq has been
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material breach of

687(1991)."

cific

Counting)

obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution

its

33

Many commentators maintain that
alition

Still

—subsequent

to Resolution 1441

—the Co-

could not take military action against Iraq in 2003 without obtaining a speforce. 34

go-ahead signal from the Security Council to resort to

The

fact that

the Coalition failed to persuade the Security Council to adopt a further resolution
expressly authorizing

means"

(i.e.,

—

678

in the vein of Resolution

force) against Iraq

—

was regrettable from a

the use of

"all

necessary

political standpoint. But,

such an additional resolution was not required. Even those con-

legally speaking,

tending that Resolution 1441 "does not contain any 'automaticity' as concerns the
potential use of force" have to concede that the text lends itself to a different interpretation. 35

It

most assuredly does not prescribe

must return

that, prior to recourse to force, the Coalition

for a second (confirmatory) resolution.

The

clear inference

from

its

to the Security Council

36

was that the other

37

as regards

agreement was

side to the cease-fire

obligation to continue to respect the cease-fire.

often missed by commentators

A salient point,

on this topic, 38 is that the other side to the cease-fire

agreement with Iraq was not the United Nations

sumption of the

necessarily imply

from the determination by the Security Council

the Iraqi "material breach"
released

—or even

hostilities, therefore,

as

such but the Coalition. 39 Re-

did not require an explicit stamp of approval

from the Security Council.
In reality, even the determination of the existence of an Iraqi "material breach"

need not have been made by the Security Council. 40 By
could have been
distinct

from

made by the Coalition itself.

a political)

Council in the

first

determination

right, this

Differently put, there

was no

legal (as

need for the Coalition to have turned to the Security

place (just as in 1990/1991 the Coalition did not have to go the

Security Council for Resolution 678 or, for that matter, Resolution 687). Yet, since

the Coalition chose to bring the matter before the Security Council in 2002

—and

up an enhanced inspection regime, giving Iraq a "final opcomply with the disarmament obligation 41 the Coalition was con-

since the Council did set

portunity" to

—

strained to give that inspection regime a chance of success. Similarly to Resolution

678, which equally offered Iraq a "final opportunity" 42

and

Coalition by introducing a temporal interval during which

tied the
it

had

hands of the

to hold

its fire,

Resolution 1441 did not leave the Coalition the option to recommence hostilities

immediately. Thus, despite the determination of the existence of a "material

breach" of the cease-fire terms, the Coalition had to await
ports.
still

However, when

a

number of reports were

in, it

unresolved issues and that Iraq had failed to take
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became

all

inspectors' re-

clear that there

were

the steps required to put an
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end

to

its

"material breach." 43

The freedom of action of the Coalition was accord-

ingly regained.

Following a

and resumed

final

ultimatum, the Coalition terminated the cease-fire with Iraq

hostilities

on March

20, 2003.

Baghdad

fell

on April

9th,

and

in a

few

days major combat operations were over. All the same, irregular fighting has persisted

long after the occupation of Iraq (with an upsurge in the violence a year later,

in 2004). Already in

May 2003, the Security Council determined that the situation

in Iraq, although improved, continued to constitute "a threat to international

peace and security." 44 In October 2003, the Council expressly authorized "a multinational force under unified
units) "to take

and

all

command"

(structured around the Coalition military

necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security

stability in Iraq." 45 In

June 2004, in accordance with Security Council Resolu-

tion 1546, the formal occupation of Iraq

Government

by the Coalition ended, and an Interim

reasserted full responsibility

and authority;

national (Coalition) force remained in the country and

nevertheless, the multiits

authority "to take

all

necessary measures" was reaffirmed by the Council. 46

Preemptive Self-Defense

The United States has traditionally taken the position that a State may exercise "anticipatory" self-defense, 47 in response not merely to a "hostile act" but even to a
"hostile intent" (a

dichotomy elevated

to the level of doctrine

by the US Rules of

Engagement). 48 In the past, the United States was careful to underscore that
patory self-defense

—or response

—must

to a hostile intent

antici-

nevertheless relate to

49

The emphatic use of the qualifying adjective "imminent" is of great import. As we shall see, the imminence of an armed attack (provided that it is no longer a mere threat) does indeed justify an early
response by way of interceptive self-defense. However, after the heinous terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), a well-known statement of policy on preemptive action in self-defense was issued as part of the US National Security Strategy, 50 and this is often referred to as the "Bush Doctrine" (after President George
W. Bush). 51 The new policy appears to push the envelope by claiming a right to
"preemptive" self-defense countering pure threats based on the "capabilities and
objectives" of today's adversaries, especially terrorists and in particular when the
potential use of
comes into the equation. 52 It is not yet clear what practical
the "threat of imminent use of force."

WMD

effects the

new policy will have in reality. But to the extent that it will actually bring

about the preventive use of force in response to sheer threats,
pliance with Article 51 of the Charter.

343

it

will
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Since Article 51 permits self-defense solely

question arises whether there exists

when an "armed

— independently of the Charter—

customary international law right of anticipatory
Court of Justice,

in the Military

attack" occurs, the

self-defense.

and Paramilitaries Activities

The

a broader

International

case of 1986, based

its

on the norms of customary international law concerning self-defense as a
sequel to an armed attack. 53 Yet, the Court stressed that this was due to the circumstances of the case, and it passed no judgment on the issue at hand. 54
On the other hand, Judge Schwebel in his Dissenting Opinion did take a
clear-cut position on the subject. In conformity with a scholarly school of thought
maintaining that Article 51 only highlights one form of self-defense (viz., response
to an armed attack), without negating other patterns of legitimate action in selfdecision

—

—

defense vouchsafed by customary international law, 55 Judge Schwebel rejected a

reading of the text which would imply that the right of self-defense under Article
51 exists

"if,

and only

if,

an armed attack occurs." 56

In the opinion of the present writer, precisely such a limitative reading of Article
51

is

called for.

Any other

interpretation of the Article

would be

counter-textual,

counter-factual and counter-logical.
First, a different

interpretation of Article 51

the use of the phrase

"armed

attack" in Article

would be counter-textual because
51 is not inadvertent. The expres-

sion should be juxtaposed with comparable locutions in other provisions of the
Charter.

It is

the coinage

particularly striking that the framers of the text preferred in Article 5

"armed attack"

in several contexts (the

to the

term "aggression," which appears in the Charter

Purposes of the United Nations (Article 1(1)), collective

curity (Article 39)

and regional arrangements

words

is

in Article 51

se-

(Article 53(1)). 57

deliberately confined to a response to

The choice of
an armed attack.

An armed attack is, of course, a type of aggression. Aggression in its generic
meaning may be stretched to include mere threats, although it is interesting that a
consensus Definition of Aggression, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974
while not pretending to be exhaustive

—does not cover the

threat of force.

only a special form of aggression amounting to an armed attack

58

Yet,

justifies self-de-

The French version of the Article sharpens its thrust by
speaking of "une agression armee." 59 Under the Article, a State is permitted to use
fense under Article 5 1

.

force in self-defense only in response to aggression

which

is

armed.

Second, the idea that one can go beyond the text of Article 51 and find support
for a

broad concept of preventive self-defense

counter-factual.

dence
it?

force

from scholarly writings) do we have

right of self-defense crystallized only

between

customary international law

is

When did such customary international law evolve and what evi-

in the practice of States (as distinct

The

in

States.

That prohibition was
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first

for

the prohibition of the use of

evinced in the Kellogg-Briand Pact
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of 1928 60 and reiterated, in clearer and broader terms, in Article 2(4) of the Charter
in 1945. 61

What

preventive war of self-defense was unleashed between 1928 and

1945?
Third, the reliance

on an extra-Charter customary

counter-logical. After

all,

right of self-defense

also

is

the framers of Article 51 introduced significant limi-

on the exercise of self-defense (which is subject to the overriding powers
of the Security Council). Does it make sense that the most obvious case of selfin response to an armed attack
is subordinated to critical conditions,
defense
tations

—

—

whereas self-defense putatively invoked in other circumstances (on a preventive
basis)

is

that an

absolved of those conditions?

armed

What is the point in stating the obvious

(i.e.,

attack gives rise to the right of self-defense), while omitting any ref-

erence whatever to the ambiguous conditions of an allegedly permissible preventive

war? Preventive war in self-defense

require regulation by lex scripta

more

(if

legitimate

under the Charter) would

acutely than a response to an

armed

since the opportunities for abuse are incomparably greater. Surely,

war

in self-defense

tual use of force),

is

justified

pervision by the Security Council. In
application of the

Having

said

maxim

right to self-defense can

comes evident

all, is

less

this

—

if

possible, even closer

su-

est exclusio alterius 7
.

the considered opinion of the present writer that the

be invoked in response to an armed attack as soon as

be-

it

to the victim State (on the basis of hard intelligence available at the

time) that the attack

is

in progress.

or, for that matter, for fire to

open

no need to wait

There

is

—

moral certainty

if

a

for the

target State can lawfully (under Article 51) intercept the

view to blunting

its

bombs to fall

exists that the

tack has actually begun (however incipient the stage of the attack

The

—

not an appropriate case for the

of interpretation expressio unius

all that, it is

preventive

(on the basis of "probable cause" rather than an ac-

ought to be exposed to no

it

if

attack,

is

armed

at-

at that point).

armed

attack with a

edge.

way to illustrate the circumstances in which interceptive self-defense
can be relied upon is to assume that the Japanese carrier striking force, en route to
the point from which it mounted the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor in DecemThe

best

ber 1 94 1 had been destroyed by American forces before a single Japanese naval
,

craft got

anywhere near Hawaii.

Americans would have succeeded

62

If that

in aborting

air-

were to have happened, and the
an onslaught which

in

one

fell

swoop

managed to change the balance of military power in the Pacific, it would have been
preposterous to look upon the United States as answerable for inflicting an armed
attack upon Japan.
The proper analysis of the case should be based on three disparate hypothetical
scenarios (all based on the counter-factual postulate that the Americans knew the
Japanese plans).
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The easiest scenario
of the Japanese aircraft
tively short

relates to the hypothetical

Counting)

Still

shooting

down by the Americans

—following detection by radar or other means—

time-frame between their launch from the

Once

execution of the attack mission.

and the actual

air carriers

the launch was completed, there can be

doubt that (although theoretically the mission could
States as the target State

in the rela-

still

be called

off) the

no

United

had every right to regard the Japanese armed attack as hav-

commenced and to intercept it.
The more difficult scenario pertains to a hypothetical sinking of the Japanese
fleet when poised for the attack on Pearl Harbor but before the launch of the airing

craft.

In the opinion of the present writer, the turning point in the unfolding events

was the

sailing of the Japanese fleet

towards

its

fateful destination (again, notwith-

standing the possibility of its being instructed to turn back).

Had the Americans

perhaps through the breaking of Japanese naval codes

—been

clusive evidence as to the nature of the mission in

which the Japanese Striking

in possession of con-

Force was already engaged, and had the Americans located the whereabouts of the
Japanese

On
fore

it

fleet,

they need not have relinquished the opportunity to intercept.

the other hand, had the Americans sought to destroy the Japanese fleet besailed

—while

it

was

still

making advance preparations

training for

—

this

its

mission, war-gaming

would have been not an

it

or otherwise

interceptive (hence,

armed attack but an (unlawful) preventive use of force in
advance of the attack which had not yet commenced. As and of themselves, training, war-gaming and advance preparations do not cross the red line of an armed
lawful) response to an

attack.

The crux of the issue, therefore, is not who fired the first shot but who embarked
upon an apparently irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the legal
Rubicon. The casting of the die, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what starts
the armed attack. It would be absurd to require that the defending State should sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove an immaculate
conception of self-defense. As Sir Humphrey Waldock phrased it: "Where there is
convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur,
though

it

has not passed the frontier." 63

Interceptive self-defense

is

lawful even under Article 51 of the Charter, 64 inas-

much as it takes place after the other side has committed itself to an armed attack in
an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive
tack that

is

strike anticipates

an armed

merely "foreseeable" (or even just "conceivable"), an interceptive

counters an armed attack which

"imminent" and

is

in progress,

practically "unavoidable."

65

even

if it is still

To put

it

in

incipient: the

strike

blow is

another way, there

nothing preventive about nipping an armed attack in the bud. But that bud
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is

is

an
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on the ground of

absolute requirement. Self-defense cannot be exercised merely

assumptions, expectations or
other side

is

fear. It

has to be demonstrably apparent that the

already engaged in carrying out an

armed

attack (even

if the

attack has

not yet fully developed).

Conclusion
Based on the preceding

analysis,

it is

clear that the Coalition case of taking military

some leading

action against Iraq in 2003 was legally impregnable. Unfortunately,

spokesmen and supporters of the Administration

in

Washington

—

instead of fo-

cusing (like the British) on the issue of Iraqi "material breach" of the preexisting
cease-fire

—preferred

to link the hostilities to preemptive self-defense, thereby ex-

posing the military operations against Iraq to harsh and legitimate criticism. The

moral of the story

is

that, at times, a

wrong "spin" of the

tool of international law

can become a dangerous boomerang.
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The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight
against Terrorism

Christoph Muller

The

become a key objective in interhas become much more than a pure law enforcement
the widest sense that has to draw on all the resources of

fight against the scourge of terrorism has

national politics.

It

task but a political fight in

political action, including, if necessary, military options.

When

the fight against

terrorism turns into military action abroad, international politics meets international law.

The use of military force by a State beyond its borders

ternational law.

Still,

is

governed by in-

given the political depth of the fight against terrorism that

sometimes seems to acquire

existential

meaning

—

is it

at all possible to discuss the

right of self-defense in the global fight against terrorism in purely legal terms?

When each and every legal argument may assume major political significance, are
we

still

talking about international law or

do we discuss

politics?

Apparently both.

This article seeks to shed some light not only on the law but also on the dynamic in-

on the use of force and the evolution of the
background of the UN Charter law, the law as it stands, and the

terrelationship between State policies
law: the historical
rift

between world order as designed by the

In conclusion,

*

it

will

be argued that the

Deputy Director General

UN Charter and the real state of affairs.

political

for Legal Affairs,

German

and

legal benefits flowing

from

a

Foreign Office, Berlin. By reflecting

personal views of the author, the article goes beyond stating the

German Government's position.
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strengthening of the

in the

Global Fight against Terrorism

UN Charter's framework on the use of force clearly outweigh

the risks incurred by letting that

framework

Historical

Ninety years ago, in June 1914, a

fall

into desuetude.

Background

terrorist organization

unsuccessfully tried to stop an assassination plot that

supplying arms, training and money.
tured by "Black

code-named "Black Hand"
it had earlier supported by

On the 28th of June, one of the terrorists nur-

Hand" carried out the plot. He assassinated the crown prince of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire and

his wife.

1

The empire then struck back. By turning against the State of Serbia, the presumed home base of "Black Hand," Austria-Hungary set into motion a world war
and its own demise. It would seem to be an interesting, even though academic

how to qualify the Austro-Hungarian action in the context of the contemporary debate. Of course, given the mood of the day and the European system of
trip-wire alliances, World War I was probably inevitable anyway. Still, the story of
question

June 1914 seems a useful reminder of the deeper layers of terrorism's destructive

power, a destructive potential that works indirectly, through the poisoning of international relations,

and may even

way they did.
The major lesson of the

trigger

wars that were not intended to happen

the

legality

First

World War was

related to the broader question of

and legitimacy of the use of force in international relations. After the horror

new question was being
something was fundamentally wrong with a world in

experienced by the killing of some 10 million people, a
asked: could

it

be that

which any nation with the power to use force

Woodrow Wilson

of the United States tried to

felt free

initiate a

to

do

so? President

revolutionary alternative:

an international organization of global reach, tying all States together in a system of
collective security.

He was ahead of his time; the US

Senate did not follow his lead.

The truncated League of Nations, as it did emerge, was too weak to deal effectively
with the blows from Japan, Germany, and Italy. 2 World War II followed, more
than 50 million people were

During the war,

new

it

killed, this

time the majority of victims being

was again an American president who took the lead

in starting a

3

search for an organizational framework to create world order. These efforts

resulted in the Charter of the United Nations,

and

civilians.

rules intended to

which

sets forth the basic principles

govern international relations.

For nearly sixty years, the

UN

Charter has been the basic legal document for

public international law. Accordingly, this article will turn to the Charter to try

and find some answers

to the question of how to define the scope of self-defense in

the fight against terrorism. There

is

no

alternative starting point for finding the
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applicable rules of international law. Furthermore, there
legal practice

under the Charter

is

adapting to the

already evidence that

is

new threat. 4 At the same

time, a

lawyer working in the context of international politics has to note, of course, that

time and again

seems fashionable to put into doubt the whole

it

UN system.

5

It is

from being met. For
decades, the Cold War paralyzed the Security Council. Even under the new,
more favorable conditions existing since the 1990s, the Security Council's record
true that the objectives of the United Nations are

have to imagine a world without

doubt

first

Germany

for post-war

it.

6

After the catastrophic

tion

that the lead of the

and

American

architects of the

new

that in addition to a robust defensive

West, an effective global system of collective security and coopera-

must be sought.

The Law as

No

breakdown of the old

half of the 20th century there has never been any

multilateral order should be followed,
alliance of the

far

been mixed. To appreciate the United Nations, we

in taking effective action has

order of nation States in the

still

other article of the

it

Stands

UN Charter plays such a prominent role in the current de-

bate on the significance of international law for a stable and peaceful world order as

does Article 51.

How is it to be read after the events of September 11, 2001, the sub-

sequent war in Afghanistan, the United States' presentation of
strategy in
threats

September 2002, and the Iraq war?

posed by

Chapter VII which

sets

Article 51

is

new

security

How is it to be read in the light of the

failing States, the proliferation

and international terrorism?

its

of weapons of mass destruction

the final provision of the

UN Charter's

out the conditions that justify the use of force within the

system of collective security created by the Charter should there by any threat to

The system of collective security
against other States. Only two excep-

the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
is

based on the prohibition of the use of force

tions to that prohibition are provided for in the Charter: coercive measures that

must be authorized by the Security Council, and the "inherent"
or collective self-defense.

The first sentence of Article

right of individual

51 reads as follows: "Nothing

in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defence
til

if an

armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, un-

the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international

peace and security."

The

exercise of the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence"

thus permissible only in the event of "an armed attack

United Nations."

It

the threshold of an

.

.

.

against a

is

Member of the

cannot be invoked when faced with actions that do not reach

armed attack and

it

may only be exercised until such time as the
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Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace

and

security. 7

September

1 1

raised the question of whether the right of self-defense

also applies in the face of terrorist action.

The

Security Council gave a clear answer

immediately, on the day following the attack in Resolution
at the

end of the same month,

terms,

first, all

in Resolution

1373 (2001 ). 9

1

It

368 (200 1 ) 8 and again,

determined

in general

acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international

peace and security, and second, the right of individual or collective self-defense in

accordance with the Charter could be applicable in connection with acts of international terrorism.

No authorization is required from the Security Council in such

self-defense actions, however, the measures taken

by

must be immediately reported

right of self-defense

a State in the exercise of

its

to the Security Council.

The Security Council's decision to recognize especially grievous terrorist attacks
as an "armed attack
against a Member of the United Nations" was a very signifi.

.

.

cant, evolutionary step in the reading of Article 51. Previously, legal doctrine generally

assumed that an "armed attack" could not be carried out by non-State actors,

but required action by a

State.

The new reading of Article

unanimous approval of international

met with the virtually
and governments. 10 The recent advi-

jurists

51

sory opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wa//, 11 of the International

Court of Justice did not

explicitly

the Court's seemingly restrictive

endorse the

—
language

new reading of Article

51, but

"Article 51 of the Charter thus recog-

nizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by

one

State against another State" 12

—should not be understood

as a contradiction,

The Court apparently aimed at emphasizing the point that an armed attack
has to originate from a territory outside the control of the attacked party. 13
Recognizing the possibility of non-State actors mounting an "armed attack" as
meant by Article 51 leads to a tricky follow-on question: who or which entity coneither.

stitutes a legitimate target

ing September

1 1

when defending

against such terrorist attack? 14 Follow-

the answer to this question was relatively simple: given the

obvious links between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the use of force by the United
States

and

coalition forces in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime

mate self-defense under

and all other NATO

Article 51 of the

UN

States shared this view.

Council decided, for the

first

time in

its

Charter.

On October 2, 2001, the North Atlantic

history, to invoke the principle of collective

On the basis of Article

UN Charter, in conjunction with Security Council Resolutions

1373, 16 the

legiti-

The German Government

defense contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
5 1 of the

was

German Bundestag on November

16,

1

368 15 and

2001 issued a mandate authoriz-

ing the Bundeswehr to support the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom.

This mandate was renewed for the second time in

354
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2003. As authorized
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by

that mandate, the

German Government provided

soldiers for the

war

in Af-

ghanistan, as well as for naval duties in the fight against terrorism.

Defensive action after September
ticipatory self-defense?

17

Whether

1 1

there

is

room

for a right of

preventive self-defense for individual States within the
lective security
cle 51 ("if

is

a highly controversial question.

18

What little

State practice there has

caution. Prior to 2001, the question

only on two occasions, during

War

clear reactor

Tamuz

Israel's

The

restrictive

wording of Arti-

I

been to date also seems to indicate

explicitly discussed in the

UN framework

preventive strike against Egypt during the

bombed the partially constructed Iraqi nuWhile a number of States felt that preventive self-

and when

in 1967

was

in 1981.

Israel

permissible and unanimously rejected by the

it

was held to be im-

UN Security Council in

487 (1981). 20 At that time the United States was

sive

preemptive or even

UN Charter's system of col-

defense was permissible in the former case, 19 in the latter case

Israel's

an-

an armed attack occurs") would seem to rule out a right of anticipatory

self-defense.

Six-Day

What about

followed an armed attack.

among

Resolution

the States that opposed

preventive action in the Security Council debate with particularly persua-

arguments based on international law. Those States which did not want to rule

out the option of anticipatory self-defense absolutely and a priori have based their

arguments on a case from the year 1837. The

test

introduced in the Caroline case

permitted pre-emptive self-defense in very exceptional cases.
Daniel Webster formulated

as follows: "It will

it

be for the government to show a

necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving

no moment

The

criteria

velopment
nent.

22

for deliberation."

Very

restrictive

no choice of means and

21

of urgent necessity contained in this

in international

US Secretary of State

test led to

the subsequent de-

law of the requirement that an attack must be immi-

conditions

have been

placed

on the concept of

"imminence." Such imminence must moreover be apparent to an objective observer.

The United

States' national security strategy

of September 2002, however,

took a wider approach:

We

must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. 23

—

today's adversaries ....

Just
tion.

how the United

No

implement

this

been specified

yet.

States will

precise criteria have

concept remains an open ques-

Nor does

place the right of self-defense within the context of the

the security strategy

UN Charter and its system

of collective security. The Iraq war may, in political terms, be viewed as an
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new national security strategy.

ternational law to the

In justifying

UN Security Council, however, the United States did not ar-

gue the asserted right of anticipatory self-defense.

It

rather stated that

operations were in accordance with Resolutions 678 (1990)

and

in particular

(2002).

position under in-

its

with the threat of serious consequences

24

made

its

military

and 687 (1991), 25
in Resolution 1441

26

The European Union adopted a new security strategy in December 2003, which
lays

out a threat assessment similar to that contained in the

also referring to the threats

mass destruction,

US

security strategy,

posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of

failing States

and organized crime.

It

also recognizes the

need for

anticipatory action:

Our traditional concept of self-defence - up to and including the Cold War - was based
on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be
abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left
alone, terrorist networks will become even more dangerous. State failure and
organized crime spread if they are neglected - as we have seen in West Africa. This
implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and

We need to develop a strategic culture that
and when necessary, robust intervention
We need to be able to
act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected,
and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more
serious problems in the future. 27
threat prevention cannot start too early
fosters early, rapid,

However, the objectives of the European Security Strategy are

explicitly

put into

the context of "effective multilateralism" and a "rule-based international order":

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental
framework

for international relations

is

the United Nations Charter.

The United

Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace
fulfill its

and

responsibilities

security. Strengthening the

and

to act effectively,

is

a

United Nations, equipping

European

priority.

...

it

It is

to

a

condition of a rule-based international order that laws evolve in response to

developments such

as proliferation, terrorism

and global warming. 28

The common European view of international law governing the use of force is thus
very much geared towards the United Nations. At the same time,

open

to

new developments

it is

not static, but

contributing to truly effective multilateralism. In this

context, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement in September 2003 seems

highly relevant. After reiterating the traditional, narrow reading of Article 51, he
stated:
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Now, some say this understanding is no longer
weapons of mass destruction could be launched

tenable, since an
at

'armed

attack' with

any time, without warning, or by a

clandestine group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right

and obligation to use force pre-emptively, even on the territory of other
even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are

States,
still

and

being

developed.

My concern

is

that, if

it

were to be adopted,

proliferation of the unilateral
it is

it

could

set

precedents that resulted in a

and lawless use offeree, with or without justification. But
we also face up squarely to the

not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless

concerns that
drive

them

make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that
We must show that those concerns can, and will,

to take unilateral action.

be addressed effectively through collective action.

The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States
may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats. Its members may need to
begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to
address certain types of threats - for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of
mass destruction. 29

The German Government

UN Charter narrowly limits the use of military force by individual States

While the
for

shares the assessment of the Secretary-General.

good reason,

i.e.,

to prevent the escalation of violence, the Security Council

does have a wide range of options

at its disposal.

Under Article 24 it is given the pri-

mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; under
Article 39

it is

granted the necessary powers to act in the event of a threat to or

breach of the peace. This preventive competence bestowed on the

UN

Security

Council, together with the conflict prevention instruments available to the
Secretary-General,

must be made

easier to use in the future

—

UN

precisely in order to

prevent the escalation of violence and the spread of armed conflict.

Meanwhile, following

Annan

November 2003 appointed

in

tions for

his speech of the

23rd of September, Secretary-General

a high level panel to develop

UN reform and for a collective response to the new threats.

recommendaThe report of

30

December 2004. 31 All States were invited to contribute to its
work. The European Union submitted a joint contribution whose thrust is clear
the Security Council should do more to assume its responsibilities under the Charter. The relevant paragraphs of the EU contribution read as follows:
the panel was issued in

The

EU

remain

reaffirms that the provisions of the
valid.

The

EU

UN

Charter regarding the use of force

also recognizes the potentially devastating threat

posed to

UN

member states by modern terrorism, and by weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of non-state actors. The threat

is

devastating both to states targeted and to those where
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they are allowed to operate. Military action

may

in certain circumstances

- such

as

when a state is unwilling or unable to deal with the threat posed by a non-state actor on
its

territory

- be required

to

meet the threat

effectively. In this context, the

EU is of the

view that military action going beyond the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence
should be taken on the basis of Security Council decisions. The Security Council,
however, must be prepared to make a rapid assessment of any threat brought to

its

if necessary, to act quickly and decisively in order to neutralize it. Strong
engagement by the Council on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as
recommended above, and the expertise thereby commanded, would confer on it an
additional strong measure of authority in demanding compliance with obligations,
and of respect for its collective decisions. 32

attention and,

To sum up: Germany, like its European partners, clearly sees the necessity for
more effective anticipatory action in the light of the new threats, including a wide
spectrum of measures that may be grouped under preventive engagement by political

means. Preventive military action, however, should be authorized by the

Security Council.
threat of an

Only

imminent

in cases

attack

33

where

is

UN

a previously indistinct threat turns into the

pre-emptive self-defense authorized under inter-

national law.

—Squeezed by Machtpolitik, Saved by Realpolitik?

The Rule of Law

Law transcends politics but time and again it has to meet the test of political acceptance. When legal norms are perceived as faltering or when they appear unsuited to
meet their intended purpose, political pressures will mount to change the law. The

UN Charter law on the use of force provides the legal framework designed to maina cursory look

around the

globe reveals that peaceful order has remained as elusive a goal as ever.

What went

tain international peace

wrong with
rity?

the

and

security.

However, even

UN Charter system of maintaining international peace and secu-

Are there better ways and means to create order

in the

world? 34

Order cannot be created without harnessing power and establishing
the use of force. In a functioning nation State,

government has

a

rules for

monopoly on

the

UN Charter system has envisaged a distribution of
the authority to use force between the nation States and the UN Security Council.
use of force. Internationally, the

The system has shown
States have

proved to be unable to establish internal

the use of force

on

number of nation
peace and a monopoly on

three major deficiencies. First, a growing

their

own

territory,

hence the increase

border violence by non-State actors, including

have repeatedly used force beyond the limits

in civil strife

terrorists.

set

by the

and

cross-

Second, governments

UN Charter. Third, the

Security Council has only sometimes been able to take remedial action against the
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disorder spreading from disintegrating States or the unauthorized use of force by

governments.
edies.

Of these three deficiencies, only the first eludes direct and swift rem-

The other two would seem

ments could cease

to flout the

to be remediable: given the political will, govern-

UN

Charter rules on the use of force, and those

represented in the Security Council, especially the five permanent members, could

make it work. Why don't they just do it?
Some governments apparently do not believe that playing by the rules of the UN
Charter could ever satisfy their

vital security

concerns. During the Cold War, such

skepticism was well-founded. Given the ideological

rift

and the imperial designs of

the Soviet Union, the idea of collective security never really had a chance so that
traditional patterns of great

power rivalry and balance of power continued to shape

on the use of force in international
relations.
Following the demise of the Soviet empire, the 1990s seemed to witness
a renaissance of the UN Charter's normative framework on the use of force. 36 Under the shock of September 1 1 and the twin threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the picture has become mixed; the United
States in particular seems to have only limited confidence in the preventive and
international politics, establishing de facto rules
35

protective potential of the
It is

UN Charter system. 37

true that the reality of today's world does not really

UN

fit

the legal abstractions

The Charter envisaged a world composed of nation States
which implicitly were assumed to have a number of seemingly self-evident characteristics that allowed them to interact on the basis of sovereign equality, that made
them share a common sense of purpose, and that gave them the ability to shape the
course of events. Nation States were, by and large, implicitly assumed to be reasonof the

Charter.

ably well organized, to be run by responsible governments, to be masters in their

own house, to have a bona fide orientation towards the lofty goals of the Charter, to
pursue power not as an end in

itself,

to

overcome the

traditional

mentality of international politics and to seek a better

life

zero-sum-game

through cooperation

with others. The real world, of course, looks different. While States in some
regions, in particular in Europe, have indeed buried their centuries-old rivalries

and the very idea of war amongst themselves, others continue
politics, whilst a third

category of a growing

number of States seems

towards primeval chaos,

38

many dictatorships and

authoritarian regimes.

to be

power

headed

not to mention the dubious domestic legitimacy of too

zones of chaos are multiplied by
fields like

traditional

new

The dangers inherent

in spreading

categories of powerful non-State actors in

organized crime, weapons proliferation, and terrorism,

who are not only

operating international networks, but sometimes have even acquired the capability

and sustain

a

asymmetrical warfare.

39

to initiate

new

type of armed conflict that
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background of such
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a pointedly realistic

world view

—which,
EU

widely shared by both the United States as well as the

is

40

in the

—

in-

security

some authors has returned to tradiwhere little room is left for the UN Charter's

that the normative thinking of

tional patterns of
multilateralist

power

politics

concept of world order. These authors consider

alistic at best, as

concept as ide-

this

naive and irresponsible at worst. Their views are reflected in the

following statements: "Although the effort to subject the use of force to the rule of

law was the monumental internationalist experience of the twentieth century, the
fact

that that experiment has failed" 41

is

that states pursue security

and "The

by pursuing power.

first

and last
42

manage
But which order would

the United Nations were thus swept away? Given the unipolar reality of

if

the day, could

thoughtful

it

not, should

not be a Pax Americana? Robert Cooper provides a

it

comment on such an

eventuality:

In general, monopolies are undesirable.
force. This

is

state system.

answer

is

not just desirable;

What

is

it is

One

exception to this rule

will

is

the

monopoly of
and

the essential basis of order in the state

in the

wrong, then, with a virtual monopoly of force in the world? The

that the state

is

based on the legitimate monopoly of force and the

with the American monopoly of force in the world community

and

is

Legalist institutions that

that pursuit maladroitly are ultimately swept away."

emerge

geopolitical truth

be exercised, necessarily, in the interest of the United

is

that

States.

it is

difficulty

American

This will not be

much a source of power as force. Force without
legitimacy is tyranny - for those who are subject to it. In an age in which security will
seen as legitimate. Legitimacy

depend on taking

is

as

early action against

important than ever. And,

like

it

emerging threats abroad, legitimacy

is

more

or not, the United Nations remains the most powerful

source of legitimacy for such action. 43

—apparently
operate outside and independently of the UN framework—which

In response, Robert

meant

to

Kagan suggests "the legitimacy of liberalism"

the

United States and the

liberal

democracies of Europe would exercise in harmony,

could add to American power. 44 However, he puts

this vision

assuming that "many Europeans are betting that the

from terrorism and tyrants, will never be
than unbound." 45

It

risks

as great as the risk

himself into doubt by

from the

'axis

of

evil,'

of the American Levia-

seems indeed doubtful whether a joint transatlantic push for

legitimacy outside the United Nations could contribute to

—but not

making US power

poli-

Kagan assumes. His assertion that many
Europeans are more concerned about American power than the risks of nuclear
proliferation and mega-terrorism seems totally beside the point. Robert Cooper's
remarks on legitimacy probably come closer to mainstream European thinking,
but the core of European skepticism vis-a-vis the unrestrained use of American
tics a

success

for the reason
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power may be found
eyed idealism:

more elementary thought

in a

many Europeans

that

is

the opposite of starry-

simply believe that unipolar power

whether executed purely unilaterally or through a coalition of the
practical

and do not work.

politics,

willing, are not

moved by the "shock and

Suicidal terrorists will not be

awe" of a bombing campaign, the application of sheer power alone does not render
the desired results under conditions of asymmetrical warfare, the transformation

of deficient nation States into responsible liberal democracies requires different

means than the application of military force.
The rebirth of democratic West Germany out of the ruins of the Third Reich is
sometimes referred to as an example for successful State-engineering initiated by
overwhelming
Allies entered

force.

Maybe

it is

—but only

ceteris paribus: in

Germany

1945, the

with huge armies and fully controlled a country that was utterly ex-

own

hausted and destroyed by nearly six years of "total war" of the Germans'

The Wehrmacht did not melt away

choosing.

fought until
feat,

it

to resurface later in a guerilla but

was finished. Furthermore, people were demoralized not only by de-

destruction and million fold deaths, but also,

when faced with the truth of un-

speakable crimes, by a rapidly growing sense of guilt. In that situation,

not occur to the remaining young

bands of fanatics trying to

happened

to consist of a

fight

men

to question defeat

and

to

it

simply did

form

asymmetrical war. Instead, the Germans,

suicidal

who

also

homogeneous and highly educated population, took up

the generous offer by the victors to re-enter the civilized world, chose to rebuild
their country,

and had another

try at

democracy.

Today's threats are different and require different treatment. In the end, only
non-military means will drain the breeding grounds of a suicidal terrorism that
fueled

by pseudo-religious

war of ideas where there
prevail,

it

will

no

The

battle for hearts

and minds

will involve a

substitute for the victory of reason. For reason to

be essential that the use of force, when necessary,

stood as action in the
this objective

is

fervor.

is

properly under-

common interest. 46 It appears hardly conceivable to achieve

without following a course of "effective multilateralism" as envis-

aged by the European Security Strategy, 47 with a reformed and revitalized
curity Council

assuming a central

In that regard,

role.

American authors have replaced the old maxim

new leitmotif,

"if

it

ain't fixed yet,

break

suggest "if it ain't fixed yet, try and do

it,"

it."

"if

it

it

fix it?

A number

seems

UN Se-

as if

some

ain't broke, don't fix it"

by

a

whereas a pragmatist would probably

Therefore,

if

the implementation of the

UN Charter system has indeed remained deficient, why sweep
and

is

it

away,

why not try

of important steps into that direction have already been

taken by the Security Council, not only before, but also after the unfortunate controversy preceding the Iraq war, including, inter alia, Security Council Resolution

1373 (2001) to fight international terrorism, 48 Resolution 1540 (2004) to fight the
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weapons of mass destruction, 49 and Resolution 1546 (2004) on
transition and reconstruction. 50 The road towards international

proliferation of
Iraq's political

peace and security through effective multilateral action has been clearly laid out by
Secretary-General Annan:

and

Security Council,

it

should follow the rule of law, 51 lead to a reform of the

arrive at a

when and how

clude criteria on

new commitment

for joint action that should in-

anticipatory action by the Council

is

necessary to

counter the terrorist threat.
In conclusion,

it

seems

fair to

use of force as set forth above
liefs

in

is

say that the reading of the international law

strongly supported by contemporary political be-

Germany. The cataclysmic events

German

role in those events,

tors have

on the

in the first half of the 20th century, the

and our national experience

after 1945; all those fac-

converged into a very strong conviction of mainstream foreign policy

thinking in Germany: the conviction that we should follow the

new course of inter-

national relations charted in San Francisco in June 1945, which had been inspired

by the United

States.

Germans presumably

they firmly believe that

it is

right,

will stay this

course not only because

but also because they see no practical alternative

in terms of Realpolitik.
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other superpower .... In this context, 'equality' and 'supremacy' did not merely define

power among states, but also states'
normative prerogatives and precautions in the use of force.
the equation of military

Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations
Journal of International Law 607, 609 (2003).
See

36.

Id. at 609, 610.

37.

For an extremely

critical

respective de facto

After Iraq, 97

AMERICAN

view of the current and future role of the Security Council, see

"The charter's use of force regime
petered out over a
hobbled along during the Cold War, underwent a
brief resurgence in the 1990s, and then flamed out with Kosovo and Iraq."
38. See Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the TwentyFirst CENTURY (2003). Cooper distinguishes the pre-State, "post-imperial chaos" as typical
example of the "pre-modern world," the classical State system of the "modern world" shaped by
balance-of-power or hegemonic policies, and the "postmodern world" as exemplified by the
European Union where the pattern of inter-State relations has been completely switched from
the balance-of-power mode towards ever-growing cooperation and openness.
39. See HERFRIED MUNKLER, DIE NEUEN KRIEGE 187 pp. (2002).
40. See supra notes 23 and 27.
41. See Michael J. Glennon, supra note 5, at 24.
Michael

J.

Glennon, supra note

5,

at 31:

period of years. The Security Council

42.

Mat 25.

43.

See supra note 38, at 167.

44.

See

ROBERT KAGAN, PARADISE

ORDER 149-158

(Atlantic

.

.

.

itself

&

POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE

NEW WORLD

Books 2003).

45.

Mat

46.

For reasons of legitimacy, but also in order to improve and not to erode the prospects of

158.

change induced by "soft power." Regarding the sources and the potential of the United
soft

power, as well as

its

States'

inverse relationship to the unrestrained use of hard power, see JOSEPH

S.

Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't
GO IT ALONE (2002). Regarding this interrelationship, cf. also THE 9/1 1 COMMISSION REPORT Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

Nye

STATES 375 (2004):
Support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken
1 1

suggested that

thing in

its

many or most

in Islamic countries after 9/

people thought the United States was doing the right

fight against terrorism;

few people saw popular support for

al

Qaeda; half of

those surveyed said that ordinary people had a favorable view of the United States. By
2003, polls showed that 'the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the
Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely
limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread .... Since last summer, favorable
ratings for the U.S. have fallen

among Muslims

from

61%

to

in Nigeria.

47.

See supra note 27.

48.

See supra note

9.
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in Indonesia
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SC Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement.
50. SC Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/
381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement.
51. See his address to the UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004, available at http://
49.

www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats. asp?nid= 1 088#.
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The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom
under International Law

Michael N. Schmitt*

preceding the attack on Iraq by the US-commanded "coalition of
Inthethe months few
captured greater international attention than the
willing," 1

ity

issues

legal-

of the impending armed conflict. Even United Nations Secretary-General Kofi

Annan

entered the fray, intimating that an attack without the imprimatur of a

Security Council

mandate would

violate the

UN Charter.

2

Once Operation

Iraqi

Freedom began on March 19, 2003, however, one might have expected the brouhaha to die down, particularly given the speed of victory, and the fact that the troubled occupation should have diverted attention fromjws ad helium reservations. 3
Indeed, controversy regarding the legality of the two campaigns the United States

and United Kingdom had recently conducted, Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom, 4 faded quickly once
Yet, as this article

is

hostilities

ended.

being written in early 2004, the controversy over Iraqi Free-

dom rages on. The 2004 US presidential election campaign has contributed to the
staying

power of the

issue.

So too have the transatlantic and

* Professor of International Law, George C. Marshall

European Center

intra- European

for Security Studies,

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views expressed herein are those of the author in his
personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of any United States or

government agency. This article was published previously
Military Ethics (2004) and is reprinted with permission.
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volume

3,
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divides created, or at least exacerbated,

by virulent opposition to the war on the

part of some

France and Germany. The seeming inabil-

ity

European

States, especially

of weapons inspectors to locate the alleged weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

capabilities that President

loomed, and the

failure to find a

Bush pointed

to so frequently as

smoking gun tying Iraq

war clouds

to Al Qaeda, have

added

fuel to the fire.

Given the panoply of justifications for the operation bandied about by governments, politicians, political commentators, legal experts, non-governmental organizations,

and the public

Freedom serves as a fascinating jus ad
considers those most commonly posed
implicit

at large, Iraqi

bellum case study. This article

—

Security Council authorization, self-defense against State support to terrorism, anticipatory (often mislabeled preemptive) self-defense against terrorism

ons of mass destruction, breach of the 1991

and regime change.

States

mounting the

the cease-fire that ended the

cease-fire,

humanitarian intervention,

attack formally proffered only breach of

Gulf War

first

and weap-

as

its

However, unofficial

legal basis.

sources in policy and academic circles floated the others as independent grounds
for the action,

and the

States involved cited each as a de facto, albeit not legal, factor

legitimizing the attack.

Implicit Security Council Authorization

The most

universally accepted basis for the use of force

United Nations Security Council. Before granting
pursuant to Article 39 of the

it,

is

authorization by the

the Council

UN Charter, that a particular situation amounts to a

threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

Security Council
ful

must

first

must determine,

Once

it

does

so, the

attempt to resolve the matter by employing non-force-

measures, such as an embargo. 5

If non-forceful actions

prove unsuccessful, or

if

them would be "inadequate," the Council may then, acting under Article 42, "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as it may deem
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Such actions are
it

believes that attempting

known
ter in

as

"Chapter VII enforcement operations," a reference to the Charter chap-

which the relevant

articles appear.

This decision generally comes in the form of a Security Council resolution containing a

mandate

to use "all necessary

678 of 1990 authorized

stance, Resolution

Kuwait" to use

all

means"

necessary

Resolution 660 and

all

means

to

to achieve a specified end. For in-

"Member

States cooperating with

"uphold and implement Security Council

subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international

6

peace and security." Resolution 660 had

from Kuwait following

their

demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi

August 1990 invasion.
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individual States or an ad hoc coalition thereof, to a regional security organization

such as

NATO,

UN commanded and controlled force.

or to a

As events unfolded

8

2002 and early 2003, the United States and United

in late

Kingdom actively sought a Security Council mandate for action against Iraq. However, the best they

could achieve was Resolution 1441, which did not contain the

desired "all necessary

means"

clause. 9

Both countries abandoned subsequent

forts to secure a

follow-on use of force resolution

ened to exercise

their veto authority.

Resolution 1441, passed unanimously on
ure to fully disclose information about
missile

tic

terrorism,

by aid
erty

12

programs,

10

its

November

agencies,

cooperate with weapons

from the

and cooperate

first

Gulf War.

15

8,

Russia threat-

condemned

13

inspectors,

facilitate

11

end

resolution

went on

ballis-

ties

to

humanitarian assistance

in accounting for missing individuals

The

Iraq's fail-

weapons of mass destruction and

cease repression of its population,
14

when France and

ef-

and prop-

to find Iraq in "material

breach" of these obligations under various resolutions, including Resolution 687,
which, as conspicuously noted in 1441,

set forth the

After granting Iraq "a final opportunity" to
tions,

terms of the 1991

comply with

its

cease-fire.

disarmament obliga-

imposing detailed requirements regarding the future weapons inspection re-

gime, and demanding that Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and
actively" with inspectors

from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

(UNMOVIC),
edly

the resolution ominously "recalled" "that the Council has repeat-

warned Iraq

that

it

will face serious

consequences as a result of its continued

violations of its obligations."

With war drawing close, some argued that Resolution 1441, standing alone, implicitly authorized the impending attack. The resolution specifically noted that the
Security Council was operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides the basis for authorizing the use of force in response to a threat to the peace.

Although

Weapons

it

gave Iraq a final opportunity to meet

Inspector

Hans

Blix briefed the Council

its

obligations, Chief

on March

7,

not cooperated "immediately," as required by Resolution 144 1.
lution

warned of "serious consequences"

tions.

Given prior sanctions on

so the

argument

ate

if Iraq failed

Iraq, the phrase

to

UN

2003 that Iraq had
16

Finally, the reso-

meet the Council's condi-

could only have been a reference,

goes, to forceful disarmament. Thus,

when

Iraq failed to cooper-

immediately with the inspectors, the 1441 condition precedent for the use of

force presented

itself.

This line of reasoning
sary

is

fundamentally flawed.

First,

the lack of the

"all

neces-

means" clause evidences the Council's discord over whether armed force con-

stituted the appropriate

remedy for Iraq's failure to meet its obligations. Moreover,
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in
its

1990 the Security Council had likewise given Iraq a "final opportunity" to meet
obligations under prior resolutions,

wait.

17

But on that occasion

ing with Kuwait to "use
tions

all

it

most

also authorized

significantly withdrawal

Member

States that

from Ku-

were cooperat-

necessary means" to uphold and implement the resolu-

and "restore international peace and security

comply with them by January

15, 1991.

in the area" if Iraq failed to

Thus, Iraqi non-compliance automatically

triggered the use of force mandate. Resolution 1441 contained

In fact, only the ttorc-inclusion of the "all necessary

no such

trigger.

means" language made Res-

olution 1441's adoption possible. During the Security Council session that ap-

proved the resolution, France, Russia, and China insisted that they viewed 1441
but the

do

first

step in a two-step process,

as

and that only the Council could decide what

The French Ambassador was particularly pointed: "France welcomes the fact that all ambiguity on this point and all elements of automaticity have disappeared from the resolution." 18
Tellingly, US Ambassador Negroponte conceded as much in his own remarks.
to

in the event of Iraqi non-compliance.

As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains
no "hidden triggers" and no "automaticity" with respect to the use of force. If there is a
further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council
State, the
12.

by

UNMOVIC,

the

IAEA

or a

Member

matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph

19

on

Portentously, he went

to qualify his

comments.

The

resolution

Iraq

must be disarmed. And, one way or another, Iraq will be disarmed.

Council

fails

makes

clear that

any

Iraqi failure to

comply

is

unacceptable and that
If the Security

to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution

does not constrain any

Member

State

from acting

to defend itself against the threat

posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world
peace and security. 20

Consistent with this approach, the United States later returned to the Security

Council to urge armed force, most famously on February 5, 2003 when Secretary of
State Colin Powell briefed

from whatever is ahead."
ident
its

Bush

to proclaim:

responsibilities, so

21

it

on

Iraq's failures

and urged the Council to "not shrink

As noted, the Council did not act,

a failure that led Pres-

"The United Nations Security Council has not

we

will rise to ours."

22

Therefore,

it

lived

up

to

should be apparent that

when Coalition forces attacked days later, their legal basis for armed action was not
Resolution 1441; nor would the resolution have provided a proper basis had they

made such an

assertion.
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Self-Defense against State Support to Terrorism

Beyond Security Council authorization

under Chapter VII, the only

to use force

other explicit exception to Charter Article 2(4)'s broad prohibition on the use of
force 23

is

self-defense pursuant to Article 51. Article 51 provides that "[n]othing in

the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective

defense

if

an armed attack occurs against a

Member

self-

of the United Nations, until

the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace

whereas a mere threat to the peace

and

security." Thus,

rity

Council's right to mandate forceful enforcement measures, an

suffices to

engage the Secu-

armed

attack

is

the condition precedent for self-defense.

The

terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001 crystallized the applicability of the

law of self-defense to acts of terrorism. The following day the Security Council
passed Resolution 1368 affirming the "inherent right of self-defense as recognized

On September 28, it again cited the right to

by the Charter of the United Nations."
self-defense in Resolution 1373,

which

set forth a

number of measures

terrorism. Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed 1368

and 1373, thus

knowledging that the situation implicated the right to

However, by March

19, 2003, Iraq

self-defense.

had not conducted

to

combat

implicitly ac-

24

terrorist attacks against

the United States, nor was there an immediate threat of it doing so. True, in 1993,
Iraq had been involved in an assassination plot against former President George

Bush,

to

Sr.,

since then,
fore,

any

which the United

States

responded with cruise missile

no known terrorist attacks have been conducted by Iraqi

justification of

must be based on

strikes.

But

agents. There-

Operation Iraqi Freedom related to ongoing terrorism

Iraq's support

of terrorists, such as Al Qaeda.

The law surrounding the use offeree

against State supporters of terrorism has ex-

perienced a sea change over the past two decades. Recall that Operation El Dorado

Canyon, the 1986 package of US
tack in Berlin that targeted

air strikes against

US military personnel,

Libya following a terrorist at-

generated nearly universal con-

demnation. With the exception of Israel and the United Kingdom, even close

The General Assembly passed a resof international law, 26 and Secretary-General

of the United States criticized the operation.
olution

condemning

it

as a violation

Javier Perez de Cueller stated that

ber state against another."

he "deplored" the "military action by one

mem-

27

State support of guerilla forces surfaced in a judicial opinion rendered the
year. In Military

allies

25

and Paramilitary Activities,

same

a case between the United States

and

Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice addressed the appropriateness of im-

puting an armed attack to a State because of its sponsorship of rebels such that military action against the State itself

is

appropriate in self-defense. 28 The Court held
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committed an armed attack by "the sending by or on behalf of a State of

that a State

armed bands, groups,

irregulars or mercenaries,

which carry out

force against another State of such gravity as to

amount

armed

or

therein."
cle 3,

conducted by regular

attack
29

The opinion went on

paragraph

(g),

when

to (inter alia) an actual

substantial

may be

taken to reflect customary international law." 30

was that the group be acting on behalf of the

been otherwise highly involved in the actual operation.

the United States and United

Kingdom directly attacked the Taliban,

government of Afghanistan, because of its decision

the de facto

of Afghanistan that

involvement

to state that " [t]his description, contained in Arti-

to basics, the requirement

State or that the State have

Yet,

its

armed

of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly

Resolution 3314 (XXIX),

Reduced

forces,

acts of

it

controls to be used

by

[Al

Qaeda]

to "allow the parts

as a base of operations," 31

community was very supportive. In addition to UK participation
strikes, Georgia, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Ara-

the international
in the initial

bia, Tajikistan,

Turkey, and Uzbekistan provided airspace and

Egypt, Russia, and the European

Union publicly backed the

the Organization for the Islamic Conference limited
States to restrict

its

campaign to Afghanistan.

32

China,

operations, while even

itself to

Australia,

facilities.

urging the United

Canada, the Czech Re-

The Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom offered ground troops. 33 Paradoxically, this all occurred in spite
of the fact that the Taliban were more dependent on Al Qaeda (for support in its
conflict with the Northern Alliance) than vice versa, and therefore did not appear
to fit the Military and Paramilitary Activities standard.
public,

Germany,

Italy,

Japan,

Particularly indicative of the shifting attitude towards the degree of State sup-

port that rises to the level of an

armed

attack

is

the fact that the justification for at-

tacking the Taliban was contained in the required

Council that

was

clearly

it

was acting

on notice

defense and

it

US

notification to the Security

in self-defense. Therefore, the international

that the United States characterized

its

community

action as one in

self-

appears to have accepted the premise that, in appropriate circum-

stances, State supporters of terrorism risk a military response pursuant to that
right.

That

said, the precise level

of State support that amounts to an armed attack re-

mains uncertain. The horror of 9/1

1,

particularly the

number of casualties and the

direct targeting of innocent civilians, clearly contributed to international accep-

tance of the

US response. So too did the fact that the United Nations had repeatedly

warned the Taliban

to put

striking

terrorist activities

on

its

territory,

34

as

had the

35

The fact that the Taliban were internationally ostracized
them even more palatable. Nevertheless, the attack against the

United States post-9/1

made

an end to

1.

Taliban and the response thereto were certainly watershed events for the law
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surrounding lawful responses to State support of terrorism. Without any doubt,
the degree of support necessary to constitute an

armed

attack has

dropped

precipitously.

And what of Iraq's complicity in terrorism?
a direct link

Failure of occupation forces to find

between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda attacks (or any other

forces actively conducting operations against the United States)
dispositive. International

the circumstances.

tween Iraq and

36

terrorist

relevant, but not

is

law judges actors by what they reasonably believed under

Therefore, the question

terrorists,

is

not whether there were links be-

but rather would any links the United States rationally

thought existed, even mistakenly, have justified an attack on Iraq in self-defense?
Defensive actions must also meet the legal criteria of necessity and proportionality in the face

of an immediate threat. 37 Necessity requires that there be no rea-

sonable alternative to the use of force; proportionality limits the force used to that
required to actually defeat the attack; and

occur only during the

last

imminency

requires the self-defense to

window of opportunity to mount an

effective defensive

operation.
Secretary of State Powell provided the

most comprehensive picture of what the

United States believed regarding Iraqi complicity in his February

2003 briefing

5,

The Secretary made the case that "Iraq
harbours a
deadly terrorist network headed by Adu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants." 38 According to
Powell, Zarqawi set up a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, which he subse-

to the Security Council.

quently

moved

.

.

.

to northeastern Iraq after the United States ousted the Taliban

from Afghanistan. Although
the Iraqi government,

this

camp was

located outside territory controlled by

Baghdad did have an agent in Ansar al-Islam, the

radical or-

some members of Al
Al Qaeda associates had moved

ganization that controlled the area. That agent provided

Qaeda

safe haven.

into the capital,

Powell went on to claim that

where they operated

freely.

Further, he asserted that over the past

decade there had been frequent contacts between Iraqi agents and Al Qaeda and

Qaeda detainee led to an admission that Iraq provided
chemical and biological weapons training for two members of the organization. 39
US concerns about Iraqi involvement in terrorism were not isolated. Even the
Security Council had determined that "Iraq has failed to comply with its commit" 40
ments pursuant to resolution 687 ( 1991 ) with regard to terrorism
Assuming
that interrogation of an Al

that the

US

allegations

were reasonable and made

in

good

faith,

did they justify a

response in self-defense?

To begin with, by linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, the issue of anticipatory self-defense
becomes moot. Al Qaeda has been conducting a campaign of terrorism against the
United States for

at least a

decade. 41

Its

attacks (planned or executed) can hardly be
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characterized as isolated, independent actions, with each response judged separately for

compliance with the law of self-defense.

ticipatory, but rather

Was

Iraq's

undertaken in the face of an ongoing campaign.

involvement

against the country?

US defensive actions are not an-

It

in this

campaign

sufficient to merit

an attack directly

would appear not. The major factor that Powell emphasized

was the presence of a key Al Qaeda operative

northern Iraq. However,

in

this

was

an area beyond the control of the government. Further, to the extent Iraq harbored
terrorists, that activity certainly

nections, with terrorist

did not

rise to

Qaeda conAfghanistan. The additional

the level of Taliban/ Al

camps operating openly

in

contacts that Powell cited were insufficiently developed to merit characterizing the

Al Qaeda campaign as an armed attack by Iraq. As demonstrated by the interna-

condemnation of the 1998 US

tional

cruise missile strike

on

a

Sudanese pharma-

ceutical plant (in contrast to acceptance of a related strike against a terrorist facility
in Afghanistan), the international

community

insists that the

States base counter-terrorist defensive operations

Anticipatory Self-Defense against

Although some commentators argued that

be

reliable.

evidence on which

42

WMD and Terrorism

Iraqi ties to Al

Qaeda

legally justified

Operation Iraqi Freedom as self-defense against an ongoing attack, anticipatory
self-defense 43
cifically

found greater support within the

and policy communities, spe-

anticipatory defense against the dual evils of weapons of mass destruction

(whether wielded by a State or
State

legal

sponsored or not).

terrorists)

And Operation

and transnational terrorism (whether

Iraqi

Freedom made good on President

Bush's September 2002 National Security Strategy promise, echoed in his pub-

weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

lished

when

necessary.

The

strategies, to act

preemptively

44

immediacy of today's threats, and the
could be caused by our adversaries' choice of

inability to deter a potential attacker, the

magnitude of potential harm that
weapons do not permit [relying on
strike first.

a reactive posture].

We

cannot

let

our enemies

45

Legal arguments based

on anticipatory

self-defense usually falter

on

the criterion

of imminency. Recall the international law requirements that an act of self-defense

be proportional and necessary to an armed attack that

is

either

imminent or under-

way. They derive historically from an 1837 incident involving the Caroline^ a vessel

used to supply Canadian rebels fighting British rule during the Mackenzie Rebellion. British forces

crossed into the United States (after asking the United States,
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without

result, to

Caroline, set

An

it

put an end to rebel

ablaze,

and sent

it

activities

over Niagara

on

Falls.

its

territory),

Two US

captured the

citizens perished.

exchange of diplomatic notes ensued in which Secretary of State Daniel

Webster argued that defensive actions require "a necessity of self-defense,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no

moment

instant,

for deliberation

.

.

.

[and must be] justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that ne-

and kept

cessity,

clearly within

it."

46

Lord Ashburton,

his British counterpart, ac-

cepted this formula as the basis of their exchange. 47 Both the International Military

Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Court of Justice have cited the stan-

dard with approval. 48

By any measure of estimation, Iraq was not about to launch an attack on the
United States, with weapons of mass destruction or otherwise, in the immediate
future. Nor is there any compelling evidence of Iraq distributing weapons of mass
destruction to transnational terrorists or in any other way directing or sponsoring
and imminent

specific

had

lieved that Iraq

attacks

on the United

failed to fully

disarm

States. Rather, the

as required

by the

United States be-

UN disarmament re-

gime; had not fully accounted for the biological and chemical weapons, such as

anthrax and the nerve agent

VX it possessed immediately after the first Gulf War;

could rapidly produce and disperse more such weapons; was actively concealing
efforts to

develop additional weapons of mass destruction, as well as existing capa-

for instance,

bilities,

logical warfare

negotiation;

by dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing bio-

agents into western Iraq while Resolution

was determined
produce

capability to

to develop a nuclear

material;

fissile

weapons of mass destruction with
(UAV).

and

49

weapon and was seeking

and was developing the

ballistic missiles

1441 was under
the

ability to deliver

and unmanned

aerial vehicles

Although assertions that Iraq possessed biological and chemical weapons

a nuclear

weapons development program

are highly doubtable in light of the

failure

of post-attack weapons inspectors to discover convincing evidence

thereof,

50

bear in

taken, that

is

mind

it is

the reasonable belief of the attacker, even

if

mis-

legally relevant.

While these

"facts" arguably fail to

tionally understood, in

that

that

its

meet the imminency

criterion as

it is

tradi-

National Security Strategy the United States has asserted

imminency must be interpreted more

liberally in the current circumstances:

We

must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction
weapons that can be
51
easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

—
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commit US

Indeed, the Congressional joint resolution authorizing the President to
forces to battle against Iraq

adopted exactly

this liberal interpretation

of anticipatory

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of
mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those
weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or
provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude
of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack,
52
combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself.
self-defense.

.

Those who urge
fail

fidelity to

an outdated

intent

.

restrictive interpretation

to grasp the realities of twenty- first-century conflict. In

may be a shadowy non-State group

.

on remaining

of imminency

an era when the enemy

invisible until

blow, a requirement to withhold defensive action until that blow

it

strikes

its

about to land

is

would render the right to self-defense meaningless. Exacerbating matters is the fact
that, given

could be
If

WMD proliferation, any miscalculation as to when an attack will come

fatal.

international law

rights

and duties

it

is

sets

to contribute to the

maintenance of global order, the

out must be interpreted not only in conformity with their

core purposes, but also with sensitivity to the security context in which they are ap-

The requirement of imminency deters States from resorting precipitously to
the most powerful
and potentially destabilizing option available in internaplied.

—

—

tional relations.

On the other hand, the right of self-defense exists to allow States an

effective shield against aggression. In the
this inherent right

Charter framework, the recognition of

compensates for the possibility

(a

de facto likelihood) that the

Chapter VII scheme for maintaining or restoring international peace and security

might

fail.

A careful balancing of the presumption against
low

States

firmative,

an
a

using force with the need to

al-

effectual defense suggests the appropriate standard. Stated in the af-

State

may

immediately to defend
revocably committed

act

anticipatorily

itself in a

if

it

must

strike

meaningful way and the potential aggressor has

itself to attack.

claims to anticipatory self-defense
the last possible

(preemptively)

is

The determinative question when

ir-

evaluating

whether the defensive action occurred during

window of opportunity in the face of an attack that was almost cer-

tainly going to occur.

This approach to imminency generally operates synergistically with the necessity criterion. After all, if the

use of force

resolving the matter, then in

most

is

not the sole remaining viable option for

cases the last

window of opportunity

will

not

have been reached.

Assuming, for the sake of analysis, the

ment

it

facts believed

acted, the case for acting anticipatorily
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Iraq presented

some threat to the United States and its Coalition partners,

larly given its ties to transnational terrorism, its

weapons of mass destruction,
hostility to the

United

States.

its

demonstrated willingness to use

possession of such weapons, and

However,

little

particu-

decade-long

its

evidence existed of an Iraqi intention

WMD in the near future. Nor did Iraq possess a reliable means of delivering

to use

those weapons over great distances. Further, although Iraq unquestionably had

connections to terrorism, there was no suggestion that

weapons

it

it

was about to transfer the

reportedly possessed to terrorists.

On the contrary, both individual States and the United Nations had the country
under a microscope. Moreover, the lessons of Afghanistan could not have been lost

on the

Iraqis.

The

Iraqi leadership

must have realized that any use of

WMD against

the United States, whether by themselves or Iraqi-supported terrorists,

proven

suicidal. Indeed, use against

have been exceedingly

any

irrational, for

State,

or even an internal group, would

such use would have immediately silenced

opposition to a use of force mandate in the Security Council. In

was serving

as

an incentive for compliance, a

inspectors pursuant to Resolution 1441,

and

fact

its

fact,

subsequent cooperation, however

cumstances that Iraq was simultaneously planning a

To conclude

in these cir-

strike against the

any Coalition partner, and that March 2003 represented the

mount an

UN pressure

apparent in Iraqi acceptance of

grudging, with them; clearly, the Iraqis feared an attack.

States or

would have

last

United

window

would have been illogical.
In the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense arguably fails on the other two criteria as well. That the Iraqis had not fully complied with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions is unquestionable; but international pressure on
Iraq had seen progress, particularly following the US and UK saber rattling and the
Council's adoption of Resolution 1441. Neither inspection team believed it had
of opportunity to

reached a dead end.

needed to enforce

And

its

effective defense,

the Security Council could not even agree that force was

prior resolutions, an easier conclusion to reach than one that

held an attack was forthcoming and only an immediate armed response could stave

Thus, Operation Iraqi Freedom

on the necessity criterion.
But even had an attack been necessary in March 2003, some might have argued
that conquest and belligerent occupation of the country was disproportionate. For
instance, selected air strikes against WMD-related targets, or perhaps even a rolling
campaign designed to impose ever-greater costs, might have compelled Iraq to disit off.

mantle
refrain

its

capabilities,

falters

cooperate fully with international weapons inspectors, and

from further involvement with

terrorists.

That

said,

given

Saddam

Hussein's record of intransigence (and in light of Operation Desert Fox's inability
to convince

him

to readmit

weapons

inspectors), assertions of disproportionality
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Of course, because

are unconvincing.

term

is

understood

in the

the operation was not "necessary" as that

law of self-defense, the entire issue

is

purely theoretical.

Breach of the 1991 Cease-Fire

The

lead Coalition partners, the United States

and United Kingdom, did not

base the legality of their attack against Iraq on a self-defense argument, anticipatory
or otherwise. Before
in a

commencing hostilities,

the United

Kingdom made

this clear

formal opinion of the Attorney General. 53 The United States issued no compa-

rable official legal opinion, a

problem because the US administration was publicly

discussing possible reasons for the attack that ranged from
cease-fires to terrorism

and regime change.

54

However, immediately

of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States addressed a
the Security Council in which

it

outlined

force, a justification very similar to that

opinion. 55
It is

its

letter to the

after

launch

President of

legal rationale for resorting to

armed

contained in the earlier Attorney General

likewise. 56

The United Kingdom did

important to distinguish these formal

other justifications suggested by the

WMD and enforcing

legal justifications

from the myriad

US and UK governments, many of which

ap-

peared to be robed in the mantle of the law. For instance, in his notification to

Congress that the United States was employing force against
stated he has determined that "further diplomatic
will neither

Iraq, the President

and other peaceful means alone

adequately protect the national security of the United States against

the continuing threat posed by Iraq, nor lead to enforcement of all relevant United

Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." 57

Some might conclude that

such statements indicate application of the preemptive self-defense strategy an-

nounced

2002 National Security Strategy. Such assertions confuse strategy

in the

with the underlying legal basis for application of a strategy in particular circumstances. Precision requires distinguishing strategic rationale

from underlying legal

justification.

To

date, the

most complete

the United States

is

"official" presentation

contained in an

article

of the legal position taken by

coauthored by the

US

State Depart-

ment's Legal Adviser, William H. Taft IV, and the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political/Military Affairs,

Law.
cil

5*

Todd

F.

Buchwald,

In that piece, they amplify

President.

self-defense

on the

in

American Journal of International

rationale contained in letters to the

They begin by accurately dispensing with the notion

is

Coun-

that preemptive

either necessarily legal or illegal; such assertions are red herrings be-

cause the legality of preemptive actions
the

in the

is

always fact-specific. 59 They then turn to

US legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom, one grounded in both the situation

2002-3 and the history of the Iraq case over the past dozen
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combined with that contained in the US and UK notifications to the Security
Council and the Attorney General's opinion yield the following justification for
the war.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait

on August

2,

1990, the United Nations Security

Council passed Resolution 660, declaring the attack a breach of the peace and de-

manding immediate withdrawal. 60 Over the ensuing two months, it passed a number of resolutions imposing sanctions on Iraq in the hope of pressuring it to
comply with 660. 61 Finally, on November 29 the Council, pursuant to its Chapter
VII authority, adopted Resolution 678, which authorized States cooperating with

Kuwait to use

and "to

"all

necessary means" to implement 660 and subsequent resolutions

restore international peace

particularly relevant as

empowered

from Kuwait, but

military
bility.

it

security in the area." 62

and

The

latter

phrase

is

the use of force not merely to expel the Iraqi

also to create the conditions necessary for regional sta-

In order to afford Iraq "one final opportunity," the resolution set a compli-

ance deadline of January

15, 1991.

Meanwhile, the United States and a number of

other States had deployed forces to the region "in the exercise of the inherent right

of individual and collective self-defense." 63

When

Iraq failed to

comply with the

forces attacked. This action

UN resolutions by the deadline, Coalition

was taken pursuant to 678, not a new Security Council

mandate; thus, individual States

—not

the Security Council

not complied and took the decision to attack. By March

—determined

3, Iraqi

forces

commanders negotiated a cease-fire.
Exactly one month later, the Security Council adopted Resolution
forth the terms of a cease-fire that would come into effect upon Iraqi

treat

and

Iraq

had

were

in re-

687. 64

It set

field

acceptance,

including terms relating to such issues as borders, terrorism, and, most significantly,

WMD disarmament. A system of inspections (and weapons destruction) by

Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA was set up for this
latter purpose. Iraq grudgingly accepted the terms on April 6 in a letter to the Secuthe United Nations Special

rity

Council. 65

As a matter of law, material breach of the terms of a
leases the other
force.

66

from

its

own

cease-fire

obligations, including that to refrain

Those who suggest that breach of a

by one

side re-

from the use of

cease-fire contained in a Security

Council resolution requires a subsequent use of force mandate before resuming
hostilities

ignore the fact that the state of war continues during a cease-fire. 67

upon in
Only when

Cease-fires are merely temporary cessations of hostilities, usually agreed

order to

facilitate

hostilities

negotiations

on formal termination of

hostilities.

have formally ended, for instance through a peace agreement, does the

UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force become operative again as
between the parties to the

conflict. 68
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On

a

forcibly,

number of occasions,

Coalition forces had responded to Iraqi breaches

most notably

and 1998. Although the Security Council did not

in 1993

specifically authorize the use of force either time, significant indications

of concur-

rence with the position that Resolution 678 alone sufficed to justify a resumption

of hostilities existed in both cases. Not only did France (an opponent of the 2003
action) participate in the 1993 operation with the United States

dom, but Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali

and United King-

stated:

the raid was carried out in accordance with a

mandate from the Security Council under
and the motive for the raid was Iraq's violation of that
resolution which concerns the cease-fire. As General-Secretary of the United Nations, I
can tell you that the action was taken in accordance with the resolutions of the Security
Council and the Charter of the United Nations. 69
resolution 678 (1991),

Similarly, following the 1998

Operation Desert Fox strikes, a vituperative debate

over the necessity of a Security Council Resolution finding Iraq in material breach
as a condition precedent to attack

took place;

tellingly, this

debate assumed that

if

the Security Council had rendered such a finding, States could have used force in

response thereto. 70
In

fact, in

the years following implementation of the cease-fire, the Security

Council found Iraq in non-compliance with Security Council resolutions on multiple occasions.

For instance, in August 1991, the Council condemned Iraq's

ous violation of a number of its obligations under
its

.

.

.

resolution 687 (1991)

"seri-

and of

undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and the International

Atomic Energy Agency, which
sions of that resolution

constitutes a material breach of the relevant provi-

which established

." 71

a cease-fire.

.

Council issued a stern warning to Iraq that "compliance
to accord immediate, unconditional

and unrestricted

.

.

.

.

In

with

March
its

have the severest consequences for Iraq."

demned Iraq for "the decision

...

72

.

.

.

obligations

access to the Special

mission and the IAEA, in conformity with the relevant resolutions,
the implementation of resolution 687 (1991)

1998, the

is

.

.

Com-

necessary for

[and] that any violation

would

That November, the Council con-

of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the

Commission" and labeled the step a "flagrant violation of resolution 687
" 73
Operation Desert Fox commenced on
(1991) and other relevant resolutions
December 16, 1998 and continued for three days, but Iraq refused to admit inspecSpecial

tors for the next four years.

The most relevant finding of breach came when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. As outlined above, in that
resolution the Council determined that Iraq had failed to comply with
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WMD information, cooperate with weapons inspectors,

requirements to disclose
cut

ties to terrorists,

sistance,

and cooperate

Gulf War.
tions

It

in accounting for

human and property losses from the first

affirmed "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obliga-

under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991),

through

and

cease repression of its population, facilitate humanitarian as-

Iraq's failure to cooperate

in particular

with United Nations inspectors and the

to complete actions required

IAEA

under paragraphs 8-13 of resolution 687

(1991)." 74 Resolution 1441 also specifically "recalled" that Resolution 678 had au-

thorized the use of "all necessary means" to uphold and implement both prior and

subsequent relevant

UN resolutions (thereby including 1441)

and

restore interna-

The Council afforded Iraq a "final opportunity" to meet
its obligations, but "failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully
in the implementation of this resolution [which requires a declaration on all astional peace

and

security.

pects of the Iraqi

WMD program and cooperation with inspectors] shall constitute

a further material breach of Iraq's obligation.

.

(emphasis added). Resolution

."

1441 concluded with a stern warning of "serious consequences" in the event of

"continued violation [by Iraq] of its obligations." Significantly, 1441 required the
Security Council to reconvene

if Iraq

did not

fulfill its

the Council did so to consider the reports of weapons inspectors,
Iraq a clean

United

bill

did not give

States.

1441 did not contain was a requirement to return to the Coun-

for a use of force authorization.

circulated

among

As noted by the US

the Security Council

again to "decide any measures to ensure
tions."

who

of health, and the concerns of individual States, most notably the

What Resolution
cil

As noted earlier,

obligations.

75

legal advisers, earlier drafts

members required
full

the Council to meet

compliance of all

its

relevant resolu-

Negotiations led to the rejection of this wording.

Based on these

facts,

the United States and

its

coalition partners presented a

rather linear argument. Resolution 687 (1991) conditioned the cease-fire

compliance with

its

on

Iraqi

terms. Iraq had not fully complied, resulting in several Security

Council declarations that such non-compliance amounted to material breach. The
Council even gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to bring

itself into

conformity and

placed Iraq on notice that further non-compliance would constitute a material

breach which could result in serious consequences. In the

Council should have acted

at that

point to enforce

its

US

view, the Security

own resolutions, but did not.

Therefore, the United States and other Coalition States were released from their
cease-fire obligations

and the

initial

use of force authorization contained in Reso-

became operative again, as it had on multiple occasions in the previous
decade. The sole limitation on their actions was that they do no more than authorized by the broad mandate contained in Resolution 678
to enforce past and

lution 678

—
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future Council resolutions

and

restore international peace

and

security.

Given

more than a decade of violation of Security Council resolutions intended to create
the conditions for stability, ousting
fell

Saddam Hussein and the

Baathists

from power

neatly within that mandate.

As a matter of law,

this line

of argumentation

is

sound. Under the principles of

humanitarian law, cease-fires are clearly temporary measures that bind parties
thereto only so long as the other side
cil

had agreed

November 2002

in

gument about whether

a

US

or

is

not in material breach. The Security Coun-

was

that Iraq

UK

all

had pre-determined
hostilities

own

mooting any ar-

justified). Further,

inspectors asserted that the Iraqis

the requirements imposed

on them,

to be a further material breach.

As

a situation

resume

hostilities

was

specifically reaffirmed Resolution 678,

as expressly

still,

In this particu-

for the cease-fire resolution

which authorized the use of force, "except

changed." The only change to that resolution was imposition of the

But with the cease-fire materially breached, the 678 use of force au-

itself.

thorization

clearer

which 1441

a general matter of law,

may immediately resume in the event of material breach.

lar case, the right to

cease-fire

was

assertion of breach

immediately prior to the attack the UN's

were not meeting

in breach (thereby

came back

into play

by the express terms of Resolution 687.

Some have claimed that only the Security Council was authorized to determine
how to respond to the cease-fire breach it had acknowledged in Resolution 1441
and previous
fire

resolutions.

However, such assertions ignore the

was not between the United Nations and

Kuwait and member

States cooperating with

fact that the cease-

Iraq, but,

according to 687, "Iraq and

Kuwait

accordance with resolution

in

678 (1990)." Therefore, those States were empowered under international law to
determine whether to resort to force once a material breach of the cease-fire to

which they were a Party occurred. 76 The
curity Council

fact that

Resolution 687 provided the Se-

remained "actively seized of the matter" has similarly been misin-

terpreted as indicating that exclusive authority to

the Council. In

fact,

the phrase

is

mandate

a response resided in

nothing more than standard text appearing

in

many resolutions indicating the Security Council will continue to address the situation at

hand

(as

cally provided,

it

did with 1441 and other post-687 resolutions). Unless specifi-

such text does not preclude actions (that are in compliance with

international law) taken

by

States or other international

tions to respond to a situation.

It

governmental organiza-

has also been argued that the use of force authori-

zation was limited to expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait, and that any use of force

would require further Council authorization. However, the
stated purpose of 678 was to "uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

beyond

That

that purpose

this

was a broad grant of authority is evidenced by inclusion of the
382

diversity of

Michael N. Schmitt

cease-fire terms

(from borders to disarmament) in Resolution 687. Clearly,

in

1990-91, the Council understood that restoring international peace and security
involved

much more

than merely liberating Kuwait.

Admittedly, this line of analysis, albeit legally valid, poses a difficult practical di-

lemma,

for the views of the Security Council

fered dramatically in
face of US
its

on the use of force

March 2003 from those of April

against Iraq dif-

1991. Yet, the Council, in the

UK opposition, was powerless to withdraw, or even modify, either

and

1990 use of force authorization or the terms of its 1991 cease-fire. 77 This

ticularly vexing

problem given post-conflict difficulties of finding the

rorism smoking guns. Thus,

we witnessed a use of force based on

resolutions that the Council itself would not have approved

cision-maker.

It

is

likely to

WMD or ter-

Security Council

had it been the sole de-

be very reticent about granting open-ended

continuing authority to employ force. In particular,

Chapter VII resolutions to require

explicit

it

can be expected to carefully

follow-on authorization for any

resumption of hostilities should a cessation of hostilities occur. That
doxical legal fact remains that based
resolutions

a par-

represented the triumph of law over policy.

In the future, the Council

craft its

is

on the

said, the para-

interplay of a series of Security Council

and the law of cease-fires, Operation

Iraqi

Freedom was

legal.

Humanitarian Intervention
There

is

no question

tion into Iraq based

that the Security Council could have authorized an interven-

on the regime's mistreatment of its population.

In doing so,

the internal situation need merely have represented a "threat to the peace" under
Article 39 of the Charter, such that the Council's Article 42 authority vested. Since

the Council itself determines

when

a threat has emerged,

it

enjoys unfettered dis-

cretion in authorizing a forcible humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of

the Charter.

The Security Council has mandated such interventions on numerous occasions.
For instance, when internal order in Somalia collapsed in 1992, the Council authorized

"member States ... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a

secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." 78
States

The United

responded with Operation Restore Hope, conducted by the multinational

Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The following year, acting under Chapter VII, the

Council approved the replacement of UNITAF by the United Nations Operation
in

Somalia

(UNOSOM)

II.

79

The nature of the intervention need not be
the Security Council authorized
fect the "restoration

classically

member States to

humanitarian. In 1994,

forcibly intervene in Haiti to ef-

of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti." 80
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Although the resolution cited the humanitarian situation
the denial of

civil liberties,

in the country, including

the intent was clearly political in purpose

— regime

change through "the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, JeanBertrand Aristide, within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement." 81

Some humanitarian

interventions

mounted without

Security Council sanction

have subsequently acquired the support of the Council. In 1990, the Economic

Community of West African
The following

approval.

States

(ECOWAS)

year, a Security

intervened in Liberia without

UN

Council Presidential Statement "com-

mended the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to promote peace and normalcy in

Liberia." 82

When fighting broke out again in

1992, the

ECOWAS for its role in addressing this "threat to international
security." 83 ECOWAS conducted yet another humanitarian interven-

Council praised
peace and

tion without Security Council sanction in 1997

when events in Sierra Leone slipped

out of control. As in the Liberia case, an ex post facto Presidential Statement com-

mended

ECOWAS

for the "important role"

resolution of this crisis."

Although

also

them

from the

out, thereby adding

ther, there

was playing "towards the peaceful

conducted without Security Council objection, these cases can be

readily distinguished
ried

it

84

situation in Iraq. First, regional organizations car-

some degree of legitimacy

was no apparent opposition

to the operations. Fur-

to the interventions in the Security

Council, and certainly none from any of the Permanent Five. Finally, in both
countries the humanitarian crisis was widespread, immediate, and horrendous.

The 1999

NATO

intervention in Kosovo represents a closer case because there

the Security Council had previously labeled the situation a threat to the peace as in
Iraq

and the operation was mounted

in the face of opposition

on the Security

Council, most significantly from Russia. Unsurprisingly, Operation Allied Force

generated significant criticism from the international legal community. Although

few contested the legitimacy of the

edged the
deaths

frailty

operation,

many

supporters acknowl-

of its asserted legal basis. Kosovo was not, after

numbered

the international

in the

Even with the

hundreds of thousands. In that

community were roundly

scale of the tragedy that

der,

NATO

rise

and sovereignty residing

criticized for inaction;

human

rights,

in the citizenry rather

B merit

resort to the use of force.

but

it

and

was the

85

human

dignity,

world or-

than the government, interna-

tional law continues to react negatively to the prospect of State

events in State

Rwanda, where

case, individual States

tended to underpin such criticism.

of concepts such as

all,

A determining that

UN Charter Article 2(4), which

prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence

of any State, continues to enjoy normative positive valence. Asserting exceptions
to this prohibition

beyond those found within the four corners of the Charter
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self-defense

and Security Council authorization

—

inevitably generates skepticism

and opposition.
Iraq

lies

further

down the continuum of situations that might legally justify hu-

manitarian intervention than the aforementioned cases. With Iraq, no regional organization rose to the challenge of intervention.

those

who

On

the contrary, close

allies

of

did attack Iraq were openly opposed to intervention without Council

approval. Further, the humanitarian situation in the country, albeit deplorable, did

not

rise to

the level of suffering of the previous precedents. In the period preceding

no question that torture was widespread, ethnic minorities were
expelled from their homes, infant and child mortality rates had grown dramatically
the attack, there

is

as a result of Saddam Hussein's
assets,

and

that the humanitarian situation

in

was generally deteriorating. 86 Never-

and scope of suffering had not reached genocidal proportions

theless, the scale

had

non-cooperation with the "food-for-oil" program

Rwanda, nor was there

Kosovo. Simply put, the

fear of

an imminent campaign of genocide,

as

it

as in

human situation in the country was not at a point where a

majority of international legal scholars and practitioners would agree that a factual
basis for

humanitarian intervention, a controversial matter in international law

even in the abstract, existed.
Thus, while the regime's treatment of the Iraqi population was morally and
gally reprehensible,

and although President Bush repeatedly

as a rationale for action against Iraq (for example,

ion Address),

it

cited such treatment

during his 2002 State of the Un-

did not justify humanitarian intervention absent Security Council

de jure or de facto acquiescence. Although the jus ad helium has

moved in the direc-

tion of increased acceptance of humanitarian intervention since the

Cold War, by March 2003
is

le-

it

had not reached situations such as that in

end of the

Iraq.

Thus,

it

unsurprising that none of the countries participating in Operation Iraqi Free-

dom formally cited the internal suffering as legally justifying their action.
Regime Change
In 1998, a distinguished group of individuals,
positions in the

of whom

now occupy

Bush administration, openly urged the removal by

Saddam Hussein's
gime change in

many

regime.

87

force of

Clearly, the Administration desperately desired re-

Iraq. Yet, despite a self-evident

need for a new regime

in the

try,

and although the US administration actually demanded on March

that

Saddam Hussein step down within 48 hours or face forceful removal,

no independent

key

coun-

17,
88

2003

there

is

basis in international law for regime change. Rather, regime

change can only be a legitimate consequence of otherwise
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may determine

For example, the Security Council

by

a particular

that

that continued governance

group threatens international peace and authorize the removal of

government under Chapter VII,

as

it

did in the case of Haiti in 1994.

Or it may

determine that another situation amounts to a threat to the peace, breach of peace,
or act of aggression and authorize the use of military force pursuant to Article 42 to
restore international peace

and

security. If the

fall

of a regime results from the en-

suing military action, that regime change would be
that Coalition forces should have

marched on Baghdad

Hussein because with the dictator
restore international peace

still

in

power

it

and security pursuant

effective defense, either individual or collective,

that

legal.

mounted an aggressive attack.

It is

For instance,

many argue

in 1991 to topple

was impossible

to

Saddam

permanently

to Resolution 678. Similarly, an

may result in the fall of the regime

even possible that a humanitarian interven-

tion could result in removal of a regime, either as a coincidental consequence of the

operation or because doing so

is

necessary to safeguard the civilian population.

That certainly would have been the case with the Hutu-dominated government of

Rwanda had
However,

external forces intervened in 1994 to stop

States

may

its

slaughter of the Tutsis.

not, absent Security Council mandate, act for the sole pur-

pose of removing a regime of which they disapprove; doing so would constitute a
patent violation of Article 2(4) of the

UN

Charter. Therefore, in the absence of a

separate legal basis for action (which existed in this case), any effort to

Saddam Hussein from power would have been

remove

illegal.

Conclusions

Despite the often-confusing rhetoric that has accompanied Operation Iraqi

Freedom, there
justified,

only one legal basis on which the action could have been plainly

is

and it is on that basis that the

Hussein rested their

States

case. Therefore, the

rent understanding of the jus

forming the coalition against Saddam

war against Iraq is unlikely to impact cur-

ad bellum in any dramatic way,

as

Operation En-

during Freedom did with regard to the use of force against terrorists and their State
supporters.
If

anything

(and

somewhat counter- intuitively), the

strengthen the centrality of the
Council's role in determining

agreed that

first

tions

on

when

its

When

Coalition

is

likely

to

Charter use of force regime and the Security
States

resort in the matter

United States and
the Council.

UN

affair

may employ armed

force. All parties

was to the Security Council. Indeed, the

allies actively

sought a use of force mandate from

they did not receive one, they nevertheless justified their ac-

a string of Security Council resolutions reaching back over a decade.

Analogously, States opposed to Operation Iraqi Freedom based their resistance on
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the argument that the Coalition should not have attacked without an explicit

Council mandate.

Had

the Coalition chosen any other ground to justify the attack, currently pre-

vailing interpretations of the jus

cant stress, with

ad bellum would have been placed under

signifi-

some scholars and practitioners arguing for new interpretations of

existing law in light of changed circumstances, others suggesting the

emergence of

new norms, and many asserting that the attack was quite simply unlawful.

It is

for-

tunate that the Coalition avoided alternative justifications, for, as every law student

knows, hard cases make bad law. Instead, the lesson of this experience

is

that States

continue to look to the Security Council as the font for authorization to use

will

force; therefore, that
cision,

and an eye

body must

exercise

its

discretion with great care, surgical pre-

to the future.
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Kenneth Roth and Robert
Moderator: The

last set

F.

Turner*

of questions to the preceding panel

members

is

a perfect

segue to questions of law enforcement and military responses to fighting terrorism,

and
look

in this particular case, targeting terrorists.
at

We are now going to take a closer

questions of preemption and prevention, as well as specific techniques that

might apply to combating

terrorists

and

terrorist groups.

am a journalist and generally examine the issue of targeting terrorists through
a domestic lens focused on homeland security and criminal justice, so I am looking
I

forward to a debate that broadens the focus to include international law and military operations. This debate
activities

is

much more

interesting

when we

start to

conducted beyond the borders of the United States with

compare

activities

con-

ducted within our borders, and then determining what standards will be applied in
targeting terrorists abroad versus within the United States.

Our
Rights

first

speaker

Watch

from 1987

is

Mr. Ken Roth, who has been Executive Director of Human

since 1993,

to 1993.

based in the United

and served

as the

deputy director of that organization
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States. Its researchers

conduct fact-finding investigations into

human rights abuses in all regions of the world and then publishes those findings in
dozens of books and reports every year, generating extensive coverage in local and
international media.

Mr. Kenneth Roth is the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. Professor Robert F.
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Debating the Issues

Mr. Roth:
ful to the

It is

an honor to be here.

Supreme Court

before deciding the

what are the

terror a real

am grateful for the invitation. am also grateI

for waiting to hear the benefits of today's conversation

Hamdi and

address the issues from a blank
tion:

I

limits to the

war and when

slate.

What

a

war on poverty or various other

I

will address this

it

so that

morning

is

we can

the ques-

More specifically, when is the war on
metaphor more akin to the war on drugs or the

war on

is it

now pending before

Padilla cases

terror.

population to pursue an

efforts to mobilize the

important goal.

Obviously Afghanistan was a war. There

no question that armed conflict
occurred there. Insofar as Iraq had anything to do with terrorism, no question,
that was a war, too. But what about elsewhere? President Bush has spoken about
the war on terror being global, since al Qaeda has cells around the world, so the
war against it and the war on terrorism must be pursued globally. Is he speaking in
is

The answer to that question is important because if
we're talking only metaphor, then we are obviously applying the rules of peacetime law enforcement. And under those rules, as you all know, you have a duty to
arrest a suspect if at all possible
indeed only arrest the suspect upon probable
cause. Then the suspect is brought before a judge, represented by a lawyer, entitled
a metaphoric sense or literally?

—

to a

trial, et cetera.

to stop a threat to

force

life

conflict. If you

to give

him

a

trial,

midst of battle, you can shoot to
if

kill.

no need

You

is

walking

don't need to

which

set

But

that.

if,

conflict.

they
If

But

may be

him

to give

a

anything. In the

Obviously,

for example, the

enemy

down the street or operating on patrol, you can shoot to kill.

first

attempt an

arrest.

Those are big

differences.

—those

The question

for

law enforce-

for law of armed conflict.

Unfortunately, the law of armed conflict provides relatively

making that

law of armed

no need

him with

to charge

of rules should apply to combating terrorists

ment or those

is

at the

necessary

And so lethal

You don't have to attempt arrest.

an enemy surrenders, you have to respect

combatant

is:

war context, you look

have detained an enemy combatant, there

no need

if strictly

or a threat of serious bodily injury to another.

carefully circumscribed. In a

is

lawyer,

Lethal force can sometimes be used but only

decision.
it is

It sets

forth detailed rules that apply once

unclear, however, exactly

when

little

guidance for

you have an armed

the circumstances are such that

considered to be an armed conflict.

you look

at the

commentary

to the 1949

Geneva Conventions,

there are references to the intensity of the violence

and

for example,

to the regularity of

armed

You can argue that the series of al Qaeda operations from the African
embassies to the USS Cole to the World Trade Center are but a series of very imporclashes.

tant criminal acts, or you

might argue that those are various
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good way to resolve that argument by looking to the Geneva Conventions
and the accompanying commentary. You end up having a battle of metaphors.
What I propose to do is to look beyond the metaphors and to try to examine a

terribly

few cases
at

—some troublesome

which the

would
ally

like to

real

cases

—

to see

whether they help us decide the point

war on terrorism should end and the metaphor should begin.

examine these cases from a policy prospective to determine what

makes sense.

I'll

I

re-

conclude by proposing a general rule that might provide guid-

ance in drawing that

line.

The obvious place to start is the Padilla case. Padilla, of course, is the alleged
"Dirty Bomber" who flew from Pakistan to Chicago's O'Hare Airport. It now appears that maybe he wasn't pursuing a dirty bomb; maybe he was going to blow up
an apartment building. But whatever he was doing, he seems to have been up to no
good. The US Government, after initially arresting him as a material witness, very
quickly moved to classify him as an enemy combatant and then shipped him to the
naval brig in South Carolina. There he was denied access to his lawyer for long periods of time on the grounds that he didn't have to be charged with a crime.
Now, does that make sense? Is Padilla, who was far from any traditional battlefield, an enemy combatant? One way to address that question is to seriously consider what it would mean if Padilla really were an enemy combatant. Because if
stepping off that plane in O'Hare Airport and through the terminal to pick up his
luggage were sufficient to make him an enemy combatant as alleged, there would
be no duty to arrest him. He could simply have been shot under the provisions of
the law of armed conflict that entitle a belligerent to kill enemy combatants.
I am troubled by that conclusion. I suspect many of you are as well. But it leads
me to question whether the characterization of an individual, even if he is up to no
good, as an
that there

enemy combatant

was

is

appropriate.

One

a functioning legal system in the

have been arrested and brought before

it.

of the reasons

United

I

am troubled

States. Padilla easily

is

could

Indeed, he was, as a material witness, be-

made an enemy combatant.
Another enemy combatant who was arrested in the United States was al-Marri.
He was arrested in his house in Peoria, Illinois. We now know his main offense was
being a nephew of the alleged 20th hijacker but at the time it was alleged that he was
a member of a sleeper cell. Again if he was really an enemy combatant, he could
have been shot as he came to open the door. He didn't have to be arrested. Is that
really where we want to go?
fore being

If you

the war

think about another war that

on drugs

trafficking

is

—we

also

are dealing with

is

generally understood to be metaphoric

comparable dangers in many respects. Drug

an international phenomenon; there

Columbia. Even though drug

cartels

is

a raging

armed

conflict in

send clandestine agents to the United States
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who engage

in violent activities that kill

uncomfortable treating drug

them

—we

situation

Now

arrest

combatants.

traffickers as

is

We

don't start shooting

Why is terrorism different when we are in a

and prosecute them.

where prosecution

thousands of people, nonetheless we are

possible?

look on the other side of the spectrum. This morning's panel dis-

let's

cussed the 2002 attack on a senior

Qaeda operative in Yemen. This is an instance
where I think it was appropriate to classify him as a combatant, but the United
States never made a good case at explaining its reasoning. At the time, all we knew
al

was that a CIA-operated Predator drone

which struck

a car carrying

Abu

flying over

Yemen launched

a missile

Ali al-Harithi, along with several of his alleged

coconspirators, and that they were

all killed.

Very

little else

beyond

that

was

made public. No effort was made at the time to justify the killing of al-Harithi as an enemy combatant.

known. In

fact,

me

even that information was not supposed to be

do that in retrospect. I think that this was probably a circumstance in which it was appropriate to classify him as an enemy combatant. First, alSo

let

though

it

try to

appears al-Harithi had been responsible for the attack on the Cole, in and

of itself that would not be sufficient because
the past, that doesn't justify shooting

engaged

in

if you've

simply committed a crime in

you today. To be shot today, you have

to be

ongoing combatant activities. So the allegation has to be that al-Harithi

was engaging
States never

in continuing terrorist activities

—an

allegation that the United

made publicly. Yet my understanding is that this was believed to be the

case.

Second, the United States never

made

the case publicly as to

why he

couldn't

we know that it would have been very difficult to arrest
him. In a prior attempt by Yemen forces to arrest him, a dozen Yemeni soldiers
were killed. Al-Harithi stayed in the tribal areas of Yemen where he was basically
beyond the reach of the Yemeni government.
You might ask, "Couldn't the United States, with Yemen's permission, send in
have been arrested. In

fact,

troops to arrest him?"

I

tive,

but apparently

without the

understand that the United States considered

felt it

tribal forces

would be impossible

this alterna-

for troops to infiltrate that area

immediately knowing they were there. Under those

cir-

cumstances, there would have been fierce resistance with casualties far in excess of
those sustained in the Predator attack.
I

think the case could have been

made that with respect to al-Harithi you had an

ongoing plans against the United

active

combatant engaged

ity to

use traditional law enforcement means to arrest him.

stances,

defend

in

no one should contend

itself.

Treating him as an

appropriate. In that case,

war

States

and no capac-

Under those circum-

that the United States could not take action to

enemy combatant and resorting to lethal force was

rules

were the right
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States didn't explain

than the

its

case well. But the al-Harithi case

is

more of an exception

rule.

Just to give

you

a

few more examples, there were

six Algerians arrested in

Bosnia. In that case, the United States decided initially to

employ the law enforce-

ment approach and brought these individuals before a Bosnian court. The court,
which had been created by the United States, agreed to accept the cases and asked
for the evidence, but

it

then found the evidence insufficient to hold the suspects.

The United States responded by saying that it had decided instead to treat the six as
enemy combatants and whisked them off to Guantanamo Bay despite the fact that
the Bosnian court order directed their release.

That

I

was an

find troublesome because here

system, hardly hostile to

US

interests, in

available, clearly functioning legal

which honest

and determined they had not been provided

justices

looked

sufficient evidence to

at the case

warrant prose-

cution. Rather than produce the evidence, rather than using the functioning judicial

them off to Guantanamo Bay.
happened in Malawi where five al Qaeda

system, the United States sent

Something very similar

picked up. The local court system looked

at the evidence,

them

suspects were

determined there was no

The United States said,
"No problem, we'll treat them as enemy combatants," and detained them anyway.
In that case, sometime later the United States decided that in fact the Malawian

evidence of criminal conduct, and ordered

released.

no evidence. The suspects were then released. This illustrates the problem with allowing war rules to be applied globally even where
law enforcement is an option. Frankly, it means that there is nothing that prevents
the US Government from picking up any one of us, declaring us an enemy combatant, and whisking us away without access to a lawyer. Indeed, as we know from
al-Harithi, there's nothing to stop the US Government from shooting us by declaring us enemy combatants and just firing away. I had the chance to ask Attorney
General Ashcroft about this and he said, "Oh, trust us; we've only done this twice,"
referring to the Padilla and the al-Marri cases.
I think it's fair to say those are test cases. If the Bush Administration gets the ruling it wants from the Supreme Court, we are going to see many more of those cases.
We already have many more of them outside of the United States. This is particularly worrisome in terrorism cases because much of what is said to be known about
terrorists is based on intelligence that can be of varying reliability. Particularly in
that situation, you want the evidence tested in an open court in some kind of adcourt was correct; there was

versarial process.

With those dangers
rules that

I

in

mind,

I

would

like to

believe should govern our efforts to

law enforcement

rules.
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Obviously, you have Afghanistan and Iraq (at least in the

initial stages

of the

military campaign) as traditional battlefields. But in the absence of a traditional
battlefield,

a regularity

the overall

would

I

and

first

level

make the case that there is

argue that you need to be able to

of intensity to the violence such that

campaign as one of war;

that a

it is

fair to characterize

mere criminal act here or there will not be

sufficient.

Second, in determining whether a particular individual

must be

a direct participant.

Here

I

refer to the traditional rules

ular or civilian can be treated as a combatant.

You need some

in this violent activity, although that does not necessarily

placing a
to be

bomb.

made

I

a combatant, he

is

on when an

irreg-

direct participation

imply carrying a gun or

understand the role of planners or organizers, but the case has

that this

is

a direct participant, not a sympathizer or a financier.

have to keep in mind the traditional

tween combatants and others

who

line that

we draw even

provide support, but

in a classic

who may

We

war be-

not be directly

targeted.
Finally,
If

and most important, law enforcement options have

someone can reasonably be

arrested, if there

those avenues should be pursued.
tions
ist

when armed combat

is

is

to be unavailable.

a functioning court system,

We should reserve the use of war rules to situa-

really the

only option

—

situations like those that ex-

in the tribal areas of Pakistan or in Afghanistan before the conflict

broke out,

where you had an uncooperative government that was sheltering individuals who
were actively

in the process of launching attacks against the

are not circumstances

United

States.

Those

where we want to require the law enforcement option.

Now let me just briefly say a word about torture.
I

don't have to repeat the international humanitarian law rules prohibiting

torture for this audience;
situations

you know these

all

too well.

I

want

to note that even in

where the Geneva Conventions are inapplicable; there

of law that military lawyers often forget about, that
applies even in the absence of the

Geneva Conventions.

vention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

Punishment prohibits torture
whatsoever. In explicit terms,

it

in

Inhuman

a parallel

rights law.

body

That law

So, for example, the

Con-

or Degrading Treatment or

any circumstance. There are no exceptions

similarly prohibits cruel,

treatment. Similarly, the International Covenant
prohibits both torture

human

is,

is

on

inhuman

Civil

and cruel and inhuman treatment.

and

It is

or degrading

Political Rights

clear that

both of

those are nonderogatory. Even in a public emergency you can never use torture.

You can never engage
ground,
dress

on

this

inhuman or degrading treatment. With that backshould be an open and shut case, and we should have nothing to adin cruel,

that issue.
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Bush Administration

In fact, a series of decisions by appointed lawyers in the

openly discussed by the

inhuman treatment are being
American (and international) public. The decisions were

taken step-by-step. The

first

did set us on that road where torture and cruel and

Relative to the

Qaeda, but

Treatment of Prisoners of

initially to

combination of a novel
distinguish itself
exactly

who

was to decide that the 1949 Geneva Convention

War was

inapplicable not only to

the Afghan conflict. This decision was reached using
failed-State theory

from the

civilian

III

al

some

and/or by arguing that the Taliban didn't

population even though every Afghan knew

the Taliban was by the turban and the dress they wore. Nonetheless,

facts didn't get in the

way of the Bush Administration, which

declared the Geneva

Convention inapplicable. That was step one.
Step two was to completely ignore the parallel requirements of

The

law.

initial

decisions

made

in January

human

rights

2002 determined the Prisoners of War

Convention was inapplicable but did indicate that those who were

in

US hands

were to be treated humanely. Until August of that year, there was no public mention of the Torture Convention at

When we

finally see

all.

mention of the Torture Convention

it is

in that notorious

August 2002 Jay Bybee memorandum from the Justice Department. In that memorandum, we see that the use of torture is dealt with in an extremely narrow way.
There

is

no mention of the

parallel prohibition

treatment, other than to say torture
that there

is

treatment.

I

much worse

actually a requirement to refrain

think the reason for that

quire criminalization of cruel and
tice

is

of cruel, inhuman or degrading

is

from

than

that.

is

not a hint

inhuman or degrading

cruel,

that the Torture

There

Convention doesn't

re-

inhuman treatment, only of torture, and the Jus-

Department lawyers were mainly worried about avoiding prosecution.

It

staff

wasn't until June 2003, after a series of meetings that

members and

viser, that the

others

had with Condoleezza

Human

Rights

Watch

Rice, the National Security

Bush Administration mentioned publicly the prohibition on

inhuman and degrading

Ad-

cruel,

The Department of Defense General Counsel
stated (in a well thought out statement) that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment proscribes the same conduct in the United States under
the US Constitution as international law proscribes overseas. In other words, if you
can't do it at the local police station, you can't do it anywhere. This correct statement of the law was, as evidenced by the various interrogation techniques that we
now know were authorized, promptly ignored. In some cases, the authorized intertreatment.

rogation techniques even involved torture.

Indeed, even after meeting with Condoleezza Rice a few weeks ago to press

her to disown coercive interrogation as contrary to the
Interrogation

manual and contrary

US Army's

to the prohibition of cruel
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treatment, the Bush Administration
interrogation that

is

insists that there is a

still

permissible and appropriate. Thus, this

is

realm of coercive
not an issue of in-

dividual aberrant interrogators but one of policy involving senior levels of the

Administration.

We're

all

aware that various defenses have been offered for the Bush Adminis-

tration's decisions.

I

won't spend

rassing to a see a lawyer putting
exercise of his
fect, rip

much time on them other than to say it is embar-

them forward. The

first is

that the President, in the

commander-in-chief authority, can authorize torture

—

can, in ef-

up the Torture Convention and the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

The second theory put forward is that in self-defense you can torture. Of course,
war involves self-defense but in that instance the use of force is governed by a whole

—

body of law the law of armed conflict. That law is absolutely clear in prohibiting
torture
you simply can't do it! The Bush Administration's decisions may be
equated to the rules for a barroom brawl anything goes.

—

—

Finally, the

you

really

have

Bush Administration puts forward the argument of necessity
to, it's permissible.

But one of the requirements of necessity

is

—

if

that

The Administration
states the rule of necessity, but then ignores the US ratification of the Torture Convention with its provision that you can never torture or use cruel or inhuman
treatment, even in extreme situations. There is no exception to this prohibition in
the legislature has not prohibited a certain type of response.

the Convention.

What this all adds up to is a highly permissive environment when it comes to coercive interrogation. We don't have evidence yet of orders from the top. I doubt we
ever will find an explicit order to torture. But we do have a group of politically appointed lawyers who, rather than conscientiously applying clear international prohibitions,

were basically looking for

legal

loopholes of enormous dubiousness and

sending the signal, "do whatever you want, we'll get you
prise

under

this

off." It

circumstance that torture and abuse were the

Moderator: Thank you, Mr. Roth. Our second speaker

should be no sur-

result.

Thank you.

Bob Turner,
who serves as the Associate Director of the Center for National Security Law at the
University of Virginia School of Law. Professor Turner knows these issues from
is

Professor

both a personal and academic standpoint having served two

Nam. He

Army

tours in Viet

has served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy, in the White House as Counsel to the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board,

at the State

for Legislative Affairs,

and

Department

as Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary

as the first President of the congressionally established

United States Institute of Peace.
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Professor Turner:
questions but also

Our time is limited. I want to leave a lot of time for not only
comments because there are many people in the audience who

know as much about these

issues as

I

do and almost

much

as

as

Ken

does, so we'll

cut to the chase.

There are

a lot of differences

between

us;

but

I

think, at

core, the difference

its

is

going to be about whether the law enforcement paradigm or the law of armed conflict

paradigm ought to govern in the war against terrorism.

foundly disagree.

I

don't deny

we have

On that issue we pro-

the legal option of arresting

enemy

we also have the option
of resorting to traditional methods of self-defense under the law of armed conflict,
which include the legal right to target enemy combatants, even enemy leaders who
take no actual part in the hostilities, and to detain them without trial until the end
combatants and trying them in Article

III

federal courts, but

of the conflict.

was pleased to hear Ken recognize

would remind you that during World
War II the United States detained hundreds of thousands of German and some
Italian prisoners of war within our territory without judicial oversight and without
access to lawyers. During the more than eight years that some American pilots were
held as prisoners of war in North Viet Nam, not once did we ask the North Vietnamese to give them a right to a lawyer nor did they receive a judicial hearing.
We understood that under existing international law, in the Geneva prisoners of
war convention, during a period of armed conflict it is permissible to essentially
I

that.

I

"warehouse" enemy soldiers for the duration of the
accused of criminal behavior they then obtain a
essentially international

ted while prisoners or

if

I

courts. Article 84 of the

war crimes committed during the
tried only

by military

It

Our

very

fact a war.

either

first

it is

commit-

and before they

courts.

seems to

constitutional system that, as chief executive officer, as

of fighting our wars, and so forth, maybe

and

Geneva Convention

conflict

But that's not a hard decision to make and

who ought to make that decision.

rights

in that setting they're not

disagree about whether law enforcement or law of

rules should apply.

tant to ask

sure, if they are

POWs are accused of criminal behavior,

were captured, they are to be

Ken and

III

To be

number of procedural

due process of law. But even

supposed to be sent into Article
provides expressly that

conflict.

it

armed

conflict

seems to be impor-

me one can argue under our

commander in chief in charge

the President's decision to make.

speaker at this conference told us that the war on terrorism

He said terrorism is an act of war. That I think is clear.

I

is

in

don't think any-

body will dispute this.
The President views this war as governed by the law of armed conflict. But then
again, maybe we can say that it's not the President's decision; that it ought to be the
law-making authority that makes this decision so maybe it's a decision for
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Or perhaps

Congress.

this

is

really a question

ought to be the United Nations
perhaps

it's

the

tions for the

—and

since

it

UN Security Council, which

is

of international law, so maybe

involves the issue of war

it

and peace,

the primary organ of the United Na-

maintenance of international peace and

security.

The response to the suggestion that it is other than the President's decision, I
would submit, is that it was determined on September 18, 2001, when the United
States Congress, by overwhelming votes in both houses, enacted Public Law 10740, which authorized the use of US armed forces against and, I quote, "those nations, organizations or persons,

he [the President of the United States] determines

planned, authorized or committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on

September
any future
Thus,

I

11,

2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent

act of international terrorism against the

would submit the war on terrorism

is

United

States."

not really a metaphor like the "war

on poverty" or the "war on drugs." The United States has been the object of numerous armed attacks within the United States and abroad that have claimed
thousands of human lives and Congress has by law authorized a military response
against those persons

whom the President determines played a role in the 9/11

at-

tacks or belonged to an organization involved in those attacks.

That Joint Resolution was the constitutional equivalent of a declaration of war.

And there is no provision in the statute for judicial review, no provision saying that
before you can target an

enemy terrorist you have

to take

him before an Article

III

judge and make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that he did belong to
that organization or did take part in that activity.

That

is

not the way wars are

fought.

Ken may not like

many of us may not like

it,

it,

but the decision has been

made

And ten

days after

Congress authorized the use of armed force on September 28, 2001, the

UN Secu-

by our President and our Congress
rity

that the law of war governs.

Council unanimously passed Resolution 1373, which reaffirmed that

international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace

may be combated by
means,

specifically

all

and

all

acts of

security

and

means. Not just by law enforcement means, but by

mentioning the inherent right of individual or

all

collective self-

defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.

Once

again, this

forcement.

is

the language of

And earlier this year,

armed

in Security

again reaffirmed the need to combat, "by

all

conflict,

not the language of law en-

Council Resolution 1526, the Council

means

in

accordance with the Charter

of the United Nations and international law threats to international peace and security caused

Now,

by

terrorist acts."

Supreme Court orders otherwise, and I
would say personally I'm delighted the Supreme Court is looking at this, this issue
I

submit that

at least until the
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has been resolved and the law of armed conflict

is

an appropriate paradigm

in the

war against international terrorism.
I

is

might add that

if

Human Rights Watch and other NGOs really believe that this

only a law enforcement problem,

hard to understand

it's

heard from them about the Geneva Conventions in the
It is

by definition

true

last

all

the concerns we've

few years.

do not abide by the law of armed

that terrorists

and thus do not qualify under international law

as lawful

conflict

combatants. But the ar-

gument that this misconduct should somehow entitle them to preferred treatment
to that given to lawful combatants when engaged in acts of war eludes me.
I

am not suggesting that there is not an important role for the law enforcement

paradigm

war on

in the

terror.

Various Security Council resolutions have noted,

importance of using law enforcement tools to criminalize the pro-

for example, the

vision of funds to terrorist organizations

ing and trying terrorist suspects.
well be the

and the like.

When those individuals are US persons, that may

most appropriate approach.

Again, I'm pleased the Supreme Court
cases.

We have the option of arrest-

When you

are dealing with

US

is

looking at the Padilla and al-Marri

persons under our legal system you some-

times get a different situation than dealing with foreign nationals.

Now,

it is

true that mistakes can

lieved to be terrorists

happen and

that innocent people honestly be-

might be apprehended and detained against

their will

and

in

violation of fundamental principles of justice. Despite the best intentions of every-

one involved, sometimes innocent people are

happened

Iraq. It's

World War

in Afghanistan.

killed in

happened

It

wartime.

in Viet

Nam.

It's

happened

in

It

happened

in

II.

There may be a war in history where mistakes were not made or innocent people

were not

killed,

but

I

choice between lesser
are absolutely certain
are not going to
to be killed

Under

am unaware of any such situation. War is often a necessity, a
we demand that no enemy be targeted unless we
of their identity and that no collateral damage will occur, we
evils,

and

if

win very many wars and

by the enemies we

elect

a lot of good people

on our side

are going

not to target.

the law enforcement paradigm, presumably

when

Jose Padilla arrived in

the United States with instructions to explore the possibility of exploding a radiological

weapon, we should have told the FBI, "Hey,

kind of keep an eye on him. Don't violate his
him. Follow him around a
lion people, bring

him

little bit if

in so

we can

you

try

this

guy may be up

rights, don't profile

can. If you

him." That

is

happen

to

no good,

him, don't harass

to see

him

kill

a mil-

the criminal paradigm.

One may say he was already guilty of conspiracy. An interesting bit of information is that when he was in Afghanistan and Pakistan he in fact did meet with senior
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Qaeda leaders and came back home on
mit some horrible felonies.
al

a mission that

was

a conspiracy to

com-

Army lieutenant, I had the experience of going

Thirty- five years ago, as a junior

through a chemical-biological-nuclear warfare course. Every graduate of that

who

course, even those

weren't paying

much

attention, focused

on the discussion

of radiological poisoning and the symptoms and the painful death that follows.

And

can

I

tell

breaks, that

you with reasonable
at

we talked about

ground zero or being

far

enough away that

it's

God, let me be at ground zero."
say,

I

during the

going to take you a

few weeks to die of radiological poisoning, every one of us would have

As

it

of us were told there's going to be a nuclear war and you have the

if any

choice of being

certainty, because

It is

said, "Please

one of the most painful ways to die I can think of.

perhaps Padilla was involved in a criminal conspiracy when he stepped

off that plane. But

I

doubt seriously we could have proven that

in federal district

court without seriously compromising our counterterrorism infrastructure.

Hearsay prohibitions do not
legal systems,

in

exist in international

law or most of the world's

but presumably US evidentiary rules would have required us to bring

our most sensitive intelligence sources from Pakistan or Afghanistan to be iden-

tified

and cross-examined

open court

in

in order to get a conviction of Mr. Padilla.

That means, of course, those sources would not have been able to return to

al

Qaeda cell meetings to find out what targets were planned for next week and next
month. That obviously is too high a price to pay for one conviction. So under Ken's
preferred paradigm, we would have been limited to following Padilla around, again
without violating his

rights, in the

hopes that perhaps

if

he murdered a few thou-

sand or a few hundred thousand or a few million of our fellow citizens with a radiological device

we might be

course, even to get that conviction,

how we managed

him in the act and get a conviction. Of
we would likely have to disclose in open court

able to catch

monitor

to keep track of him, the various technologies used to

his activities, to intercept his

communications and the

like,

and

his friends

would

no doubt be sitting there taking careful notes. If they didn't, in reporting on the
trial, Time magazine would help the American people and al Qaeda understand
what tools the United States can use that al Qaeda needs to avoid.

me turn briefly to the issue of targeting individual

Let
that

terrorist leaders,

an issue

Some of you know this has been an
going back many, many years to my service in Viet Nam,

incorrectly described as "assassination."

is

my heart
where one of my jobs was investigating acts of terrorism and assassination. In fact,
issue close to

wrote a very long
1970.

was

1

don't think

left

classified
it

I

study called The Viet Cong Tactic of Assassination in

went anywhere. They couldn't get

behind. These are issues of interest to me.
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For

five years in the

mid-70s

I

worked

as national security adviser to a

member

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and followed both the Church and the
Pike hearings.

The Church Committee

issued a several-hundred-page report at the

end of which they concluded they could not
the world where the
pages.

Most

identify a single incident

CIA had ever assassinated anyone. That

didn't

anywhere

make the

hired by the White

House

to be the

was

intelligence

reporting directly to the President any violation of the law or of

Executive Order 12333. As most of you know, Section 2.1
I

1

Counsel to the President's Intelligence Over-

Board charged with the job of overseeing the activities of all of the

community and
and

front

surprising today!

In 1981, a few days after President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333,

sight

in

quote, "Prohibition

on

behalf of the United States

Assassination.

Government

No

shall

1

of that Order provided,

person employed by or acting on

engage in or conspire to engage in

assassination."

Now

by way of background, you may remember Frank Church being

again,

very indignant about the role of the CIA. Prior to the Church Committee coming

—Director of Central
predecessor Richard Helms— had issued

into existence,

and

his

directors

Intelligence William

Colby

internal regulations prohibiting

assassination

So

two CIA

by anyone

this issue

was not

in the

CIA.

really a

major problem. But again,

been thinking about and working on since 1974,
important

we

define

our terms.

if not

this

before.

is

an issue

I

have

And I think it is very

The Executive Order does not

define

"assassination."

Over the

years,

I

have come up with almost two dozen different definitions in

various dictionaries and legal dictionaries and the like, and in almost every instance

one word is used

—"murder." A

typical definition

der of a person by lying in wait for

is

that assassination

him and then killing him,

der of prominent people for political motives;

e.g.,

is

the "mur-

particularly the

mur-

the assassination of President

Kennedy."
I

would suggest what we

assassination, but rather

are talking about

it is

is

not murder

at all,

and thus

it is

not

the intentional targeting of terrorists as an act of self-

way eliminates a lot the very burdensome
baggage of being linked with Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy and Martin Luther
King. I think we should agree that "assassination" is wrong and ought not to be an
defense.

Approaching the subject

in that

option.

On the other hand, "self-defense" is a good thing, at least a relatively good thing
considering the alternatives. What am talking about are situations in which the
I

intentional taking of

slaughter of large

life

of one wrongdoer might be expected to prevent the

numbers of innocent people.
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force primarily against the leadership of terrorist groups

numbers of their

strategy that kills large

who

want

really

to die for their religion, although

gerness to die of some of their leaders.

Osama

foot soldiers.

You

I

difficult to deter

It is

people

my doubts about the ea-

have

will note, for

morally preferable to a

is

example,

we

haven't seen

bin Laden rushing out in front of gunships waving his arms and saying

make me a martyr."
There are numerous aspects of this issue that time simply will not permit me to
address. One thing I do want to emphasize is that in using lethal force that right is,
"please

of course, limited by the duties to avoid unnecessary suffering and to mitigate collateral

damage.

In conclusion,
is

not a game.

let

me emphasize that the war on terrorism is serious business. It

An overwhelming presumption

in favor of the terrorists

is

neither

mandated by the law or by prudent policy. If we relax our guard and tie the hands
of our leaders and our militaries, al Qaeda will be given an opportunity to kill vast
numbers of our fellow citizens. Be assured that they will take full advantage of that
opportunity.

I,

for one, will

be surprised

they don't hit us again hard before

if

November.
At the same time,

if

we

sacrifice

Osama bin Laden will have won

our

of Rights in the war on terrorism,

Bill

was apparent

a far greater victory than

as

we dug

through the rubble of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September of
2001 looking for survivors.
If we

demand unrealistic and inappropriate

standards, insisting that the

war on

terrorism be waged in federal district court by law enforcement rules, while our en-

emy

is

likely

using military weapons and tactics against our civilian population,

soon be burying large numbers of our

ties will

—and

will

the cause of civil liber-

not be served by the likely public reaction.

Preserving the rule of law

is

critically

important in our struggle against terror-

ism, but preserving the lives of our citizens

framework

set forth in the Fifth

particularly important.

They

above

liberty

also expire

because

is

Amendment

are that

also important.

we understand

it is

that

The

constitutional

establishes three values

no person

property without "due process of law." But
life

citizens

we

shall

I

be deprived of life,

not an alphabetical

when your

life is

your liberties. In the war on terrorism, these are

list.

think are
liberty

or

We cherish

taken from you so

in fact values

we have to

on the side of civil liberties, our fellow citizens may pay with their
liberties are one of the things that have distinguished this country from

balance. If we err
lives. Civil

so

much

of the world. They are cherished values

gress, the President,

armed

conflict

is

and the

UN

we have

Security Council

all

to uphold.

recognize that the law of

the appropriate paradigm in this struggle.
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makes Osama bin Laden and other

International law

targets for the intentional application of lethal force.
call.

That

Qaeda

al
is

not, in

leaders lawful

my view, a close

Thank you.

Moderator: Thank you, Professor Turner. In the interest of keeping

more

a like a debate,

I'll

give

Ken maybe two minutes

to rebut

this a little bit

and then

go to

we'll

the audience for questions.

Mr. Roth:

On the Padilla case, Bob seemed to sort of vie back and forth between a

nuclear explosion and a radiological weapon, which we

now

any event, the government

know are quite different. In

admits he wasn't going to use a radiological

weapon; he had some other bombing plan

in

mind.

him until he kills thousands of people. The alternative was quite simply to arrest him on criminal charges,
demonstrating probable cause. To do that would not have required any revelation
Be that

as

it

may, the alternative was not to

try to follow

of clandestine techniques.

An FBI agent or some other law enforcement official could have come before an
Article 3 judge and said a source has told me under the following circumstances
that

Mr. Padilla was plotting to blow up buildings. That would have been

to arrest him. Hearsay works.

You

here.

I

can speak from experience

sufficient

—personal experience

don't need eyewitness testimony to get an arrest warrant.

So you get Padilla arrested under probable cause. Then under the Speedy Trial
Act you make application for an interest of justice exclusion to delay his actual
until

such time as

court. This

is

trial

possible to produce whatever witnesses need to be brought to

it is

a doable proposition.

We should be realistic here that there were quite genuine law enforcement opBush Administration wanted to push

tions that were not pursued because the
radical theory that

Second point.

anyone they pick up

It is

I

Human Rights Watch or critics of the

that terrorism has to be fought simply through law

thought

war

is

war

rules apply. Afghanistan

some

an enemy combatant.

a red herring to say that

Bush Administration believe
enforcement agents.

is

I

made that clear at the outset:

there are times

perfectly appropriate. Indeed there are traditional battlefields
is

a perfect

declaration of the war against

Because

if it

does,

what

that

al

example of

Qaeda

justify

means very simply

is

centuries of due process protections, international

them aside.

their

that.

war

that

where

The question

rules

clearly

is:

does

around the world.

we have taken

human

when

rights

a couple of

law and constitu-

means that governments, simply by declaring someone
an enemy combatant can, without any evidence, lock that person up for forever.
That is a radical notion, but that is what the global application of war rules entails.
tions,

and

set

It
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You should be very reluctant to do that. We should insist that war rules be applied
only in circumstances when there is some level of actual armed conflict. We should
not be handing out this extraordinary power that essentially obliterates our

civil

Thank you.

rights.

Question and Answer Period
Question: Professor Turner, you mentioned the Joint Congressional Resolution.
think

it is

important to assess the scope of that Resolution in

ute, Title 18

light

of another

I

stat-

USC § 4001 A, known as the Non-detention Act that Congress passed,

about 35 years ago. That statute said the government can't detain a United States
citizen

even for offenses

Joint Resolution

and

like

that statute together to provide that

are subject to procedural safeguards like judicial review

right to counsel?

a

good question. I have not spent a lot of time looking at

and I don't have

a

complete answer to

be, but this

very

is

much

a lay opinion, that

armed

conflict settings,

but

I

don't

it. I

think perhaps an answer might

what Congress

American judicial process or domestic law and
tional

and

is

Professor Turner: That
that issue

we at least read the
any enemy combatants

espionage or sabotage. Shouldn't

is

talking about

is

the

that an exception exists in interna-

know if that

is

the answer.

To the extent the President has independent power to do this, the question then
becomes can Congress take away that power even by statute. I would argue, despite
separation of powers in
ity to

do some things

derived right.

that can effectively

You don't amend the

purporting to
I

many areas, the President does have constitutional author-

tell

will just give

the President he

to a taking

away of a

must do thus and

pushed through

move

statutorily

Constitution by a statute that Congress passes
so.

you one example. Bob Dole, when he was running

against Bill Clinton,

President had to

amount

a statutory

for President

amendment that provided that the

the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

I

can't

imagine why, in an election year, he'd want to be bothered with something
that,

but he seemed to think

it

had some

benefit.

The Supreme Court has

like

deter-

mined that the decision as to where to site an embassy is part of the decision on
what government is to be recognized as the lawful government of a foreign sovereign, and thus an act of Congress trying to usurp power that clearly belongs to the
President is null and void.
I

think a case can also be made, particularly after Congress has authorized use

of lethal force

—has authorized war—

cannot be limited by
its

statute,

that the President has certain powers that

and the best way to interpret the

reading so as not to infringe

upon

the President's power.
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This

is

really

an off-the-cuff response to your question.

It is

Maybe somebody else has a better answer to it. Another option
be

right. It is

an issue that needs to be

Court took these three

cases.

I

raised.

think that

it is

dents that there were one and arguably two

were

US

persons.

concluded

at least

I

I

is

was delighted

fairly clear

a

good question.

that

you may well

that the

from the

Supreme

existing prece-

German soldiers in the Quirin case who

think two of them claimed citizenship and

I

believe the

one was an American. But the Court said when a

Court

US citizen joins

armed forces of the enemy he becomes subject to the same consequences that
enemy soldiers face. It seems to me that principle governs until the Supreme Court
decides otherwise. But I am delighted it is considering these cases and I look forward to reading the opinions when they come out.
the

Question:

First, a

comment. Both

speakers, by desperately trying to keep within

the confines of current international law, are contributing to the undermining of
basic principles of the law of armed conflict.

As we have been discussing through-

out the conference, the ultimate legal justification to target and

which I agree

is

not assassination,

ing terrorism does not

fall

is

based on the right of self-defense. Yet combat-

within the traditional definitions of either international

or non-international armed conflict. Obviously

combated under the

right of self-defense

and

I

agree that terrorism

which

it

initially to regulate

must be

that the use of military force

must be

armed

conflict,

part of that effort, but rather than attempting to apply the law of

which was developed

kill terrorists,

wars between

States, in

circumstances for

was not intended, the focus should be on the development of a new

legal

regime governing what can be done to address the threat of terrorism.

When we

attempt to apply the law of armed conflict to the conflict between

and non-State

States

law of armed conflict

actors,

—the

we

principle of reciprocal rights

States in a truly international
that, raises

since

Mr. Roth: I'm not
Take

armed

is

not a

entirely sure

I

The "war on

terror," if

State.

I

may

call

it

Thank you.

much of the law of
among governments.

understand the point. There

conflict that isn't entirely

Common

dependent on reciprocity

is

Article 3. In this case we're dealing with an internationalized, but

not an intergovernmental conflict.

view that Article 3 only applies to
sition.

conflict.

and obligations between

novel issues that simply defy analysis under the law of armed conflict

one party to that war

armed

are shaking the very fundamental principle of the

There's no reason

why it

I

know

civil

the Bush Administration

wars, but

I

don't

is

taking the

know the basis for that po-

can't apply across borders as well.

Nobody challenges that. But does
that right allow you to use war methods every place or is there some kind of limit to
Yes, of course, there's the right of self-defense.

411

Debating the Issues

You can certainly launch a war wherever you want. Once it looks like a real
war we know that classic war rules apply. But can you go into a country and when
that?

means declare a war for that five minutes it takes to detain them and pull them out as enemy combatants? I don't think
so. That kind of playing games with war rules is the problem.
you

fail

to arrest the people through judicial

Professor Turner:
It

I

agree with most of the points you

me when

seems to

the Security Council and the

made as I understood them.

US

Congress have authorized

measures of self-defense that you have the option of resorting to law enforcement,
but since both the Security Council and Congress clearly identified

al

Qaeda

as the

source of the attacks, you can engage in self-defense actions against individual

members of al Qaeda. Should you decide initially to arrest them and then change
your mind and decide you would rather use a law of armed conflict approach, I
don't have a problem with that.

To me

you can't arrest someone who you
honestly believe to be an enemy combatant and hold them in detention. If that is
the case, it would seem to follow with a lot more force that you obviously can't

make

it is

unjust to

tell

a decision to shoot

them.

If

the President that

them or

can't order a cruise missile strike vice arresting

we're going to apply law enforcement rules, presumably every soldier

needs to be told before you take a shot
ing a

rifle at

you, you need to

Supreme Court,

first

take

at that

guy on the other

him back to

to obtain a ruling that there

is

side

who's point-

the 9th Circuit, perhaps to the

no doubt about

this person's

identity.

By the same logic that says the President is allowed to authorize a private (hopefully through a general, a colonel and maybe a lieutenant) to kill a suspected enemy
combatant, it would seem to follow that they could also detain him under the rules
of the law of armed conflict.

Comment

(Audience Member):

due categorization.

I

would

I

too share the fears of the questioner about un-

like to

make

a

comment about

the

war on

terror. In

March 2004, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations made a very important general comment, General Comment Number 31. It states that international humanitarian law

question of either/or.

and human

Now,

if

we

rights

law are complementary.

are faced with a

war on

terror

and

It's

this

war

will

never end, a war in which there will never be a ceasefire or a peace treaty,

ally

have to rethink the interaction between

conflict.

I

believe that's something

the subject of a conference in

its

right.
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Question: Mr. Roth, you talked about the troublesome hypothesis of the govern-

ment shooting Mr.

Padilla

upon his arrival at O'Hare Airport.

pothetical slightly. Say he vaulted over his
into a taxi.

What

go.

loss

if

change that hy-

would-be captors and was about

The law enforcement choice would have been

to kill

him or

to step

him

to let

your solution to that situation?

is

Mr. Roth: Well, under
force

Let's

you

are a cop

classic

law enforcement rules you are allowed to use lethal

on the beat and

it's

necessary to stop an imminent threat of

of life or serious bodily injury.

Now my understanding of Padilla
imminent threat. In
the hypothetical a

can shoot him.

that case, a

little bit, if

mere

he's

You do not need

But in a situation

like this

is

was nowhere near posing such an

that he

fleeing suspect

If you

cannot be shot.

change

about to go and plant the bomb, of course you

international humanitarian law to

where there

is

a sole operator

do

that.

and you have everybody

him and an available judicial system, there is no reason why you shouldn't
use law enforcement rules. The danger of allowing war rules is that it potentially

tracking

applies to

all

of us.

Professor Turner: There
thority to take

war. Just as

a reason

is

we authorized the President to delegate the au-

human life without a judicial hearing. It has to do with the nature of

we authorized the President to fight a war against al Qaeda, if the PresiI

am

know what

the

dent really wanted to order a cruise missile to be launched against one of us,

not sure what formal check on his authority would prevent
aftereffects

know

the

of that will be.

know the American

I

less

I

people will be outraged over

American Congress would be outraged over

system that are

When

I

that.

it.

There are checks

in

it. I

our

formal.

spoke recently in Munich,

I

made

the point that

if

the United States,

which has this unchecked military power, uses that power in an aggressive manner,
the

American people

Nam,

aren't going to tolerate

they will stop the war on terrorism

it.

Just as they stopped the

if they

war

in Viet

conclude, rightly or wrongly, that

violations are going on.

There are lots of quieter checks
missile at

if the

President were to give an order to launch a

John Kerry's home. You would have

mand presumably

lots

of people in that chain of com-

resigning, going public, doing whatever

was necessary

to pre-

vent that from happening. But the difference between that situation and a situation

where you say a
conflict

is

federal district court has to authorize the taking of

life

in

armed

tremendous.

The President has to be able
decision is made to shoot Mr.

means a
decision with which some

to protect the nation to save lives. If that
Padilla, that
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would

And, of course,

disagree.

it

would be

a particularly unfortunate decision if

Mr. Padilla or someone similarly situated turns out to be an innocent person.
But the consequences of the alternative, the alternative of saying you can't take

human

someone of due process or personal liberty, are far
greater. Do you want the President to be able to authorize the US armed forces to
take the lives of people that they have strong reason to believe are al Qaeda operatives? I think most of us want him to be able to do that. To those who argue that it is
permissible to shoot al Qaeda members but they can't be detained, I say there is a
life,

you

can't deprive

disconnect in the logic that

I

can't understand.

Question: Mr. Roth has referred, on a couple of occasions, to the question of the
application or characterization of a
a state of

war

exists.

We

war zone on

have an adversary

through the use of armed

force.

That

a global scale.

who

is

pursuing a

what distinguishes

is

would suggest that

I

this

set

of policy aims

from metaphorical

on drugs or the war on poverty. In terms of the place of execution, or the battlefield as it were in which that war is executed, one of the things that

wars, like the war

we teach

Naval

at the

War College is that the enemy gets a vote. Al Qaeda has cho-

sen the battlefield of the world and the nontraditional battlefield of soft targets

worldwide. The choice

do we
not.

fight back,

To

which

is

theirs,

do we engage

get to the question,

very

real,

do we protect our
while

is

still

I

not ours. The choice that

in a

ours

war that has been declared

would

against us, or

do we

is

almost unprecedented, of how

and how do we protect the values of our culture

me say it's not so easy to distinguish the war on drugs. It's worth tak-

ing that analogy seriously because there too

chosen a global

you have clandestine groups

battlefield, routinely use violence,

ple than terrorism does. Nonetheless

and

kill

we have chosen to keep

it

a metaphorical

we understand the consequences of not doing so would be
type of democracy in which we live.

Similarly, al

Qaeda has chosen

should we respond?

tional military

means

If

to use violence worldwide.

we choose

as in Afghanistan,

sponding elsewhere, such

as in

to

respond with

that have

many, many more peo-

because

How

do we respond,

fighting in that battlespace.

Mr. Roth: Let

the

is

prefer to see the panelists address the issue,

of given that situation, which
civil liberties

is

I

war

devastating for

don't doubt that.

lethal force using tradi-

then war rules apply. But should we be

Hamburg,

as if it's a

war?

I

re-

think to do so would be

devastating.

we need to draw those lines establishing that in some instances the use of
military force operating under the law of armed conflict is the appropriate response, but in other instances law enforcement means should be used. As a matter
I

think
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of policy
the war

—and of prudence—
global, because the

is

center of our society

Comment

I

would

is

would be quite

what

I

it

would be

consequences for the

(Audience Member):

lenge and that

argue,

If I

a mistake to

civil rights that

respond as

we view

if

as the

severe.

may, just one follow-on comment.

It is

a chal-

am asking you to try to respond to. It is a war and it is global

because there are policy objectives being pursued by our adversary through the use
of armed force. The drug lords don't have policy objectives. They have profit objectives.

that

That

is,

is

part of the distinction that defines

in fact, occurring

on

a global battlefield.

war and makes

this a state

of war

We can't change that. What we can

change or what we can address, and hopefully will,

is

how to protect our freedoms

while fighting on the battlefield that they have chosen.

Mr. Roth: The
profit. Yes, al

profit

Qaeda

motive
is

is

not the distinction. Saddam invaded Kuwait for

using violent means. As a matter of policy that

is

what

it's

we should respond. We should be very
selective in how we apply war rules. In some instances, the option of law enforcement means should be preferred because that is more likely to produce the kind of
society that we desire.
doing. That

still

begs the question of how

Under our constitutional system, the President has been given a
great deal of unchecked power. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall
Professor Turner:

wrote that certain matters, which are of a

political character, are

confided to the

President's discretion. But he said these things affect the nation, not individual
rights,

and

that Congress has the primary responsibilities for preservation of indi-

By passing the equivalent of a declaration of war, Congress decided
that the United States may use lethal force against al Qaeda and other terrorists
wherever they may be found. If we find them in Germany, however, we don't
launch cruise missiles into Germany.
Let me raise a more fundamental question about human rights because some
feel, since 9/11, that I've become the poster boy for government repression because
I've sat on so many panels addressing the issues that have been discussed at this
conference. I'm convinced that if the American people become really scared,
they're going to make a decision to demand lessening restraints on the use of force
and more limitations on civil liberties.
I will give you one example to think about. Go back 62 years to a decision made
vidual rights.

by President Roosevelt. Of all of our presidents there are very few that had
record in

civil liberties

and humanitarian

issues.

a better

Yet President Roosevelt issued an

order to arrest, to apprehend, and to detain thousands of American nationals, most
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of them

US citizens and many of them native-born Americans. Most of them were

not even suspected of the slightest wrongdoing. These thousands of our fellow citi-

many respects, the equivalent of
killed when they arrived.

zens were sent to detention camps, which were, in

concentration camps except folks were not

These people were quite properly outraged. They applied for release to the federal courts.

act? Earl

Who argued the case before the courts that this detention was a lawful

Warren, then the Attorney General of California,

Justice of the

United

States.

dential authority because

threatened.

The

it

who later became Chief

He argued that the order was a proper exercise of presiwas believed that the security of the United

case finally

made

its

way

to the

Supreme Court on

Court unanimously upheld President Roosevelt's order.

States

appeal.

was

The

Who was the justice who

Hugo Black. There probably has never been
a finer civil libertarian in the history of the US Supreme Court and yet he, like President Roosevelt, was afraid. In that fear they sacrificed the human rights, the civil

wrote the opinion in that case? Justice

liberties,

of tens of thousands of innocent people.

Now, one reason

that

I

favor reasonable measures, even understanding they

may involve the unjust detention of a few innocent people, is because I understand
if the

fundamental responsibility of protecting the lives of our people

out, the

demand

for casting aside the Bill of Rights

is

is

not carried

going to be overwhelming.

We saw that in 1942. We will see that in 2004, 2005, or 2006, if we don't continue an
effective

war against terrorism.

The thought of losing our civil liberties terrifies me, but if you look at public
opinion polls, the American public will support it. We must preserve our lives if
we're going to preserve our liberties. Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you Mr. Roth and Professor Turner for your insightful discussion of very important issues.

As

is

often the case in discussions such as this, one

doesn't necessarily reach specific conclusions, but the dialogue
outlining those things that

must be considered
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is

very helpful in

in reaching those conclusions.
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